I recently watched an episode of Piers Morgan Uncensored featuring a debate between two Orthodox Christian apologists, Jay Dyer and Andrew Wilson, and two younger atheists. To my disappointment, the comment section was overwhelmingly supportive of Dyer and Wilson. That said, I understand why. The atheists’ performance left a lot to be desired, and I wasn’t particularly impressed either. As a result, I’ve started researching presuppositional apologetics to see if I could formulate more compelling counterarguments myself.
One of Dyer’s key points involved citing David Hume’s Is-Ought gap to criticize atheism, arguing that atheism lacks a foundation for morality and therefore cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” I actually agree with the basic assertion that atheism doesn’t provide an objective foundation for morality. However, it’s ironic that Dyer invokes Hume, since Hume’s argument applies universally, not just to atheism, but to any worldview, including theistic moral systems. Even theists acknowledge that God cannot do what is logically impossible, such as creating a square circle. Likewise, turning an “is” into an “ought” would constitute a similar logical paradox.
Moreover, the Is-Ought problem isn’t much of an issue for those who openly accept that morality is subjective. The problem only arises for those attempting to treat moral claims as objective facts, like scientific measurements. But subjective moral claims aren’t invalid simply because they’re subjective. For example, when we say “you ought not touch a hot stove,” we’re implicitly appealing to a subjective preference, namely, the aversion to pain. Recognizing this doesn’t undermine moral discourse; it just grounds it in human experience rather than metaphysical absolutes.
Presuppositionalists like Jay often argue that atheists undermine their own position by using logic and reason to argue against God, on the basis that God is supposedly the necessary precondition for logic and reason. They liken this to breathing air to argue that oxygen doesn’t exist. But this analogy only works if one already accepts the presuppositionalist’s framework. From their perspective, it seems like a contradiction, but only because of the assumptions they bring to the table. An atheist could just as easily flip the analogy, claiming that the theist is contradicting themselves by using logic, assumed to be naturalistic and secular, to argue for a supernatural being. Both sides can make mirror-image claims, which shows that the assertion is not inherently persuasive unless one’s worldview is already biased toward it.
Jay also repeatedly appeals to the so-called “transcendental argument” for God, claiming that it must be true because “the contrary is impossible.” But that’s not self-evident. The “impossibility of the contrary” is just an assertion unless it’s actually demonstrated. Why should we accept that the opposite is logically impossible? It needs more than rhetorical flair to be convincing.
Presuppositionalists often argue that logic and reason require a foundation, but why assume that? Theists frequently claim that God is a “necessary being” who doesn’t require justification or a cause. But if that’s acceptable for God, why not for logic? One could just as easily argue that logic itself is foundational, true by necessity, not in need of a creator. Jay’s own argument could be turned around: perhaps logic is necessary “because the contrary is impossible.” To say that logic needs grounding while God does not is special pleading.
Besides, the laws of logic, like the law of non-contradiction, are not arbitrary. They reflect the structure of thought and meaning. What would it even mean for something to be both itself and not itself at the same time? That’s not just counterintuitive; it’s incoherent. If logic were “created,” then God could have made it otherwise, which would imply that God could have created a universe where contradictions are true. Yet theists will simultaneously claim God cannot do anything logically contradictory. This implies that God is subject to logic, not the source of it.
Lastly, on the topic of trusting our senses, presuppositionalists often challenge atheists by questioning how they can know anything at all. But this epistemic skepticism cuts both ways. If “knowledge” is defined so strictly that anything short of omniscience doesn’t count, then no one, atheist or theist, can claim to know anything. Theists aren’t immune to illusion, deception, or delusion. Schizophrenia, optical illusions, and vivid dreams all demonstrate that our senses can mislead us, regardless of our metaphysical beliefs. To critique someone for relying on their senses, while offering no viable alternative, is unhelpful. We don’t have access to some “objective reality switch” we can flip to verify everything with divine certainty. We work with what we have, whether the world is real, a simulation, or a hallucination.
Comments
Sophia_in_the_Shell • 9 points •
I think a lot of the seemingly strongest arguments for theism involve reasonably identifying puzzles of reality (fine-tuning, foundation for logic) and then challenging atheism to solve them without actively arguing for why theism does solve them, often taking it to be assumed because it’s intuitive at a surface-level.
