Skip to content
Read • Question • ConnectAnthony’s notes & researchReturn with a new question
Anthony’s NotesA personal field guide
From the notebook

Atheism

Arguments

Problem of Evil

1. The Core Idea of the Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil is a central challenge to theism, especially for religions that posit a God who is all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and perfectly good (omnibenevolent). The core dilemma is summarized by the ancient formulation attributed to Epicurus (via later sources, such as Lactantius and David Hume):

  1. If God is willing to prevent evil but not able, He is not omnipotent.
  2. If He is able but not willing, He is malevolent.
  3. If He is both able and willing, whence evil?
  4. If He is neither able nor willing, why call Him God?
    Modern philosophers (e.g., J.L. Mackie, James Sterba, J.L. Schellenberg) refine this into two main categories of argument:
  • Logical Problem of Evil – claims that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of a traditional theistic God.
  • Evidential (or Probabilistic) Problem of Evil – argues that while not logically impossible, the scale, distribution, and nature of suffering (especially seemingly gratuitous suffering) make God’s existence highly improbable.

2. The Logical Problem of Evil

As defended by Mackie (in The Miracle of Theism, 1982) and others, the argument posits:

  • God knows about all suffering (omniscience).
  • God has the power to stop all suffering (omnipotence).
  • God, being good, would want to stop all suffering (omnibenevolence).
    Thus, logically, such a God would prevent all suffering. Since suffering exists, God cannot exist.
    Philosophers note this “strict contradiction” was widely discussed but has largely been abandoned in favor of evidential arguments, because theists offered plausible rebuttals.

3. Theist Rebuttals to the Logical Problem

Theists argue that the logical problem fails because it ignores possible reasons God might allow suffering:

  1. Free Will Defense (Alvin Plantinga) – Evil is a byproduct of genuine free will. A world where creatures freely choose love and goodness is more valuable than a world of programmed automatons, even if it risks suffering.
  2. Soul-Making Theodicy (John Hick) – Suffering is a means for moral and spiritual development. Virtues like courage, compassion, and perseverance only exist if there are challenges to overcome.
  3. Greater Goods Defense – Certain goods (e.g., bravery, forgiveness, redemption) can only exist in the presence of evil and suffering.
  4. Divine Mystery Defense – Humans, with limited understanding, cannot fully comprehend God’s purposes (echoing the Book of Job).
    These rebuttals led most modern debates to shift toward evidential versions of the problem, where the question is not whether evil can exist with God, but whether the amount and kinds of evil make God’s existence unlikely.

4. The Evidential Problem of Evil

This version, developed by thinkers like William Rowe and Paul Draper, argues that while some evil might be compatible with a divine plan, the extent, randomness, and brutality of suffering make theism unlikely compared to naturalism.
Key points:

  • Gratuitous Suffering: Many instances (e.g., a fawn dying painfully in a forest fire, countless cases of child suffering, the extinction of 99% of species) appear to serve no discernible greater good.
  • Evolutionary History: Hundreds of millions of years of predation, disease, parasitism, and mass extinctions suggest a “bloodbath” inconsistent with a benevolent creator.
  • Alternative Creation Options: A good God could have used painless or non-predatory mechanisms for life, or anesthetized prey, or shortened lifespans of suffering beings—yet chose a system rife with agony.
    Under Bayesian reasoning (Draper, 1989), this data is vastly more probable if there is no moral, benevolent designer than if such a God exists.

5. Religious Counterarguments

Theists counter evidential versions in several ways:

  1. Skeptical Theism – Humans cannot judge what counts as “pointless” suffering; our limited knowledge cannot assess God’s morally sufficient reasons. (Michael Bergmann, Stephen Wykstra)
  2. Ultimate Goods or Afterlife – Suffering may be outweighed by eternal goods, making present evils temporary and purposeful.
  3. The Argument from Existence – Even if suffering is abundant, the fact that conscious, moral beings exist at all may itself suggest divine creation; on naturalism, consciousness and moral frameworks are not guaranteed.
  4. Moral Argument Turnaround – Critics like William Lane Craig argue that atheists, by labeling suffering as objectively “evil,” implicitly invoke moral standards that naturalism cannot justify, “borrowing from theism.”

