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How to Do the Right Thing

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Philosophus), Seneca

Book Cover
How to Do the Right Thing- An Ancient Guide to Treating — Seneca; Robert Kaster (Annotated).pdf (file not included in this release)

My Summary

Main Ideas, Takeaways & Similarities

Questions

I. What is the problem?
A. How is this problem formulated?
B. Why is this problem important?
C. What is the history of this problem?
D. Which prominent personalities have been interested in this problem?

II. What solutions to the problem are there?
A. What are the conclusions reached?
B. By what argument(s) is the conclusion reached?
C. What facts or assumptions serve as premises?
D. When a prominent personality offers a solution, does he also argue for or against other prominent personalities? Does he raise objections to alternative solutions? Does he consider objections to his own solutions?

III. Evaluation
A. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative formulations to the problem?
B. Has the importance or history of the problem ever been misrepresented?
C. Are the solutions logically related to the premises?
D. Are the facts true? Are the assumptions acceptable? Are the objections answerable?

AI Summary

Introduction

Robert Kaster gathers Seneca’s scattered ethical passages into five thematic chapters that explore fairness—the everyday Stoic virtue of treating people exactly as they deserve. Seneca’s life (exile, tutorship of Nero, withdrawal from court, forced suicide) provides the backdrop. The introduction explains core Stoic ideas—divine reason permeating nature, virtue as the only true good, “indifferents” such as health or wealth, and the goal of living “according to nature.” Magnanimity (a “large mind” that sees the world steadily and justly) is presented as the foundation of right action toward others.

1. Striving for Magnanimity

Key idea: Fairness begins with enlarging the mind.

  • Highlights & themes*
  • Small- vs. large-mindedness. Petty people cling to narrow self-interest; the magnanimous adopt broad, impartial views.
  • The Stoic “large mind.” True magnanimity is flawless judgment that differs from the mind of God “only in being mortal.”
  • Models to imitate. Seneca offers Socrates and Cato the Younger as near-wise exemplars who remained steadfast under persecution, civil war, and personal loss.
  • Progress is possible. One cultivates a good will by shrinking desires rather than enlarging possessions or honors; wisdom is open to all, regardless of birth.
  • Daily practice. Clear judgments, modest wants, and continuous self-correction move the ordinary person toward the “fair and just” perspective that the wise possess effortlessly.

2. Being Calm, Thinking Clearly

Key idea: Justice requires unclouded perception.

  • Highlights & themes*
  • Good vs. bad emotions. Where the ordinary person feels fear, the wise experience measured caution because they know bodily harm is not a true evil.
  • Sources of unrest. Restlessness, chronic dissatisfaction, and lack of self-knowledge keep most people agitated and unjust.
  • Therapies for the mind.
    • Limit desires; focus effort only on worthwhile aims.
    • Anticipate fortune’s reverses and plan with “unless-something-intervenes” humility.
    • Ignore crowd opinion; fashion leads away from nature.
      Calm reason positions us to weigh other people’s claims fairly instead of reacting from impulse.

3. Judging Yourself Fairly

Key idea: Before judging others, examine yourself.

  • Highlights & themes*
  • Seneca urges nightly self-audit—What did I do? How did I speak? Was it just?—to curb self-flattery and align conduct with rational standards.
  • A balanced verdict on one’s own actions trains the faculty that later decides what others deserve.

4. Doing Right by Others

Key idea: Justice is relational; benefits and duties must be rightly exchanged.

  • Highlights & themes*
  • Cosmic citizenship. Because the wise regard all possessions as ultimately on loan from Jupiter, they give and receive without envy.
  • Oikeiôsis (affiliation). Human beings naturally extend concern from self to family, friends, and eventually all of humanity; right action honors those concentric ties.
  • Practical counsel. Gifts, help, praise, correction, or punishment should match the recipient’s character and the common good—neither grudging nor extravagant.

5. Being Merciful

Key idea: The power to punish must be tempered by reasoned clemency.

