Skip to content
Read • Question • ConnectAnthony’s notes & researchReturn with a new question
Anthony’s NotesA personal field guide
From the notebook

The 1991 Muslim Brotherhood Explanatory Memorandum - Provenance, Meaning, and Limits

Bottom line

The memorandum is authentic, not a modern fabrication. Mohamed Akram addressed it to the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council in 1991; the FBI recovered it during a 2004 search of Ismail Elbarasse’s Virginia home; and it became Government Exhibit 3-85 in the Holy Land Foundation proceedings. Its language about a “Civilization-Jihadist Process,” destroying Western civilization “from within,” institution-building, coalitions, and support for a global Islamic state is genuinely in the exhibit.

What remains unproved is equally important: the available public record does not show that the Shura Council formally adopted Akram’s memorandum; the appendix is not self-executing proof that every named organization was controlled by the Brotherhood; and a 1991 network document cannot by itself establish what any organization or individual believes or does in 2026. The responsible conclusion is documented network and intent evidence, requiring organization-specific and time-specific corroboration.

The first correction — written in 1991, seized in 2004

The common phrase “the 1991 memorandum seized by the FBI” is ambiguous and often becomes the false statement that the FBI seized it in 1991.

EventWhat the evidence supports
1987Akram says a long-term goal had been approved by the U.S. Brotherhood’s Shura Council and organizational conference. His 1991 paper presents itself as an explanation and proposed elaboration of that earlier goal.
May 22, 1991Date printed inside the translated government exhibit. The Investigative Project landing page says May 19, but the scan itself and the 2009 district-court order say May 22.
2004FBI agents executing a federal search warrant at Ismail Elbarasse’s Virginia home recovered an archive of U.S. Brotherhood records, including this memorandum.
2007The first Holy Land Foundation trial ended in a mistrial. The memorandum was admitted as a government exhibit.
2008HLF and five officers were convicted of providing material support to Hamas and related offenses after retrial.
2009In litigation over the public naming of unindicted co-conspirators, Judge Jorge Solis discussed Exhibit 3-85 and other evidence.
2011–2012The Fifth Circuit affirmed the individual defendants’ convictions and sentences; the Supreme Court denied review.
August 5, 2026Retired FBI agent Lara Burns, who led the HLF investigation from 2001–2008, described the recovery and network in Senate testimony. This is knowledgeable witness testimony, but it remains testimony—not a new conviction or a finding binding every named group.

What the document is

The exhibit is an Arabic memorandum with an English translation titled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.” It is signed by Mohamed Akram and addressed to the General Masul, secretary, and members of the Shura Council.

Its own framing matters:

  • Akram calls the pages his “hopes, ambitions and challenges,” disclaims infallibility, asks recipients to comment and correct them, and requests that the subject be added to the next Council agenda.
  • At the same time, he says the paper is rooted in a long-term plan approved in 1987 and quotes a previously approved strategic goal: establish a stable Islamic movement led by the Brotherhood, unify Muslim efforts, present Islam as a civilizational alternative, and support a global Islamic state.
  • The memo therefore lies between two misleading descriptions. It is more than an irrelevant private fantasy, but less than a proved, formally adopted constitution for every Brotherhood-connected organization.

What it actually proposes

1. Permanent institutional presence

“Settlement” or “enablement” means making Islam and its movement part of the North American homeland, rooted in society and supported by durable organizations.

2. A movement led by the Brotherhood

The quoted strategic goal envisions an effective movement “led by the Muslim Brotherhood,” expanding the observant Muslim base, directing Muslim efforts, and supporting a global Islamic state.

3. Gradual institutional construction

Akram advocates mosques and Islamic centers that do much more than worship: education, youth formation, social life, publishing, political work, planning, and leadership development. He recommends gradualism, specialization, coordination, research, fundraising, and an “organizational mentality.”