If we take the position that perhaps human logic is just an illusory system designed by a massively (but perhaps not infinitely) powerful being such that we collectively move towards this being’s goals, then we’re all back to square one, and none of us get to use logic.
In fact, while either a theistic or an atheistic worldview allow for logic to be some “mass delusion,” at least with an atheistic worldview you can talk about triangulation. That is, if the illusion is designed by our individual drives for survival, our individual illusions shouldn’t always coincide with each other. When they do, that’s interesting.
Narrow_List_4308 • 1 points •
I think it defeats naturalism and materialism, which is most kinds of atheism.
On the other hand, what stands most natural in relation to intuitions is a perfectly acceptable stance.
But I think that the theist position does explain how logic is a positive case. But not just logic. Presup of logic is very rare. The most have to do with a lot of transcendental categories
Kapitano72 • 6 points •
Theist: You can’t explain X, therefore…
Atheist: Therefore the flying spaghetti monster did it.
Theist: No, only god can explain it.
Atheist: No, only the FSM can explain it.
Theist: You’re not arguing seriously.
Atheist: You thought you were?
shlaifu • 3 points •
explain why “god” means old guy from the middle east from 5000 years ago and not the flying spaghetti monster
Narrow_List_4308 • 1 points •
If your worldview cannot possibly account for transcendental categories are sufficient to reject that worldview.
Why do you think the theist does not give positive specific reasons for theism? All transcendental argumentation for theism makes specific cases
Kapitano72 • 1 points •
Try that again, but with grammar.
Then, we can focus on its complete incoherence.
happyhappy85 • 3 points •
Wilson is the worst, it’s like less than philosophy 101 lowest common denominator “debate bro” tactics.
The only problem is he has a big following of idiots to applaud him along, so it always looks like he did better than he actually did when you read the comments.
Jmoney1088 • 2 points •
When presuppositionalists say God is the “necessary precondition” for intelligibility, they are simply begging the question, assuming what they need to prove. Logic doesn’t require a mind to exist any more than mathematics does. These are abstract systems that describe relationships and structures, not personal entities. If theists can claim God exists necessarily without explanation, why can’t the same be said of logic or moral intuitions? To demand a foundation for one but not the other is special pleading.
The claim that atheists “borrow” from the Christian worldview when they use reason is equally flimsy. It presumes that logic is the exclusive property of theism, when in fact logic arises from the very structure of coherent thought. If the Christian God were truly required for logic to function, then different theological traditions should produce different logical systems, but they do not. Logic is not region or religion-specific. Furthermore, presuppositionalists often pretend their own epistemology is immune to the same skepticism they apply to atheism. But how does one know the Bible is divinely inspired without first trusting their senses, their reasoning, or the historical reliability of texts, all of which are fallible human faculties? Saying “God reveals it” does not solve the problem, it just shifts the burden to unverifiable revelation.
When Jay Dyer or others invoke the transcendental argument, claiming that God must exist because the contrary is impossible, they skip the hard part, which is demonstrating that the contrary is actually impossible. It is not enough to say it; they must show it. Until then, this is just rhetorical posturing. And appeals to Hume’s is-ought distinction to critique atheism are dishonest when they ignore that the same problem applies to theism. One cannot derive moral obligations from divine facts without inserting extra assumptions. Saying “God is good, therefore we ought to obey him” requires just as much a leap as any secular moral framework. At best, theists are in the same boat; at worst, their moral epistemology is more opaque, because it depends on unverifiable metaphysical claims.
Presupps are the worst apologists.
[deleted] • 1 points •
I’m not going to reply to everything in your comment, I’m tired. One thing, you’re misunderstanding the implications of the is/ought gap. The video linked below has a philosopher explaining it in depth. This philosopher has also debated a ton of presuppers (including Dyer) and shown them for the fools they are. So do a search for his name, sit back and enjoy some quality theist pwnge.
