Natasha Hausdorff — Argument Map

Hausdorff is a barrister and director of the Centre for International Rule of Law (UK Lawyers for Israel’s policy arm). Roughly twenty distinct arguments appear in the interview. They fall into six clusters. For each: the claim, the support she actually offers, and what the documentary record shows.

Internal dating: she discusses the UN Commission of Inquiry children’s report (23 June 2026), the CPJ database review (25 June 2026), the Israel–Lebanon framework agreement (26 June 2026), and Karim Khan’s Bar Standards Board suspension (19 June 2026). The interview therefore post-dates late June 2026.

The master frame: inversion

Nearly every specific argument in the interview is an application of one structural claim: that allegations against Israel are projections of documented Hamas conduct. Sexual violence, child-killing, and journalist-targeting were perpetrated by Hamas on and after 7 October, and are now, she argues, being attributed to the victims. If the inversion thesis holds, each downstream allegation inherits a presumption of bad faith. If it does not hold, each allegation has to be assessed on its own evidence. This is the load-bearing move in the entire interview, and it is asserted rather than demonstrated.

Cluster 1 — The two UN reports

1.1 The allegations are a modern blood libel

Claim. The child-targeting allegation is “reminiscent of the ancient blood libel,” because in medieval times Jews were accused of killing Christian children to use their blood.

Support offered. Historical analogy only. She says “the parallels write themselves.”

Assessment. The historical premise is accurate — the blood libel is a documented medieval accusation. But the analogy is doing rhetorical rather than evidentiary work: the medieval libel was ritual murder for blood, whereas the COI alleges military conduct in an armed conflict. The argument establishes why the allegation is inflammatory, not whether it is false. Note that this rhetorical framing is contested from the other direction as well: critics argue that invoking the blood libel functions to make the allegation unexaminable.

1.2 The timing was engineered

Claim. The spike in sexual-violence allegations against Israel was timed to blunt the release of the Civil Commission report (led by Cochav Elkayam-Levy) documenting Hamas sexual violence on 7 October — two years of work, tens of thousands of hours of footage, eyewitness testimony.

Support offered. Temporal correlation. No mechanism, no actor named as coordinating the timing.

Assessment. This is a post hoc ergo propter hoc inference. The Secretary-General’s Conflict-Related Sexual Violence report is an annual document with a fixed reporting cycle; the 2026 edition covers calendar year 2025 and was released in late May 2026. Its listing decision followed an explicit warning in the 2025 report that Israel could be added. The timing is therefore explicable without coordination.

1.3 Too few instances to call it “institutional”

This is Whitman’s framing, which Hausdorff accepts rather than argues.

The underlying record. The 2026 Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence, covering 2025, stated that the UN had verified 13 instances of sexual violence against Palestinians by Israeli forces in 2025, plus 18 cases in 2023 and 2024, with victims comprising 14 men, seven women, nine boys and one girl from Gaza or the West Bank; alleged perpetrators included the IDF, the Israel Prison Service and the Israeli police, with violations recorded in prisons, West Bank checkpoints and the Gush Etzion police station. The listed violations included rape including with objects, gang rape, attempted rape, violence to the genitals, targeted shooting of genitals, strip and cavity searches without apparent security justification, forced nudity and threats of rape.

The counting objection misstates the listing criterion

The annex is a “List of Parties Credibly Suspected of Committing or Being Responsible for Patterns of Rape or Other Forms of Sexual Violence.” The threshold is a pattern, and the report’s own reasoning turns partly on non-cooperation and impunity rather than raw case volume. Pramila Patten, who authored the report, told reporters she had received no information on measures taken by the Israeli government to implement preventive measures. The report also noted that five reserve soldiers were indicted in February 2025 over the Sde Teiman assault, that no sexual violence or rape charge appeared in the indictment despite video and medical evidence, and that in March 2026 all charges were dropped. Israel’s counter-position is equally on the record: Ambassador Danny Danon said Israel had done its utmost to comply with the steps Guterres outlined the previous year — directives against sexual violence, enforcement and disciplinary systems, investigation of credible complaints, and UN access for monitoring. The dispute is about access and remediation, not just arithmetic. An argument that only addresses case counts does not reach the actual listing rationale.

1.4 The COI report is Hamas propaganda laundered through NGOs

Claim. The chain runs: anonymous testimony from a Hamas-controlled ecosystem → Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch → the Commission of Inquiry. Her specific evidentiary point: Amnesty’s methodology section conceded it had no people on the ground and relied on “local government authorities,” which she says is code for Hamas.

Assessment. This is her strongest methodological argument and it deserves engagement on the merits rather than dismissal — access restriction in Gaza is real and does degrade verification. But three things weaken it as stated.

She does not name the Amnesty report or quote the methodology passage, so it cannot be checked from the interview alone. Worth pulling directly if you want to use this.
The COI report is not solely testimony-driven. Airwars documentation and analysis was cited throughout the report, including its “Patterns of Harm” analysis on high child casualties within the same family unit. Airwars is an open-source incident-documentation body, not a testimony aggregator.
Access denial cuts both ways as an argument. CPJ has stated that in-person verification by researchers from outside Gaza has been impossible since the start of the war because Israel has refused access to the territory. If restricted access discredits findings, it also discredits the party restricting access from complaining about method.

What the report actually says, for the file: the Commission found that Israeli authorities and security forces deliberately targeted Palestinian children resulting in genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Gaza and war crimes in the West Bank, with chair Srinivasan Muralidhar stating that the evidence shows Palestinian children have been deliberately targeted and killed, and that children continued to be killed after the October 2025 ceasefire. This is only the second time in the history of a UN Commission of Inquiry that a dedicated report has focused specifically on violations against children.

Cluster 2 — Specific atrocity allegations

2.1 The Kristof dog allegation

Claim. The New York Times published, and still stands by, an allegation that Israelis used dogs to rape Palestinian detainees; it has been discredited by dog-handling experts and has no corroborating evidence; it originated in NGOs with Hamas links.

Verification — this is her best-supported specific claim. Kristof’s column detailed the account of an unnamed Gaza journalist who said guards summoned a dog while he was imprisoned in 2024. Israel rejected all allegations in the column, which drew condemnation from Jewish groups describing it as a modern-day blood libel. The New York Times stood behind the column, saying it reflected rigorous reporting and standards. James Crosby, a retired police lieutenant and canine aggression expert affiliated with Harvard’s Canine Brain Project, told JTA the allegations seemed implausible if not impossible. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, which amplified the dog claim, was also a key source for the report; Netanyahu said he had instructed legal advisers to consider action against the Times and Kristof.

Where her summary overreaches

She treats the dog allegation as standing in for the whole column. It does not. Kristof himself wrote that there is no evidence Israeli leaders order rapes, and relied on conversations with 14 individuals who said they had been sexually assaulted by Israeli settlers or security forces. Some Jewish critics of the column emphasised that they found the broad allegation of abuse in Israeli prisons plausible and deserving of scrutiny, pointing to statements by Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has overseen the Israel Prison Service since late 2022. Discrediting the most lurid specific claim does not dispose of the general one, and the Sde Teiman indictments and their March 2026 dismissal sit inside the general one.

Source-tracing: HonestReporting’s Sep 2026 thread compares the Euro-Med, PCHR, MEE, Anadolu, and UN-letter accounts side by side. That supports her claim that the testimony was filtered through NGOs. → Kristof Dog-Rape Column - HonestReporting Sourcing Thread

2.2 The British doctor and the quadcopter

Claim. A British volunteer doctor told a UK parliamentary hearing he had seen children with gunshot wounds he “knew” came from Israeli quadcopters shooting them in the head. He had not witnessed any shooting, had not seen a quadcopter capable of firing a bullet, and the testimony went unchallenged. Quadcopters surveil and can drop munitions; firing an aimed bullet is a different order of technical capability.

Support offered. Structure of the testimony itself — the epistemic gap between “children arrived with head wounds” and “quadcopters shot them.”

Assessment. The logical point is clean and is the sharpest analytical move she makes in the interview: it identifies hearsay presented as observation. Two caveats. She does not name the doctor or the hearing, so it is unverifiable as delivered. And the technical claim is an assertion of her own, not sourced — armed small UAS platforms exist, and whether a specific system was deployed is an empirical question rather than a categorical one. Treat the epistemological point as strong and the technical point as unsupported pending sourcing.

2.3 Hamas shoots Palestinian civilians, including children

Claim. Hamas shot civilians fleeing under Israeli evacuation instructions, and shot civilians approaching GHF aid sites because that distribution threatened its control over aid. Americans confirmed this on verified footage.

Assessment. The general claim that Hamas has used lethal force against Gazan civilians is well documented across the war. The specific attributions here are unsourced in the interview. And the GHF point is one-sided: aid-site shootings were also and repeatedly attributed to Israeli fire. The GHF was plagued by near-daily shooting incidents that saw hundreds killed as they tried to reach its distribution centres. Presenting the site deaths as Hamas conduct alone is not sustainable on the record.

2.4 The 90 percent aid diversion figure

Claim. “Even the UN acknowledged that about 90% of the aid on occasion was being diverted, or over 90% on occasion — was being diverted by Hamas, was being stolen.”

This is the least defensible factual claim in the interview

The number exists, but not with the attribution she gives it. UNOPS published data showing that between the 19 May 2025 resumption of deliveries and 5 August, 2,604 aid trucks were collected by the UN and 2,309 did not reach their intended destinations, because trucks were “intercepted either peacefully by hungry people or forcefully by armed actors during transit in Gaza” — 88% of all trucks. The category is interception, and the UN’s own attribution is the opposite of hers: a UN employee said the vast majority of the looting was carried out by hungry Gazans rather than armed gangs, attributing it to long-standing restrictions on aid entry creating an environment in which convoys were offloaded directly by starving people; the IDF’s own intelligence-based estimate, reported by Reuters on 25 July, was that Hamas diverted up to 25 percent of aid supplies. A USAID report of 25 July 2025 concluded the agency had found no evidence of widespread Hamas theft of US-funded aid, based on analysis of 156 incidents between October 2023 and May 2025.

So: ~88% intercepted is real and citable; “~90% diverted by Hamas” is not. If you use this material, cite the UNOPS dashboard figure with its actual definition and note Israel’s own 25% estimate. The overstatement is the kind of thing that costs an otherwise strong argument its credibility in debate.

2.5 Journalist casualty lists included combatants

Claim. Press-freedom organisations are quietly removing names from lists of journalists killed because they were not journalists or were members of terrorist organisations, and no one reports the removals.

Verification — substantially accurate, with the numbers she omits. CPJ announced on 25 June 2026 that it was conducting a full review of its database after Hamas and PIJ published obituaries identifying as combatants individuals previously listed as journalists. It removed eight names because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants, and a further 12 for other reasons. As of that date its total stood at 209 journalists or media workers documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention since 7 October 2023. The Times of Israel reported that at its peak CPJ’s list held 276 names across Yemen, Lebanon, Iran and Gaza, down to 259 by 22 June, and that CPJ had been quietly removing names in preceding weeks.

Proportionality caveat. Eight combatant removals against a remaining total of 209 is roughly 4 percent. Her framing (“we’ll see how many of them they quietly take off the books”) implies a much larger correction is coming; that is a prediction, not a finding. CPJ’s stated position is that it never includes anyone with evidence of engaging in combat or inciting imminent violence, consistent with IHL treating journalists affiliated with non-state actors as civilians provided they do not directly participate in hostilities. Note also that the removals are contested from within: CPJ has confirmed it is reviewing the status of at least four individuals whose names were removed, amid objections from current and former insiders.

Official dossier. IDF Press Files dossier records the IDF’s 170 individual allegations and compares them with CPJ’s completed 2026 review. It is the fullest version of her claim, and also an interested party’s case: many stated sources (intelligence, field documents, interrogations) cannot be checked independently, and 170 is the IDF’s count, not a CPJ or third-party finding. Cross-check individual names against CPJ’s case findings, armed-group records, and contrary evidence before citing.

Cluster 3 — The ICC and lawfare

3.1 The publicity anomaly

Claim. ICC arrest warrants are normally sought and issued in confidence, precisely so targets can be picked up when they travel. Khan applied publicly — press release, press conference, an interview with Christiane Amanpour. That deviation reveals political purpose.

Assessment. The procedural premise is correct as a general practice, and the inference from deviation to motive is at least a reasonable inference to raise. The counter-explanation is equally available: the Palestine situation was already public, the OTP had an institutional interest in transparency for a case involving a sitting head of government of a non-party state, and prior warrants against Putin were also publicised. Deviation from norm establishes that a choice was made, not what motivated it.

3.2 The rehabilitation motive

Claim. The 2020 Independent Expert Review destroyed the court’s reputation — one successful prosecution in ten years at a cost of nearly a billion dollars, an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, a dysfunctional and in many respects corrupt judiciary, and in its second decade an exclusive focus on African defendants that drew accusations of racism. Going after Israel was the fastest route to rehabilitation with an international community that loathes Israel’s leaders.

Verification of the IER characterisation — largely accurate on culture, wrong on the numbers. The IER was carried out by nine experts chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone, reported in September 2020, and made 384 recommendations, cataloguing observations about workplace culture — fear, bullying and harassment among staff — organisational structure, the quality and consistency of judicial reasoning, and lack of strategic planning. It found that the working environment in Chambers had been affected by instances of harassment and bullying by some judges, insufficiently tackled partly due to the perceived unaccountability of judges, and described an approach of self-perceived aristocracy from some judges treating staff as commoners. It also found a liquidity crisis, with unpaid member-state contributions exceeding €70 million, equivalent to 47 percent of the 2020 budget.

Two numerical errors worth correcting before reuse

On convictions: the OTP had achieved five convictions for core crimes in the fifteen years since the first arrest warrants were issued, and critiques typically began with the dearth of convictions for atrocity crimes — four — in the eighteen years since the court began operating in 2002. Not one. The “one prosecution, nearly a billion dollars” formulation is a compressed version of a real critique, but it is not what the record says.

On Africa: the exclusive-Africa criticism attaches to the court’s first decade. By its second decade the OTP had opened situations in Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Afghanistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Venezuela and Ukraine. Her chronology is inverted.

3.3 The jurisdiction argument

Claim. Fatou Bensouda opened the Palestine investigation “without jurisdiction”; the court was operating “entirely outside of its powers.”

Assessment. Stated as settled fact; it is not. It is a contested legal position, resting principally on the argument that Palestine is not a state capable of delegating criminal jurisdiction, and that the Oslo Accords withheld from the PA any jurisdiction over Israeli nationals which it could then delegate. The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected this in its February 2021 ruling. Her position is respectable and widely held among a certain body of scholars and by several states; presenting it as though no reasonable lawyer disagrees is the weakest habit in her presentation, and it recurs.

3.4 The burden-of-proof inversion

Claim. In October 2023 Khan said Hamas’s alleged crimes would have to be investigated and that Israel would have to prove it was complying with IHL, repeating this in Cairo. This inverts the first principle taught in week one of any criminal law course: the burden lies on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Assessment. The legal principle she invokes is correct and the rhetorical criticism lands if the quotation is exact. The available defence of Khan is that his remarks concerned complementarity — a state party or affected state demonstrating that it is genuinely investigating, which is a burden on the state under Article 17 — rather than the trial burden of proof. She does not address that reading. If you deploy this argument, source the exact wording of both statements first; the whole point turns on it.

3.5 The starvation charge is factually false

Claim. COGAT’s published data on aid facilitated into Gaza disposes of the starvation allegation. UKLFI submitted to the court that every sentence of Khan’s public summary was false. Khan’s response was to tell the court to disregard any submissions on accuracy not coming from him. Because this was an ex parte application, his duty as a barrister was to advance the defence case and disclose exculpatory material, and he did the opposite.

Verification of the professional-conduct sequence — accurate. UKLFI reported Khan and his assistant Andrew Cayley KC, both English barristers, to the Bar Standards Board for failure to comply with the duty not to mislead the court, after providing detailed concerns in a letter and annexes of 27 August 2024 and receiving no reply. Its letter stated that the Prosecutor had asked the court to ignore any information or evidence other than the material originally filed. UKLFI argued that if Khan’s public statement was a fair summary of the applications he was not acting with candour, and that if it was not a fair summary it would be additionally misleading; it also invoked Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute requiring the prosecutor to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.

The causal chain she implies is false

She says the UKLFI complaint “has now in fact suspended Karim Khan.” It did not. The Bar Standards Board suspended Khan following the ICC oversight body’s finding of serious misconduct over accusations of an inappropriate relationship with a female staff member, after a UN report accused him of nonconsensual sexual contact with an aide. Khan’s lawyers said the BSB decision was based on the finding by the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties. He was suspended by the ICC’s governing body on 8 June 2026, denies the allegations, and lost an appeal to lift the BSB suspension on 14 July 2026. The 2024 UKLFI complaint about misleading the court is real and pending; the June 2026 suspension is a separate matter on unrelated grounds. Conflating them is a serious accuracy problem, and it is the correction most likely to be used against anyone repeating her version. Note also that a panel of three judges reportedly submitted a confidential report to the ASP Bureau on 9 March 2026 clearing Khan of wrongdoing, before the Bureau’s June action — the procedural history is messier than either side’s summary.

3.6 Head-of-state immunity makes enforcement unlawful

Claim. Enforcement of the warrants is effectively impossible because arresting Netanyahu would violate customary international law on official and diplomatic immunity — one of the most basic mechanisms of interstate relations. Israel is not an ICC state party and has not waived those protections, as state parties do.

Assessment. This is the interview’s most substantive legal argument and it is genuinely contested rather than simply right or wrong.

For her position: Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute bars the court from requesting surrender that would require a state to act inconsistently with its obligations regarding the immunity of a third state. The ICJ’s Arrest Warrant judgment (DRC v Belgium, 2002) affirmed personal immunity of serving senior officials before foreign national courts.
Against it: Article 27 removes official capacity as a bar. The ICC Appeals Chamber held in Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir (2019) that head-of-state immunity does not apply before international courts, and does not bar states parties from executing an ICC warrant even against a non-party’s head of state. That is binding within the ICC system, whatever its critics say of the reasoning.

Her presentation gives no hint that Al-Bashir exists. That is the single largest omission in the interview.

3.7 The UK never actually said it would arrest Netanyahu

Claim. Number 10 said only that the UK would comply with international law; the press read that as an arrest commitment, but given binding customary immunity the statement means the opposite.