4. Coalitions and “absorption”

The Brotherhood, he says, cannot perform the mission alone. It should master coalitions, cooperation, and “absorption,” winning Muslims of different tendencies and bringing allies into the orbit of the plan.

5. “Civilization jihad” and the destruction passage

The most alarming passage is not invented by critics. The government translation calls the settlement project a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” and describes the Brotherhood’s work as a “grand Jihad” aimed at destroying Western civilization from within so that God’s religion prevails.

Translation and interpretation

The English exhibit is a government translation containing awkward language and obvious typographical errors. The core destructive language is nevertheless clear enough that disputes about a single English word do not make the passage disappear. What is contestable is its operational meaning: violent overthrow, nonviolent ideological displacement, triumphalist daʿwa, patient institutional entryism, or a blend of these. The rest of the memorandum emphasizes institution-building and coalition work rather than an operational plan for violence.

6. The appendix

The appended heading is “A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends.” It lists 29 bodies or sub-bodies, including ISNA, MSA, NAIT, IAP, UASR, OLF (the former name of HLF), ICNA, and IIIT.

That heading creates three evidentiary limits:

  1. “Our organizations” and “our friends” are not separated into distinct columns.
  2. Inclusion records Akram’s 1991 classification, not an adjudication of ownership or control.
  3. Organizational identities, leadership, governance, and ideology can change. A current claim needs current evidence.

What the courts did—and did not—establish

The Holy Land Foundation convictions

The 2008 jury convicted HLF and five leaders in a Hamas-financing prosecution. The Justice Department said HLF and the defendants provided roughly $12.4 million in support to Hamas. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the individual convictions and described a voluminous record of surveillance, searches, financial records, organizational documents, and testimony.

The convictions therefore establish serious facts about HLF, its officers, the Palestine Committee, and Hamas support. They do not convert every exhibit into a judicial finding against every person or group mentioned in it.

The 2009 unindicted-co-conspirator order

This order is often quoted selectively by both sides.

  • The court held that publicly naming CAIR, ISNA, NAIT, and hundreds of others as unindicted co-conspirators without a forum to defend themselves caused reputational injury and violated due-process principles; it ordered the list sealed.
  • But the court declined to strike the three organizations’ names and said the government had produced ample evidence of historical associations with HLF, IAP, and Hamas. It specifically described the memorandum and additional financial and organizational exhibits.
  • The Fifth Circuit’s 2010 decision concerned the remedy and did not decide that every public allegation was true. Nor did it announce that the underlying historical associations were imaginary.

Correct legal inference

“Named as an unindicted co-conspirator” is not a conviction. The due-process ruling concerns the government’s public labeling of uncharged parties. Conversely, the sealing order is not an exoneration of every historical association discussed in the evidence. Each claim still has to be stated at the level the evidence supports.

The strongest case for treating the memo as important

  1. Provenance is strong. It came from an archive recovered from an individual connected to the relevant network and was authenticated and admitted in federal litigation.
  2. Akram was not a random outsider. Court records and other internal documents place him in the U.S. Brotherhood/Shura and Palestine Committee milieu.
  3. The memo invokes a prior approved plan. Its author presents the strategic goal and “settlement” priority as existing Council policy, not as inventions created from nothing in 1991.
  4. Other internal records corroborate organization-building. The HLF record included charts, bylaws, minutes, and reports describing a structured U.S. network and the Palestine Committee’s support for Hamas.
  5. The language is substantively illiberal. A project to subordinate pluralist society to a religious movement is a legitimate object of democratic scrutiny even if pursued through lawful institutions rather than violence.
  6. Later development can be compared with the proposal. Lorenzo Vidino’s 2025 GWU study says no evidence shows formal approval, yet argues that the institutional evolution of the MSA/ISNA milieu resembles important parts of Akram’s vision.