Narrow_List_4308 • 0 points •
The is-ought gap is not a logical one. After all, oughts are, and therefore are subsumed within the ‘is’ category. Not even Hume thought this was a logical gap. He gave this as a challenge, because he stated there was something beyond mere facticity(or generic facticity) that was implied. This does present an issue for naturalism, though, because ought as opposed to can and mere description entails an ideal kind of facticity. This is the relevant part, for what ‘is’ in natural reality does not constitute a normative factor and whatever counts as a normative factor would constitute this regardless of the actual. That is the is/ought gap. Non-naturalists can easy appeal to the ‘is’-ness of the normative through various potential mechanisms and so their problem is not a general one. But it IS a general one and constitutive to the naturalist position(or the non-ideal position) as there is no principled way to demarcate the two realms(the natural/actual vs the normative/ideal one).
Concerning the oxygen example, yes, it is the case that this assumes a bit the point, but that is not meant as a demonstration(that would be quite begging the point), just establishing their point(not their reasoning). Like someone saying in English “English does not exist”, or someone claiming “I don’t exist”. In order for the case to be analogous you would have to make a counter-example of how naturalism can make these transcendental argumentation(by principle it can’t).
Dyer, however his faults(and they are many) may be, does not in fact merely leave it at impossibility of the contrary and leave it at that. He makes systematic demonstrations as to why the main proposals fail. Transcendental argumentation is effective at negating naturalism, not so much atheism. It can be shown against atheism, but not for the Eastern Orthodox theism, that requires further argumentation, and they’ve tried to do this work but to my view does not succeed beyond demonstrating theism.
> One could just as easily argue that logic itself is foundational
Yes, that is true. However, their point is two fold:
a) Logic is non-actual, so it cannot ground in itself anything.
b) They would claim they are not denying logic but saying that there must be a reason why logic is operative. To say logic is operative because it’s necessary would for them beg the question as it would be to affirm logic through logic, but that is question begging. This can also bypass the charge of being necessary because logic in itself cannot ground its own actuality(its connection to reality and not mere formality).This is controversial but the point doesn’t seem moot to me.
> it’s incoherent
Sure. But incoherent in thought, not in reality. How are the structures of thought binding upon reality if there is not a foundational relation of thought and reality?
> If logic were “created,” then God could have made it otherwise
Well, the theist can just bite that bullet and you saying “it makes no sense from this logic” would be irrelevant. But their point is more sophisticated. It is that GOD’s logic is fixed, it is just beyond our logic. It is not the case that GOD could have made logic to be different because how it is is already set by GOD’s eternal meta-logic. It just means it is beyond being established in itself. This is quite a nuanced point, and even if it’s ultimately problematic, it is far more sophisticated than you’re presenting it.
Also, I think you are missing the key aspects of their critique, which are very effective against atheism, especially naturalist atheism, but this is already long. As for your critique of knowledge, I don’t think the “tu quoque” works. Fallibilism of some sense is not incompatible with infallibilism of some sense, what cannot work by principle is total fallibilism.
Kapitano72 • 1 points •
> oughts are, and therefore are subsumed within the ‘is’ category
Go on then, try to empirically demonstrate an ought.
Narrow_List_4308 • 0 points •
Who says the empirical is the only category of is? This is not a logical aspect, at best it’s a theoretical commitment of empiricism, but why are we constrained to an empiricist ontology as a matter of logic? At best this would entail precisely the classic critique that empiricism as such cannot sustain non-empirical categories(namely, the ought of morality) and an a priori reason to reject such empiricism.
For example, a Platonist can affirm the is of oughts(at least in some sense), a Kantian(which I’m partly) can as well. But I would not dream of thinking these are empirical demonstrations for they are not empirical entities.