  • Highlights & themes*
  • Definition. Mercy is “the mind’s moderation when it holds the power to punish” and is opposed both to cruelty (excess) and to sentimental pity (irrational distress).
  • Aims of punishment. Correction of the wrongdoer, deterrence of others, and community safety are better achieved by sparing, proportionate penalties than by habitual severity.
  • Why the wise do not ‘forgive’. They neither over-punish nor waive deserved penalties randomly; instead they choose the just minimum, guided by reason—not by weakness or raw emotion.
  • Case studies.
    • Augustus and Cinna: the emperor spares a would-be assassin, turning an enemy into a loyal friend and securing public peace.
    • Tarius’s domestic court: Augustus advises a father to banish, not execute, a near-parricide son—illustrating calibrated mercy that satisfies justice yet preserves humanity.
  • Stoic stance on pity. The wise relieve misery without sharing the sufferer’s agitation; clear sight, not shared distress, best serves the common good.

Overall Through-Line

Seneca’s book moves from forming a just character (magnanimity, calm reason, honest self-assessment) to acting justly (right exchange, merciful restraint). The highlighted passages you marked emphasize that Stoic fairness is neither cold nor passive: it is an active, rational commitment to give every person—including oneself—exactly what nature and reason say is due.

Summary of the Introduction

The introduction establishes that the book explores the concept of fairness in everyday, person-to-person interactions, drawing from the ethical writings of the Stoic philosopher Seneca. It provides a brief biography of Seneca, noting his role as a Roman statesman and tutor to the emperor Nero. The book’s excerpts are taken from Seneca’s major ethical works: On Benefits, On Mercy, the Dialogues (especially On Anger), and the Moral Epistles.

Crucially, the introduction outlines key Stoic beliefs that provide the foundation for Seneca’s advice. These include the idea that the universe is governed by a providential God, also called “nature” or “reason”. For humans, the only true good is virtue, defined as the mind’s consistent exercise of reason. External things like wealth or health are considered “indifferent” and do not contribute to a truly good life. The ultimate goal is to achieve “magnanimity” or “large-mindedness,” the quality that ensures one always acts with reason and treats others with perfect fairness.

Chapter 1: Striving for Magnanimity

This chapter defines the ideal state of mind required to do the right thing: magnanimity, or “large-mindedness”. This quality is presented as the direct opposite of being “small-minded”—petty, inflexible, and self-interested. A person with a large mind is content, self-confident, and understands that happiness comes from their own inner resources, not from external things like wealth or favors.

Seneca uses a metaphor of a dog that greedily snatches and swallows scraps without savoring them, always hoping for more. This is how most people treat fortune’s gifts. The wise person, by contrast, is full and content, calmly enjoying a happiness that is their own. This state of mind is described as a “fine and holy sight”, incorporating all virtues like justice, courage, and generosity. The chapter emphasizes that the path to this ideal involves lessening one’s desires rather than trying to acquire more things. It concludes with the encouraging Stoic principle that a “good mind is available to all,” regardless of social rank; philosophy “shines for all”.

Chapter 2: Being Calm, Thinking Clearly

This chapter argues that clarity of mind is the essential precondition for all virtues, including fairness. Seneca explains the Stoic view that emotions like fear or anger are the result of incorrect judgments. For instance, we fear physical harm only because we mistakenly judge it to be a true evil, when for a Stoic the only evil is a lack of virtue. The non-wise mind is therefore in a state of constant turmoil, plagued by restlessness, self-loathing, and indecision.

To achieve tranquility, one must question common opinions and think for oneself. Seneca advises anticipating that things may not go as planned, stating one’s intentions with a reserve clause like, “I will sail—absent some chance occurrence”. This prevents the pain of disappointed desire. The ultimate goal is self-reliance, which is the only true guarantee of a happy life. The chapter uses a metaphor of a skilled helmsman in a storm. The helmsman’s skill is demonstrated not by a successful voyage (which is subject to chance) but by his expert effort. Similarly, virtue lies in the intention and the attempt, which are the only things fully in our control.

Chapter 3: Judging Yourself Fairly

This chapter posits that treating others fairly begins with judging yourself fairly. Seneca identifies a core human tendency to have “the mind of a monarch within,” wanting complete freedom for ourselves but not for others. The primary obstacle to fairness is this innate self-centeredness and complacency. People are quick to believe praise, even when they know it is false, because it allows them to avoid changing.

As a remedy, Seneca urges honest and regular self-reflection. He uses Alexander the Great as an example: when wounded, Alexander was forced to admit, “this wound cries out that I am human,” puncturing his own divine pretensions. This kind of self-awareness is key. The most effective practice is a systematic review of one’s day. Seneca describes his own nightly habit of examining his actions and words, acting as his own accuser, judge, and intercessor. This practice, encapsulated in the quote “Awareness of doing wrong is the beginning of well-being”, allows one to identify and correct their own flaws before they lead to unfair treatment of others.