6. Atheist Responses to These Counters

  • The argument can be framed without appealing to objective morality, focusing only on the descriptive fact of extreme suffering (Rowe’s “fawn in the forest” example).
  • The argument can be made internally: if theists themselves claim objective evil exists, they must reconcile that with their God’s plan.
  • Objective morality does not require God; secular moral realism and other metaethical theories provide naturalistic accounts (see works by Erik Wielenberg, Russ Shafer-Landau).

7. Why It Persists as a Central Argument

The Problem of Evil remains the most cited and intuitively powerful argument for atheism because:

  • It is simple and relatable (“Why would a loving God allow this?”).
  • It can be presented without complex metaphysics.
  • It applies across most theistic religions, particularly Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
  • It aligns with empirical observations of suffering, making it rhetorically effective even if not deductively conclusive.
    Philosopher Graham Oppy notes that while professional debate often shifts to subtle evidential forms, the problem’s enduring power lies in its emotional and existential force as much as in logic.

References for Context

  • J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (1982) – classical logical problem statement.
  • William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” (1979).
  • Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists” (1989).
  • Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (1977) – Free Will Defense.
  • John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966) – Soul-making theodicy.
  • Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering” (1984) – Skeptical Theism.

The Problem of Evil (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Divine Hiddenness

1. The Core Argument from Divine Hiddenness

The argument, most famously developed by philosopher J.L. Schellenberg (see Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 1993), challenges the existence of a perfectly loving God. It can be summarized as:

  1. If a perfectly loving God exists, He would be always open to a personal relationship with any finite person.
    • Perfect love is relational and self-giving. It implies a desire for union, not just benevolence.
    • A loving God would not withhold the opportunity for creatures to enter into a conscious, reciprocal relationship.
  2. If God is always open to such a relationship, there would be no “non-resistant non-belief” (people who lack belief in God without willfully rejecting Him).
    • To be in a personal relationship, one must at least believe the other exists.
    • If someone is genuinely open to relationship, God would provide the minimal conditions (awareness of His existence).
  3. There are many cases of non-resistant non-belief.
    • Millions of people, through no fault of their own, lack belief in God—due to cultural, historical, or evidential factors.
    • Examples include people raised in non-theistic societies (e.g., Buddhist Thailand), historically isolated tribes, or sincere seekers who never encounter convincing evidence.
      Conclusion:
      Therefore, no perfectly loving God exists. If the traditional theistic God is supposed to be perfectly loving, His existence is undermined.

2. Why the Argument Resonates

  • Many atheists (especially “passive” or “apatheists”) cite God’s absence—rather than suffering—as their main reason for disbelief.
  • The argument taps into a common, intuitive feeling: “If God wants me to know Him, why is He silent?”
  • It feels less abstract than the Problem of Evil, since it concerns personal experience and relationship, not only suffering.

3. Supporting Observations

  1. Geographic Distribution of Belief
    • People are far more likely to be theists in places like Rwanda (heavily Catholic) than in Thailand (over 90% Buddhist and generally non-theistic).
    • If salvation or divine relationship depends on belief, why would a loving God allow birthplace to so strongly influence eternal destiny?
    • This suggests belief patterns track culture, not divine revelation.
  2. Historical and Cultural Isolation
    • Billions of people throughout history never had exposure to Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.
    • Some tribal peoples remain completely unaware of any “theistic” concept.
    • If their non-belief is “non-resistant,” why would a loving God leave them ignorant?
  3. Arbitrariness of Revelation
    • Some, like C.S. Lewis, describe being “dragged” into belief despite resistance. Others beg for evidence and receive none.
    • The seemingly random distribution of divine self-revelation is puzzling if God desires universal relationship.