reformed-xian • -4 points •
you say presuppositional apologetics begs the question—assuming God to prove God—but then turn around and do the same with logic, treating it as necessary “just because it is,” as if necessity needs no grounding when it supports your view; but that’s not argument, that’s metaphysical sleight of hand, and you only get away with it because logic works so well you forget to ask why
you say hume’s is–ought gap makes all moral systems equal in their subjectivity—yet smuggle in obligation through the back door by appealing to shared experience and harm avoidance, as if pain has intrinsic authority or consensus creates duty; it doesn’t, and you know it, which is why you still talk about injustice like it’s real, not just preference
you call god subject to logic—as if logic exists independently, as a cosmic referee god must obey—but can’t explain how impersonal abstractions constrain physical causality without invoking minds or magic, both of which your worldview excludes; so you’re left with laws that govern but aren’t grounded, constraints that constrain nothing, and a universe that somehow obeys rules that didn’t come from anyone
you try to flip the script and say theists use logic too, so they’re borrowing from secularism—but logic isn’t secular, it’s necessary; it’s not the property of naturalism, it’s the precondition of intelligibility, and the real question isn’t whether theists use logic, it’s whether logic itself makes sense in your system—and it doesn’t, not if it’s just a human habit or brain quirk selected for survival
you call the transcendental argument a bald assertion, but you’re still standing on the floor it built—arguing, parsing, inferring, appealing to non-contradiction, coherence, and explanation—without realizing that unless something guarantees those things, your whole case is just noise bouncing off cave walls
you suggest logic can be foundational like god, but then deny it any agency, any mind, any causal force—so which is it? is logic a brute fact, a ghost in the machine, or just the name we give to how our neurons fire? if the last one, stop pretending it’s universal; if the first, explain why it constrains everything without being anything
you admit atheism has no objective morality, then shrug like it doesn’t matter—but it does, because the moment you say “ought,” you’re appealing to something more than instinct or opinion; you’re invoking obligation, and without a moral lawgiver, your moral language collapses into sentiment
and when you say presuppositionalism only makes sense inside its own framework, you miss the whole point—that every framework has presuppositions, including yours, and the real debate isn’t about proof, it’s about preconditions; the question isn’t “can you argue without god?”—you clearly can—the question is “can your worldview justify the tools you’re using to argue?”—and the answer is no
you haven’t refuted the presuppositional claim, you’ve just shifted the burden and hoped no one would notice
oddXian.com | r/LogicAndLogos
Kevidiffel • 6 points •
but then turn around and do the same with logic, treating it as necessary “just because it is,” as if necessity needs no grounding when it supports your view; but that’s not argument, that’s metaphysical sleight of hand, and you only get away with it because logic works so well you forget to ask why
I want to remind you that you you just admitted in a previous post that “logic” is necessary and independent of any God.
you call god subject to logic—as if logic exists independently, as a cosmic referee god must obey
You just admitted that in a previous post.
you call the transcendental argument a bald assertion, but you’re still standing on the floor it built—arguing, parsing, inferring, appealing to non-contradiction, coherence, and explanation—without realizing that unless something guarantees those things, your whole case is just noise bouncing off cave walls
But the transcendental argument didn’t built “the floor” as you previously admitted and that there is no such thing as “something” that “guarantees” those things.
It appears your AI is a bit confused.
came1opard • 1 points •
This is Dr Malpass’ “toast” all over again, isn’t it?
happyhappy85 • 1 points •
Dr Malpass?
reformed-xian • 1 points •
Let’s get clear about the confusion here—because it cuts to the heart of the metaphysical double standard many skeptics walk around with unexamined.
You accuse the transcendental argument of being “sleight of hand”—of just asserting necessity “because it is.” But that’s exactly what your own position does. You treat logic as necessary and independent while denying that anything can make it so. That’s not a refutation; it’s a self-defeating concession.
Logic doesn’t “just exist” like a rock. It is prescriptive—it governs possibility. That requires grounding. If you claim logic is necessary but reject any metaphysical root for that necessity, you’re asserting a brute constraint with no cause, no reason, no origin. That’s metaphysical magic. And you’re doing it while mocking the idea that the Christian worldview has the gall to explain it.
You say, “But you just admitted logic is necessary and independent of God!” No. What I affirm is that logic is not arbitrarily invented by God—it is not posterior to His will. It is anterior to creation but identical to His nature. God doesn’t obey logic like an external law; logic is the eternal expression of His rational mind—the Logos (John 1:1). When I speak of grounding, I’m not appealing to some abstract force beyond God. I’m saying: logic has authority because it is who God is.
You treat logic as a floor we all stand on—and then scoff at the idea that anyone built it. You use tools that only make sense if the universe is rationally structured, and then call the idea of a rational structurer “unscientific.” You’re not neutrally reasoning. Your borrowing the inheritance while denying the Father.
And here’s the real twist: You rely on logic to argue against its own necessity being grounded. That’s like trying to saw off the branch you’re sitting on and insisting gravity doesn’t apply to you.
So yes—the transcendental argument did build the floor. Not by fiat, but by necessity. If logic is universally and prescriptively valid, it must come from something transcendent, rational, and necessarily existent. Every alternative collapses:
• Naturalism can’t account for why logic must apply—only that it happens to.