Assessment. Fair as a caution against press paraphrase. But it is an inference resting entirely on 3.6 being correct — if Al-Bashir governs, “comply with international law” points toward arrest. Whitman’s rebuttal is the practical one and she partly concedes it: Netanyahu has not travelled to these countries and reportedly routed his aircraft to avoid certain European airspace. Her answer — prudence, abundance of caution, distinguish political rhetoric from legal obligation — is honest but concedes that the warrants have real operational effect regardless of their legal merit.

3.8 Antisemitism drives rather than merely assists the lawfare

Claim. Rising antisemitism does not just make the warrants more effective; it is the motive force. The court sought relevance through a target the international community would applaud.

Assessment. Unfalsifiable as stated. It also proves too much: the same court simultaneously pursued Putin, Duterte and Sudanese defendants, and is under US sanctions for the Israel investigations — which cuts against the theory that targeting Israel is the reputationally cheap option. A diplomatic official told AP that a number of countries are convinced the misconduct allegations against Khan are an attempt to stop the court’s investigation into Israel. That is the mirror-image conspiracy theory, and it illustrates the problem: motive-attribution arguments are cheap in both directions and neither side’s version is testable.

Cluster 4 — Lebanon and Iran

4.1 Bilateral agreements are a primary source of international law

Claim. The Lebanon agreement matters “hugely” because international law is made in two principal ways: customary international law developed over time and binding generally, and agreements between sovereigns, bilateral or multilateral.

Assessment. Correct and uncontroversial — this tracks Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. The best-grounded legal statement in the interview.

4.2 What the agreement actually says

Her characterisation, and Whitman’s premise, both need correcting against the text.

On 26 June 2026, at the conclusion of the fifth round of direct negotiations in the United States, the ambassadors of Lebanon and Israel signed a framework agreement in the presence of the Secretary of State. Its main provisions are mutual recognition by each state of the other’s sovereignty and a commitment to continue negotiations to end the state of war and establish peace; gradual Israeli withdrawal from pilot areas in south Lebanon into which the Lebanese army will enter to dismantle all non-state armed groups; and completion of IDF withdrawal only after official verification that the groups and their infrastructure have been dismantled. Hezbollah and its allies rejected the agreement outright as surrender.

Two corrections:

Whitman says Lebanon recognised Israel “as a Jewish state.” The text is mutual recognition of sovereignty. Hausdorff does not correct him and then builds on the premise.
She says the relevant content is in a secret annex under press embargo, so “we don’t entirely know the extent.” That was overtaken almost immediately. The security annex, not publicly released with the rest of the text, was published by Asharq Bloomberg, and its veracity was confirmed to The Times of Israel by two officials familiar with the matter; it is accompanied by a map of the two pilot zones from which Israel agreed to withdraw.

4.3 The only occupying force in Lebanon is Hezbollah

Claim. In a “true sense,” the only occupying force in Lebanon is Hezbollah — a hostile force the Lebanese government and people want rid of but lack the capability to remove.

Assessment. This is rhetoric with a legal word doing non-legal work. Belligerent occupation is a defined status under the Hague Regulations and Geneva IV, applying to foreign armed forces exercising effective control over territory. Hezbollah is a domestic Lebanese actor; it can be an armed group usurping state authority, which is a real and serious thing, but that is not occupation as the term of art. Meanwhile Israel entered Lebanon in a March 2026 ground operation and holds a security zone in the south — which is the situation the framework agreement is structured to unwind through phased, verified withdrawal. Whether that constitutes occupation is precisely the contested question she defines away.

The consent point she wants is available without the wordplay, and it is a good one: a host state’s consent to foreign military presence changes the legal analysis, and the framework agreement supplies exactly that.

4.4 The Nawaf Salam irony

Claim. Lebanon’s current prime minister is the former president of the International Court of Justice who led the charge against Israel at the ICJ, and before that was Lebanon’s UN ambassador accusing Israel of war crimes and of being a terror state — and he is now part of the government recognising Israel as a state.

Assessment. Accurate on the biography. Salam presided over the ICJ during the South Africa v Israel provisional measures phase and became prime minister in January 2025. As an argument it is ad hominem tu quoque: a person changing position under changed circumstances says nothing about whether either position was correct. Effective rhetorically, worthless analytically.

4.5 No contradiction between the Lebanon deal and the US–Iran MOU

Claim. The MOU is broader, more nebulous, and interim rather than a done deal. The contradiction is not between the two texts but between the MOU and Hezbollah’s continued conduct as an Iranian proxy.

Assessment. Reasonable framing, and the interim characterisation is right. But it insulates the MOU from evaluation: if continued hostilities are always the proxy’s fault rather than the agreement’s design flaw, the agreement cannot fail on its own terms. She also asserts other Iranian breaches without specifying any.

4.6 The Iran strikes: no jus ad bellum question arises

Claim — the interview’s most consequential legal argument. There has been a continuous armed conflict between Israel and Iran, never ended by peace agreement or even ceasefire, and arguably between Iran and the US. Therefore the strikes are not a “resort to force,” not a reprisal, and not the starting of a war. The only question is jus in bello: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, precautions. On a secondary basis, imminence of the nuclear and ballistic-missile threat supplies additional justification, which the President invoked.

Timeline. On the morning of 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched a coordinated assault on Iran, codenamed Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion, striking targets across Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj and Kermanshah using cruise missiles, drones and manned aircraft. This matches her “right at the end of February.”

The UK did not adopt her legal framing — including when it said yes

Her argument implies that if you understand the conflict as continuous, the bases question answers itself. The UK’s actual reasoning ran on ordinary self-defence grounds, which presupposes a jus ad bellum question exists. On 1 March 2026 the Prime Minister confirmed the UK had agreed to a US request to use British military bases for the “specific and limited defensive purpose” of taking out Iran’s capability to launch attacks; the legal summary published by the government invoked collective self-defence of Gulf allies and protection of British lives and nationals. The attorney general’s published summary stated that as well as defending itself and its position in the region, the UK was acting in the collective self-defence of regional allies who had requested support, and added that UK bases could only be used for strikes against missile facilities used by Iran against countries not previously involved in the conflict. On that limitation, US aircraft flying from UK bases could not strike Iran to protect US forces or to shield Israel from counterattack — a distinction unavailable on her continuous-conflict theory.

Her account is also incomplete on the facts. She says the UK denied the request; it did, and then reversed. The British government initially concluded that US and Israeli strikes on Iran did not meet the legal definition of self-defence under the UN Charter, and Starmer consulted government lawyers who advised against participation, until Iranian retaliatory strikes on Gulf states placed British nationals and treaty partners under direct threat.

4.7 Hermer was pursuing politics, not law

Claim. No one is privy to the advice, but the UK’s position must have been significantly influenced by it, and this is not the first time his advice has followed a political agenda rather than proper application of international law — she cites the recognition of “the non-existent state of Palestine” as a parallel.

Assessment. She concedes in the same breath that the advice is not public, then characterises its motivation. That is not a sustainable inference. What is fair to say is that the advice is contested by serious lawyers, which is the stronger and more defensible version of her point — Lord Wolfson attacked the government’s position as “amoral evasion dressed up as legal principle,” and Joshua Rozenberg has argued Hermer was wrong. Reach for that rather than motive attribution.

4.8 “It is illegal for a stronger state to strike a weaker state”

Claim. A New York Times journalist asserted this; it is nonsense, and it exemplifies how badly international law is being misrepresented.

Assessment. If accurately quoted, she is plainly right — relative power has no bearing on legality under the Charter or IHL. She does not name the journalist or the piece, so it cannot be checked. Attacking an unnamed and possibly unrepresentative statement is weak construction; the argument would be stronger against a named, sourced example.

4.9 Misrepresentation corrodes the law itself

Claim. The real damage is that the public concludes international law is “an ass” and not worth the paper it is written on. She agrees it would be worthless if it said what it is claimed to say — but it does not.

Assessment. The most interesting argument in the interview and the one least dependent on the Israel context. It is symmetrical, though, and she does not apply it symmetrically: overstated defences of Israel’s position — the 90 percent diversion figure, the UKLFI/suspension conflation, the silence on Al-Bashir — corrode the same credibility by the same mechanism. Anyone using the corrosion argument has to hold themselves to it.

Cluster 5 — The ECHR

5.1 The “example to others” justification fails

Claim. The consistently posited reason for remaining is the message leaving would send to other members including Turkey — that the UK should stay to provide a positive example. This does not wash: Britain should act in its own national interest; it does not control other states, and encouragement of others has to be weighed against the cost to national interest.

Assessment. A clean national-interest argument, and Whitman’s Turkey rejoinder is effective: Turkey’s human rights record while inside the Convention is poor, so the demonstration effect is not doing observable work. She endorses this — “a very fair analysis of the flawed logic of that argument.”

What is omitted: the exemplar argument is not the only or even the principal case for remaining. The Good Friday Agreement obliges incorporation of the ECHR in Northern Ireland; the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains law-enforcement cooperation provisions tied to ECHR adherence; and the domestic constitutional question of what replaces it is unaddressed. She does not engage any of these, so the argument only defeats the weakest reason for staying.

5.2 The common law suffices

Claim. The UK had a substantial human rights tradition emanating from the common law before the Convention, is a world leader in respecting individual autonomy and civil rights, and does not need foreign judges at Strasbourg. Activist Strasbourg jurisprudence has pushed the mantle on rights concepts and generated ill will.