4. Theist Counterarguments

Theists challenge the argument by denying one or more premises:

A. Denying Non-Resistant Non-Belief

  • Some argue no one is truly non-resistant. Everyone has “enough” evidence but suppresses it (Romans 1:20).
  • Atheists are accused of rejecting God due to pride, sin, or moral rebellion.
    Problems:
  • Implausible given cultural and historical isolation (e.g., isolated tribes, sincere seekers).
  • Selective: theists reject similar accusations when skeptics claim all believers are “wishful thinkers.”

B. God Has Reasons to Hide

  • Avoiding Epistemic Overpowering – If God’s existence were obvious, humans couldn’t freely choose to love Him; belief would be coerced.
  • Greater Goods – Temporary non-belief can lead to deeper relationships later (the “prodigal child” effect). Conversion stories inspire others.
  • Implicit Relationships – Non-theists pursuing truth, goodness, and beauty are, unknowingly, relating to God. Explicit awareness may not be necessary.
    Critiques of These Defenses:
  1. Knowing someone exists doesn’t negate free will (e.g., Satan and demons know God exists but reject Him).
  2. A single undeniable encounter would suffice without God being constantly “hovering.”
  3. Non-belief still carries risks—if salvation hinges on conversion, a random event (like untimely death) could doom someone despite God’s supposed plan.

5. Evidential vs. Logical Form

Like the Problem of Evil, the argument can be framed:

  • Deductively (logical incompatibility): A loving God cannot allow non-resistant non-belief.
  • Inductively (probabilistic): The prevalence of such non-belief is highly unexpected under theism but expected under naturalism, thus counting as evidence against God.
    Most modern philosophers (including Schellenberg) present it as an evidential argument, not a strict proof.

6. Specific Challenges to Certain Religious Doctrines

The argument especially targets exclusive salvationist Christianity (where lack of belief leads to eternal damnation).

  • It seems unjust for people like:
    • A Thai Buddhist who never hears of Jesus.
    • A 12-year-old Jewish girl taught only Judaism.
    • Isolated tribes with no exposure to theism.
      If such people are condemned solely for lack of belief, divine love appears incoherent.
      Some Christians counter that:
  • Salvation is based on Christ’s sacrifice, not explicit belief.
  • What matters is doing “the will of the Father” (Matthew 7:21), not labels.
  • Moral living may be sufficient, regardless of religious affiliation (Romans 2:14–16).

7. Why It Remains Powerful

  • Like the Problem of Evil, Divine Hiddenness is simple and intuitive.
  • It appeals to the lived experience of believers and non-believers alike (the feeling of divine silence).
  • It highlights cultural and historical contingencies that challenge notions of universal divine love.
    However, compared to the Problem of Evil, many find it less conclusive—divine absence can be more easily reframed (e.g., as testing, mystery, or implicit relationship).

References for Context

  • J.L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993).
  • Michael Rea & Paul K. Moser, Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2017).
  • Paul Draper, “God and the Problem of Evil” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
  • Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering” (applied analogously to hiddenness).

Hiddenness of God (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Religious Confusion

1. The Core Argument

This argument claims that the sheer diversity and confusion of religious claims—across time, geography, and cultures—is unexpected if a loving, just God exists, but unsurprising if there is no God. In its basic evidential form:

  1. If God exists and desires a relationship with finite creatures, we’d expect Him to make the truth about Himself and the path to relate to Him clear and accessible to all.
    • Relationship with God is said to be of ultimate value.
    • Many religions teach that getting it wrong has eternal stakes (salvation vs. damnation).
  2. The world is filled with extreme religious diversity and confusion.
    • Thousands of competing religions and denominations, each with different conceptions of God (or no God), different sacred texts, and conflicting teachings on salvation and morality.
    • Many revelations appear “mundane or absurd” (e.g., texts with morally troubling commands like killing entire groups, collective punishment, or miraculous stories that resemble folklore).
  3. Such confusion leads to strife and doubt.
    • Religious wars, persecution, sectarian divisions, and tribalism often emerge from this diversity.
      Conclusion:
      If a God existed who cared about human salvation and flourishing, we’d expect more unified, clear revelation. The confusion we see is much more probable on naturalism (religions as human cultural constructs) than on theism, making theism less likely.