The strongest skeptical case

  1. Proposal is not adoption. Akram explicitly asks that the memo be put on a future agenda. No public minutes or resolution demonstrate formal approval.
  2. The document is aspirational. “Imagine if they all march according to one plan” implies that the listed bodies did not already do so.
  3. The appendix is ambiguous. It mixes “our” groups with “friends.” A list written by one participant cannot establish current command relationships.
  4. Institution-building is not inherently subversion. Mosques, schools, charities, political participation, and advocacy are normal civil-society conduct. Their moral and legal character depends on aims, methods, transparency, and conduct—not Muslim identity.
  5. The memo was not the HLF verdict. The prosecution’s case was much larger and concerned material support for Hamas. Treating Exhibit 3-85 as if a jury convicted every listed group on its contents is false.
  6. The “master plan” narrative often jumps scales. It moves from Akram → a historical network → every American Muslim organization → Muslims generally without supplying the evidence required for each step.

Fact-check of Georgetown Bridge’s “Civilization Jihad” article

The Bridge Initiative’s 2016 article, “‘Civilization Jihad’: Debunking the Conspiracy Theory,” contains an important corrective but presents it as a more complete exoneration than the sources justify. Its soundest point is that Exhibit 3-85 cannot establish a coordinated conspiracy by ordinary Muslims or every organization in its appendix. Its most serious error is a materially inaccurate description of the 2009 court order.

What the original exhibit can and cannot establish

I checked the 32-page exhibit itself: the Arabic scan, the accompanying English translation, the continuous Bates markings, the addressees, the internal date, the introductory qualifications, the quoted 1987 goal, the “civilization-jihad” passage, the institutional program, and the appendix. The English is the translation filed as part of Government Exhibit 3-85 and quoted by the district court; it is not treated here as a fresh independent Arabic translation.

The exhibit can establish what Akram wrote and how he framed it. It cannot, by itself, establish whether the Council adopted the 1991 elaboration, how widely it circulated, whether every appendix-listed body accepted it, or what any such body does now. Those questions require minutes, communications, governance, finance, testimony, and time-specific conduct.