Assessment. Historically defensible and the standard case. The standard reply is that the common law offers no entrenchment against a sovereign parliament: rights protected only by ordinary statute and judicial development can be removed by ordinary statute. Her claim is about the tradition’s quality; the objection is about its security. She does not meet it.

The cat. Her example of public exasperation — a deportation blocked because of a pet cat — is the 2011 Theresa May conference story, and it was substantially misreported at the time: the Judicial Office and the presiding judge stated the cat was not the basis of the decision. Using it as an illustration of public sentiment is fair; it should not be offered as an example of what the Convention actually does.

Cluster 6 — The Church of England

6.1 The Archbishop’s visit was one-sided and propagandised

Claim. She visited the Nova exhibition in London, then travelled to the Palestinian Authority, met individuals linked to the PFLP through family members, and posted about it seemingly oblivious to those connections and to the propaganda she had been fed.

Verification — the specific allegations are documented. A photograph on the Archbishop of Canterbury’s website shows Mullally praying in a living room with a portrait of Kamal Nasser, a former PLO spokesperson, behind her. British-Jewish journalist David Collier noted the host’s support for the Democratic Progressive Student Pole and its parent body, writing that her timeline was full of support for the “Front” and that she can be seen alongside red PFLP flags. Mullally also met a woman labelled on the Archbishop’s website as a child detainee in administrative detention and whose testimony Mullally called powerful — Zeina Barbar, daughter of Majd Barbar, a PFLP member who served 20 years for attempted murder, membership of a terrorist group and related offences. Anglican biblical scholar Ian Paul noted a portrait of Yasser Arafat on the wall during her meeting with Greek Orthodox Archbishop Benedictus.

Mullally pledged to help Palestinians achieve “the peace you desire and the freedom you deserve” and praised their “faithful resistance” in a sermon at St Peter’s in Birzeit. She and Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem Hosam Naoum issued a joint letter urging Anglicans to press politicians to establish a credible path towards ending the occupation, leading to a viable two-state solution, with Jerusalem’s status determined through negotiation as a shared capital.

One factual correction to the interviewer, not to her. Whitman says “she wasn’t here… she went to the Palestinians.” She visited St George’s Cathedral in East Jerusalem, Palestinian healthcare charities, St Peter’s Anglican Church and the Church of the Nativity, and also Nazareth, where she prayed at St Mary’s Well and visited the Grotto of the Annunciation. The sharper version of the criticism is what she did not visit: there was no confirmed record of visits to the Western Wall, the Temple Mount area, the City of David, the Mount of Olives, the Sea of Galilee, Yad Vashem, or sites pertaining to the 7 October massacres. Whitman’s closing offer — to connect her with Christian leaders in Nazareth — is undercut by the fact that she went to Nazareth.

6.2 A pattern, not an incident

Claim. This is consistent with prior Church of England conduct, including her predecessor’s public anti-Israel statements and embraced propaganda such as “Jesus was a Palestinian,” mapping ancient oppression onto present-day Palestinians oppressed by Jews. She extends this to the Vatican and a Christmas nativity in which the infant Jesus was draped in a keffiyeh — a claim she explicitly flags as uncertain.

Assessment. The pattern claim has support beyond her assertion. Rowan Williams attributed the flight of Palestinian Christians from Bethlehem to Israeli policies and the security barrier before Christmas 2006; four senior Church of England bishops called on the British government to act in 2025. The keffiyeh nativity is real — Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity in 2023 — but the Vatican attribution is the one she herself hedges, and it should not be repeated without checking. Her account of the keffiyeh’s symbolism, adopted by Arafat as a symbol of the PLO and worn to conceal identity during the March of Return, is accurate as to its political use; treating it as a symbol of terrorism rather than of Palestinian identity is a contested interpretive claim, not a fact.

6.3 The Christian demography argument

Claim. Christians in Israel are the only growing Christian population in the region and the only ones with free and equal rights as citizens; the decline in Bethlehem happened after Israel withdrew, so blaming Israel inverts the causation. Whitman gives 70 percent falling to 10 percent since Oslo.

Verification — the direction is right, the numbers Whitman gives are not. According to the Christian Information Center, Christians made up 86% of Bethlehem’s population in 1950; until the Oslo Accords Bethlehem had the largest Christian majority of any city in the area, and since the PA assumed control in 1994 the Christian population has steadily decreased, with a 2017 census showing only 10% of residents were Christian. In Gaza, the Christian population has shrunk from 5,000 to approximately 600 since Hamas took over in 2007. A separate account puts Bethlehem at more than 60% Christian when authority was ceded in 1995.

So the drop from a large majority to roughly 10% is real, but the 86% baseline is from 1950, not from Oslo — most of the decline predates the PA. Using “70% at Oslo to 10% now” overstates the post-1994 collapse and is checkable. The honest version: Bethlehem was still a Christian-majority city at the time of transfer and is now around 10%.

On causation: the attribution is contested. Many residents attribute the decline to the general difficulties of living in the West Bank rather than overt discrimination, noting that Muslims are also leaving, which is less visible given relative numbers. The counter-case for her position — that PA-era discrimination, harassment and clan violence drove departures — is documented but not uncontested. Israel’s own Christian population growth is well established and is the strongest leg of this argument.

Overall assessment

Where the interview is strong and where it is exposed

Strongest: the Kristof dog allegation (expert-contradicted, thinly sourced, still defended); the doctor/quadcopter hearsay analysis; the CPJ removals; the professional-conduct case against Khan’s ex parte handling; the observation that misrepresenting international law corrodes public confidence in it; the sources-of-law point on the Lebanon agreement.

Most exposed: the 90 percent aid-diversion attribution, which the UN’s own data contradicts on attribution; the claim that the UKLFI complaint produced Khan’s suspension, which it did not; the ICC “one conviction” figure, which is wrong; the omission of Al-Bashir from the immunity argument; the “no jus ad bellum question” framing, which the UK itself declined to adopt; and the recurring habit of presenting contested legal positions as settled.

Structural weakness: the inversion thesis is asserted as a master key. Once adopted, no adverse finding can count as evidence — it is always projection. That makes the position unfalsifiable, which is precisely the epistemic failure she attributes to her opponents when she says that “these positions will be entirely impervious to the facts.”

Follow-up sourcing to pull

The Amnesty International methodology section she references — identify the report and quote the passage verbatim.
The exact wording of Khan’s October 2023 Rafah remarks and the Cairo press conference, to test the burden-of-proof argument.
The named British doctor and the parliamentary session, for the quadcopter testimony.
The named New York Times journalist for the “stronger state” claim.
The Elkayam-Levy Civil Commission report’s publication date, to test the timing argument properly.
The published UKLFI amicus submission to the Pre-Trial Chamber, for the “every sentence is false” claim.

Content

Legal Director of UKLFI Charitable Trust, Natasha Hausdorff, joins Ariel Whitman of The Western Spirit for a wide-ranging conversation on the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), NGOs and doctors that launder Hamas lies, terrorists who pose as journalists, the war with Iran, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Church of England, and more.

Natasha explains why she believes the ICC prosecutor, Karim Khan, failed to present key evidence in his application for arrest warrants against Israeli leaders; how second-hand, anonymous testimony and Hamas-controlled sources have influenced international institutions; and the concern that politics and antisemitism — not law — are driving international legal cases against Israel.

She also discusses the recent, landmark agreement between the Lebanon and Israel, the UK government’s refusal to allow British bases to be used by the US for military operations against Iran and the legality of those operations.

Natasha Hausdorff is an international law expert and barrister. She specialises in the law of armed conflict, state responsibility and international legal institutions. She regularly lectures and comments on legal issues relating to Israel and the Middle East.

This video was produced by The Western Spirit and is also available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DloG3G5WU9Y

For business inquiries to The Western Spirit, including advertising opportunities, email [email protected]

Transcript

0:00 · striking the foremost state [music] sponsor of terror, which also happens to be in an ongoing armed conflict in its continuing efforts to eradicate the only Jewish state, is unlawful under international law. And those [music] that argue the contrary, I think, are motivated by political aspects that are unfortunately anti-Israel [music] and in some respects anti-American and also anti-West. Both of these sets of allegations are heenous, false, uh, lless. They are reminiscent of the ancient blood label in respect of the uh targeting [music] of children.

0:29 · Very particularly so because in medieval times Jews were accused of of killing Christian children to use their blood.

0:37 · Hello everyone and welcome to another episode of the western spirit here from Israel. I’m Ariel Whitman and today with me I have for the I think the third time or the second time on my show Natasha Horf. Natasha is a barristister uh which I think in other English means lawyer and she is the director or how would we call you Natasha the the the CEO of the

0:59 · center for international rule of law um and Natasha who’s someone who when we want to understand where we are on lawfare and the real rule of law we go talk to her so Natasha it’s a pleasure and honor to speak with you wonderful to be back with you Ariel thank you so I want to talk to you firstly about the UN and their reports that they’ve come out over the past few weeks. So there was the first report which was about the that they added the is that Israel was added to the sexual violence.

1:31 · Uh the claim was that or is that Israel committed I think the point is that it’s that it’s institutional sexual violence in Gaza. Um what do we know about this report? because I saw different things that discredit it. There was not a lot of instances which makes it weird to say that it’s institutional. So, how can you explain what they’re actually saying and what the flaws are in the report?