Chapter 4: Doing Right by Others

Building on the previous chapters, this section explains the basis for our duty to others and how to practice it. The fundamental reason is the Stoic belief that “we are God’s comrades and God’s limbs”. The universe is a single, interconnected whole, and all humans are physically and rationally connected to each other and to God. Therefore, to harm another person is as irrational as for your hand to want to harm your foot.

Given that humans are universally flawed, Seneca recommends adopting the attitude of the philosopher Democritus: we should find the faults of humanity “laughable” rather than hateful. This humorous, tolerant perspective allows us to judge others with forbearance, giving them the benefit of the doubt and considering their intentions rather than just their actions. In a metaphor of playing a ball game, a good player serves the ball differently to a tall partner versus a short one. Likewise, being fair requires adapting our actions to the specific person we are dealing with. Ultimately, fairness should be pursued for its own sake, not for reward, with the constant, unrewarded generosity of the gods as the ultimate model.

Chapter 5: Being Merciful

This final chapter addresses the specific form of fairness required when someone has done wrong and punishment is deserved. Seneca argues that mercy is natural to human beings, meaning it aligns with our ideal rational nature. The three proper goals of punishment should always be forward-looking: to correct the wrongdoer, to make others better through his example, or to make the community safer. Punishment should never be about simple retribution for the past.

Seneca carefully distinguishes true mercy from related concepts. It is not pity, which the Stoics considered an irrational emotion based on a false judgment. Nor is it forgiveness in the sense of ignoring a deserved punishment. Rather, mercy is a rational and “honorable” judgment that “reins itself in short of what could deservedly be ordained”.

The chapter provides two powerful case studies of the emperor Augustus. In the first, he shows mercy to the conspirator Cinna for the practical reason that it secures his own safety and ends further plots. The second, more profound example involves a man named Tarius, whose son had plotted to kill him. Augustus sits as an advisor in the father’s domestic court and, after ensuring his own judgment is seen as impartial, concurs with the father’s decision for a mild, carefully calibrated punishment—exile rather than death. This illustrates mercy in its highest form: a dispassionate, rational, and humane act of justice performed for its own sake.

Highlights

For human beings, the final good is virtue— for us, only “virtue” provides a valid subject for the predicate “is a good thing for me,” just as only “the absence of virtue” is a valid subject of the predicate “is a bad thing for me”— and virtue is one thing, and one thing only, a unified whole: it is the mind’s consistent and unceasing exercise of reason, as it makes true judgments and right choices in every circumstance. Individual traits that we call “virtues”— like courage and fidelity and, yes, fairness— are only the actions of the rational mind making true judgments and right choices in par tic u lar circumstances (Page 14)

we can also understand why a Stoic would think that you cannot be fair and do right by others unless you sort yourself out first, and why for a Stoic sorting yourself out begins and ends with your mind. The wise are not born but made. (Page 16)

always give others exactly what they deserve—in every way, from material goods to personal re spect, and even punishment— and are therefore always fair. This Stoic sense of magnanimity— (Page 17)

1 STRIVING FOR MAGNANIMITY (Page 21)

The largeness of a mind that is never greater than when it … has created peace for itself by fearing nothing, wealth by desiring nothing. (Epistle 87.3) (Page 21)

People like that— petty, fretful, inflexible, intolerant, often vehemently so— seem constitutionally incapable of adopting another person’s point of view, or at least pausing to consider it calmly and clearly, and constitutionally incapable of being either critical of themselves or generous toward others. (Page 23)

Seneca took clear and calm thinking, critical self- awareness, and generosity to be absolutely central to treating others fairly. That is where the opposite trait— “largemindedness,” or “magnanimity”— comes in, for it incorporates the ability to be and do all the things that right dealing and fairness require. That is why it is worth getting a clear view of what such “large- mindedness” entails. (Page 25)

proper aim of human beings to try to approximate the God with whom— alone of all creatures— they share the gift of reason. (Page 27)

With that aim in view, in fact, the Stoics granted “magnanimity” a special standing that the definition just quoted only begins to touch. Suppose that you had a mind so capacious and sharp that it always perceived every circumstance with complete accuracy, recognizing it for what it truly was, then evaluated it thoroughly and correctly, decided unerringly what if anything to do about it, planned perfectly what ever it was that needed doing, and provided all the resolve needed to do it. You would indeed have a “large mind,” a perfectly virtuous mind—in fact, the mind of a wise person (Page 27)

the princi ple that if you are loyal, brave, and pious you are necessarily also generous, prudent, and fair— with “magnanimity looming above all.” (Page 31)

a mind that is sound if it is content and confident, if it knows that all human desires, all favors granted and sought, have no bearing on the best human life. What ever can be increased is imperfect, what ever can be lessened is impermanent: (Page 33)

Have you ever seen a dog, jaws open wide, trying to snatch a bit of bread or meat its master has tossed? What ever it gets, it immediately swallows whole and is always gaping hopefully for more. We’re the same way: what ever 15 (Page 33)

STRIVING FOR MAGNANIMIT Y sine ulla voluptate demittimus statim, ad rapinam alterius erecti et attoniti. Hoc sapienti non evenit: plenus est; etiam si quid obvenit, secure excipit ac reponit; laetitia fruitur maxima, continua, sua. (Epistle 72.7–8) (Page 34)

This does not happen to the wise: whatever comes along they calmly take up and set aside, enjoying a happiness that is very great, unending, all their own. (Epistle 72.7–8) (Page 35)

What a fine and holy sight we’d see if we could observe the mind of a good person, its brilliance shining forth from a place of tranquil splendor, with justice and courage, moderation and prudence gleaming on every side, and thrift, too, and self- control, fortitude, and generosity casting their fair light upon it. What glory, what weight and dignity, what gracious authority foresight and scrupulousness (Page 35)

No matter how often the Republic changed, no one saw a change in Cato: he showed himself to be the same in every circumstance, in high office or defeat, as prosecutor or provincial commander, in the assembly, in the army, in death. (Page 45)

once we shake the yoke from our necks. (Page 47)

If you value freedom highly, all else must be thought cheap. (Page 49)

diminish our desires, understand that a “good mind” is available to all people, and work every day to achieve it. (Page 49)

“If you want to make Pythocles wealthy, don’t increase his funds, lessen (Page 49)

his desires.” (Page 51)

a good mind is available to all. We’re all nobles in that regard. Philosophy neither rejects nor selects: it shines for all. (Epistle 44.1–2) (Page 53)

There is no reason not to have hope just because vice holds us firmly and has done so for a long time: one comes to have a good mind only after having a bad one. (Page 55)

2 BEING CALM, THINKING CLEARLY (Page 59)

act bravely and speak truthfully, simply because, being wise, they can act and speak in no other way. (Page 59)

I will be absolutely mistaken to accept as true the belief that physical harm is a bad thing for me. (Page 63)

The belief that physical harm is a bad thing for me is no more true and acceptable than the belief that physical well- being is a good thing for me, because harm and well- being are neither good nor bad things. (Page 63)

experience “caution,” the “good” emotion that corresponds to the nonwise person’s “fear.” (Page 65)

Every one is in the same fix, both the feckless, troubled souls who constantly change their goals out of boredom, only to find that they prefer what they abandoned, and the apathetic types who yawn their lives away. Then there are those who toss and turn like insomniacs, arranging themselves this way and that until (Page 69)

exhaustion brings them rest: repeatedly refashioning their way of life, they’re finally overtaken, not by distaste for change, but by a senile lack of energy for change… . (7) This vice has innumerable traits but just one result: self- loathing. It arises from a mind not well balanced and from longings either too cautious or too unprofitable, when people’s desire exceeds their daring or failure leaves them grasping only at hope. They’re never steady and still— inevitably, since they’re always up in the air… . (8) Then regret for what they’ve undertaken grips them and fear of making a start; the agitation of a mind that sees no way out comes over them, incapable of either commanding or obeying their desires… . (10) Hence that boredom and self- loathing, the spinning of a mind that is never at rest and the (Page 71)

morose and queasy sufferance of unfilled time— how could it be other wise, when acknowledging the cause prompts a blush and the torment is suppressed out of shame, when unvented desires are strangled by their close confinement. Grief and wasting result; the mind, unresolved, heaves on a thousand waves, anxious over hopes only sketched, depressed at hopes abandoned… . (11) Repelled by others’ successes, despairing of its own, the mind grows furious with fortune, laments the times, withdraws into its recesses, and sulks at being punished, fed up and disgusted with itself. (On Tranquility of Mind 2.6–8, 10–11) (Page 73)

if I ever want to be amused by a fool, I don’t have far to look— I laugh at myself. (Page 75)

Why do we deceive ourselves? The cause of distress lies not outside us but within; it is settled in our very vitals, and because we do not know that we are ailing it is hard to find relief. (Page 77)

The road to tranquility begins with reflection: consider where your energy should be directed, and why; pare away every thing irrelevant to the peace of mind that is your proper goal; and be prepared for the stroke of bad luck that frustrates your aim. (Page 79)

Let our efforts not fail to produce results, let the results not be (Page 79)

unworthy of our efforts, for despondency follows both from failure and from success that brings disgrace. (Page 81)

They wander randomly, looking for occupation, and do what comes their way, not what they had in mind: they are just on the run, thoughtlessly and aimlessly… . Most people live that way— fidgety indolence, one could call it. (Page 81)

So let all our effort be directed at some goal. Diligence does not make people restless, but phantoms drive them crazy: some impression goads them on, and their enslaved minds do not see it for the empty thing it is. (Page 83)

This is why we say that nothing unexpected happens to the wise: we exempt them from humanity’s common errors, not its misfortunes, and every thing turns out, not as they wished, but as they expected— having expected above all that something could oppose their plans. Inevitably, the pain of disappointed desire more lightly touches a mind to which you haven’t promised success. (On Tranquility of Mind 12.1–5, 13.2–3) (Page 85)

We acquire so many things because others have acquired them! … The fact that we model our lives on others’ is one source of our prob lems: we do not or ganize our lives according to reason but are led astray by fashion. Be hav ior we would not willingly imitate if we saw it only in a few we adopt when we see more people behaving that way, as if greater currency made it more honorable: once wrong becomes common it supplants right in our minds. (7) So now every one travels with Nu mid i an horse men riding before them and a column of runners in the vanguard: it’s a disgrace not to have attendants to sweep from the path those they meet and raise a dust cloud to mark a bigshot’s (Page 87)

there is only one good, the cause and guarantee (Page 91)

of the best human life— self- reliance. (Epistle 31.2–3) (Page 93)

The most impor tant thing is this: that we not, like cattle, just follow the herd ahead of us, going where it happens to go, not where we should go. And yet nothing gets us into more trou ble than organ izing our lives according to what people say; … having many models, not good ones; and living not according to reason but by mimicry. (Page 93)

If we think for ourselves, using the reason that nature gave us instead of aping the preferences of others, we can more reliably think clearly, more quickly come to see that virtue is the only worthy goal, and more surely direct our intentions toward it: (Page 97)

the potential for suffering makes them as distressed as those who have actually suffered… . (6) Whoever surrenders to chance gives anxiety much raw material to work with, making it inescapable: disdaining external things, being content with what is honorable, is the one path to safety. For those who reckon that there is some good preferable to or other than virtue bare their breasts to what ever fortune throws at them: they uneasily await its darts. (Page 101)

We rejoice when we seize something and when others’ hopes of doing so are mocked… . So let’s (Page 103)

withdraw from those games, yielding our places to the eager snatchers: let them look to the prizes dangled above them, and let them be in still more suspense themselves. (10) Whoever is resolved to live the best sort of life should reckon that what is honorable is the only good. (Epistle 74.1–2, 4, 6–10) (Page 105)

To illustrate the singular importance of forming a good intention the Stoics often used the example of an archer, whose skill consists of knowing how to seat the arrow properly, draw the bowstring to the right degree of tension, and release it smoothly and accurately toward the target. If the archer does all these things properly, he has done every thing that was needed to demonstrate his skill, and he deserves to be considered a good archer: if after he releases the (Page 105)

bowstring a sudden gust of wind chances to blow the arrow off course, that has no bearing what ever on his skill and should have no bearing on our judgment of him. And as with archers, so with us. Having done what was in our power to do, we can be content with the outcome, what ever it happens to be: because they proceed from our own will, the intention and the attempt are the only things that we can truly and wholly call our own. (Page 107)

3 JUDGING YOURSELF FAIRLY (Page 113)

What sort of person do you want to be?” largely depends on the way each of us balances the relation between self and other. And that relation, in turn, is central to a key (Page 115)

Stoic tenet called oikeiosis (oy- kay- o- sis), “making [something] one’s own” (literally, “domesticating”). (Page 117)

But coming to better understanding is hard work, and unless we undertake it in earnest, our innate self- attachment inclines us to selfish be hav ior and arrogant ways of thinking that are the opposite of “largeminded.” (Page 119)

So he urges on his readers several ways to overcome this innate tendency to think oneself the center of the universe, above all by cultivating the habit of reflecting on our dealings with others and practicing the frank self- assessment that can moderate our sense of entitlement, the better to avoid the sort of complacent self- satisfaction that he describes in our first passage. (Page 121)

But no one holds the wise in contempt: they know their own stature and remind themselves that no one has power over them; as for all life’s annoyances (I wouldn’t call them “trou bles”), they don’t overcome them— they don’t even notice them. (Page 129)

The wise receive blows of a sort but having received them, overcome, allay, and subdue them. (Page 129)

Lesser blows they do not even feel, nor do they deploy against them the virtue that consists of bearing up under hardship: either they do not remark them or they think them laughable. (On the Consistency of the Wise 10.3–4) (Page 131)

they (Page 131)

acknowledge an injury in order to cause one. (Epistle 47.19–20) (Page 133)

no one swims clear [of a shipwreck] if he is towing his own baggage. (Page 135)

(3) … It does not take a wise person to disdain injuries and insults (the shadows and hints of injuries, I call them) but only someone in their right mind, able to say, “Did that happen to me deservedly or undeservedly? If the former, it is not an insult, it is a judgment; if the latter, the person who behaves unjustly should be ashamed.” (4) And what is it that is called an “insult”? Someone made a joke about my baldness, my poor eyesight, my skinny legs, my lack of stature: what sort of insult is it to hear described what’s plain to see? We laugh at some remark made before an audience of one; when it is made before a larger audience, we’re (Page 141)

indignant, and we do not grant others the license to say the things we’re accustomed to say about ourselves. (On the Consistency of the Wise 16.3–4) (Page 143)

And so to develop that capacity for detached reflection Seneca repeatedly urges us to cultivate the habit of regular and systematic self- assessment: (Page 143)

“Awareness of doing wrong is the beginning of well- being.” (Page 143)

Therefore convict yourself of error, to the extent you can, and look deep within yourself: first play the part of an accuser, then of a judge, fi nally of an intercessor. Sometimes, offend yourself. (Epistle 28.9–10) (Page 145)

minute endof- the- day review that he conducts when he retires each night (Page 149)

I examine my entire day and go back over what I have done and said, hiding nothing from myself, passing nothing by. For why should I fear any consequence from my mistakes (Page 151)

A good man delights in being admonished, but the worst people have the hardest time enduring correction. (Page 153)

Accurately assessing your be hav ior in this way is obviously indispensable to answering the questions with which this chapter began: what sort of person are you, and what sort of person do you want to be? It is also indispensable to answering the question taken up in the next chapter: how can you best be certain to do right by others? (Page 159)

4 DOING RIGHT BY OTHERS (Page 161)

the wise come to regard the good of all others as indistinguishable from their own because they understand that we are in fact all parts of an integrated whole. (Page 165)

when we are confronted by human foibles and failings, we should follow the recommendation of the phi los o pher Democritus: stand back and laugh. (Page 167)

Whenever the latter went among the people, he wept, seeing wretchedness in all we do; the former laughed at the foolishness he saw. We should make light of it all and bear it indulgently: laughing at the way we live is more humane than lamenting. (Page 169)

By understanding human weakness, we come to understand that none of us is innocent: we should therefore judge others as we would want to be judged. (Page 171)

We treat diseases without anger, and yet this is a disease of the mind, requiring not just gentle treatment but also a healer who is in no way hostile to the patient. (On Mercy 1.6.1–3, 17.1) (Page 175)

Judging others fairly starts with trying to understand their intentions and, in so doing, giving them the benefit of the doubt: (Page 175)

Luck very rarely shows good judgment.” (Page 177)

Let’s put ourselves in the place of the person with whom we are angry: from that perspective we see that valuing ourselves unfairly makes us angry, and that we are unwilling to tolerate an act that we would willingly commit. (On Anger 3.12.2–3) (Page 179)

[The wise] do not take every thing at its worst or look for someone to blame; they rather attribute people’s mistakes to misfortune. (Page 181)

“I will view all lands as my own, my own as belonging to all. I will live as if aware that I was born for others and thank the universe on that account: how could it have done better by me? It gave me, one individual, as a gift to all people, and all people to me… . (5) … My friends will find me congenial, my enemies mild and accommodating. I will be won over before I am asked and hasten to meet all honorable requests. I will know that the world is my homeland, the gods its guardians, standing above and around me as judges of my words and deeds. Whenever nature asks for my spirit back or reason lets it go I will depart with an oath that I have loved a good conscience and honorable pursuits, and that I diminished no one’s freedom, least of all my own”: those who make this their goal, (Page 187)

People who have regard only for themselves and turn every thing to their own advantage cannot live the best human life: you must live for others if you want to live for yourself. (3) If maintained carefully and faithfully, this princi ple makes us all each other’s partners and establishes a shared standard of right for the human race. (Epistle 48.2–3) (Page 189)

In such common, everyday ways, we cultivate “the fairness that looks to another’s good” and so try to treat others as we would want the providential God to treat us. (Page 195)

the greater reward lies in fairness itself. (32) Keep fixed in your mind … that it is irrelevant whether many know of your fairness. (Page 197)

Since I’ve mentioned the gods, I might best set down this model for a prince to imitate:7 let him wish to treat his fellow citizens as he wishes the gods to treat him. (Page 199)

If we do not stray from our models, let human reason also preserve this princi ple: honorable be hav ior is not for hire. Any favor we do for a price should be a cause of shame: we have the gods for free. (On Benefits 4.25.1–3) (Page 203)

We should imitate them: we should give even if much is given in vain. (On Benefits 7.31.2, 4–5) (Page 205)

5 BEING MERCIFUL (Page 211)

First it confronts an unfortunate fact: while one impor tant way of “ doing right by others” is making sure that they receive exactly what they deserve, giving them what they deserve sometimes means giving them what they do not want— a rebuke, a scolding, or some form of punishment. (Page 215)

Seneca explains how Stoic mercy confronts the necessity of punishment in a way that is dispassionate and carefully calibrated: it does not dwell on the past but looks to the future, aiming not at retribution but at improving the wrongdoer or the community at large. (Page 217)

Moreover, a sparing use of punishment does more to correct a community’s habits, for a multitude of wrongdoers makes wrongdoing a matter of habit: condemnations that come thick and fast lessen the stigma of punishment, and strictness, when unrelieved, loses its moral authority, which is its most impor tant healing power… . 23 (2) In a community where people are rarely punished innocence comes to enjoy general support and is kindly regarded as a common good. (Page 219)

Mercy is also distinct from and superior to pity (misericordia, literally “being unhappy at heart”) and forgiveness (ignoscentia, literally “taking no notice of”). The latter is unacceptable because it involves giving people nothing of what they deserve. The former is unacceptable because it is an emotion that (on the Stoic view) arises from (Page 225)

muddled thought and does no more good for its object than clear- eyed mercy. (Page 227)

Pity looks only at the state a person is in, not its cause; mercy is in accord with reason. (Page 229)

I know that the Stoics have a bad reputation among the ignorant for being too callous … : they’re charged with asserting that the wise man does not feel pity and does not forgive. Taken by itself, that assertion is invidious, for it implies that the Stoics leave human error no hope, but instead refer all shortcomings directly to punishment. (3) … But no philosophical school is kinder and gentler, nor more loving of humankind and more attentive to our common good, to the degree that its very purpose is to be useful, bring assistance, and consider the interests not only of its own members but of all people, individually and collectively. (4) Pity is a distress caused by (Page 229)

The wise, then, will not feel pity, but they will give aid and be useful, having been born to assist their fellows and add to the common good, of which they will give each person a share. (Page 233)

Forgiveness is granted to one who ought to be punished; the wise, however, neither do anything they ought not do nor forgo doing anything they ought to do. Accordingly, they do not remit a punishment that they ought to exact. (Page 235)

But to forgive is to forgo punishing one whom you judge ought to be punished, and pardon is the remission of a deserved punishment. (Page 239)

Mercy exercises freedom of judgment: it makes its determinations not according to a set formula but according to what is fair and good, … [and] not as though it were doing less than what is just, but as though the determination it reaches is the most just. (Page 267)