Claim-by-claim audit

Georgetown claimVerdictWhat the primary record supports
The document was written in May 1991 and found by the FBI in Virginia in 2004.Accurate, with a minor wording issueThe exhibit is dated May 22, 1991. It was recovered during an FBI search under warrant in 2004; “raid” is colloquial but less precise.
Mohamed Akram was “a member” of the Brotherhood.True but materially incompleteThe 2009 order identifies him as “Mohamed Akram of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood.” “One member” understates the institutional position attributed to him in the court record.
HLF was tried on a money-laundering allegation.Incomplete and misleadingMoney laundering was one part of the case. The convictions also included conspiracies and substantive counts involving material support and funds or services to Hamas, plus tax offenses for two defendants.
The 2009 judge said the memo was not “supporting evidence” for money laundering or any other conspiracy.Materially falseGeorgetown appears to lift “without any supporting evidence” from the order’s due-process discussion of publishing a bare list of 246 unindicted co-conspirators. In the order’s evidentiary section, however, Judge Solis said the government produced ample evidence of historical associations, declined to strike CAIR, ISNA, and NAIT from the documents, and expressly discussed Exhibit 3-85 as part of that record. This was not a conviction of those uncharged organizations, but it was also not a ruling that the memo supported no conspiracy.
The 1991 memorandum was not shown to have been formally adopted.Substantially correct if phrased as absence of proofAkram asks that the subject be added to the next Council agenda and requests comments and corrections. No public adoption resolution has been identified. Georgetown overstates the evidence when it moves from “no public proof of adoption” to the affirmative certainty that colleagues “did not adopt” or ignored it.
It was merely Akram’s personal “hopes, ambitions and challenges.”Accurate quotation, selectively usedThe introduction does use those words and disclaims infallibility. In the same paragraph sequence, however, Akram says the paper is an attempt to interpret and explain a long-term plan “approved and adopted” in 1987. The next page says the six-part strategic goal and the priority of “settlement” had Shura approval. The new elaboration was tentative; the goal from which he said it was derived was presented as prior policy.
The memo’s language did not reflect the Brotherhood’s agenda in the other FBI documents.Not demonstrated by the article and in tension with the exhibitThe exhibit itself claims continuity with a 1987 approved goal, an approved “settlement” priority, an Islamic Circle merger effort, and a recent paper from the General Masul. The separate 1991 meeting-summary omission is relevant evidence against formal adoption of this particular memorandum, but silence in a summary does not establish that its underlying goals were foreign to the network.
“Imagine if they all march according to one plan” shows the appendix organizations were not already coordinated under one plan.A legitimate limiting inferenceThe sentence is powerful evidence that Akram was describing an aspiration rather than reporting full coordination of all listed bodies. Yet it coexists with a heading that calls them “our organizations and the organizations of our friends” and with a program for alliances, “absorption,” and bringing others into the plan’s orbit. It rebuts automatic control; it does not make the list meaningless.
The memo proves ordinary American Muslims and major Muslim organizations were cooperating to impose a caliphate.Georgetown is right to reject this inferenceExhibit 3-85 does not survey ordinary Muslims, prove their assent, or separate “our organizations” from “friends.” Nor does inclusion establish present control. Any allegation against a named organization needs organization-specific evidence.
The memo was a report from U.S. leadership to a Brotherhood “mothership” in Egypt.Not supported by this exhibitThe memo is addressed to the General Masul, Council secretary, and Shura members in the North American group. It does not establish that the document was sent to Egypt or issued by international leadership.
The exact phrases are rare online and in a corpus; therefore Akram’s ideas had no influence.Unsupported inferenceExact-phrase rarity can show that “civilization jihad” was not ordinary or mainstream Islamic terminology. It cannot establish the organizational impact of a private internal memorandum. Public web frequency through 2012 is a weak proxy for private circulation, policy adoption, institutional behavior, or the prevalence of similar ideas expressed in different language. Georgetown moves from a linguistic finding to a historical-causal conclusion its method cannot bear.
The memo “did not have influence in other Muslim circles” and is inconsequential worldwide.Not establishedThe exhibit cannot prove its own later influence, but Georgetown’s corpus searches cannot prove non-influence either. This remains an empirical question requiring reception and implementation evidence. The article is strongest when it says influence is unproved, not when it says absence is proved.
“This document should not be taken seriously.”Unwarranted conclusionThe responsible conclusion is narrower: do not treat it as an adopted constitution, a control chart, a criminal verdict, or a warrant for collective suspicion. It remains serious historical evidence about the goals and methods advocated by a Shura-linked participant who claimed to be explaining previously approved objectives.

The article’s sourcing problem

As the Georgetown page is currently published, many of its pivotal links—including links attached to the memorandum, the 2009 opinion, the alleged 1991 meeting summary, and the linguistic methodology—resolve through the same citation target or redirect to a Southern Poverty Law Center profile of Frank Gaffney rather than to the underlying documents. This makes several claims difficult to reproduce from the article’s own citations. A source audit should use the court exhibit and judicial order directly, not Georgetown’s current link chain.

Overall verdict on Georgetown

Mixed, with one major factual error

Georgetown is right that critics often inflate a proposal into a formally adopted master plan, turn an ambiguous appendix into a control chart, and generalize from a historical Brotherhood milieu to ordinary Muslims. It is also right that this exhibit does not prove a reporting line to Egypt or a current nationwide conspiracy.

Georgetown is wrong about the 2009 order, misleadingly minimizes Akram as merely one undifferentiated member, and uses selective quotations to obscure the memo’s claimed basis in a previously approved goal and priority. Its exact-phrase searches may rebut claims that “civilization jihad” is mainstream Islamic vocabulary, but they do not prove that Akram’s underlying program was inconsequential. The article therefore corrects genuine overreach while committing a mirror-image overreach of its own.