1:57 · Well, I’d like if I may to perhaps address the two reports that that I think you have in mind together because I think there are parallels here. So the first was Israel being added to this list of um of entities using sexual violence as you say in an institutional fashion um alongside Hamas. Uh and the other is this uh more recent report that suggests or or or seeks to find that Israel has been deliberately targeting Palestinian children.

2:24 · Um both of these sets of allegations are heenous, false, uh liable. They are reminiscent of the ancient blood liable in respect of the uh targeting of children very particularly so uh because in medieval times Jews were killed, Jews were accused of of killing Christian children to use their blood. And so this, you know, modern invocation of it in terms of deliberately targeting Palestinian children, um, I mean, the parallels write themselves.

2:55 · Um, but in each of these respects and the reason I think it’s important to deal with them together, I think what we are looking at is a projection of what uh Hamas and other internationally prescribed terrorist organizations and and other uh Palestinian terrorist organizations that have yet to be prescribed have done on

3:15 · the 7th of October and subsequently both in terms of the use of sexual violence uh against Israelis on the 7th and subsequently uh against hostages in captivity. uh and also the targeting of children on the 7th of October uh in ways that we’re now very familiar with and also the targeting of children for kidnap.

3:34 · Um so there are parallels here and it’s not by accident that the um significant increase in noise around these false allegations of sexual violence against Israel and Israelis um came at a time when there was a very substantial report being um released by the civil commission uh that had spent uh two years under the leadership of Kaval William Levy of analyzing um tens

4:09 · of thousands of hours of footage uh of uh compiling testimonies from eyewitnesses um looking through uh countless photographs to chronicle the systemic use of sexual violence by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorists on the 7th of October and subsequently against hostages in captivity.

4:28 · And so to understand where these false allegations are coming from, I think it’s really important to understand the sort of inversion that is happening here that what was perpetrated uh and in many respects continues to be perpetrated against uh Israelis and and and Jews more broadly um is in fact what

4:49 · is being uh alleged against the very victims of those crimes. this this form of projection that we see the United Nations uh now jumping on the bandwagon of now this latest report from the commission of inquiry uh is um is is not new. It is not a new phenomenon. Of course it comes off the back of uh a broader report from the commission um that alleged genocide uh against Israel.

5:15 · And this as other reports is essentially um comprised of testimonies uh from anonymous individuals in Gaza uh which are in turn compiled by NOS’s like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch.

5:31 · Um and their reports I think merit a little further investigation because uh for certainly in the Amnesty International report the methodology section made it clear that Amnesty didn’t have people on the ground in Gaza. uh it relied on what it called local government authorities um which is code for Hamas.

5:49 · So there is a very uh significant pattern across these reports which then all end up in uh the subsequent reports of the commission of inquiry that we have uh Hamas propaganda being filtered uh through these supposedly uh credible organizations, credible entities and um we see this process also in terms of the individual testimony uh that has led to these broader allegations.

6:18 · If I may just briefly take those in turn with respect to um for example the allegations that were echoed in the New York Times article uh the now infamous New York Times article in which Kristoff indicated that um Israelis had used dogs to rape Palestinians in in custody.

6:37 · There are uh a number of individual testimonies that began in NOS’s um with significant links to Hamas. It’s it’s important to to add that had then sort of been filtered through into the op-ed that we saw uh the New York Times um still standing by extraordinarily uh for for allegations of of of that obscene nature uh despite it being discredited by um you know experts in in in dog handling and um and despite there being no corroborating evidence.

7:10 · This has come from the testimonies of of individuals that let’s be clear are in an ecosystem that is controlled by Hamas. Um similarly when we look at these uh allegations of Israel deliberately shooting Palestinian children, I recall many many months ago

7:30 · uh the testimony of a doctor, British doctor who had been volunteering in Gaza who told parliament here in the UK that he had seen children with gunshot wounds that he knew uh were the result of Israeli quadcopters hovering over wounded Palestinian children and shooting them in the head. That was part of his testimony which was not challenged. There was no indication that he had seen these children be shot. Uh there was no indication that he had even seen a quadcopter capable of shooting a bullet.

7:59 · And there remains a very significant question over the military capabilities of that because we know quadcopters uh surveil. We know that drones of that nature are used um and they can they can drop munitions. But the firing of a bullet is a is a very different order of military uh technological sophistication which certainly I’m not aware of of um military hardware that is able to even execute the sort of uh shot that this

8:27 · doctor was describing but he was describing it not on the basis of firsthand knowledge and that is what’s critical here. He was describing it on the basis of what he had been told what he’d been told about these children that were being brought into hospitals in Gaza. Now, we do know that Hamas has been shooting civilians, including kids.

8:43 · We know that from the very beginning of the war, they were shooting civilians who were seeking to flee according to Israeli instructions um in order to try and keep them safe, in order to evacuate them from areas that that Hamas was using uh as strongholds. Hamas was shooting these civilians in the streets, and even the Americans had confirmed that this is what they had seen on uh on verified footage.

9:03 · We also know that Hamas was shooting civilians seeking to access uh aid from the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation when they were operating in Gaza because that threatened Hamas’s control over the aid distribution system and and it’s um uh diversion of aid which even the UN acknowledged that about 90% of the aid on occasion was being diverted or over 90% on occasion was being diverted by Hamas was being stolen.

9:31 · So given the fact that there is uh a significant track record of Hamas abusing civilians in this heinous fashion of Kamas actually deliberately shooting Palestinian children in Gaza.

9:45 · Uh it is simply extraordinary that we see these claims being advanced uh on the basis of uh either no evidence or what has to be said to be fabricated because there is absolutely no corroborating evidence of these stories that have emanated from Hamas propaganda and that is simply being magnified amplified through these supposedly neutral bodies. They are nothing of the sort. Um, and that is the consequence.

10:12 · And and you see, of course, this is the projection also. It’s Hamas that is shooting kids. That is projected onto the Israeli Defense Forces. We know that Israel is a law-abiding army. We know that Israeli soldiers target military uh targets, either military installations or combatants. Uh, and we see this also consistently in the false allegations about Israel targeting journalists. We now see uh international uh journalist organizations like the uh CJP.

10:40 · Is that the correct acronym? I think.

10:42 · Yeah.

10:42 · They’re taking off names of people that were supposedly journalists killed. They’re taking them off the list because they realized they weren’t journalists. Some of them weren’t killed, but those who were were members of terrorist organizations that were falsely or mistakenly, depending on who you ask, added to the list of journalists killed. And this, like you said, it’s been amplified all over the place and they’re quietly taking them off the books. No one talks about that.

11:10 · Yes.

11:10 · Well, we’ll see how many of them they quietly take off the books because at the moment they’ve indicated that they’re re reassessing the the threshold by which they consider individuals to be terrorists. I mean, um, by by my reckoning, if Hamas is presenting a senior military officer, um, you know, in Hamas attire, uh, and, uh, posing with with pretty serious um, arms, um, there there’s very clear evidence that they’re a terrorist and not a journalist.

11:35 · But this is part of the same pattern of immediately the finger being pointed at Israel and the allegation being that Israel is deliberately targeting either civilians or children or journalists in this case. And all of the evidence demonstrates the complete contrary.

11:49 · Okay.

11:49 · I want to just say about this that we had and I think you also spoke to Judge Roy Olman. He’s a judge in a federal judge in South Florida and he wrote a pretty good book I think on sort of dismantling everything we just spoke about. And one of the things that he said to me was, which is exactly what you said, the way that they defend themselves of things that are patently true, because we have the videos, we have actual people giving evidence and

12:16 · testimony that this happened to them, not hearsay, of all of the things we just said is that they’ll blame the Israelis for doing those same things.

12:25 · And that way they’re able to deflect from the fact that their side or the people that they support or the people that they’re running cover for are the actual perpetrators. It’s sort of it’s a very it’s very um useful because a lot of people are prepositioned to want to support their cause. And so when you give them that f so they’re like oh the the Israelis do that too. It’s a very good tactic I think for them at least.

12:50 · But it’s it’s horribly in terms it’s horrible in terms of moral. But we can talk about that differently.

12:57 · But it falls it certainly falls on very fertile ground and that takes us back to you know old old discussions about anti-semitism. But it is extraordinary I think from a psychological perspective that these positions will be entirely impervious to the facts. You know when people are presented with the reality they just shut down. They don’t want to know. They prefer to believe the fantasy.

13:15 · Exactly.

13:15 · Okay. I want to talk to you about what we spoke about I think about a year and a half ago when we last spoke on this platform which was lawfare. Um there was the there’s two cases in both types of courts of the HEG. One is against Israel itself and the other one is against in the other court which I always get mixed up in their names against specific people in Israel.

13:36 · So the prime minister, the former defense minister is out in the open and there’s all these rumors that there are secret warrants in which people who are being wanted for arrest don’t know. So if they’ll go to some country, they’ll I guess put their passport in and that country will see that they are wanted and arrest them. I guess that’s the implication.

13:59 · Um and so the person the prosecutor uh of uh those spe people um Karim Khan I think his name is has been um accused of sexual crimes. I think that’s accurate. and he has been quoted in the Wall Street Journal story saying that he was going after Israel so strongly because he knew that this is what would sort of give him cover for um and Qatar was saying that they would help him. These are all these stories.

14:32 · So I want to ask you just in general without getting into the specific first.

14:38 · The fact that there are so much people now in the world that are anti-semmites and it’s growing, does that allow lawfare against Israel to be more successful? Meaning if people would support Israel, they would elect politicians who would say we won’t, for example, enforce these ridiculous um warrants. But the fact that the people hate Israel makes these warrants more lethal. I don’t know if does my question make sense?

15:05 · It it does. I might approach it in a slightly different um uh direction. Um I it is relevant in this respect. Um so as you say uh there is a distinction between the warrants that have been issued against uh Benjamin Nesa and Yav Galant in that they are very public. Um even when Karim Khan um applied for

15:26 · these warrants before they were issued by the court there was a press conference a press release he gave an interview on Christian Amanpor and this is unprecedented because uh generally speaking arrest warrants by the ICC are both sought and issued in private in confidence so that the individuals that they attach to are unaware and that if they travel internationally they may be picked up on that warrant. That’s the usual approach, but that wasn’t applied with respect to these high-profile targets um of Israel’s prime minister and former defense minister.

15:57 · Why is that, one might ask? Now, the context of this is a court that had its reputation already in the gutter. Um in 2020, there was a very substantial independent expert review that basically tore the court to shreds. It had failed to live up to the aspirations of its founders for sure. But in its 10 years of operation, there had been one successful prosecution at a cost of nearly a billion US dollars.

16:23 · And this was a court that was um uh that had an atmosphere that the report said of a fear and an intimidation, which is certainly what we have seen uh in the context of these allegations against Karim Khan. um but also that it had a dysfunctional judiciary that was um essentially corrupt in many respects and had in its second decade of operation ultimately just focused on African defendants. So it was also being accused of racism.

16:49 · So this is the context in which the former prosecutor Fatu Ben Suda opened this investigation into Israel without jurisdiction. It’s important to stress that this is a court that was operating entirely outside of its powers with respect to its pursuit of Israelis. So why would it be doing this?

17:06 · And I think the context of that report and the context of its reputation being so resoundingly trashed is very important because uh it’s clear that there’s not much uh better uh ways of um rehabilitating yourself in the eyes of the international community who seemingly hate Israel and have a special special form of loathing u for the leaders of the Jewish state. You know what better way of rehabilitating yourself than go by going after those very same leaders?

17:32 · And I think we saw this in terms of the opening of the investigation despite the fact that all of the court’s um own you know structure and rules with respect to jurisdiction were being thrown out of the window. And then Kareem Khan picked this investigation up immediately after the 7th of October. You know after what had been done to Israeli civilians. Kurim Khan visited um Gaza, the the border of Gaza uh with Rafa and he said uh a couple of very interesting things I thought at the time.

18:03 · Uh in October 2023, he said that the alleged crimes of Hamas would have to be investigated and that Israel would have to prove that it was complying with international humanitarian law in Gaza. Uh there was subsequently also a press conference in Cairo where he reiterated exactly that sentiment. Now the reason I think that those comments are interesting is because they turn criminal law on its head.

18:26 · Every uh law student learns in their first week of a criminal law course about the burden and standard of proof that it is up to the prosecution to prove its case uh so that a tribunal of of fact uh in the UK we have juries uh is sure or what used to be called beyond reasonable doubt. And that was entirely inverted by Khn, at least in his rhetoric, and certainly in his approach to this issuing of arrest warrants which were issued. Let’s be clear, for the alleged crime of deliberately starving the Palestinian civilian population.

18:57 · Now, you just have to look at the Kogat website to see the level of aid that Israel facilitated into Gaza across this war to know that that is bunkham. And when this was presented to Kareem Khan and to the court uh by UK lawyers for Israel, we we put together a submission uh to the court that highlighted that every praise of every sentence of Karim Khan’s public summary of his arrest warrant application was false. His response was to tell the court to ignore any submissions on accuracy that did not come from him.

19:27 · Uh and that in fact prompted a complaint uh by UK lawyers for Israel to the bar standards board that has now in fact suspended Karim K. is the regulator of barristers in England and Wales. Um so ultimately it’s important to say that uh that that he is um facing a suspension from that or organization as well, not just the International Criminal Court. uh and our um complaint was based on the fact that

19:53 · he had put before the court entirely misleading information and that because this was what’s called an exparte application uh one in which the defense were not present to make their case uh as a barristister he has every obligation responsibility to present whatever case the defense would and and to certainly put forward any exculpatory or contradictory evidence and he did exactly the opposite. he sought to suppress what we had put before the court and tell them to ignore it. And it’s clear that it is on that basis that these arrest warrants were actually issued. Right? So that’s a little bit of the background here.

20:24 · Um to come to the essence of your question which is you know are these arrest warrants more effective because of general levels of anti-semitism and increasing hatred towards the Jewish state and I think absolutely they are but more than that they are driven by that. This is the court seeking to gain relevance uh and

20:44 · to gain international appreciation um through its targeting and and that I think is buttressed by everything that I’ve described about the extraordinary and unlawful nature of both the arrest warrant application and its subsequent issuance. And it’s important just to bear in mind that the ability of countries to enforce these warrants is um I would argue non-existent because it would be contrary to customary international law certainly in respect of Netanyahu who uh benefits from official immunity as the prime minister of the state of Israel.

21:16 · Customary international law um with respect to diplomatic and official immunity is is one of the most basic aspects of the way that countries are able to interact with reciprocal protections for the leaders of of of its state and for its diplomats and um these arrest warrants which have no legal basis uh fly in the face of those internationally accepted protections.

21:38 · So at every level I think this is politics not law and certainly increased um ineffectiveness by general rising levels of anti-semitism but but at the same time the countries including where you’re sitting now the UK and others especially in Europe have all said they’ll arrest Netanyahu if he comes.

21:56 · Hungary was an exception and then now this new guy the new prime minister of Hungary now also pretty much says that he’ll arrest Netanyahu. So basically all the countries and this I think is mostly in most of these countries because of public opinion hating Israel. So if they don’t say they’ll arrest Netanyahu then the people who are very pro Palestine which are a lot of these government’s core constituents will be very annoyed at them.

22:23 · I would just be very careful about the reporting around this. Um you’re right.

22:26 · This is what the newspapers and broadcasters have been saying. Um but if you actually look and for example the UK if you actually look at what was said number 10 uh immediately after the issuance of these arrest warrants simply said that the UK would comply with international law. Now it’s right that the press took that to mean the UK will be arresting Netanyahu. But I take that to mean the complete opposite given what I’ve just said to you about binding customary international law u that protects uh Netanyahu and others uh when they travel internationally.

22:55 · And it’s important because Israel is not a state party to the ICC. It has not waved these protections which state parties do with respect to ICC arrest warrants.

23:07 · But I guess can I just but I guess proof is in the pudding in the sense that Netanyahu has not come to any of these places. And the reason with that he has not gone to any of these places. Not only has he not visited any of any of these countries, his plane when he came to the US made a longer route to not fly over airspace of certain European countries on his way to America in fear of being tried to being arrested as he’s flying over their countries.

23:34 · And so maybe they haven’t, you know, outward, you know, say said explicitly will arrest you. But definitely the prime minister here is very worried of being arrested. And so that is the reason why he’s not going to visit countries and a lot of the times the only way he visits the world leaders that want to meet him is that they have to come here. And so it extremely um hurts his ability to represent Israel on the international stage and like he won’t go to certain international conferences that all world leaders are just because he’s worried.

24:07 · They might not have said but they didn’t say not and they won’t arrest him. So he’s worried and so maybe they will or maybe they won’t but he thinks they will.

24:16 · Well I I think you know clearly there’s an approach of prudence um being taken then uh by by Israel and I’m sure on on the basis of advice perhaps out of an abundance of caution but I think we do need to make a clear distinction between the political rhetoric and any actions that might be taken for a political reason and on that basis you know that’s the assessment that the governments of of Israel have made so be it. found the legal basis for that as a matter of law.

24:44 · uh an arrest of the prime minister of Israel would simply not be lawful um for the reasons that I’ve I’ve described and at least in the UK the position has been uh put equivocally and it has been interpreted uh by press immediately they said oh well so you know Kharma at the time um would would arrest um would arrest Netanyao on the basis of a simple statement from number 10 that said um that the UK would comply with international law and and this is I think reflective of a of broader problem

25:15 · um with respect to the misrepresentation of international law and how it is being used and abused for political purposes and for political agendas. Uh because when you step back and you recognize you know what the powers of the court are um what the jurisdiction is and therefore uh what the follow through um powers of member states might be. Uh it just doesn’t hang together in the way that the press are represented.

25:38 · Yeah.

25:38 · Um so now I want to ask you about something that I found very interesting. So we’ve heard especially on the online discourse which is horrible in general but I think it also like you says promotes um stupidity and lack of knowledge instead of more knowledge especially on topics like this.

25:57 · A lot of people over the past two years have blamed Israel for occupying quoteunquote Lebanon. Now we have a deal between the Lebanese government and the Israeli government shephered in by Secretary of State Rubio in which the Lebanese government on paper recognizes Israel’s first of all recognize Israel as a Jewish state but also recognizes Israel’s right to be in southern Lebanon as long as Hezbollah is still an armed um terrorist force.

26:26 · And so how much in terms of international law does it matter that a state says to another state we recognize the fact that there is a group this is pretty much I think what the not in these words because I’m not well versed in legal ease but they’re saying basically you have to protect yourself we both have an interest of destroying and so we want you to stay until we’re able to take care of these places by ourself how much does that matter in international

26:57 · hugely significant because this is an agreement by two sovereign states. Um and this is how most international law um is made and developed. Um there are two critical sources of international law. One I mentioned earlier, customary international law which develops over time uh binding on all states generally and then agreements made between sovereigns uh either bilaterally as in this case between uh the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel or um sometimes multilaterally in terms of international conventions.

27:23 · Um really significant here that the only occupying force uh in in in a true sense um isbala uh in Lebanon and and that is again not talked about in much of the international coverage that we have seen. Uh and that is a a hostile force in Lebanon that uh the Lebanese government and the Lebanese people very much want to be rid of. And the difficulty that they have faced is that they have not so far had the capability uh of ridding themselves ofaha.

27:53 · Israel has been assisting them significantly on this front but also acting in defense of Israeli citizens especially those living in the north of Israel that have been under somewhat consistent bombardment from this internationally prescribed terrorist organization. And now we have this agreement. I mean landmark and breakthrough. And I think uh certainly Ambassador Lightner in the US and uh Secretary of State Rubio have to be congratulated on what is a monumental recognition uh by the state of Lebanon of the state of Israel.

28:24 · Uh it’s interesting actually to note that um Lebanon’s current prime minister is the former president of the International Court of Justice who was leading the charge uh against Israel on on many of the developments at the ICJ and and before that he’d in fact been Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations where he accused Israel of war crimes and of being a terror state. And here uh he is part of the government that is recognizing Israel as a state.

28:49 · Um, it’s a it’s another feather in the cap, let’s say, of of President Trump uh in terms of um the the normalization agreements uh that we had between Israel and and others under the Abraham Accords. Uh and of course, it’s important to note that that much of what you described is um in a secret annex uh which albeit is being reported somewhat in the Israeli press, there’s there’s an embargo on discussing that um certainly by the press in Lebanon.

29:18 · And so we don’t entirely know the extent um of the government of Lebanon’s recognition of of Israel’s right to to remain uh in uh in parts of Lebanon for the purpose of of defending itself and for the purpose of combating.

29:35 · That is the very clear implication um of of these agreements and I think they are a a turning point not least because um the Iranians are so very upset by them that this not the Iranian people of course this is the Islamic regime uh in Iran uh that uh that very much threw his toys out of the pram but it’s a very clear indicator to the Ayatollah that they have no business deciding uh on behalf of the people of Lebanon and behalf of the governments of Lebanon what should be going on in Lebanon.

30:04 · I think there’s a very clear signal that has been sent uh to the Iranians and and therefore I mean those both on the Lebanese side, the Israeli side and and brokering it in um in the US ought to be congratulated uh on what was achieved through those negotiations.

30:20 · Is there any um discrepancy between that agreement and the agreement of mo theou between America and Iran? um in the sense that the first I think par piece of the Iranianou says that there will be a stop in of all hostilities including in Lebanon and then after that JD van said that they came to some sort of understanding on a mechanism that will be able to I guess look at with Iran in

30:53 · in part of that mechanism to try to stop hostilities in Lebanon. Is there do you think inherently a sort of contradiction between the two agreements?

31:05 · Well, theou um is certainly broader and um if I can say perhaps more nebulous.

31:12 · Um and it is also an an interim um memorandum of understanding. It’s it’s not as many are referring to a a deal, a done deal. Um but I think the critical aspect of the continuing hostilities in Lebanon is is the hostility from Kazbala. Um and so rather than the two agreements contradicting each other, it is the actions of this Iranian proxy in Lebanon that is contradictory to the memorandum of understanding.

31:36 · And there are many other aspects unfortunately in the last few weeks that we have seen um the Iranian uh regime breaking the provisions of of that memorandum. um perhaps not surprising but in respect of of this critical issue um with respect to Israel’s presence in Lebanon um the existence of the hostilities there emanate fromaha that is why Israel is

32:02 · back in Lebanon uh and that is why it is um seeking to uh deal with the continuing threat that the Lebanese um uh terrorist organization is is posing. So that’s the contradiction that I see as opposed to something that’s emanating from the actual text.

32:19 · Okay.

32:19 · I want to ask you something that we’ve heard in the news that in when the Iran war this turn with America actually attacking Iran. The first one was the 12-day war. There was just the B2 sorty um on the nuclear sites. This one was actually sorties flown both with Israeli pilots and American pilots. It was I think the first time ever that this happened. And there America asked to use its bases that were located in certain European countries territories.

32:48 · Yeah.

32:49 · And it was denied by most of these countries including the UK at least in the beginning.

32:56 · Yeah.

32:56 · And behind the scenes as I read it, one of the reasons given was that the UK’s I guess maybe it’s called attorney general or however you want to call it said that it was an illegal war and therefore under international law and therefore we can’t take any part in it including allowing Americans to use their bases on our soil.

33:18 · So did it have any basis to say that this is an illegal war given that I guess first of all with Israel’s part in it Iran has been attacking us through its proxies but also directly over the past 40 years especially since the past three years but with America’s perspective America decided that Iran was a a threat uh on a number of issues including the ballistic missile issue including by the way missiles that can get to I think parts of the UK um and obviously the nuclear issue.

33:51 · So was there any basis for this I don’t know what you would call it decision?

34:00 · No. Uh and it’s not the first time that um Richard Hurmer the uh Lord Herma the uh attorney general in the UK has given um well has no one is privy to the advice he has given but it is clear that the UK’s position on this must have been um significantly influenced by legal advice provided by the attorney general and is not the first time that that has I believe been in pursuit of a political agenda rather than guided by the proper application of international law.

34:28 · Another parallel example of that is the the nonsense recognition or aspirational recognition, whatever that means, that the UK gave to the non-existent state of Palestine. But with respect to the analysis of um these uh strikes on Iran by Israel and the United States, they have to be seen in the context of the ongoing war that you have alluded to. Um it was interesting to me at the at the beginning of your question, you referred to uh this war and that war.

34:53 · And I appreciate in Israel it’s referred to uh very much in those terms, but um language aside, the reality is that there has been an ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Iran and very arguably also between Iran and the US as you described through its proxies, through terrorist attacks, through the targeting of US military personnel around the world for decades. Um, and even if you take that level of the analysis out of the equation, the existing war between Israel and Iran is unquestionable.

35:24 · Um, and it has never abated. There has never been a peace agreement uh between these two states uh to put a an end to that, not even a ceasefire. So that armed conflict has been ongoing and the ability of the United States to assist Israel in this ongoing armed conflict um is uncontroversial. That is the proper analysis. It’s not a resort to force.

35:47 · It’s not a reprisal. It’s not the starting of a war. It is what the question to ask is what does international law say that Israel and the US are able to do in this continuing armed conflict. And there we come to the very wellestablished rules of customary international law and and in the law of armed conflict in uh international humanitarian law in particular which is that you can strike targets that are militarily necessary. You must distinguish between civilians and combatants. And so you are targeting military targets, military installations, and military personnel.

36:17 · Uh you exercise the um the equation, if you will, of proportionality. So you have to take into account collateral damage as you’re deciding on strikes. Uh that you intend uh to minimize civilian uh or collateral damage through the exercise of precautions. And there is no suggestion that Israel and the US have not been complying with these this applicable framework in the conduct of their strikes against Iranian uh military infrastructure. Um that much is clear.

36:46 · And so the suggestion and we’ve heard this you know even in the New York Times there was a journalist that say that said um entirely erroneously of course it is illegal under international law for a stronger state to strike a weaker state. I mean that is the the nonsense that is being put out there by supposedly respectable journalists and you know in papers of record uh and it is a reflection of how international law is being so badly misrepresented here.

37:12 · Why is this problematic? not just in respect of this sort of nonsense statements that we’ve heard from the UK and from others and and the very very um troubling decisions with respect to the bases and the American use of those bases that you’ve described not at least for this for the sake of the relations between these countries and the United States um but also for you know general understandings of what international law says um it’s it’s um ludicrous and and

37:38 · it’s a very significant factor in the fact in the respect that I think general members of the public are thinking Oh, well, you know, if international law does say that, international law is an ass and it’s not worth anything. And that is the really damaging impact that the misrepresentations of international law here are causing people to think that it’s not really worth the paper it’s written on. And that would be the case. I would agree with them if this is actually what international law said, but it’s not. Uh the legal basis for these strikes by Israel and by Iran uh by Israel, by the US, forgive me, on Iran, uh could not be clearer.

38:07 · But even if we ignore all of that, uh there is an additional layer of justification that the United States uh could deploy um in relation to the imminence of the threat that the Iranian regime posed with respect to its development of nuclear weapons, with respect to its uh deployment of ballistic missiles. uh and that is you know as I say a secondary justification for uh military action but

38:34 · one that um the president of the United States did also invoke when he announced these military operations uh right at the end of February. Uh so on all of these camps, on all of these bases, yeah, striking the foremost state sponsor of terror who uh which also happens to be in an ongoing armed conflict in its continuing efforts to eradicate the only Jewish state is unlawful under international law.

38:57 · And those that argue the contrary, I think are motivated by political um political aspects that are unfortunately anti-Israel and in some respects anti-American and also anti-West.

39:10 · Okay.

39:10 · I want to ask you two short questions before we finish. The first one is these are a little bit different I guess from the Israel aspect of the things we talked about. So the first one is in the UK you’re you’re you are going through years of an immigration crisis and at least the public perceives it as so.

39:31 · And some of the parties, I think both the Conservative and the Reform Party have said that if they come into power, they will leave the I think it’s called the European um Convention on Human Convention of Human Rights, which basically for the reason why they’re saying they would leave it is that it makes it much harder to kick people out of your country. I I think that’s the that is the reason.

39:55 · And so do they would you as someone who studies this would it be good if that is the if that is the idea the reason why they want to do it is there any reason why not to leave the ECR?

40:11 · Well the reason that has been consistently posited um and this has been over you know certainly the last couple of decades that that I have been uh following the debate about the European Convention on Human Rights. The reason that has been consistently posited that the UK should not leave is uh the message that it would send to others uh other members of the convention including Turkey um you know we it has been argued should remain in order to provide a positive example and encourage um other states around the world to to respect human rights in a in a more robust fashion.

40:41 · Um that argument doesn’t really wash for me because the United Kingdom um Great Britain should be acting in its own national interest irrespective um of what that might mean for for other states. Um the UK doesn’t control other states. Um absolutely it can uh seek to encourage positive behavior in other states. Um but at what cost to uh its own national interest? I think that’s ultimately the question.

41:08 · Now the European Convention on Human Rights again did did not start as um a negative or nefarious uh enterprise. But there is a very unfortunate reality that much of the juristprudence from the court um pursued by very activist judges has been really pushing the mantle um on human rights concepts uh and has created a great great feeling of ill will uh

41:33 · amongst uh the British population um especially because of you know repeated stories of um various uh different um efforts by the British government to um expel uh undesirable individuals from

41:49 · from the country uh might be thwarted uh because you know they had a cat a pet cat and therefore they couldn’t be there was one very famous story many years ago that that focused on that and and perhaps understandably you know public sentiment was exercised as a result of that it is significant I think that you have clear policy now uh from uh two

42:10 · very significant opposition parties in the UK uh that um that they would be leaving the European Convention and it’s important to underscore that the UK before the convention had a very substantial uh human rights um tradition uh that emanates uh from the common law.

42:28 · Uh it is in fact, you know, a world leader uh in respecting uh individual autonomy and individual uh civil and human rights. So in that respect, the UK doesn’t need the European Convention. um that justification that I began with that you know it is if you will a light onto other nations uh in order to uh to

42:47 · improve their human rights records um is the only you know justifying factor that that many people have been able to come up with because there is no suggestion that the UK tradition and law and the common law on human rights wouldn’t be sufficient uh to protect individuals here uh without the intervention uh of uh of foreign judges through the European Court of Human Rights.

43:12 · It’s a very weird justification. And you mentioned Turkey. Turkey literally puts people in jail that Erdogan feels are threats to him politically. Even literally Turkey has threatened to take over Jerusalem in the last week. And then Israel responded by recognizing the Armenian genocide. But regardless, they’re not a a well-known beacon of human rights even with the UK being in this um in the ECR.

43:42 · So, uh and and there’s other examples as well. I don’t think there’s any country we can say that they are very good on human rights just because the UK is part of this um treaty. Unless I’m missing something.

43:55 · No, I think that’s a very fair analysis of the flawed logic of that argument.

43:59 · But it’s it’s a case of well, you know, we want to encourage Turkey to be better and to maintain their membership of of the of the court and and of the convention. And I think that it is reflective perhaps of a rather naive attitude in the west uh that um that through positive example we can change the mindset uh and the uh human rights record of uh non-democratic states.

44:22 · Okay.

44:22 · Lastly, um, and this might have some, um, judicial maybe implications, but I’m asking you more so as someone in the who lives in the UK and knows, I guess, what the Jewish community has been going through over the past few years, the head of I think it’s the Church of England. It’s she was here in Israel and in mostly, but she wasn’t here. She went to the Palestinians.

44:46 · She like when she was here, she was here to show how mean we are. and she walked around all of these areas, met with literal I would say just I don’t know about ter but terrorist supporters families of terrorists refused to mention maybe she didn’t know but I found it hard to believe that these people were David Kier journalist has a very interesting Twitter ex thread about this she then put out like all these messages about how mean Israel is how we

45:18 · don’t um respect the dignity of the Palestinian Ians um there was I don’t think mention at all about uh victims of Palestinian terrorism. I think probably I’m not sure but don’t we can check later but I’m pretty sure not at all or at least it was maybe slightly mentioned. What do first of all why do you think this is happening?

45:39 · We we don’t tend to think uh we tend to think that Christians are our allies the you know the churches usually at least in the west in America where I’m from originally tend to be our friends and then this happens don’t they have enough problems in the UK with the you know lowering church attendance um the fact that um the

46:02 · church has been severely I think its influence downgraded over the years so why do you think this what do you make of It’s deeply troubling. Um I thought David Collier’s uh analysis of this was was excellent. Uh and it did contrast um her attendance at the Nova exhibition which is currently on in London um which which you and your viewers may be familiar with which has been traveling around the world and really brings that the horror of what happened at Nova to life.

46:31 · Um she attended that and then pretty soon afterwards made this trip uh to uh the Palestinian Authority uh and indeed uh met with um individuals that were linked to the PFLP either through you know family members uh and and posted uh seemingly obliviously about these connections uh about this and about the the sort of the propaganda that she had been fed.

46:55 · Um this is not new unfortunately from the Church of England. have seen uh a number of uh prominent individuals including her predecessor um making public statements that are extremely anti-Israel. Um and it is consistent, I’m afraid to say, with the sort of uh propaganda that the Church of England has embraced uh including, you know, Jesus was a Palestinian that features in occasionally um and and subject to the oppression uh in ancient times that the Palestinians are subject to the oppression by by the the dastardly Jews today.

47:26 · What is extraordinary, of course, uh there was no mention uh really of of of Hamas uh and its attacks on on Jews, but there was no mention of attacks on Christians uh in that part of the world and and throughout the Middle East uh by Arabs and the fact that uh Christians in Israel uh are the only population that are increasing and the only Christians that are able to live uh with free uh rights and equal rights as citizens. And that’s extraordinary.

47:57 · I think latally we have seen an uptick unfortunately um in negative sentiment fueled by um you’ll remember that very famous um horrendous uh set of of images of recording of of a soldier desecrating a figure of Jesus in Lebanon.

48:13 · Um, and there have been a number of uh similar um news frenzies uh about uh Israel um destroying uh a church I believe also in Lebanon that was being uh essentially used by a couple of mistakes maybe that may have um been associated with with that. And and of course in Lebanon, Israel is having to fight um in between uh many uh Christian villages and and places of worship and and that presents its own challenges.

48:44 · But it is clear that the rhetoric especially from the church of England, especially from the leaders of the church uh against Israel has been increasing. Uh and we saw this also uh from the Catholic Church uh and from uh the Vatican um in its Christmas address uh and in the pope’s Christmas address and in the fact that I believe the baby Jesus uh in the manger was cloaked in a kafir. Um I hope I’m correct in remembering that if it wasn’t uh in Vatican City that it might have been elsewhere.

49:13 · But that is the level of um you know polit politicization uh and and for anyone that’s not familiar unfortunately the kafir adopted by Yasa Arafat as a as a symbol of the Palestinian people uh and ultimately of the PLO at the time another terrorist organization is by many rightly regarded as a symbol of terrorism as opposed to you know Palestinian culture because it is dawned so frequently uh by terrorists.

49:40 · It was um used to cover the faces and identities of so many on that uh so-called March of Return uh several years ago when they were seeking to test Israel’s uh border fence uh with Gaza that ultimately led up to uh what happened on the 7th of October. So in every one of these respects, unfortunately um a terrorist cause is being embraced uh by the church and that was reflective in the meetings uh that you’ve described with PFLP members.

50:06 · It’s extremely problematic. it something definitely needs to be done and and I think certainly the Jewish population here in the UK are feeling uh that rising animosity from church groups uh very significantly also I would just add before I go and the first one is that she went to I’m pretty sure she went to Bethlehem and lamented the fact that the Christian community is smaller but blamed Israel for it which is amazing because Israel does not control Bethlehem it literally since the Oslo

50:39 · Accords the population of ch Christians went down I think from like 70% to now 10%. When Israel pulled out of the area it’s the opposite exactly of what she’s saying. And second of all, like you said, I think next time if she wants to come, she can call me or even you and we can put her in touch with literally millions, not millions, I would say hundreds of thousands of Christians in Israel and we can put her with church leaders here in Nazareth and other places that will give her the actual

51:09 · truth of what is happening in the sense that Israel is the only country at in the Middle East where the Christian population is literally growing. that there have been members of the Knesset and I I’m pretty sure that the Arab member is a in the in the Supreme Court at least one of them in the past decade was a Christian etc etc. So my point is that someone maybe it’s because the people who took her were so anti-Israel so they just like lied to her because some of this stuff are just obviously not true like the Bethlehem stuff.

51:37 · So I’m giving her the I’m being generous and saying someone she didn’t have all her facts right. Let’s just put it that way. and next time we’ll hope she gets them right. In the meantime, Natasha Housef, it was a lot of fun, even though some of the stuff was depressing, but still fun to talk to you as always. And thank you so much for giving us time early in the morning, your time, and we’ll see you next time.

52:02 · See you soon. Thank you, Ariel.

Natasha Hausdorff Exposes Lies about Israel in International Tribunals