2. Why It Feels Forceful

  • It appeals to common intuition: If God really wanted us to know Him, why are His messages so contradictory?
  • It feels especially compelling when combined with the high stakes taught by many faiths (eternal reward/punishment for “getting it wrong”).
  • It highlights how belief correlates with cultural accident: most people inherit their religion based on geography, not divine encounter.
    Philosopher Paul Draper and others note that, much like the Problem of Evil, the force of this argument is probabilistic—it suggests the world looks more like one without a God who reveals Himself clearly.

3. Theist Counterarguments

A. Religious Commonalities Undercut the Force

  • Though diverse, nearly all societies exhibit religious sensibilities—a sense of the sacred, belief in supernatural forces, moral codes tied to transcendence.
  • This “convergence” suggests a divine source: humanity’s universal search for the transcendent could itself point to God (C.S. Lewis makes this point in Mere Christianity).
    Critique:
    The argument isn’t about bare religiosity, but about the conflicting revelations and high-stakes contradictions. Universal religious instinct doesn’t explain why a loving God would allow such confusion over the details that supposedly matter for salvation.

B. God Has Reasons to Allow Confusion

  1. Moral and Spiritual Growth:
    • Disagreement fosters humility, dialogue, and the pursuit of truth across barriers.
    • Conflict can be an opportunity for virtues like patience, tolerance, and love toward opponents.
  2. Freedom and Non-Coercion:
    • A perfectly clear, undeniable revelation could “coerce” belief, undermining free will in choosing God.
  3. Revelation Already Given:
    • Many traditions (Christianity, Islam) argue God has revealed Himself clearly (via scripture, prophets, or incarnation). Disagreement arises from human error, sin, or cultural distortions.
      Critiques of These Defenses:
  • The “goods” from disagreement (virtue, dialogue) can be realized within a single clear religion without risking eternal damnation.
  • The freedom objection is weak: as with Divine Hiddenness, knowing someone exists doesn’t negate free will(e.g., Satan and demons in theology still freely reject God).
  • Scripture itself is part of the confusion, as holy texts often appear culturally bound, contradictory, or morally problematic.

4. Relation to Divine Hiddenness

This argument is often seen as a subset of the Divine Hiddenness problem, since religious confusion is another manifestation of God’s apparent silence.
However, it has a distinct focus:

  • Hiddenness asks, “Why doesn’t God make Himself known to non-believers?”
  • Religious Confusion asks, “Why are even believers so deeply divided about who God is and what He wants?”
    Both arguments gain extra weight under traditions that tie salvation to belief.

5. Probabilistic Framing

Like the Problem of Evil and Hiddenness, this is best framed as an evidential (not deductive) argument:

  • On atheism/naturalism: Religious diversity is easily explained as a product of history, culture, psychology, and social dynamics.
  • On theism: A loving, just God would likely provide consistent and unambiguous guidance, at least on core truths.
  • Therefore, the diversity we observe counts as evidence favoring naturalism.

6. Final Placement and Force

Compared to the Problem of Evil (S-tier) and Divine Hiddenness (A-tier), Religious Confusion is generally seen as weaker (B-tier) because:

  • Religious diversity doesn’t directly contradict God’s existence.
  • Theists can appeal to shared religious instincts or argue that some confusion serves a purpose.
    Still, it remains a probabilistic challenge to the notion of a loving God concerned with human salvation.

References for Context

  • Paul Draper, “God and Perceptions of Evil” (for parallels to evidential arguments).
  • J.L. Schellenberg (on hiddenness, overlapping issues).
  • C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (on religious commonalities as evidence for God).
  • John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (pluralistic theology of religions).
  • William Lane Craig (various debates on divine revelation and plurality).

Institutional religion, authority, and harm

Christopher Hitchens’s 2009 case against the Catholic Church is best classified as an institutional and political critique, not a direct proof that God does not exist. It asks whether recurrent institutional harm, delayed correction, and claims of divine warrant defeat the Church’s claim to special moral authority. It also separates the real value of charitable work from the unrelated inference that the charity proves doctrine true.

References

Arguments For Atheism Tier List - YouTube