Assessment of the two supplied polemics

SourceWhat it gets rightWhere it overreaches
Georgetown Bridge Initiative (2016)Correctly stresses the aspirational phrasing, absence of public proof of formal adoption, and misuse of the memo to stigmatize ordinary Muslims.Materially misstates the 2009 court order, underweights Akram’s institutional position and the prior approved goal he quotes, and infers lack of influence from weak linguistic proxies.
Middle East Forum / Investigative Project (2017)Correctly rejects claims that the memo is fabricated or wholly isolated and points to additional Brotherhood/Palestine Committee material.It sometimes moves too quickly from historical connections or ideological similarity to continuing organizational control, and it treats critics’ cautions as if they all deny the primary evidence.

The 2026 Senate testimony

Lara Burns’s 42-page testimony is unusually relevant because she says she led the HLF investigation between 2001 and 2008. It identifies the Elbarasse search, reproduces network exhibits, and interprets the memorandum as recording the agenda of a U.S. Brotherhood network. It is a stronger source for investigative provenance than ordinary commentary.

But it must be classified correctly:

  • First-hand professional witness concerning the investigation and recovered record.
  • Advocacy testimony at a hearing titled Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America.
  • Not a court judgment, cross-examined trial verdict, or neutral consensus report about every present-day organization.

The current U.S. legal position is also branch-specific. In 2026 the federal government designated several national Brotherhood branches, including the Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Sudanese branches, under terrorism authorities. That does not automatically designate a single undifferentiated worldwide movement or every U.S. organization alleged to have historical Brotherhood ties.

Claim-status table

ClaimStatusConfidence / limit
The document exists and is authenticDocumentedVery high
It was written in 1991DocumentedVery high; internal date May 22
The FBI seized it in 1991FalseThe recovery was in 2004
Akram addressed it to the U.S. Brotherhood Shura CouncilDocumentedHigh
It contains the “civilization jihad” and destruction languageDocumentedVery high
It presents itself as elaborating a 1987 approved strategic goalDocumented self-descriptionHigh as to what the memo says; independent adoption evidence should still be sought
The 1991 Shura Council formally adopted this memorandumNot established in the public record reviewedCritical missing link
The appendix proves every listed group was Brotherhood-controlledUnsupported as a blanket inferenceNeeds group-specific corroboration
Other records show a structured U.S. Brotherhood/Palestine Committee milieu and Hamas support activityDocumentedStrongest for the particular people and entities litigated in HLF
HLF and five leaders were convicted of supporting HamasConfirmedConvictions affirmed
The 2009 court ruled that Exhibit 3-85 supported no conspiracyFalseConfuses the due-process discussion of publishing a bare list with the order’s later evidentiary analysis
Rare use of Akram’s exact terminology proves the program had no influenceUnsupportedPhrase frequency is not reception or implementation evidence
Every contemporary U.S. Muslim organization is part of one covert Brotherhood networkUnsupportedSweeping present-day claim
The memo is irrelevant because it was “one man’s fantasy”Too strongAspirational and unadopted are not the same as irrelevant

How to use the memo responsibly

Best formulation

The 1991 Explanatory Memorandum is an authentic internal proposal from a significant participant in a documented U.S. Brotherhood milieu. It reveals one influential actor’s illiberal, gradualist vision and claims continuity with a previously approved strategic goal. It is legitimate evidence for investigating particular networks. It is not, standing alone, proof of formal adoption, present-day command over every listed organization, criminal conduct, or the beliefs of Muslims generally.

Use a four-link test before making a present-day allegation:

  1. Identity: Is this the same legal organization or leadership lineage?
  2. Authority: Did the author or body have power to bind it?
  3. Adoption: Was the proposal accepted, funded, implemented, or repeated?
  4. Continuity: Is there current conduct, governance, finance, or communication corroborating the historical link?

Sources

Primary and official

Interpretive

See also