• Platonism gives you abstract forms with no causal power—phantoms with no hands.
• Christian theism gives you a rational mind whose nature defines coherence itself.
You’ve mistaken the preconditions of argument for the spoils of debate. But without a guarantor of reason, inference is just noise. And calling that noise “necessary” doesn’t make it true. It makes it unexamined.
oddXian.com | r/LogicAndLogos
pnerd314 • 4 points •
the question is “can your worldview justify the tools you’re using to argue?”
Is there a worldview whose presuppositions can be justified?
hoomanneedsdata • 1 points •
🤔👍
stevgan • 1 points •
youtuber tjump shares some interesting ideas on godless objective morality.
Probably better google : presuppositionalist vs graham oppy
AdministrativeLeg14 • 1 points •
Moreover, the Is-Ought problem isn’t much of an issue for those who openly accept that morality is subjective. The problem only arises for those attempting to treat moral claims as objective facts, like scientific measurements. But subjective moral claims aren’t invalid simply because they’re subjective. For example, when we say “you ought not touch a hot stove,” we’re implicitly appealing to a subjective preference, namely, the aversion to pain.
Adding to this, suppose there were an omnipotent deity that had set down a list of rules which a theist might want to call objective morality. Well, so what? Just because it thinks those rules are a good idea, that doesn’t mean that we think in those terms. If you tell me that there’s some rule woven into the very fabric of space-time, which we might call “objective morality”, and according to which you must worship an ANE deity, abstain from gay sex, commit genocide only against the people God tells you to murder, &c.—well, you basically end up with two concepts, morality¹ as woven into the fabric of spacetime and morality² as manifested in the behaviour and internally perceived in the qualia of moral agents like us humans. But even in this case, why should we assume that morality¹ = morality²? Why, in fact, ought we to care about morality¹ at all?
After all, when I say that something is morally good or bad, I’m referring to my concepts of morality, which are presumably some messy combination of primate instinct, my sociocultural background, and (in broad terms) [rule-]utilitarian ethics. If you show me a god who says that what they mean by “good” and “bad” refers to concepts or values distinct from mine, then we’re discussing different concepts, and attempting to conflate them just because both parties happen to use familiar moral terminology becomes a fallacy of equivocation.
Tiny-Ad-7590 • 1 points •
There are so many problems with the presuppositional approach.
One that I think that people miss is that it’s not actually the case that we need to solve the problem of the foundations of logic before we can solve logic.
For example, we have not yet solved the physics problem of how gravity and quantum mechanics can be unified. We’ve not even solved the physics problem of establishing that they can be unified or not.
But we can still engineer cars perfectly fine despite that gap in our knowledge while admitting that there is a low-level gap in our understanding of the universe. “I don’t know, and that’s okay” is a perfectly acceptable answer.
Similarly, we can use logic and reason without needing to solve the fundamental gap at the base. “I don’t know, and that’s okay” is also a perfectly acceptable answer.
I’ve found that once you allow “I don’t know, and that’s okay” as a reasonable answer to questions for which we don’t have good answers so much of religious aplogetics just dissolves in a puff of smoke. Presuppositionalism is one of them.
OddDesigner9784 • 1 points •
Everyone agrees that atheism doesn’t provide a lens for objective morality. Atheism is skepticism for god. Moral systems are seperate. It feels like the top rhetoric method these days is just framing the conversation. Atheism’s solution to morality has absolutely no weight on the validity of Christianity or Atheism. But if you frame a conversation away from what you are defending you can keep asking questions criticising those answers. The goal of this is to win the attention war. If your attention is on atheism and there is more time spent on attacking it gives the illusion religion wins even if that wasn’t explored adequately at all. Because it’s some negativity around atheism vs not talking about Christianity and that’s a false dichotomy. And that’s all Piers Morgan is. He just controls the flow of the conversation to win that attention war for right leaning figures.
Frequent_Clue_6989 • 1 points •
Presupp here …
// Lastly, on the topic of trusting our senses, presuppositionalists often challenge atheists by questioning how they can know anything at all. But this epistemic skepticism cuts both ways. If “knowledge” is defined so strictly that anything short of omniscience doesn’t count, then no one, atheist or theist, can claim to know anything
Presupper Gordon H. Clark puts it this way:
“There is a definite reason why not everything can be deduced. If one tried to prove the axioms of geometry, one must refer back to prior propositions. If these too must be deduced, there must be previous propositions, and so on back ad infinitum. From which it follows: If everything must be demonstrated, nothing can be demonstrated, for there would be no starting point. If you cannot start, then you surely cannot finish.
Every system of theology or philosophy must have a starting point. Logical Positivists started with the unproved assumption that a sentence can have no meaning unless it can be tested by sensation. To speak without referring to something that can be touched, seen, smelled, and especially measured, is to speak nonsense. But they never deduce this principle. It is their non-demonstrable axiom. Worse, it is self-contradictory, for it has not been seen, smelled, or measured; therefore it is self-condemned as nonsense.
If the axioms of other secularists are not nonsense, they are nonetheless axioms. Every system must start somewhere, and it cannot have started before it starts. A naturalist might amend the Logical Positivist’s principle and make it say that all knowledge is derived from sensation. This is not nonsense, but it is still an empirically unverifiable axiom. If it is not self-contradictory, it is at least without empirical justification. Other arguments against empiricism need not be given here: The point is that no system can deduce its axioms.
The inference is this: No one can consistently object to Christianity’s being based on a non-demonstrable axiom. If the secularists exercise their privilege of basing their theorems on axioms, then so can Christians. If the former refuse to accept our axioms, then they can have no logical objection to our rejecting theirs. Accordingly, we reject the very basis of atheism, Logical Positivism, and, in general, empiricism. Our axiom shall be, God has spoken. More completely, God has spoken in the Bible. More precisely, what the Bible says, God has spoken.”
https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=50
anfal857 • 1 points •
I know you’re not the author of that quote, but assuming you agree with their conclusion, I have to ask, is there no difference between axioms that establish rules and axioms that assert the literal existence of something (instead of as an abstraction)? If not, then would having “Cthulhu exists” as an axiom also be valid?
Frequent_Clue_6989 • 1 points •
// If not, then would having “Cthulhu exists” as an axiom also be valid?
Valid in what sense? I would say that Dr. Clark’s point is to engage with the anti-dogmatism of the 19th century, to people who said things like:
“For too long, people have created false ideas about themselves—who they are and who they should be. They’ve built their lives and relationships around these notions, based on their concepts of God, the “ideal person,” and so on. Essentially, the creations of their minds have taken on a life of their own, and these creators have ended up bowing down to their own inventions.
It’s time to free people from these illusions—the ideas, rigid beliefs, and imaginary beings that are holding them back. Let’s rebel against the tyranny of thought itself. Some say we should teach people to replace these fantasies with ideas that are true to human nature. Others suggest we should critically examine them, and still others propose we simply get rid of them altogether. If we do, our current reality will crumble. …
There’s a story about a brave man who believed people drowned only because they were convinced of gravity. He thought if they could just reject the idea of gravity, perhaps by calling it a superstition or a religious belief, they would be immune to the dangers of water. He spent his entire life fighting against the illusion of gravity, even though statistics constantly proved him wrong. This man is a perfect example of the new revolutionary philosophers emerging in Germany.”
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (updated language translation by AI)
So, Presupps like Clark (and myself!) come to engagements about reality by noting that EVERYONE has presuppositions about reality that they bring when they reason and inquire about it; no one is presuppositionless! Consequently, we reject the notion that some have, that one should start reasoning about reality with no presuppositions!
But then, you raise a good point: “What about people who start reasoning from false presuppositions?” … well, the first response is to offer a principle of garbage in, garbage out:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garbage_in%2C_garbage_out
Who can start from bad inputs and expect good outputs?!
So, this would disqualify people who start with knowingly bad inputs (e.g., Cthulu is god!). But, what about people who UNKNOWINGLY start with bad inputs?! (e.g., a hypothetical person who sincerely believes Cthulu is god!) The suggestion is, of course, often offered by atheists who suppose that the existence of the Christian God is as bad a reference point as assuming Cthulu would be!
[deleted] • 1 points •
I thought Jay and Andrew came off like a couple of morons, neither of them could Answeer the Euthyphro dilemma. You have to remember they actively have content creators and weirdos brigade every thing they do.