DESCRIPTION

Named a Best Book of the Year by The Economist, Financial Times, Inc., Prospect Magazine, and The Conversation “The most comprehensive and reasonable story of this shift that has yet been attempted … Mounk has told the story of the Great Awokening better than any other writer who has attempted to make sense of it.” —The Washington Post “An intellectual tour de force about the origins of identity politics and the threat it presents to genuine, honest, old-fashioned liberalism.” —Bret Stephens, The New York Times “Among the most insightful and important books written in the last decade on American democracy and its current torments, because it also shows us a way out of the trap.” —Jonathan Haidt, author of The Righteous Mind, and coauthor of The Coddling of the American Mind “Outstanding.” —David Brooks, The New York Times A fascinating account of the origins of “wokeness”—and a trenchant explanation for why the noble goals of identity politics are doomed to fail For much of history, societies have violently oppressed ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. It is no surprise that many came to believe that members of mar­ginalized groups need to take pride in their identity to resist injustice. But over the past decades, a healthy appreciation for the culture and heritage of minority groups transformed into a counterproductive obsession with group identity. This new ideology denies that members of different groups can truly understand each other and insists that the way governments treat their citizens should depend on the color of their skin. This, Yascha Mounk argues, is the identity trap. Those who battle for these ideas are often full of good intentions. But they ultimately stand in the way of the genuine equality we desperately need. Mounk built his acclaimed scholarly career on being one of the first to warn of the risks that right-wing populists pose to American democracy, a danger that now remains as serious as ever. But far from being mortal enemies, the identitarian left and the populist right actually reinforce each other; to vanquish one, he shows here, it is necessary to oppose both. In The Identity Trap, Mounk provides the most ambitious and comprehensive account to date of the origins, consequences, and limitations of “wokeness.” He shows how postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory conquered many college campuses. He lays out how these ideas gained tremendous influence in business, media, and government, and he makes a nuanced philosophical case for why these ideas are so counterproductive—and why universal, humanist values can best serve the vital goal of true equality. The Identity Trap provides truth and clarity where they are needed most.

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Important

Summary (Mine) — State the Ideas of the book in own words (Interrogating Texts)

Important

Summary (AI)

• Chapter 1: Postwar Paris and the Trial of Truth

  • Post-WWII Europe’s precarious state, with uncertainty about the success of democracy in formerly fascist countries and the Soviet Union’s influence.
  • Intellectuals in postwar Paris, inspired by Marxism, believed in the downfall of capitalism and the advent of communism, with figures like Tony Judt, Charles de Gaulle, Simone de Beauvoir, Louis Althusser, and Jean-Paul Sartre playing significant roles.
  • A shift in French intellectual circles as doubts about Marxism and Soviet oppression emerged, leading to a critique of “grand narratives” by figures such as Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard.
  • Foucault’s personal struggles, his initial embrace of Marxism, and later rejection of Soviet communism in favor of critiquing power structures and societal norms, including in the realms of mental health, criminal justice, and sexuality.
  • Foucault’s debates with Noam Chomsky on political ideals and his skepticism about the possibility of defining a better societal model, which contrasted Chomsky’s more hopeful vision for human nature and political activism.
  • The influence of postmodern skepticism on identity, truth, progress, and the critique of universal narratives and stable identity categories.

  Important people mentioned include Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Tony Judt, Charles de Gaulle, Simone de Beauvoir, Louis Althusser, Jean-Paul Sartre, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Noam Chomsky.

• Chapter 2: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE EMBRACE OF “STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM”

  The chapter from “The Identity Trap” by Yascha Mounk discusses the complexities postcolonial societies faced in establishing national identities and political institutions post-independence. It highlights the intellectual journeys of scholars like Edward Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who critiqued Western narratives and ideologies while grappling with the legacies of colonialism. Key points include:

  • The challenge of creating cohesive national identities in postcolonial countries.
  • The influence of Western education on postcolonial leaders and intellectuals.
  • The adoption of postmodernist theories by postcolonial thinkers to critique and dismantle Western discourses and grand narratives.
  • Edward Said’s seminal work “Orientalism,” which analyzed Western representations of the East and its political implications.
  • The concept of “strategic essentialism” proposed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, advocating the tactical use of essentialist identities for political purposes despite theoretical reservations.

  Important figures mentioned include:

  • Frantz Fanon, Habib Bourguiba, Assia Djebar, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Jomo Kenyatta, Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Edward Said, Michel Foucault, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.

• Chapter 3: THE REJECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY

  This chapter from “The Identity Trap” by Yascha Mounk focuses on the critique of the Civil Rights Movement and the emergence of Critical Race Theory (CRT). Key points include:

  • The initial successes of the Civil Rights Movement didn’t fully translate into systemic change, leading to disillusionment among activists.
  • Derrick Bell and Kimberlé Crenshaw, prominent figures in the development of CRT, argued that racism in America is a permanent condition, not fully addressable through existing legal frameworks.
  • Bell challenged the effectiveness of desegregation efforts and proposed a more nuanced understanding of racial equality.
  • Crenshaw introduced the concept of “intersectionality,” emphasizing how various forms of oppression interconnect, particularly for Black women.
  • The chapter also discusses the broader implications of CRT and intersectionality for understanding and addressing racial inequality and discrimination in the United States.

• Chapter 4: THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS

  This chapter of “The Identity Trap” by Yascha Mounk discusses the evolution and impact of what Mounk terms the “identity synthesis” in intellectual and political discourse, particularly within American academia. It explores the shift in focus from class struggle to culture and identity, influenced by theories such as postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory. The chapter outlines seven fundamental propositions central to this synthesis, including skepticism about objective truth, the political use of discourse analysis, strategic essentialism, pessimism about Western societies, identity-sensitive legislation, intersectionality, and standpoint theory. Important figures mentioned include Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Derrick Bell, and Kimberlé Crenshaw.

  The seven fundamental propositions discussed in the chapter are:

  1. Skepticism towards objective truths, highlighting the subjective nature of knowledge and the role of power in its construction.
  2. Discourse analysis as a political tool, emphasizing how language shapes reality and power dynamics.
  3. Strategic essentialism, the tactical use of essential identity categories for political purposes despite theoretical critiques.
  4. Pessimism about Western societies’ ability to overcome racism and sexism, suggesting systemic issues are deeply entrenched.
  5. Advocacy for identity-sensitive legislation, to address specific injustices faced by marginalized groups.
  6. Intersectionality, focusing on how different aspects of identity intersect and create unique experiences of discrimination.
  7. Standpoint theory, proposing that marginalized groups possess unique insights into societal structures due to their experiences.

• Chapter 5: THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS GOES MAINSTREAM

  This chapter from “The Identity Trap” discusses the impact of social media, particularly Tumblr, on the proliferation of identity-focused discourse and its mainstream acceptance. Key points include:

  • Early optimism about the internet fostering cross-cultural understanding has been replaced by recognition of its role in amplifying identity-based divisions.
  • Tumblr’s architecture facilitated the exploration and expression of new identities, significantly influencing young users’ engagement with identity politics.
  • Social media platforms extended the reach of “Tumblr ideology,” influencing broader media and public discourse with concepts like intersectionality and standpoint epistemology.
  • This shift contributed to a change in journalistic content and public discussion, emphasizing identity and lived experience, with significant implications for social and political discourse.

  Important figures mentioned include David Karp (Tumblr’s founder) and influential theorists like Kimberlé Crenshaw (intersectionality).

• Chapter 6: THE SHORT MARCH THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONS

  The chapter from “The Identity Trap” by Yascha Mounk discusses the transformation of societal and organizational norms through strategic infiltration and advocacy within institutions. Here are the main points and important people mentioned:

  • Strategies of Infiltration: Influenced by Rudi Dutschke’s concept of the “long march through the institutions,” activists aimed to subvert political systems from within by gaining positions of power in key societal structures.
  • Impact on Society: The infiltration led to significant cultural and social changes as former activists entered various sectors, transforming norms and practices from the 1970s to the 1990s.
  • Herbert Marcuse’s Influence: Marcuse expanded on Dutschke’s ideas, advocating for working within established institutions to effect change.
  • Short March Through the Institutions: This concept explains the rapid assimilation of the “identity synthesis” ideology into powerful organizations by the 2020s, driven by a new generation deeply influenced by identity politics.
  • Transformation of Nonprofits and Corporations: Organizations like the ACLU and corporations such as Coca-Cola have undergone ideological shifts, prioritizing identity politics and diversity training, often at the expense of their original missions.
  • Legal and Social Pressure: The adoption of new policies and practices within these institutions has been accelerated by legal pressures, social media activism, and the desire to align with industry standards.

  This summary reflects the chapter’s exploration of how ideological shifts, driven by a combination of strategic infiltration and societal changes, have reshaped key institutions and cultural norms.

• Chapter 7: DISSENT DISCOURAGED

  The chapter from “The Identity Trap” discusses the political and social aftermath of Donald Trump’s election, focusing on the polarization within American society and the impact on progressive organizations. Here are the main points:

  • Election of Donald Trump: Sparked widespread protests and mobilization among opponents, raising concerns about his policies and rhetoric.
  • Reaction to Trump’s Presidency: Activists and organizations like the ACLU and NAACP saw increased support and activism, but efforts to remove Trump from office failed.
  • Shift in Focus: As direct opposition to Trump proved challenging, some progressives turned their focus inward, leading to internal conflicts within progressive institutions over ideological purity.
  • Identity Orthodoxy: A rigid adherence to specific ideological positions became prevalent, with dissent being discouraged. Notable figures like Donald McNeil, David Shor, and Emmanuel Cafferty faced consequences for perceived or actual deviations from these norms.
  • Intellectual Enforcers: Authors Ibram X. Kendi and Robin DiAngelo contributed to defining and enforcing this orthodoxy, with Kendi advocating a binary view of racism and antiracism, and DiAngelo asserting the ubiquity of racism among white people.
  • Impact on Progressive Institutions: The internal strife and focus on identity politics diverted energy from broader goals, affecting the effectiveness and morale within these organizations.

  This summary reflects the chapter’s exploration of the dynamics within progressive movements and the broader societal implications of political and ideological polarization.

• Chapter 8: HOW TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER

  • Standpoint theory’s origins with feminist philosophers advocating for recognizing unique insights based on social identities.
  • Critique of standpoint theory’s philosophical and practical applications, highlighting communication challenges among different identity groups.
  • Advocacy for a nuanced approach to empathy and solidarity, focusing on mutual understanding and collective action despite differences.
  • Mention of figures such as Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Ayanna Pressley, contributing to discourse on knowledge, experience, and identity politics.

• Chapter 9: THE JOYS OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE

  • Critique of cultural appropriation concept, advocating for cultural hybridity and mutual influence.
  • Discussion of real-world examples and academic perspectives on cultural exchange.
  • Argument against labeling cultural exchange as appropriation, highlighting misidentification of issues like discrimination or exploitation.
  • Call for celebration of cultural diversity and exchange benefits.
  • Emphasis on reevaluating societal understanding and engagement with different cultures, stressing mutual respect and shared human creativity.

• Chapter 10 & 11

  • Dangers of restricting free speech: entrenches power dynamics, increases political stakes, hinders social change.
  • Critique of progressive turn against free speech, influenced by Herbert Marcuse and Stanley Fish.
  • Importance of a culture of free speech to counter governmental and private censorship.
  • Promotion of free speech as a means to foster empathy, cohesion, and democratic resilience.
  • Advocacy for policies and social practices encouraging open dialogue and respect for diverse opinions.

• Chapter 12: THE PATH TO EQUALITY

  This chapter from “The Identity Trap” examines the implications of race-sensitive public policies and equity-focused strategies within governmental decisions, including vaccine distribution during the COVID-19 pandemic. Key points include:

  • Critique of race-sensitive policies for potentially leading to worse outcomes across demographic groups.
  • Examination of equity vs. equality, with equity potentially reinforcing disparities or not addressing broader inequalities.
  • Discussion on the philosophical and practical drawbacks of equity-focused approaches.
  • Highlight of legal frameworks and criteria for race-sensitive policies by referencing views of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia.
  • Argument for race-neutral policies as capable of addressing racial disparities and historical injustices more effectively than race-sensitive approaches.
  • Concerns over the popularity and divisiveness of race-sensitive policies among various demographic groups.

• Chapter 13: ON STRUCTURAL RACISM, GENDER, AND MERITOCRACY

  The chapter covers three main topics:

  • Structural Racism: It discusses how structural racism extends beyond individual prejudices to systemic issues, challenging the notion that racism solely stems from personal bias and highlighting complexities in addressing hate crimes between different minority groups.
  • Sex, Gender, and Transgender Rights: It explores the debate over recognizing gender identity versus biological sex, advocating for a balanced understanding that respects both concepts while addressing practical implications in medicine, sports, and public policy.
  • Meritocracy: It critiques the diminishing reality of social mobility and the ideal of meritocracy, suggesting that while the concept has flaws, completely abandoning it would ignore the benefits of incentivizing talent and effort in society.

• Chapter 14: A RESPONSE TO THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS

  The chapter outlines the critique of liberalism by proponents of the identity synthesis, highlighting three foundational claims:

  • Emphasizing group identities (like race, gender, and sexual orientation) as primary lenses to understand the world.
  • Arguing that universal values and neutral rules mask the dominance of privileged groups over marginalized ones.
  • Advocating for norms and laws that prioritize treatment based on group identity to achieve justice.

  The chapter also presents a liberal response that acknowledges the significance of group identity but argues for a broader consideration of various factors (including class and ideology) in understanding societal dynamics. It defends the role of universal values and neutral rules in facilitating progress towards fairness and equality, urging a commitment to liberal democracy’s ideals for continued societal improvement.

• Chapter 15: A BRIEF CASE FOR THE LIBERAL ALTERNATIVE

  • Advocacy for liberalism as opposed to the identity synthesis perspective.
  • Emphasis on liberal principles: individual freedom, political equality, and collective self-government.
  • Critique of the identity synthesis’ pessimism about human nature and its divisive focus on identity categories.
  • Argument for liberalism’s historical success in achieving peace, prosperity, and fairness.
  • Call for a broad coalition against identity synthesis, upholding liberal values for societal progress and cohesion.

• Appendix: WHY THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS ISN’T MARXIST

  This appendix from “The Identity Trap” addresses the misconception that the identity synthesis is a form of “cultural Marxism.” It clarifies that, despite structural similarities, the identity synthesis and Marxism have fundamental differences, particularly in their foundational views and ultimate goals. The identity synthesis’s roots are more aligned with postmodern thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard, who were critical of grand narratives, including Marxism. The appendix argues that while both ideologies critique liberalism, they do so from different premises, with the identity synthesis focusing on group identities over economic conditions, and lacking the utopian promise of classlessness inherent in Marxism.

• Strategic Essentialism

Important

MAIN IDEAS, TAKEAWAYS & SIMILARITIES

Important

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

YaschaMounk-The_Identity_Trap__A_Story_of_Ideas_and_Power_in_Our_Time(2023)_-_libgen.li 1.pdf (file not included in this release)

Important

My Notes

• Progressive went from universalism, people not being defined by their skin color or sexual preference—the opposite is now true.
• 1960s-1970s—number of leftists thought the commitment to universalism wasn’t fighting hard enough or ignored some ‘minorities.’ Thinking it’d be better to identify as a marginalized group and then fighting for collective liberation.
• postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory.

Overcoming the Universalist Shortcomings

Step 1: View the world the prism of identity categories like race, gender, and sexual orientation.

Step 2: Rejection of universal values and neutral rules. Treat people based on their identity group.

• Identity synthesis with the goal of creating a society of genuine equals; actually create a society with rigid identity groups pit against each other.

Talks about right-wing populism—what are the policies that the left is afraid of?

What are the policies that the right are afraid of from the identity leftists?

• AI on ‘right-wing populism’ Based on the search results, some of the main policies associated with right-wing populism in the United States include:
  1. Anti-immigration policies:
  • Support for expanding border walls and increased border security
  • Opposition to illegal and legal immigration, especially from non-European countries
  • Calls for deportations and restricting asylum claims
  1. Economic nationalism and protectionism:
  • Opposition to free trade agreements and globalization
  • Support for tariffs and protectionist trade policies
  • Criticism of outsourcing jobs and offshoring production
  1. Welfare chauvinism:
  • Support for expanding welfare programs and benefits
  • But restricting access only to certain “deserving” groups based on ethnicity, religion, immigration status
  1. Law and order policies:
  • Support for expanded police powers and criminal justice enforcement
  • Opposition to movements like Black Lives Matter and antifa
  1. Social conservatism:
  • Opposition to liberal social policies related to gender, sexuality, race
  • Defense of “traditional” cultural values and American identity
  1. Anti-elitism:
  • Attacks on political, economic, academic, and media “elites”
  • Speaking on behalf of “real” Americans and the “silent majority”
  So in summary, right-wing populism in the U.S. combines nationalist, protectionist economic policies with conservative cultural stances and anti-elite rhetoric. Restricting immigration and access to social programs for “undeserving groups” are also notable policy priorities. Citations:
  [1]
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_populism
  [2]
  https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/11/09/populist-right/
  [3]
  https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/right-wing-populism/
  [4]
  https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/12/6/154
  [5]
  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/06/01/understanding-right-wing-populism-and-what-to-do-about-it/ Based on the search results, right-wing populism is a political ideology that combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes. Some key characteristics of right-wing populism include:
  • Anti-elitist sentiments and opposition to the perceived “establishment” or “elite”
  • Speaking on behalf of the “common people”
  • Nationalism and anti-immigration stances, especially opposition to immigration from the Muslim world
  • Euroscepticism (opposition to the European Union)
  • Support for expanding the welfare state, but only for certain groups deemed “worthy,” described as “welfare chauvinism”
  • Associations with ideologies like neo-nationalism, nativism, protectionism, and opposition to globalization and environmentalism
  • Prominent in the Republican Party in the U.S. and in right-wing political parties in Europe
  • Reliance on populist rhetoric and themes to mobilize a coalition of both economic and cultural conservatives
  In summary, right-wing populism combines conservative, nationalist ideological elements with an anti-elite, pro-”common people” populist appeal. It has become an influential force in many Western countries. Citations:
  [1]
  https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/right-wing-populism/
  [2]
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_populism
  [3]
  https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/11/09/populist-right/
  [4]
  https://www.idea.int/blog/explainer-populism-left-and-right-progressive-and-regressive
  [5]
  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/06/01/understanding-right-wing-populism-and-what-to-do-about-it/ Right-wing populism in the United States has been a significant force in the country’s political landscape, particularly in recent years. The movement is characterized by its appeal to the “common man” against what it perceives as a corrupt elite, often emphasizing nationalism, strict immigration policies, and skepticism towards globalization. Here are some of the main policies and themes associated with right-wing populism in the U.S.:
  1. Immigration Control: A central policy of right-wing populism in the U.S. is a strict approach to immigration. This includes advocating for building walls or barriers on the border (notably the U.S.-Mexico border), stringent enforcement of immigration laws, and reducing the number of immigrants and refugees accepted into the country.
  2. Economic Nationalism: Right-wing populists often criticize globalization and its impact on domestic jobs and industries. They advocate for policies that prioritize American workers and businesses, such as tariffs on imported goods, renegotiating trade deals perceived as unfair, and encouraging manufacturing within the U.S.
  3. Law and Order: Emphasizing a strong stance on crime and domestic security is another hallmark. This includes support for tough-on-crime policies, increased funding and support for law enforcement, and sometimes, advocating for policies that are criticized for being overly harsh or discriminatory.
  4. Anti-Establishment Sentiment: Right-wing populists often position themselves against the political, cultural, and economic elite, arguing that these groups are out of touch with the needs and values of ordinary Americans. This can manifest in criticism of mainstream media, traditional political parties, and various institutions perceived as being elitist.
  5. Cultural Conservatism: Many right-wing populists in the U.S. emphasize traditional values and cultural identity, often expressing skepticism or opposition to social movements that advocate for progressive changes in society, such as LGBTQ+ rights, abortion rights, and gun control measures.
  6. Skepticism of Multilateralism and International Alliances: There is often a preference for unilateral action over multilateral international agreements and organizations, which are seen as limiting America’s sovereignty and ability to act in its own interest.
  It’s important to note that right-wing populism is not a monolith, and its proponents may emphasize some policies over others based on their particular brand of populism or the issues that are most salient at a given time. Additionally, the movement can vary regionally within the U.S., with different groups and leaders prioritizing different aspects of the populist agenda.

Rise and Fall of Marxism after WWII

• France
• Jean-Paul Sartre

Michael Foucault

Jean-Francois Lyotard

• They set out to critique any set of ideas which assumed that there are universal truths; that some values are objectively superior to others; or that we can make genuine progress toward building a better society.

As the language of intersectionality became popular in activist circles, this tempted some activists to place a very high entry barrier on anybody who wants to participate in a political movement. If somebody wants to join a feminist movement committed to intersectionality, these activists now also expect that person to agree with a set of specific positions about such varied topics as the nature of race discrimination, the injustices suffered by disabled people, and the conflict in Palestine. (pg. 72) This is very interesting and explains a lot of what’s happening now with the protests of Palestine by people of the LGBTQ movement

• Intersectionality = All these left movements coming together; if you’re part of it you must agree to all the conditions.
• Idea that different victimizations enforce the others

Screenshot_2024-02-13_at_10.40.03_PM 1.png (image unavailable)

Important

HIGHLIGHTS

Rise and Fall of Marxism after WWII

Introduction THE LURE AND THE TRAP (Page 6)

THE STAKES ARE HIGH (Page 10)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 14)

THE LURE (Page 16)

THE TRAP (Page 20)

WHY THE IDENTITY TRAP IS WORTH WORRYING (AND WRITING) ABOUT (Page 24)

THE GREAT ESCAPE (Page 26)

PART I The Origins of the Identity Synthesis (Page 31)

Chapter 1 POSTWAR PARIS AND THE TRIAL OF TRUTH (Page 34)

THE FALSE PROMISE OF PROGRESS (Page 36)

THE REJECTION OF IDENTITY (Page 41)

A REFUSAL OF POLITICS (Page 43)

TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 2 THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE EMBRACE OF “STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM” (Page 47)

FIGHT THE POWER (OF WORDS) (Page 49)

PUTTING THE POLITICS BACK IN (Page 51)

THE EMBRACE OF STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM (Page 53)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 3 THE REJECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Page 58)

DERRICK BELL’S CASE AGAINST DESEGREGATION (Page 60)

THE (SUPPOSED) PERMANENCE OF RACISM (Page 64)

THE INVENTION OF INTERSECTIONALITY (Page 67)

INTERSECTIONALITY TAKES ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN (Page 70)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 4 THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 75)

THE MAIN THEMES OF THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 77)

1. Skepticism About Objective Truth (Page 77)

2. Discourse Analysis for Political Ends (Page 79)

3. Doubling Down on Identity (Page 80)

4. Proud Pessimism (Page 81)

5. Identity-Sensitive Legislation (Page 82)

6. The Imperative of Intersectionality (Page 83)

7. Standpoint Theory (Page 85)

CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR (Page 86)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

PART II The Victory of the Identity Synthesis (Page 91)

Chapter 5 THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS GOES MAINSTREAM (Page 95)

HOW A FORGOTTEN PLATFORM HELPED TO BIRTH A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE (Page 96)

NEW MEDIA PLATFORMS EMBRACE TUMBLR IDEOLOGY (Page 100)

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MAINSTREAM (Page 103)

THE GREAT AWOKENING (Page 106)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 6 THE SHORT MARCH THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONS (Page 111)

THE TRAINING GROUND (Page 113)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS TAKES OVER NONPROFITS (Page 116)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS ENTERS THE C-SUITE (Page 122)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 7 DISSENT DISCOURAGED (Page 129)

AN IDENTITY ORTHODOXY DESCENDS ON PROGRESSIVE INSTITUTIONS (Page 131)

PEER PRESSURE AND THE RADICALIZATION OF GROUPS (Page 134)

THE INTELLECTUAL ENFORCERS OF THE IDENTITY ORTHODOXY (Page 139)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

PART III The Flaws of the Identity Synthesis (Page 145)

Chapter 8 HOW TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER (Page 150)

THE ORIGINS OF STANDPOINT THEORY (Page 153)

WHY STANDPOINT THEORY MAKES FOR BAD PHILOSOPHY (Page 156)

WHY STANDPOINT THEORY MAKES FOR BAD POLITICS (Page 159)

ONLY HARD-WON EMPATHY CAN GROUND REAL SOLIDARITY (Page 162)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 9 THE JOYS OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE (Page 166)

HOW THE LEFT CAME TO WORRY ABOUT CULTURAL APPROPRIATION (Page 168)

THE PROBLEMS WITH “CULTURAL APPROPRIATION” (Page 171)

The Problem of Original Ownership (Page 172)

The Problem of Group Membership (Page 174)

A BETTER WAY OF EXPRESSING WHAT’S WRONG (Page 176)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 10 SPEAK FREELY (Page 181)

THE ROOTS OF THE “PROGRESSIVE” REJECTION OF FREE SPEECH (Page 186)

WHY RESTRICTING SPEECH IS SO DANGEROUS (Page 189)

Empowering the Powerful (Page 192)

Raising the Stakes of Elections (Page 193)

Closing the Safety Valve (Page 194)

FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY (Page 195)

The Government Must Not Have the Right to Lock You Up for What You Say (Page 197)

There Must Be Limits to the Power of Private Actors to Censor Political Debate (Page 198)

Building a Culture of Free Speech (Page 201)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 11 THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION (Page 206)

THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE SEPARATISM (Page 208)

THE PROGRESSIVES WHO CHAMPION WHITE IDENTITY (Page 212)

WHAT SOCIAL SCIENCE CAN TEACH US ABOUT HOW TO FOSTER EMPATHY AND COHESION (Page 214)

Human Beings Are Groupish (Page 215)

The Promise of Intergroup Contact (Page 216)

When Intergroup Contact Does (and Doesn’t) Work (Page 217)

WHY THE PRACTICES PROPOSED BY PROGRESSIVE SEPARATISTS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (Page 218)

WHY ENCOURAGING WHITES TO EMBRACE RACE IS LIKELY TO BACKFIRE (Page 222)

THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION (Page 225)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 12 THE PATH TO EQUALITY (Page 231)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 13 ON STRUCTURAL RACISM, GENDER, AND MERITOCRACY (Page 255)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

PART IV In Defense of Universalism (Page 268)

Chapter 14 A RESPONSE TO THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 271)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Chapter 15 A BRIEF CASE FOR THE LIBERAL ALTERNATIVE (Page 284)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Conclusion HOW TO ESCAPE THE IDENTITY TRAP (Page 297)

Appendix WHY THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS ISN’T MARXIST (Page 323)

Introduction THE LURE AND THE TRAP (Page 6)

In a growing number of schools all across America, educators who believe themselves to be fighting for racial justice are separating children from each other on the basis of their skin color. (Page 6)

race-segregated “affinity groups.” (Page 6)

Schools and universities, foundations and some corporations seem to believe that they should actively encourage people to conceive of themselves as “racial beings.” Increasingly, they are also applying the same framework to other forms of identity, encouraging people to think of their gender, their cultural origin, or their sexual orientation as their defining attribute. (Page 9)

THE STAKES ARE HIGH (Page 10)

But for the past decade, some influential doctors, activists, and experts have been pushing to make triage decisions on the basis of a different consideration: racial equity. (Page 10)

But rather than making up for these injustices by taking the necessary measures to ensure that the hospital would treat white and Black patients equally in the future, their “implementation measure to achieve equity” consisted of “a preferential admission option for Black and Latinx heart failure patients.” (Page 11)

As Lori Bruce, the associate director of the Center for Bioethics at Yale University, recently argued in the Journal of Medical Ethics, protocols for whom to prioritize when medical goods are scarce “should be assessed by a broader lens than merely the simplistic measure of the number of lives saved.” (Page 11)

guidelines adopted by the State of New York are part of a wider trend. (Page 12)

Centers for Disease Control (CDC) urged states to give essential workers access to the vaccine ahead of the elderly on the grounds that older Americans are disproportionately white. (Page 12)

small businesses that were in danger of going bankrupt because of revenue loss caused by the pandemic, for example, it explicitly favored those owned by women over those owned by men. (Page 13)

City of San Francisco recently announced a basic income scheme that would provide low-income residents with $ 1,200 a month. The only catch is that eligibility for the program is restricted to members of one group: those who identify as trans. (Page 13)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 14)

But over the past six decades, the left’s thinking on identity has—for reasons that are in many ways understandable—undergone a profound change. (Page 14)

In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of leftists argued that a theoretical commitment to universalism all too often existed alongside serious discrimination on racial or religious grounds. They also pointed out that many left-wing movements had long been inhospitable to ethnic and sexual minorities. As awareness and understanding of the historical oppression of various identity groups grew, some parts of the left came to embrace the idea that the solution must lie in encouraging new forms of activism and group pride. If some people have suffered serious disadvantages because they were gay or Black, then it made sense to encourage gay or Black individuals to identify with these marginalized groups—and fight for their collective liberation. (Page 14)

identity synthesis is concerned with many different kinds of groups, including (but not limited to) those based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and disability. (Page 16)

postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory. (Page 16)

ideology that dare not speak its name turns out to have a nature that is all too real. (Page 16)

THE LURE (Page 16)

Many advocates of the identity synthesis are driven by a noble ambition: to remedy the serious injustices that continue to characterize every country in the world, (Page 16)

It seeks to do so by moving beyond—or outright discarding—the traditional rules and norms of democracies like Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (Page 18)

The first step in overcoming the supposed shortcomings of a universalist outlook, they argue, is to recognize that we can only understand the world by seeing it first and foremost through the prism of identity categories like race, gender, and sexual orientation. (Page 18)

more likely to invoke new concepts like “microaggressions” and “implicit bias” than they are to invoke older concepts like social class. (Page 19)

second step, the rejection of universal values and neutral rules also implies a very different set of views about how to fix persistent injustices. (Page 19)

how we all treat each other—depend on the identity group to which they belong. (Page 19)

THE TRAP (Page 20)

social psychologists have demonstrated again and again, drawing lines between different groups seems to come naturally to members of our species. We are capable of great courage and altruism when called upon to assist members of our own group, but also of terrifying disregard and cruelty when confronted with people whom we think of as members of another group. Any decent ideology must have an account of how to attenuate the ill effects of such conflicts. One key problem with the identity synthesis is that it fails to do so. (Page 20)

Pedagogical approaches like the fashionable exhortation to “embrace race” encourage young people to define themselves in terms of the distinct racial, religious, and sexual groups into which they are born. Meanwhile, public policies like the “race-sensitive” protocols for medical triage give citizens a strong incentive to fight for the collective interests of their own groups. Taken together, these kinds of norms and policies are likely to create a society composed of warring tribes rather than cooperating compatriots, with each group engaged in a zero-sum competition with every other group. (Page 21)

The lure that attracts so many people to the identity synthesis is a desire to overcome persistent injustices and create a society of genuine equals. But the likely outcome of implementing this ideology is a society in which an unremitting emphasis on our differences pits rigid identity groups against each other in a zero-sum battle for resources and recognition—a society in which all of us are, whether we want to or not, forced to define ourselves by the groups into which we happen to be born. That’s what makes the identity synthesis a trap. (Page 23)

WHY THE IDENTITY TRAP IS WORTH WORRYING (AND WRITING) ABOUT (Page 24)

right-wing populism and the identity trap feed on each other. (Page 26)

Right-wing populists and the advocates of the identity synthesis see each other as mortal enemies. In truth, each is the yin to the other’s yang. The best way to beat one is to oppose the other—and that’s why everyone who cares about the survival of free societies should vow to fight both. (Page 26)

THE GREAT ESCAPE (Page 26)

features the rejection of grand narratives, including both liberalism and Marxism, by postmodern thinkers such as Michel Foucault; an embrace of the need for intellectuals to speak on behalf of oppressed groups by adopting a form of “strategic essentialism” by postcolonial thinkers such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; and the rejection of the key values of the civil rights movement, including the goal of racial integration, by critical race theorists such as Derrick Bell. (Page 27)

PART I The Origins of the Identity Synthesis (Page 31)

Chapter 1 POSTWAR PARIS AND THE TRIAL OF TRUTH (Page 34)

With every passing year, the faith that scientific Marxism had invested in the supposedly inevitable process by which capitalism would founder on its internal contradictions looked increasingly anachronistic. (Page 35)

revealed the extent to which purges had decimated the party’s ranks in a shocking speech. “Of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress,” which had taken place in 1934, Nikita Khrushchev announced, “98 persons, i.e. 70 percent, were arrested and shot.” (Page 35)

The true lesson of gulags and show trials, they claimed, was to distrust any ideology that offered a sweeping account of what makes the world tick and how to improve it. (Page 36)

THE FALSE PROMISE OF PROGRESS (Page 36)

Michel Foucault (Page 36)

When Soviet papers blamed an imaginary plot of Jewish doctors for Stalin’s illness in 1953, inspiring a vile anti-Semitic campaign both in the Soviet Union and in the French Communist Party, Foucault found that he could no longer toe the line. (Page 37)

Foucault remained a committed leftist until his death. Many of the stances he embraced in his later life—from a petition to abolish the age of consent to complimentary comments about Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran—are horrifying. (Page 38)

1960s. In Madness and Civilization, his first influential book, Foucault started to question conventional narratives of moral and scientific progress. (Page 38)

Foucault gave a definition of the nature of power that was to prove deeply influential. Classic philosophers such as John Locke, he argued, tended to understand power as a tool that the state can wield to ensure that citizens follow its rules. Radical philosophers thought of it as a system of domination that systematically subjugated a particular category of people, such as the proletariat in Marxist thought or women in feminist thought. But as Foucault now came to conceive of it, power is much more fluid and variegated. Because real power lies in the identity labels we use to make sense of the world and the normative assumptions enshrined in the discourses that structure our society, it is “produced from one moment to the next, at every point… . Power is everywhere not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” (Page 41)

The consequence of this conception of power was a radical skepticism about the perfectibility of the social world. People, Foucault believed, would always chafe against the form that power takes at their particular historical juncture: “Where there is power, there is resistance.” But this resistance itself will, if it should prove successful, immediately come to exercise a power of its own. Because resistance “is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power … there is no single locus of great Refusal.” Even the most noble struggle against present-day oppression, Foucault was warning his readers, would contain within itself the seed for new and equally constraining forms of future oppression. (Page 41)

THE REJECTION OF IDENTITY (Page 41)

those who read his work took away two fundamental lessons. (Page 42)

The first was to turn Foucault’s distrust of progress into a kind of intellectual manifesto. (Page 42)

the intellectual predicament of the second half of the twentieth century should be characterized by the gradual recognition of the falsity of such grand narratives. (Page 42)

For many people who read Foucault and Lyotard, this incredulity toward metanarratives soon came to extend to the most basic building blocks with which we make sense of the world. Metanarratives give people a sense of the broader moral or political goals they should be aiming to realize. The scientific method—itself a metanarrative that must be distrusted, according to Lyotard—gives people a sense of the objective criteria by which they can assess the truth or the falsity of a statement. Those who come to believe that both are based on a big mistake are forced to reject the most fundamental assumptions that ground our practices and institutions, from the veracity of scientific findings to the value of democracy. (Page 42)

The second lesson was a fundamental skepticism about identity categories. Foucault argued that labels like “mental illness” and “homosexuality” are tools of power rather than descriptions of reality. As the years went by, postmodern thinkers seized on this idea to develop an ever more radical skepticism about the ability of anyone to make claims on behalf of a group defined by some common identity. (Page 42)

A REFUSAL OF POLITICS (Page 43)

Noam Chomsky (Page 43)

For despite Foucault’s refusal to propose a better model for society, it was his rejection of universal truth, his skepticism about the possibility of progress, and his warnings about the power of oppressive discourses that ended up inspiring an ideology that has gone on to transform the left and gain unexpected influence in the mainstream: the identity synthesis. (Page 45)

TAKEAWAYS

• To understand the rise of the identity synthesis, we must go back to its original impetus in the Paris of the 1950s and 1960s.
• Key “postmodern” theorists like Michel Foucault were steeped in communist ideas. But the core of their philosophy consisted of a rejection of all “grand narratives,” including Marxism.
• The rejection of grand narratives led postmodern theorists to grow deeply skeptical of claims to both objective truth and universal values. It even led them to reject stable identity categories, like “woman” or “proletarian.”
• Foucault argued against the widespread notion that democratic societies have become more humane in their treatment of criminals, the mentally ill, or sexual minorities. In reality, he believed, societies have merely found more sophisticated ways of controlling the behavior of the aberrant.
• Philosophers have traditionally assumed that formal institutions like states wield power from the top down. But Foucault argued that modern societies exercise social control in a more subtle way. He argued that it is informal “discourses” which determine what people can do or think. This called into question whether a rebellion against existing power relations could ever set people free. (Page 45)

Chapter 2 THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE EMBRACE OF “STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM” (Page 47)

Weakened by World War II, Europe’s colonial powers could no longer muster the resources to impose their will on the world. For the first time in centuries, the sun set on the British Empire. (Page 47)

For most of their lives, scholars and intellectuals from the newly liberated parts of the world had focused their energy on fighting for independence. Now they faced a new set of daunting tasks. They needed to create a cohesive national identity in countries riven with long-standing religious or ethnic rivalries. They needed to agree on the economic and political institutions that would govern them. And they needed to accomplish all of that while discarding the vestiges of a Western intellectual tradition they regarded as a foreign imposition. (Page 47)

This process of self-reinvention was all the more challenging because a great number of leaders from formerly colonized countries had been educated in Western schools and universities. (Page 47)

Many more looked for inspiration in the revolutionary promises of Marxism or sought an alliance with the avowedly anti-imperialist Soviet Union. (Page 48)

The postmodernist ethos of Foucault and other French theorists, they came to believe, could help them dismantle the “discourses” and “grand narratives” that had justified the brutal colonization of their countries, laying the groundwork for a more authentic self-understanding. (Page 48)

FIGHT THE POWER (OF WORDS) (Page 49)

The strange origin of Edward Said’s name proved to be prophetic of his ambivalent relationship with the West. (Page 49)

Said argued that long-standing “Occidental” representations of the “Orient” were responsible for real harm. Explicitly recognizing his debt to “Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse,” he claimed that the way in which Western writers had described the East was a key precondition for wielding power over it: “Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.” (Page 50)

PUTTING THE POLITICS BACK IN (Page 51)

During the 1980s, postmodernism quickly gained popularity in American academia, with French theorists and their disciples coming to dominate literature departments around the country. But the style of “theory” they popularized was highly self-referential and deeply obscure to outsiders. Over time, Said grew increasingly concerned about the “institutionalization and professionalization of literary studies,” complaining that his colleagues were fleeing politics to play obscure word games (or, as he put it, “retreat into a labyrinth of ‘textuality’ ”). (Page 52)

For many of Orientalism’s readers, it seemed clear that the goal of cultural analysis should be to help the oppressed. (Page 52)

The goal was to change the dominant discourse in such a way as to help the oppressed resist the oppressor. This was, in other words, a form of discourse analysis for explicitly political ends. (Page 52)

THE EMBRACE OF STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM (Page 53)

These few cryptic remarks quickly took on a life of their own. Faced with the problem of how to speak on behalf of the “oppressed,” scholars from a large number of disciplines followed in Spivak’s footsteps. They continued to wield the tools of postmodernism to cast doubt on any claims invoking scientific objectivity or universal principles. At the same time, they insisted that they can speak on behalf of groups of oppressed people by invoking the tactical need for what they came to call “strategic essentialism.” This attempt to square the circle is still apparent today when activists preface their remarks by acknowledging that race (or gender or ability status) “is a social construct,” before going on to make surprisingly essentializing claims about what “Black and brown people” (or women or the disabled) believe. (Page 55)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Postcolonial scholars like Edward Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak sought to speak to the challenges facing former colonies from Asia to Africa without embracing the long-standing Western traditions they distrusted. Postmodernism, with its attack on supposedly universal truths, provided them with a key tool for doing so.
• Edward Said built on the kind of “discourse analysis” pioneered by Michel Foucault to critique Western narratives about the “Orient.” His aim was to uncover the ways in which a set of supposedly objective claims about Asia and Africa served as a justification for colonial domination.
• Said and other postcolonial scholars eventually grew dissatisfied with the apolitical nature of postmodernism. They resolved to put discourse analysis to explicitly political use by trying to reshape dominant discourses in ways that would help the oppressed. This soon came to serve as a model for an avowedly political form of discourse analysis in other academic fields.
• Postmodern theorists were also deeply skeptical of the validity of seemingly neutral identity categories, such as “women” or “the oppressed.” In response, Spivak advocated the embrace of “strategic essentialism.” She recommended that activists should, insofar as this might prove politically useful, encourage people to organize on the basis of their group identities. (Page 56)

Chapter 3 THE REJECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Page 58)

In the early 1970s, neighborhoods that had once been entirely white saw Black families move in. But because of “white flight” many quickly became almost entirely Black. Traditionally white public schools finally admitted Black students. But because many white parents responded by taking their children out of these schools, yet another generation of Black pupils languished in segregated classrooms. (Page 59)

As the noble aspirations of the civil rights movement gave way to these disheartening realities, a generation of young legal scholars such as Derrick Bell and Kimberlé Crenshaw set out to understand what had gone wrong. (Page 60)

Why, they began to ask themselves over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, were all those intoxicating victories in courtrooms and legislatures translating into so little progress on the ground? (Page 60)

DERRICK BELL’S CASE AGAINST DESEGREGATION (Page 60)

Any steps to achieve desegregation must be reviewed in light of the black community’s interest in improved pupil performance as the primary characteristic of educational equity… . We think it neither necessary nor proper to endure the dislocations of desegregation without reasonable assurances that our children will instructionally profit. (Page 63)

political bombshell. Drawing on a line of argument that (as Bell himself acknowledged) had originally been advanced by racist opponents of desegregation, he warned that civil rights lawyers were trying to “serve two masters” at the same time. (Page 64)

In his mind, casting doubts on the merit of desegregation was only the opening salvo in a much wider campaign to question the logic and the values of the civil rights movement. (Page 64)

THE (SUPPOSED) PERMANENCE OF RACISM (Page 64)

The standard, idealistic explanation for the apparent progress of the civil rights era, he now argued, was hopelessly naive. Far from being driven by a gradual process of moral enlightenment or mandated by the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the most storied court cases of the civil rights era had, all along, been driven by the racial self-interest of whites. (Page 65)

This pessimistic interpretation of the landmark court decisions of the civil rights era led Bell to a stark prediction: “The interests of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.” (Page 66)

“Racism,” he contended, is not “a holdover from slavery that the nation both wants to cure and is capable of curing.” Rather, it is “an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.” (Page 66)

THE INVENTION OF INTERSECTIONALITY (Page 67)

When Crenshaw helped to organize a summer workshop at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 1989, she called it “Critical Race Theory” without much deliberation, and the name stuck. A new movement was officially inaugurated. (Page 68)

In Crenshaw’s most influential paper, which she published in 1989, she coined a term for the way in which different forms of discrimination can reinforce each other: “intersectionality.” (Page 69)

INTERSECTIONALITY TAKES ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN (Page 70)

But as critical race theory became more influential in the following decades, and the once-obscure academic term coined by Crenshaw morphed into an unlikely rallying cry for a new generation of activists, its meaning became increasingly broad and amorphous. (Page 70)

feminist scholars like Donna Haraway were starting to emphasize the way in which each person’s experiences depend on their particular constellation of identities. (Page 70)

This idea became a central component of critical race theory. According to Bell, for example, “a neutral perspective does not, and cannot, exist.” Charles Lawrence, another influential legal theorist, goes even further: “We must learn to trust our own senses, feelings, and experiences and give them authority, even (or especially) in the face of dominant accounts of social reality that claim universality.” (Page 71)

intersectionality thus came to stand for a belief in the profound incommensurability of human experience. (Page 71)

Another common invocation of intersectionality is rooted in its emphasis on the way in which different forms of victimization can reinforce each other. (Page 71)

be intersectional, according to this reading, was to recognize that anybody who is truly committed to the eradication of one form of injustice, like gender discrimination, must also be committed to the eradication of other forms of injustice, like racial or religious discrimination. (Page 71)

As the language of intersectionality became popular in activist circles, this tempted some activists to place a very high entry barrier on anybody who wants to participate in a political movement. If somebody wants to join a feminist movement committed to intersectionality, these activists now also expect that person to agree with a set of specific positions about such varied topics as the nature of race discrimination, the injustices suffered by disabled people, and the conflict in Palestine. (Page 72)

critical race theory played in bringing together disparate intellectual traditions, from postmodernism to postcolonialism, and preparing the ground for the identity synthesis. (Page 72)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The civil rights movement transformed the United States by abolishing most of the formal ways in which laws and institutions discriminated against African Americans. But beginning in the late 1960s, a young set of activists came to be bitterly disappointed that triumphant legal victories did not translate into similarly radical changes in conditions on the ground.
• Some legal academics started to blame the basic moral framework of the civil rights movement, with its emphasis on universalism, for these disappointments. Derrick Bell, the biggest influence on the new movement of critical race theory, concluded that civil rights lawyers erred in making desegregation the principal aim of school reform.
• Bell and other theorists within the tradition of critical race theory also denied that universal moral principles could help to bring about genuine political progress. On closer inspection, they argued, the apparent progress of the civil rights era turned out to be a function of the racial self-interest of whites. They saw American racism as a permanent condition that might shift its nature but would never attenuate.
• Kimberlé Crenshaw called attention to the way in which different forms of disadvantage can compound. The concept of “intersectionality” captured how existing discrimination law failed to recognize that the challenges faced by Black women cannot be reduced to a sum of the challenges faced by white women and Black men.
• The concept of intersectionality soon took on a life of its own, becoming a shorthand for two related yet distinct ideas. According to advocates of this broader sense of intersectionality, members of different identity groups can never fully understand each other’s experiences. And because different forms of oppression reinforce each other, any effective form of activism against a particular injustice also needs to fight all other forms of identity-based oppression. (Page 73)

Chapter 4 THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 75)

geopolitical transformation ushered in by the events of 1989 soon brought about an intellectual shift that was, in its own way, just as momentous. (Page 75)

gradually and then suddenly, the center of gravity on the left swung from class and economics to culture and identity. (Page 75)

Over the course of three or four decades, feminism and antiracism, gay rights and trans liberation, came to stake their place as integral parts of left-wing political discourse. (Page 75)

prevalent paradigm was deeply shaped by the triple influence of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory. (Page 77)

THE MAIN THEMES OF THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 77)

1. Skepticism About Objective Truth (Page 77)

there is no objective truth, just an infinite series of viewpoints. Those who pretend otherwise aren’t struggling, as best they can, to understand the world; they are concealing the way in which they exercise power over the oppressed and marginalized. (Page 78)

Richard Delgado, an influential law professor who used to teach at the University of Alabama, for example, “Liberal democracy and racial subordination go hand in hand.” (Page 78)

2. Discourse Analysis for Political Ends (Page 79)

dominant “narratives” and “discourses” structure our society. Inspired by Edward Said’s work in Orientalism, they hope to put the tools of “discourse analysis” to explicitly political use. Their ambition is nothing less than to change the world by redescribing it. (Page 79)

In virtually every developed democracy, activists now expend enormous efforts on changing the way in which ordinary people speak. (Page 79)

3. Doubling Down on Identity (Page 80)

key aspects of the world are “socially constructed.” (Page 80)

interests. How can they both emphasize that race and gender are social constructs and encourage people to identify as, say, Black or transgender? To answer this question, many adherents of the identity synthesis have taken to invoking Spivak’s concept of “strategic essentialism.” (Page 80)

4. Proud Pessimism (Page 81)

5. Identity-Sensitive Legislation (Page 82)

many adherents of the identity synthesis believe that any set of institutions or arrangements that does not explicitly distinguish between people on the basis of their ascriptive identities will merely serve to oppress marginalized minorities. (Page 82)

Joe Biden (Page 83)

incoming administration repeatedly touted its commitment to bringing about “equity” through “race-conscious” and “race-sensitive” public policies. Both at the federal and at the state levels, some such policies have quickly been implemented. From government guidelines giving nonwhite patients priority for scarce COVID drugs to basic income programs reserved for trans people, government institutions have started to adopt schemes that explicitly distinguish between citizens on the basis of their membership in particular identity groups. (Page 83)

6. The Imperative of Intersectionality (Page 83)

should require their members to sign up to a very broad catalog of causes and positions—with the necessary stance on each being determined by the group that is most directly affected. (Page 84)

7. Standpoint Theory (Page 85)

they now started to argue that there were key insights about the social world—and even the policies that would be needed to fix injustices—that members of marginalized groups would never be able to communicate to members of dominant groups. (Page 85)

Patricia Hill Collins, a distinguished university professor emerita at the University of Maryland, has argued, “Differences in power constrain our ability to connect with one another even when we think we are engaged in dialogue across differences.” (Page 85)

simpler form (Page 86)

idea that I have “my truth”—one that you have no right to question or critique on the basis of supposedly objective facts, especially if you do not belong to the same marginalized identity group. (Page 86)

CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR (Page 86)

For the story of Foucault’s influence on the identity synthesis is about as good an instance of “careful what you wish for” as intellectual history has on offer. (Page 86)

Foucault would, I believe, have pushed back against the ideology his work inspired. He would have recognized that the attempt to reshape existing discourses for political ends, though conceived as an act of liberation, was likely to create new forms of repression. And he would have abhorred the ways in which big social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook have transformed public debate into a modern-day panopticon, with every misstep subject to draconian punishment and all users trying to follow an amorphous set of rules about what they can or cannot say in an act of anticipatory obedience. (Page 87)

Edward Said became very critical of the way in which the identity synthesis was starting to transform intellectual life in the United States. Identity, he said at one point, is “as boring a subject as one can imagine.” Though some leftists had seemingly started to believe that people who belong to a group that has historically been victimized have some form of privileged access to moral virtue, “victimhood, alas, does not guarantee or necessarily enable an enhanced sense of humanity.” (Page 87)

The idea that it would serve progress for members of different ethnic and cultural groups to be more defined by their differences than by their commonalities struck Said as particularly perverse. The trend of supposedly progressive institutions “focusing principally on our own separateness, our own ethnic identity, culture, and traditions” wrongly suggested that members of marginalized groups were somehow “unable to share in the general riches of human culture”; in the description of the literary critic Adam Shatz, this struck Said as a kind of “apartheid pedagogy.” (Page 88)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Since the 1960s, parts of the American left paid growing attention to social issues connected to oppression on the basis of race, gender, and sexuality. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the left could no longer look to a powerful country committed to class struggle. It became increasingly focused on questions of culture and identity.
• In the last decades of the twentieth century, this new emphasis started to transform intellectual life on campus. It led to a renewed focus on the experiences of marginalized groups in both the humanities and the social sciences. This transformation was further accelerated by the rise of a new set of academic centers and departments devoted to studying questions of identity, such as gender studies, media studies, African American studies, Latino studies, and disability studies.
• Gradually, the triple influence of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory gave rise to an “identity synthesis.” This new ideology was defined by seven major themes: a rejection of the existence of objective truth; the use of a form of discourse analysis for explicitly political ends; an embrace of strategic essentialism; a deep pessimism about the possibility of overcoming racism or other forms of bigotry; a preference for public policies that explicitly distinguish between citizens on the basis of the group to which they belong; an embrace of intersectionality as a strategy for political organizing; and a deep skepticism about the ability of members of different groups to communicate with each other.
• The identity synthesis was inspired by major thinkers including Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Derrick Bell, and Kimberlé Crenshaw. But ironically, many of these thinkers have expressed serious misgivings about the way in which their work has transformed the left. (Page 89)

PART II The Victory of the Identity Synthesis (Page 91)

Over the course of the following decade, America underwent an astonishing transformation. By 2020, The New York Times and The Washington Post regularly invoked key concepts associated with the identity synthesis, including both “white privilege” and “structural racism.” The ACLU had abandoned parts of its historical mission, refusing to assist defendants whose speech it deemed too offensive. Popularizers of the identity synthesis like Robin DiAngelo and Ibram X. Kendi had become bestselling authors and were making frequent appearances on prime-time television. In the 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns, Democratic candidates embraced the language of the identity synthesis and promised a slew of policies that would make the receipt of state assistance conditional on the group to which a would-be beneficiary belongs. (Page 93)

Chapter 5 THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS GOES MAINSTREAM (Page 95)

“A three-minute call … between New York and London cost $ 300 in 1930. Today it is almost free through the Internet,” Friedman pointed out. (Page 95)

Costless communication would usher in an age of dialogue, tolerance, and grassroots resistance to dictatorial regimes. (Page 95)

The idea that social media would lead people to bridge long-standing divides looks naive in the wake of the rise of polarization and the ascent of far-right populists, the bloody failure of the Arab Spring, and the consolidation of increasingly repressive regimes in Russia and China. Given the freedom to communicate with anybody in the world, most people have chosen to talk to those who already belong to the same identity group. (Page 96)

HOW A FORGOTTEN PLATFORM HELPED TO BIRTH A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE (Page 96)

Tumblr. (Page 97)

“Tumblr became a place for people to fantasize and build upon ideas about real identities… . Most of the people involved had little lived experience as these identities.” (Page 97)

identity-based communities (Page 98)

Two core themes that have roots in the identity synthesis came to be especially important on Tumblr: standpoint epistemology and intersectionality. (Page 99)

Tumblr proved to be at the vanguard of the internet: it was one of the first online spaces in which users regularly experienced a sudden and dramatic fall from grace on the basis of some minor violation of ever-shifting community norms. (Page 100)

NEW MEDIA PLATFORMS EMBRACE TUMBLR IDEOLOGY (Page 100)

Thought Catalog (Page 101)

Publications like Jezebel, xoJane, Rookie Mag, and the Daily Dot became key in promulgating a popularized form of the identity synthesis. Even more established publications, like Salon, started to follow suit. Tumblr ideology had reached an important milestone: its offshoots were now so visible and influential that even relative “normies” like me were starting to stumble across them. (Page 101)

everydayfeminism.com, (Page 102)

This was to change as Twitter and especially Facebook grew much more important as distribution channels for more respectable publications. As mainstream news outlets from Newsweek to The New York Times started to chase clicks, and recognized that first-person articles were especially likely to go viral on social media, they quickly changed the kind of content they published. (Page 102)

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MAINSTREAM (Page 103)

Vox, (Page 103)

As Yglesias observes in a recent article, some of the most important media trends of the mid-2010s were “a direct consequence of Facebook’s influence over journalism… . Objectively speaking, hard-core identity politics and simplistic socialism performed incredibly well on Facebook during this period.” (Page 106)

THE GREAT AWOKENING (Page 106)

Anyone who compares a copy of The New York Times or The Guardian in 2010 with a copy of those same newspapers in 2020 would be struck by the difference in their tone and content. (Page 107)

The share of New York Times articles using the term “racist,” for example, increased by an astonishing 700 percent in the eight years between 2011 and 2019, according to an analysis by Zach Goldberg, a doctoral student in political science at Georgia State University. Over the same time period, uses of the word “racist” in The Washington Post increased even more quickly, by 1,000 percent.[*] (Page 107)

Both in The Washington Post and in The New York Times, the share of articles invoking “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” or “institutional racism” increased by tenfold between 2013 and 2019. The share of articles associating the word “white” with the idea of “racial privilege” grew at an even more rapid pace: their incidence increased twelve-fold in The New York Times and fifteen-fold in The Washington Post. (Page 107)

In the so-called feeling thermometer, for example, social scientists have long asked respondents about the general impression they have of members of a particular ethnic or religious group. Until recently, white liberals were more likely to have positive feelings toward white people than toward African Americans. By 2016, this had changed: white liberals were now more likely to say they had negative feelings toward white people—a group that presumably included their parents and other close relatives—than did Black Americans. (Page 108)

“The Great Awokening.” As he put it, “White liberals have moved so far to the left on questions of race and racism that they are now, on these issues, to the left of even the typical Black voter.” (Page 109)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The rise of social media fundamentally transformed the role that group identity plays in the lives of young people. Making it far easier for them to experiment with new labels with which to describe themselves, it encouraged the emergence of a popularized version of the identity synthesis, which originated on social media platforms such as Tumblr and found its written form in publications such as Thought Catalog.
• Social media became more important as a distribution mechanism for both new media ventures and legacy publications, putting a premium on content that would appeal to particular identity groups. As a result, the main themes and concepts of the identity synthesis quickly spread to prestigious outlets including Vox and The New York Times.
• By the end of the decade, these concepts had helped to reframe the views of a large segment of the American population. This shift in views was most pronounced among white and highly educated Americans. (Page 110)

Chapter 6 THE SHORT MARCH THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONS (Page 111)

Revolutionaries, Dutschke argued in 1967, should try to subvert the political system by means of a “long march through the institutions.” In Dutschke’s original formulation, the purpose of this infiltration was to subvert and sabotage. But by 1972, when the German American philosopher Herbert Marcuse picked up on these ideas in his highly influential Counterrevolution and Revolt, the strategy had come to encompass more subtle avenues of influence. When “working against the established institutions while working within them,” Marcuse counseled, activists should be “doing the job” by learning “how to program and read computers, how to teach at all levels of education, how to use the mass media, [and] how to organize production.” (Page 111)

To be clear, the great majority of those who participated in the short march through the institutions did not see their actions as part of some grand strategy. They probably did not even know who Rudi Dutschke was. They didn’t have to. They simply left their universities deeply steeped in the core tenets of the “identity synthesis” and imbibed its popularized version on social media. Following their ambitions, they took jobs in prestigious newspapers and well-endowed foundations, in giant corporations and powerful government offices. As their presence within these institutions took on critical mass, they were able to transform the norms, rules, and assumptions that govern them. (Page 112)

One reason why the march through the institutions could be so short is that it took place against the background of the wider cultural and technological changes I discussed in the last chapter. In the past, unhappy employees might have grumbled to each other or privately taken their grievances to their bosses; now they increasingly took to social media, blasting their own organizations in Twitter threads or Instagram posts that quickly went viral and boosted their professional profile. (Page 113)

THE TRAINING GROUND (Page 113)

Faculty are even more likely to lean left than their students: professors are six times more likely to say that they are liberal than to say that they are conservative. Administrators have a still clearer political slant: they are twelve times more likely to call themselves liberal than they are to call themselves conservative. (Page 115)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS TAKES OVER NONPROFITS (Page 116)

David Goldberger, a progressive Jew who served as the lead lawyer on National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, took the case to defend a key constitutional right. (Page 116)

The ACLU won its case. For the next four decades, its principled defense of the right to free speech defined its image in the public imagination. (Page 117)

“Once a bastion of free speech and high-minded ideals,” the feminist legal scholar Lara Bazelon recently concluded in The Atlantic, “the ACLU has become in many respects a caricature of its former self.” (Page 117)

Hundreds of staffers published an open letter that argued that the ACLU’s “rigid stance” on free speech undermines its “broader mission.” (Page 118)

When deciding what cases to litigate, they should consider factors such as “the structural and power inequalities in the community in which the speech will occur.” (Page 119)

Goldberger, the lawyer who argued the Skokie case, is unsparing in his assessment of the new ACLU. It now seems “more important for ACLU staff to identify with clients and progressive causes than to stand on principle,” he recently lamented. “Liberals are leaving the First Amendment behind.” (Page 120)

Sierra Club, (Page 121)

investigation by The Economist concluded in 2021, “Philanthropy is veering left.” Deep-pocketed foundations are increasingly pursuing equity, “defined not as equal opportunity, but rather as equal outcomes.” (Page 121)

“racial equity funding” (Page 121)

THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS ENTERS THE C-SUITE (Page 122)

Coca-Cola (Page 122)

Since their widespread adoption in the 1960s, the nature of diversity trainings at American companies has radically changed. Long focused on teaching the importance of mutual respect and the benefits of a diverse workplace, they have of late shifted to inculcating DiAngelo’s core conviction that even well-meaning employees are inescapably sexist or racist. (Page 123)

“The term ‘psychological safety’ was only used in academic journals in 2010,” he writes by way of example; “now, C-suite executives discuss its importance.” (Page 124)

“insider activism.” (Page 124)

used a combination of internal channels of dissent and external threats of bad publicity from Twitter or The New York Times to push their employers to change their ways. (Page 124)

“isomorphic diffusion”— (Page 125)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The student activists of the 1960s transformed the culture of many countries through a “long march through the institutions.” As they entered workplaces in business, entertainment, and politics, they gradually changed prevailing norms and practices. Though they did not consciously set out to emulate that strategy, a new crop of students deeply steeped in the identity synthesis both at college and on social media completed a similar “short march through the institutions” over the course of the 2010s.
• Pressure from young employees was especially effective in transforming foundations and nonprofits pledged to making the world a better place. Activist organizations like the ACLU became less likely to fight for liberal values, like free speech, when these clashed with other progressive priorities. Similar changes at major grant-making foundations ensured that the identity synthesis lastingly increased its influence throughout the nonprofit world.
• Even major corporations, like Coca-Cola, became more likely to embrace key aspects of the identity synthesis and to train their employees in concepts like white privilege. The short march through the institutions started in tech companies and professional firms that recruit from elite universities, compete for top talent, and are highly averse to negative publicity. Other major corporations quickly followed suit due to employee activism and legal incentives to emulate the actions of their peers. (Page 127)

Chapter 7 DISSENT DISCOURAGED (Page 129)

AN IDENTITY ORTHODOXY DESCENDS ON PROGRESSIVE INSTITUTIONS (Page 131)

That is a big part of the reason why, from 2016 to 2020, some of the most intense energy on the left was devoted to getting rid of anybody who supposedly threatened to pollute the moral purity of their community. (Page 132)

Anybody who offended the political sensibility of their peers was liable to be portrayed as a sexist, a racist, or a secret sympathizer with Donald Trump. (Page 133)

PEER PRESSURE AND THE RADICALIZATION OF GROUPS (Page 134)

Asch’s findings, which have been replicated by psychologists in a large number of different contexts, illustrate how whole groups can come to embrace wrong, extreme, or even dangerous ideas. (Page 135)

Cass Sunstein has termed “the law of group polarization”: after groups of like-minded people have a chance to deliberate about some question of morality or politics, the conclusions they come to are more radical than the beliefs of their individual members. (Page 136)

The pressure to conform, social psychologists have found, becomes much bigger when a group is in the middle of a conflict that involves high moral stakes, making its members feel that they are under threat. (Page 138)

THE INTELLECTUAL ENFORCERS OF THE IDENTITY ORTHODOXY (Page 139)

As the risk grew that any open form of dissent with the popularized version of the identity synthesis would be seen as “running interference for Trump,” more and more members of progressive institutions who disagreed with the prevailing consensus chose to stay silent. And as more members of progressive institutions chose to stay silent, the cost for anyone who still insisted on speaking up grew. A vicious cycle had emerged. (Page 139)

Ibram X. Kendi argued in a bestselling 2019 book, is either racist or antiracist; there is no such thing as a neutral act: (Page 140)

the way Kendi defined his key terms, including the nature of “antiracism,” made his theory much more radical than might at first be obvious. For, according to Kendi, the sole criterion of whether a particular act, person, institution, or public policy is “racist” or “antiracist” is whether it helps to increase or decrease the gap in income (or wealth or some other desirable metric) between white and Black people. As a result, he has declared that an extraordinary array of entities that, in his assessment, do not reduce such racial disparities are racist—from capitalism to the SATs, and from the filibuster to the U.S. Constitution. (Page 140)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• After Donald Trump’s election, millions of people mobilized to protest his administration. But when hopes for his quick removal from office faded, a small number of these activists turned their anger toward the inside, targeting anybody in their immediate surroundings who had violated the new progressive sensibilities.
• Individuals are very susceptible to peer pressure. As a result, groups of like-minded people often take more radical positions than those initially held by any of their members. Internal critics therefore play a very important role in keeping groups from going off the rails. But while groups are often open to such dissenters, they start to mistrust or even to punish them when they feel that they are under external threat.
• These group dynamics can help to explain why many institutions grew so intolerant of anybody who disagreed with the key precepts of the identity synthesis after Trump’s election. Understandably feeling under threat from his administration, they came to think of any internal critic as a traitor or saboteur. An identity orthodoxy descended on many institutions.
• The enforcement of the identity orthodoxy was given an intellectual superstructure by two bestselling authors. According to Ibram X. Kendi, every person is either racist or antiracist; this made it easy to accuse anybody who disagreed with his prescriptions for how to remedy injustice of being a bigot. And according to Robin DiAngelo, anybody who denies that all white people are racist must be motivated by a self-serving refusal to acknowledge the truth. This helped to turn the popularized version of the identity synthesis into a non-falsifiable theory: in many milieus, any public disagreement with it would henceforth be seen as a form of self-incrimination. The mainstreaming of the identity synthesis was complete. (Page 143)

PART III The Flaws of the Identity Synthesis (Page 145)

• All five applications are inspired by the identity synthesis and are now in the process of transforming mainstream institutions. All five have intuitive appeal because they give voice to real concerns about genuine injustices. But all five would ultimately fail to address the grievances that motivate them, and even undermine the goals they supposedly serve. Like the ideology from which they derive, they are a trap. These claims are:
  1. Standpoint theory: Citizens drawn from different groups can never truly come to understand one another. Those who are comparatively privileged should therefore defer to the factual assessments and political demands of those who are comparatively marginalized.
  2. Cultural appropriation: Groups do (or should) enjoy a form of collective ownership over their cultural products and artifacts, from distinctive modes of dress to particular culinary dishes. This puts restrictions on how people who do not belong to those groups can legitimately make use of them.
  3. Limits on free speech: The state should make laws that rein in misinformation and protect minority groups from being exposed to hurtful or bigoted speech. Even when it comes to forms of expression that remain legally permitted, society should uphold a “consequence culture” that makes people less likely to express views that others will see as offensive.
  4. Progressive separatism: Social and educational institutions should encourage people to identify themselves by the ethnic, racial, religious, sexual, and gender groups to which they belong. Spaces that are reserved for members of such groups can play an important role in helping people gain political consciousness and take on persistent injustices.
  5. Identity-sensitive public policy: To redress persistent socioeconomic inequalities between different communities, the state must favor historically disadvantaged groups. We therefore need to adopt “identity-sensitive” policies, like prioritizing members of marginalized ethnic minorities for scarce medical resources, which make the way the state treats people depend on the group to which they belong. (Page 147)

Chapter 8 HOW TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER (Page 150)

corporate diversity trainings, the focus has shifted from celebrating cultural differences to recognizing the impossibility of overcoming ingrained racism and implicit bias. (Page 151)

In Hollywood, actors from Tom Hanks to Eddie Redmayne to Kristen Bell have apologized for portraying characters whose sexual orientation, gender identity, or ethnic origin they did not share. Alison Brie has even publicly atoned for voicing an Asian American character on BoJack Horseman, an animated series whose protagonists largely consist of speaking animals. (Page 151)

“Even if they can hear you, they’re not really listening,” the British Nigerian author Reni Eddo-Lodge claimed in Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race. “It’s like something happens to the words as they leave our mouths and reach their ears.” (Page 151)

The job of a loyal ally is to “listen,” to “affirm the beliefs of the less privileged,” and to “amplify their demands.” In practice, the stress on “lived experience” often amounts to claims both that members of different identity groups will never be able to understand each other and that those who belong to more privileged groups should defer to those who belong to more marginalized ones. (Page 152)

The second problem is that standpoint theory fails as a set of practical guidelines for how to take effective political action in the real world. In particular, its growing influence is unlikely to empower the marginalized and may even make it harder to sustain the forms of true political solidarity we need to overcome real injustices. (Page 152)

THE ORIGINS OF STANDPOINT THEORY (Page 153)

“standpoint epistemology.” (Page 153)

In its more modest versions, standpoint epistemology reminds us of an important and intuitive insight. It really is easy for the comparatively privileged to remain blind to the challenges faced by those who are less fortunate. (Page 154)

• four interlocking claims are particularly central to the forms of standpoint theory[*] that now routinely influence public debate:
  1. There is a set of significant experiences that (virtually) all members of (particular) oppressed groups share.
  2. These experiences give members of the group special insight into the nature of their oppression and other socially relevant facts.
  3. Members of the group cannot fully or satisfactorily communicate these experiences to outsiders, even insofar as they have important political implications.
  4. When an oppressed group makes political demands based on the identity its members share, outsiders should defer to them. (Page 155)

WHY STANDPOINT THEORY MAKES FOR BAD PHILOSOPHY (Page 156)

The first core claim of standpoint theory runs into trouble because it is extremely hard to identify meaningful experiences that all members of a socially relevant group share. (Page 156)

The second core claim of standpoint theory has also been called into doubt. Even insofar as many members of a relevant group do have common experiences, it is not clear that these bestow an overall advantage in understanding the world. Especially in deeply stratified societies, members of privileged groups may—unjustly and perversely—have some important forms of knowledge that are inaccessible to those who belong to marginalized groups. (Page 156)

The third core claim of standpoint theory is misleading in a somewhat more subtle way. (Page 157)

distinction between experiential and propositional knowledge (Page 158)

“While the oppressed may often have a contingent epistemic advantage deriving from their tendency to have more informative experiences of the workings of social marginalization,” Dror concludes his consideration of the subject, “there are only extremely limited grounds for thinking that they have an epistemic advantage derived in principle from being oppressed.” Fraser is even more skeptical about the way in which standpoint-flavored claims are now commonly made in public. People, she points out, “often want to say that the fruits of oppression are a kind of virtue, a kind of admirable illness. I think that’s just not there in the intellectual tradition. There’s a kind of naïveté to that perspective that is very difficult to actually find in the academic work.” (Page 159)

WHY STANDPOINT THEORY MAKES FOR BAD POLITICS (Page 159)

Most people simply won’t be willing to delegate their judgment about what actions or policies they should support to a representative of a different group. (Page 162)

ONLY HARD-WON EMPATHY CAN GROUND REAL SOLIDARITY (Page 162)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Starting in the 1970s, feminist philosophers began to criticize traditional approaches to the theory of knowledge. Who we are, they argued, influences what we can know. Because women are usually expected to be primary caregivers, for example, they have more insights into the injustice of gender norms.
• These ideas were soon popularized in the form of standpoint theory. As activists now often claim, members of dominant groups cannot understand the experiences of members of marginalized groups. To be good allies, members of dominant groups should “defer” to members of marginalized groups, especially when they describe social injustices or make political demands.
• Standpoint theory consists of three key philosophical claims: First, there are significant experiences that members of oppressed groups share. Second, these experiences give members of the group special insight into the nature of their oppression as well as other politically relevant facts. And third, members of the group cannot fully or satisfactorily communicate these experiences to outsiders.
• Even most feminist philosophers who advocate some forms of standpoint epistemology reject the core claims of its popularized version. There are, they argue, no meaningful experiences that all members of particular identity groups, like women, share. Members of marginalized groups need not have superior insight into the true structure of society, in part because they might be excluded from spaces where important decisions are made. And though there are limits to the extent to which they can share “experiential” knowledge (for example, what it feels like to be discriminated against), they can communicate the “propositional” knowledge they derive from such experiences (for example, the fact that such forms of discrimination are unjust).
• Standpoint theory also entails a fourth claim, which is more political in nature: that members of dominant groups should defer to members of marginalized groups in the name of political progress. But in a pluralistic society, it is unclear who can legitimately speak on behalf of relevant identity groups. In practice, most members of dominant groups are going to either ignore demands to defer to members of marginalized groups or anoint people with whom they already agree as the “true” spokespeople of those groups.
• We should therefore insist on a more ambitious account of political solidarity and the role of empathy. True solidarity would have two elements: First, each of us would listen to members of other identity groups with an open mind, empathizing with the forms of oppression to which they may be subject. And second, each of us would strive to remedy genuine injustices, not out of a misguided sense of deference, but because they violate our own aspirations for the kind of society in which we want to live. (Page 163)

Chapter 9 THE JOYS OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE (Page 166)

Traditionally, it has been the right that opposed and the left that defended new cultural influences. But in recent years, many progressives have also started to worry about ways in which cultures might cross-pollinate. While they celebrate a great variety of traditional cultures, and seek to improve the representation of various ethnic and religious minorities, they have started to warn about the dangers of “cultural appropriation.” As one professor put the point, the cultures of others should be considered “off limits.” How did such concerns come to conquer the left? (Page 168)

HOW THE LEFT CAME TO WORRY ABOUT CULTURAL APPROPRIATION (Page 168)

And rather than being something we should guard against, the ever-present reality of mutual inspiration is one of the most attractive features of diverse societies. (Page 170)

THE PROBLEMS WITH “CULTURAL APPROPRIATION” (Page 171)

The Problem of Original Ownership (Page 172)

Since its dawn, human culture has evolved by remixing and reappropriating a rich array of cultural influences. So if we were to apply the same rules to the groups that first produced cultural artifacts whose use the critics of cultural appropriation now seek to limit, we would quickly find that the supposed victims of cultural appropriation have themselves perpetrated the very same sin. (Page 173)

This points to an insight that is as simple as it is important: Nearly all of the greatest dishes, customs, and inventions on which humanity can pride itself have roots in multiple cultures. Trying to assign particular instances of culture to one group in a clean way is a fool’s errand. For the same reason, it would fundamentally undermine our collective creativity if humans were to be restricted from drawing on the cultures of all groups in the future. (Page 173)

The Problem of Group Membership (Page 174)

Who gets to count as one of the collective “owners” of a practice or artifact? Can Mexican Americans whose ancestors hail from Europe partake in cultural practices that were invented by Mayans? (Page 175)

A BETTER WAY OF EXPRESSING WHAT’S WRONG (Page 176)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The left has traditionally celebrated art’s ability to speak to people beyond the boundaries of race and religion. But of late, many left-leaning milieus, especially in the arts, have endorsed the idea that any instance in which a member of a dominant group uses, co-opts, or partakes in the culture of a marginalized group constitutes a dangerous form of “cultural appropriation.”
• The concept of cultural appropriation gains superficial plausibility from the fact that artists who belong to marginalized groups have often been cheated out of the fruits of their creation. But as it is now applied, it misdescribes what made those situations wrong and inhibits valuable forms of cultural exchange.
• The concept of cultural appropriation is based on an implicit notion of collective ownership over particular products and ideas. But it is unclear how the inventions of particular individuals who lived at a different time and place (like indigenous craftswomen in Central America) should convey ownership over such products to the kinds of broad identity categories (like Latinos) that are most salient today. Because virtually all cultural artifacts and ideas are themselves inspired by a broad range of preexisting cultures, it is also unclear why a particular innovation should give rise to such a form of collective ownership.
• In philosophical terms, cultural appropriation misidentifies the “wrong-making feature” of unjust situations. When supposed instances of cultural appropriation really are bad, the injustices at stake can be explained in simpler terms, such as discrimination against Black artists or an intent to mock Latinos. When it is impossible to express the supposed wrong involved in cultural appropriation in such simple terms, it is a mistake to pathologize otherwise healthy forms of cultural exchange.
• The ability of people from different cultural backgrounds to inspire each other is one of the most attractive features of diverse societies. While genuine injustices motivate the opponents of cultural appropriation, we should proudly defend the joys of mutual cultural influence. (Page 179)

Chapter 10 SPEAK FREELY (Page 181)

To feel empowered to engage in political debate, it is, as political theorists have long recognized, not enough for them to be protected from the police throwing them in jail. They also shouldn’t have to fear that voicing a view that happens to stray from the fickle consensus of the day will get them socially shunned or fired from their job. (Page 184)

As John Stuart Mill pointed out during the Victorian era, society practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them. (Page 184)

society requires a genuine culture of free speech. (Page 185)

THE ROOTS OF THE “PROGRESSIVE” REJECTION OF FREE SPEECH (Page 186)

The most influential rejection of free speech from the left was formulated by Herbert Marcuse. (Page 186)

According to Marcuse, principles such as free speech might be appropriate for a society that is truly free. But, Marcuse claimed in “Repressive Tolerance,” the Western democracies of his time were defined by class domination and media propaganda. Under such circumstances, “freedom (of opinion, of assembly, of speech) becomes an instrument for absolving servitude”; free speech, he concluded, merely serves to entrench oppression. (Page 186)

The solution, according to Marcuse, was for a “subversive majority” to gain power, by violent means if necessary, and to withdraw “toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc.” (Page 187)

A quarter century later, a prominent literary scholar formulated another highly influential rejection of free speech. According to Stanley Fish, the very idea of free speech is logically incoherent. (Page 187)

The lasting influence of these two strands of critique is evident in contemporary attacks on free speech. Marcuse’s idea that “true” tolerance requires intolerance toward offensive views, for example, now holds tremendous cultural sway. (Page 188)

Fish’s idea that those who favor free speech merely have different preferences about where to draw the line between permissible and impermissible speech—and that this indeterminacy serves the interests of the powerful—has quickly gone mainstream. (Page 188)

This view portrays anybody who is concerned about formal or informal restrictions on free speech as a right-wing reactionary who secretly hopes to maintain existing hierarchies of oppression. (Page 188)

WHY RESTRICTING SPEECH IS SO DANGEROUS (Page 189)

When they make the case for free speech, philosophers have traditionally explained its value by enumerating the benefits that would flow from it. Two arguments are especially common. The first argument points out just how many societies have jailed, tortured, or murdered people—from Socrates to Galileo—for expressing what later generations came to embrace as the truth. (Page 189)

second argument points to the value of letting people express their views even when these turn out to be wrong. (Page 190)

The answer is that true beliefs can, if they are never challenged, turn into dead dogma. “Truth, thus held,” John Stuart Mill argues in On Liberty, “is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.” Having such weak foundations, it can be swept aside all the more easily if, at some point in the future, it does come under attack. (Page 190)

Like Mill, I worry that this prioritizes the public recitation of fashionable slogans over the achievement of real change, making it hard to resist pernicious ideas if they are clad in the clothes of a righteous cause. (Page 190)

Empowering the Powerful (Page 192)

The single most compelling reason against restrictions on free speech stems from the impossibility of appointing smart and selfless censors. (Page 192)

Raising the Stakes of Elections (Page 193)

precisely because it is so important not to let the stakes of political competition escalate, an absence of free speech would be even worse. For if I have good reason to fear that my opponent’s victory would give him the power to stop me from speaking out for my beliefs, I would have much stronger reason to go to any length—including violence—to stop him from taking control in the first place. (Page 194)

Closing the Safety Valve (Page 194)

Free speech acts as a safety valve that helps to alert all of us when something in our society has gone well and truly awry. So when certain positions or policies are put beyond reproach, the prospect for social progress diminishes. (Page 195)

FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY (