USAID and Color Revolutions - DataRepublican Fact-Check

Assessment

Mixed evidence; the largest conclusions exceed it

Public records substantiate substantial foreign democracy assistance and domestic philanthropic organizing. Several named grants are real. These records establish funding and institutional relationships; they do not, on their own, establish a single operation directing political outcomes across countries or organizing American protests.

The most useful findings are:

• The Colombian opera grant was a State Department award: $25,000 in federal obligations, with $22,020 in nonfederal funding. Assigning it to USAID is incorrect.¹
• The two Georgian grant amounts are substantially right: USAspending records $26,490,383 obligated to CEPPS and $21,107,362 to East-West Management Institute. Their start dates were 2019 and 2022, respectively.²³
• The Georgian chronology needs repair: IDFI was founded in 2009. It cannot supply evidence of an organization operating during the 2003 Rose Revolution.⁴
• Several domestic financial claims are supported: the Knight/AJP grant, MacArthur/Howard grant, $10 million Hopewell grant, and approximately $173 million in Open Society Action Fund domestic program expenses have documentary support.⁵⁶⁷⁸
• The Election Trust Initiative funding figure is incomplete: four founding partners each committed $25 million over five years, totaling $100 million in commitments. This is not $100 million disbursed at launch.⁹
• Deaths projected through 2030 must be distinguished from deaths already recorded. The relevant study forecast 4.54 million additional under-five deaths under its funding-cut scenario; it did not count that many children already killed.¹⁰

Evidence labels: Supported means the specific record was located. Partly supported means an underlying fact is real but its scope, date, entity, or implication needs qualification. Not reproduced means the stated number could not be independently replicated with the documented method. Unproven means the evidence reviewed does not establish the causal or intentional allegation; it does not mean the allegation has been logically disproved.

Source and scope

Original: DataRepublican’s X article. Author’s parallel publication: Substack.

The complete X article was retrieved through the FXTwitter public mirror, including its hyperlinks and embedded infographic; the author’s Substack publication was used as a cross-check. X’s ordinary page did not load through the web reader. The versions differ in some wording, so this audit follows the linked X article. The mirror reports publication at 03:13 UTC on June 24, which was June 23 in South Florida. The X article ID is 2069619596769001472; the user-supplied post ID is 2069619851518431312.¹¹

Brief reconstruction: The author connects foreign democracy assistance, Georgia’s Rose Revolution, domestic foundations, and anti-Trump mobilization into a common political-infrastructure argument. Media, legal advocacy, election observation, organizer training, and government-accountability research are its five categories.

“The point was the network.” — DataRepublican, original article.¹¹

This note checks the financial and historical propositions separately from the author’s causal interpretation. It also distinguishes evidence available when the post appeared from subsequent developments known on November 10, 2026. The full copyrighted article is available at the source links rather than reproduced here.

Claim ledger

The short labels below identify propositions to audit. The evidence and qualifications are part of each verdict.

Agency, elections, and humanitarian claims

Georgian history and grants

Domestic organizations and inference

Elections: chronology and causal limits

The seven-country sequence is substantially real. Verification does not require denying an electoral shift:

Why causation remains unresolved: These are different electorates and political starting points. Selecting winners after a funding change provides no comparison with what would have happened without that change. A meaningful test would track the affected programs by country, the actual timing and size of lost funding, political outcomes before and after, and plausible competing explanations. It should also examine countries where the predicted outcome failed.

Timing of the cuts: January 20, 2025 began the administration’s aid pause; March 10 brought the announced cancellation of 83% of USAID-managed programs; July 1 marked the end of USAID’s implementation of foreign assistance and transfer of selected functions to State. An 83% program-count cancellation is not automatically an 83% expenditure reduction, and some assistance continued.¹⁶

Later update, not a retrospective correction: Lula’s reelection in Brazil on October 25, 2026 means the no-left-victories generalization cannot be repeated as current fact on this note’s review date. That later result does not erase the seven earlier wins or establish that aid cuts had no effects.¹⁵

Georgia: influence is real; the stronger interpretation needs more evidence

What is well supported: Foreign donors helped develop civil-society organizations, election observation, media capacity, and activist skills. Some participants deliberately drew lessons from Serbia. The Liberty Institute’s own institutional history describes political reform advocacy and founders’ participation in the Rose Revolution and subsequent government.²⁰

Cory Welt’s research examines external assistance alongside elite defections, government vulnerability, popular mobilization, and limits on repression. It recognizes NGO contributions while treating stronger causal explanations as hypotheses requiring further research. Funding, tactical influence, and complete control remain different claims.¹⁹

Election monitoring: A parallel vote tabulation is a method for checking results using observed polling-station data, often a representative statistical sample. Its reliability depends on sampling, coverage, reporting accuracy, and uncertainty. Foreign financing does not by itself validate or invalidate the results. The independent OSCE/ODIHR mission found serious fraud in the 2003 election, so the underlying grievance cannot be dismissed merely because another monitor had foreign donors.⁴⁵²⁵

Specific corrections and limits:

• IDFI: Its own history fixes its founding in 2009. It belongs to a later account of Georgian transparency work; placing it within the pre-2003 causal story collapses distinct periods.⁴
• Otpor: Roger Cohen’s November 26, 2000 reporting distinguishes NED’s almost $3 million Serbia portfolio from the portion going to its largest recipient. It also documents USAID assistance and IRI training, so the correction changes the allocation claim without denying U.S. involvement.²²
• ISFED: Its primary history supports 1995 and extensive election observation. The precise founding-finance claim and the bundled 3,000-observer/ten-PVT figures remain unverified in this audit. Current or cumulative organizational statistics should not be silently dated to 2003.²¹
• Personnel: Konstantine Vardzelashvili’s Constitutional Court biography confirms Liberty Institute work and service as deputy justice minister in 2004–2006. Contemporary accounts date Anna Zhvania’s intelligence appointment to 2006 and Giga Bokeria’s National Security Council appointment to 2010. These support career connections while correcting an impression of one immediate post-revolution transfer. The other named individuals’ complete employment histories were not independently reconstructed here.²⁶²⁸²⁷
• Open Society: Its official history confirms operations from 1994 and substantial, varied grantmaking. The exact 16,000-project figure and its period were not independently established. A cumulative project count cannot be assumed to mean 16,000 organizations, simultaneous projects, or pre-2003 political operations.²³

The foreign-funding-law dispute

The 2024 Georgian law applied to specified NGOs and media receiving more than 20% of annual income from foreign sources. It required a foreign-interest designation and registration, financial reporting, Ministry of Justice monitoring, and fines. The Venice Commission identified serious problems with breadth, discretion, privacy, and proportionality and recommended repeal. It also noted existing reporting obligations.²⁹

Foreign-funding transparency can be a legitimate objective. The policy question is whether particular requirements are proportionate and protect association and expression. Opposition to an intrusive disclosure regime is not, by itself, evidence of a covert foreign mission. Conversely, the Commission’s criticism does not establish that every foreign grant was benign. Its opinion concerns the 2024 legislation; later measures must be examined separately.

Federal money: exact records and reproducibility

The following figures were retrieved from the official USAspending API on November 10, 2026. Obligations are commitments recorded on the award; they are not interchangeable with cash outlays, award ceilings, or the amount personally received by a final beneficiary.

Sources: CEPPS award/API, EWMI award/API, Serbia award/API, opera award/API. A zero in an outlay field is not sufficient to conclude that no payment occurred; reporting completeness and reporting requirements matter.

The Colombian award includes $22,020 of nonfederal funding, producing the often-quoted $47,020 combined total. That combined amount is not all U.S. taxpayer spending.¹

Georgia aggregate check: The saved query uses USAID as the awarding agency, Georgia the country as the place of performance (GEO), and transaction dates October 1, 2007–September 30, 2025, corresponding to FY2008–FY2025. The returned net transaction obligations total $803,666,778.10. A different query selecting USAID as the funding agency returns $783,134,507.16 across awarding agencies. These are different definitions and should not be substituted for one another.

Neither result reproduces the article’s larger total. This is a methodological discrepancy, not proof that every possible $1 billion total is false: award-lifetime totals, recipient versus performance geography, calendar versus fiscal years, and subsequent deobligations or revisions can differ. The article does not supply a complete saved query or a dated data export resolving the discrepancy. Nor would an aggregate aid total measure spending on political overthrow.

Review the exact filters and responses in USAspending-Georgia-queries.json (file not included in this release). Individual records are preserved in USAspending-award-records.json (file not included in this release).

Domestic money: what the records establish

Verified grants and program scale

• Knight → AJP: A new $25 million investment announced February 18, 2025, supporting nonprofit local news. AJP also describes a separate $20 million Knight investment in 2019 and a wider newsroom portfolio. These are publicly described institutional grants, not documentation of instructions to manufacture protests.⁵
• MacArthur → Howard: $5 million for the Center for Journalism and Democracy, with up to $1.25 million allocated to the next phase of the 1619 Project. That demonstrates a specific institutional and intellectual agenda; the grant announcement does not establish operational control over anti-government demonstrations.⁶
• FPOS → Hopewell: The 2023 Form 990-PF identifies $10 million for Free Election Fund. This is a real connection between donor, fiscal sponsor, and project.⁷
• OSAF: Its 2023 Form 990 reports $173,081,829 in domestic program expenses, including $170,774,618 in grants, plus $70,339,097 in international program expenses. It is a 501(c)(4) social-welfare organization with openly stated advocacy goals. The domestic total spans many policy areas and is not a measured budget for demonstrations.⁸
• Alliance: Its account reports over $15 million granted to 53 organizations during 2023–2024, including projects reaching more than 200 campuses. This supports organized donor-funded civic activity; the campus figure describes funded work across a network.³⁸

Entities and accounting distinctions

Hopewell and Democracy Docket: MacArthur identifies the Hopewell-sponsored project as Free Election Fund, founded as Democracy Docket Legal Fund. Democracy Docket LLC is a separate media business; Marc Elias’s litigation work and related entities should be identified by their actual legal names. A grant to a sponsored litigation fund is not automatically a grant to every Elias-associated organization.³¹³²

VRP: The 2022 return shows $45,787,219 in revenue and $49,878,502 in expenses, with $45,777,336 on the other-contributions line and no amount reported on the government-grants line. Its Schedule I identifies a $1,844,926 grant to State Voices. The 2023 summary shows $44,603,930 in revenue but $23,293,026 in expenses. Thus a real, large donor-funded organization exists, while an unspecified annual “budget” obscures revenue/expense differences and election-cycle variation.³³

State Voices: The current primary website lists 22 State Tables, eight emerging states, and 1,200+ partners across 50 states. It separately describes Tools for All serving 700+ organizations. The older 700-organizations/24-states description is documented in financial-summary material. Counts with different dates or program definitions are not necessarily contradictory. They do not demonstrate that every partner performs polling-place monitoring, voter verification, and legal rapid response.³⁴³⁵

ETI: Its four founding partners are Pew, Hewlett, Peterson, and Klarman. Each committed $25 million over five years. Pew’s return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2024 lists Election Trust Initiative LLC on Schedule R as a disregarded entity, reporting $15,915,389 in income and $29,653,495 in year-end assets. That is public disclosure within a parent filing. The arrangement can make separate project-level analysis harder, but it is not evidence by itself of illegal concealment. ETI’s public grantee list includes election-administration and research organizations.⁹³⁶³⁷

Nonpartisan versus ideologically neutral: An organization can favor particular reforms and demographic constituencies while describing its work as nonpartisan. Assess its activities, legal structure, funding restrictions, and evidence of candidate support rather than treating a self-description as either proof of neutrality or proof of fraud. The Brennan Center explicitly describes advocacy, litigation, and communications alongside research.³⁰

Humanitarian work and the mortality estimate

The Lancet study used 2001–2021 country-level panel data from 133 countries and territories, adjusted for measured demographic, socioeconomic, and health-care factors, then combined retrospective estimates with a forecast. It estimated 91.84 million deaths averted during the study period. Its funding-cut scenario projected 14.05 million additional deaths through 2030, including 4.54 million children under five.¹⁰

These are model-based estimates, with uncertainty and possible residual confounding. The forecast depends on future funding, replacement assistance, and other assumptions. It does not establish 4.54 million observed child deaths or assign exclusive personal responsibility to Musk. Equally, errors in political rhetoric do not establish that cutting health and food assistance is harmless.

CRS identifies health as the largest funded sector from the early 1990s and humanitarian assistance in FY2022 and FY2024. Ukrainian budget support largely explains governance’s top ranking in FY2023. A sector label alone does not establish covert activity.¹⁶

For the wider ethical argument and existing methodological discussion, see 60 Knowledge/60.3 Politics/60.3.1 - Foreign Policy/USAID.

How to evaluate the network argument

The strongest defensible concern: Sustained grants can give donors influence over research agendas, media capacity, legal strategies, recruitment, and which civic groups survive. Organizations can coordinate, share staff, and create lasting political advantages. These effects merit scrutiny even when activities are public, nonviolent, and legal. The funding records and Georgian institutional histories establish enough real relationships to make that inquiry worthwhile.

Where the present evidence falls short:

1. A funding relationship is not complete control. Establish who made which decisions, under what conditions, and whether recipients followed a common plan.
2. Similar functions are not proof of a single organization. Legal clinics, journalism, and election observation can serve different interests and purposes.
3. A later grant cannot finance an earlier event. Keep 2003, 2009, 2019, and 2022 on their actual timelines.
4. A temporal sequence does not identify a cause. Electoral outcomes require country-level mechanisms and comparison with plausible alternatives.
5. A program total is not an operational protest budget. Trace money to named events, dates, payees, and activities before making that claim.
6. Agency names matter. USAID, State, NED, private foundations, and fiscal sponsors are distinct entities. Coordination must be demonstrated rather than assumed from overlapping goals.³⁹

This also clarifies the meaning of regime change. Peaceful electoral defeat, exposure of fraudulent results, negotiated resignation, coercion, and unlawful overthrow are different outcomes. Evidence for one should not silently stand in for another. A normative objection to foreign political influence can be argued separately from an empirical claim that a particular donor engineered a particular transition.

Unresolved items and evidence that would change the verdict

• Georgia aggregate: A dated export and complete filters reproducing the article’s total, with award ceilings, lifetime obligations, transaction obligations, subawards, and geography kept distinct.
• ISFED’s exact historical figures: contemporaneous annual reports, founding donor records, and the dates associated with the observer/PVT counts.
• 16,000 projects: the full original recording or audited grant register with an explicit period and unit of counting. The linked clip alone was not independently transcribed in this audit.
• Ian Kelly’s quotation: a verified transcript of the full linked interview around the excerpt. The existence of donor dependence is supported elsewhere; the article’s exact edited quotation is not independently authenticated here.²⁴
• The full personnel roster: dated institutional biographies establishing each claimed affiliation and appointment. The broad pipeline and selected appointments are verified; the complete six-person sequence remains only partially checked.
• U.S. protest causation: grants and expenditures tied to particular demonstrations, evidence of coordination and objectives, and a defined event inventory for the alleged monthly pattern. No such event-level demonstration follows from the reviewed financial records.
• Electoral causation: a country-by-country account of lost funding and organizational effects, considered alongside competing explanations and outcomes outside the selected seven.

Related vault notes and preserved evidence

• 60 Knowledge/60.3 Politics/60.3.1 - Foreign Policy/USAID — agency record, humanitarian effects, and moral arguments.
• 60 Knowledge/60.3 Politics/60.3.1 - Foreign Policy/Color Revolutions — broader cases and local versus external agency.
• 60 Knowledge/60.3 Politics/60.3.1 - Foreign Policy/Foreign Aid — fiscal definitions and policy context.
• 60 Knowledge/People/Abdul El-Sayed/El-Sayed - AE-004 - USAID Restoration and Domestic Affordability — the separate policy-consistency inquiry.

Local documentary evidence

• USAspending-award-records.json (file not included in this release) — four official award responses with source URLs and retrieval date.
• USAspending-Georgia-queries.json (file not included in this release) — both exact agency/geography/date queries and responses.
• IRS-financial-checks.json (file not included in this release) — financial values, filing identities, and provenance.
• Open-Society-Action-Fund-2023-Form-990.pdf (file not included in this release) — domestic and international program expenses.
• Voter-Registration-Project-2022-Form-990.pdf (file not included in this release) — State Voices grant; revenue and expenses appear on PDF page 3 and contributions on page 11.
• Pew-FY2024-Form-990.pdf (file not included in this release) — ETI on Schedule R; fiscal year ended June 30, 2024.
• OSCE-Georgia-2003-Election-Report.pdf (file not included in this release) — executive summary of observed electoral fraud.
• Venice-Commission-Georgia-2024-Opinion.pdf (file not included in this release) — requirements of the 2024 law; conclusions on pages 23–24.
• CRS-USAID-Overview-2025-09-05.pdf (file not included in this release) — agency mandate, sector context, and transition chronology.

Sources

Primary records establish amounts, dates, self-reported activities, and stated institutional purposes. They do not automatically provide independent proof of an organization’s effectiveness or political neutrality. Contemporaneous reporting and original historical research are identified separately below.

Footnotes

1. USAspending, Universidad de los Andes award SCO20021GR3086; official API record. Awarding/funding agency: Department of State. Public Diplomacy award; $25,000 federal obligations and $22,020 nonfederal funding. ↩ ↩² ↩³

2. USAspending, CEPPS award 72011419LA00001; official API record. Current API generated identifier uses the top-tier suffix 072; the older public URL uses sub-tier code 7200. The recipient, award number, and agency were checked. ↩ ↩²

3. USAspending, EWMI award 72011422CA00001; official API record. A rule-of-law program with recorded obligations and performance dates, not an award explicitly designated for overthrow. ↩ ↩²

4. Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, About Us. Primary source explicitly dates founding to 2009 and identifies later international donors. ↩ ↩² ↩³

5. American Journalism Project, Knight Foundation invests $25 million in American Journalism Project to expand and strengthen local news, February 18, 2025. Primary recipient announcement. ↩ ↩² ↩³

6. MacArthur Foundation, Two Iconic American Writers Join Howard University to Create the Center for Journalism and Democracy. Primary donor announcement; specifies the $5 million contribution and 1619 Project allocation. ↩ ↩² ↩³

7. Foundation to Promote Open Society, EIN 26-3753801, 2023 Form 990-PF; main filing renderer. The underlying IRS-derived rendered return was retrieved and the $10 million Hopewell/Free Election Fund row read. Saved financial-check data retains the filing ID and extracted facts. ↩ ↩² ↩³

8. Open Society Action Fund, EIN 52-2028955, 2023 Form 990 PDF, Part III, page 2. Primary filing: domestic $173,081,829, domestic grants $170,774,618, international $70,339,097. IRS-derived summary cross-checks the program amounts; older databases retain the former name Open Society Policy Center. ↩ ↩² ↩³

9. Election Trust Initiative, About. Primary statement naming four partners, each with a five-year $25 million commitment. ↩ ↩² ↩³

10. Daniella Medeiros Cavalcanti et al., Evaluating the impact of two decades of USAID interventions and projecting the effects of defunding on mortality up to 2030, The Lancet, online June 30, 2025, DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(25)01186-9. Original empirical study; abstract and reported methods/results checked. The forecast is conditional, not an observed count. ↩ ↩² ↩³

11. DataRepublican, original X post/article; FXTwitter retrieval endpoint; author’s Substack version. Source text and hyperlinks read in full; mirror metadata cross-checked against the author’s publication. The article’s funding assertions are checked against independent records rather than treated as verified by reproduction elsewhere. ↩ ↩²

12. AS/COA’s country reporting, linked individually in the following election footnotes, verifies the cited 2025 contests. These are reporting/analysis sources, not primary ballot records or evidence of aid-cut causation. ↩

13. AS/COA, A Guide to 2026 Latin American Elections, including calendars and linked Peru/Colombia coverage. Updated page read November 10, 2026; later updates are not treated as information available in June. ↩ ↩² ↩³

14. Reuters, June 22, 2026, De La Espriella win in Colombia cements Latin America’s rightward shift. Contemporary reporting distinguishes Peru’s projected result and Colombia’s verification process. ↩ ↩² ↩³

15. Diana Roy, Council on Foreign Relations, Is Brazil the Exception? Explaining Latin America’s Rightward Political Shift, October 27, 2026. Reports Lula’s October 25 reelection and discusses crime, corruption, economic frustration, and anti-incumbency. Expert analysis supplies alternative explanations, not a controlled test of aid effects. ↩ ↩² ↩³

16. Emily M. McCabe, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Agency for International Development: An Overview, September 5, 2025. Official congressional analysis; relevant first-page text and the termination timeline read in the downloaded PDF. HTML mirror. ↩ ↩² ↩³

17. USAspending, Grupa Izadji award 72016922FA00001; official API record. Retrieved $1,499,999 total obligations and the workplace-inclusion description. ↩

18. David Zimmermann, Musk vows to sue Ro Khanna over claim USAID cuts harmed 4.5 million children, June 22, 2026. Contemporary reporting; the accessible portion confirms the accusation and threat, not a filed lawsuit or a court’s ruling. Additional contemporaneous account of Khanna’s wording. ↩

19. Cory Welt, Regime Vulnerability and Popular Mobilization in Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Stanford CDDRL Working Paper 67, September 2006. Original historical research; relevant discussion of external assistance, polling, media, domestic mobilization, and causal limits read in the PDF. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵

20. Liberty Institute, About Us. Primary institutional account: founding in 1996, political reform advocacy, the 2003 manifesto, Rose Revolution participation, and later appointments. A participant account, not independent proof of every causal claim. ↩ ↩² ↩³

21. ISFED, History. Primary source gives 1995, 28 monitored elections, and a nine-election PVT/turnout-monitoring description. Those statements have distinct scopes and are not an authenticated account of every number in the post. ↩ ↩²

22. Roger Cohen, Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?, The New York Times Magazine, November 26, 2000. Contemporary interviews with officials and activists; the original archive text was read directly. NED’s approximately $3 million Serbia total and Otpor’s status as largest recipient are not the same number. ↩ ↩²

23. Open Society Foundations, The Open Society Foundations in Georgia, February 13, 2020. Primary institutional history confirms founding in 1994 and diverse grantmaking, but does not establish the article’s specific 16,000 figure or a pre-2003 project total. ↩ ↩²

24. Article-linked clips: Open Society segment, 2:11 and Ian Kelly segment, 32:04. These are provenance pointers; their full recordings were not independently transcribed or authenticated in this audit. ↩ ↩²

25. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 2 November 2003: Final Report; report PDF, January 28, 2004. Primary observation report; PDF page 3 executive summary and page 19 observations examined. ↩ ↩²

26. Constitutional Court of Georgia, Konstantine Vardzelashvili. Primary institutional biography confirms Liberty Institute work and deputy-minister service in 2004–2006. ↩ ↩²

27. Civil Georgia, Reshuffle in Government, NSC, November 20, 2010. Contemporary report of the appointment announced by the president’s administration. ↩ ↩²

28. Civil Georgia, New Chief of Intelligence Service Appointed, September 19, 2006. Contemporary report dates Anna Zhvania’s appointment. ↩ ↩²

29. Venice Commission, Opinion 1190/2024; CDL-AD(2024)020 PDF, issued May 21 and endorsed June 21–22, 2024. Primary legal assessment; paragraphs 48–55 and 94–100 examined. It is an advisory opinion, not a binding judicial judgment. ↩ ↩²

30. Brennan Center, About Us. Primary self-description of research, advocacy, litigation, legislation, and communications; ideological neutrality is not independently established by that description. ↩ ↩²

31. MacArthur Foundation, Hopewell Fund grant record. Primary donor records identify Free Election Fund’s former name, fiscal sponsorship, and litigation function in 2020 and 2024 grants. ↩ ↩²

32. InfluenceWatch, Free Election Fund / Democracy Docket Legal Fund. Secondary source used narrowly for the distinction between the litigation fund and Democracy Docket LLC; its ideological characterizations are not independent legal findings. ↩ ↩²

33. Voter Registration Project, 2022 Form 990, public-disclosure PDF mirror, EIN 26-4802468. Primary filing hosted by a secondary organization: PDF pages 3, 11, and 37 read. ProPublica summary; IRS-derived API supplies 2022–2023 totals. An empty government-grants line is reported as such; it is not proof that no indirect public support could ever have existed. ↩ ↩²

34. State Voices, Our Network. Primary current self-description; partner, state-table, and Tools for All counts describe different scopes. ↩ ↩²

35. State Voices financial/program summary, IRS-derived secondary source retaining the older 700-charities/24-states wording. That wording does not identify every member’s activity or prove a date-specific protest operation. ↩ ↩²

36. Pew Charitable Trusts, Form 990 for fiscal year ending June 30, 2024, Schedule R, PDF page 125. Primary filing explicitly identifies ETI LLC, its grantmaking activity, income, assets, and controlling entity. ↩ ↩²

37. Election Trust Initiative, Grants. Primary current list includes research, election administration, security, observation, and related work; a published grantee list is not a complete audited project-level expenditure statement. ↩ ↩²

38. Alliance for Youth Organizing, Our Work. Primary statement identifies over $15 million to 53 organizations in 2023–2024 and campus-organizing projects reaching 200+ campuses. ↩ ↩²

39. National Endowment for Democracy, Investing in Freedom: An Introduction to the National Endowment for Democracy, February 2, 2025. Primary institutional account of its distinct origin and institutes. CRS, Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance provides the institutional/funding distinction; source is congressional analysis hosted by FAS. Shared policy goals do not make NED an organizational component of USAID. ↩ ↩²

40. AS/COA, Daniel Noboa Wins Reelection in Ecuador, April 14, 2025; Ecuador’s runoff comparison. ↩

41. AS/COA, Rodrigo Paz Wins: Bolivia’s Electoral Context in Five Charts, October 21, 2025; candidate comparison. ↩

42. AS/COA, Nasry Asfura Prepares to Take Honduras’ Presidency in New Direction. ↩

43. AS/COA, Susan Segal on José Antonio Kast’s Presidential Victory in Chile. ↩

44. Associated Press, Conservative populist Laura Fernández wins Costa Rican presidency, preliminary results show, February 1–2, 2026. ↩

45. NDI, The Quick Count and Election Observation: An NDI Guide for Civic Organizations and Political Parties. Primary methodological account; explains representative polling-station sampling and observation. Methodological design is not proof that every implementation is accurate. ↩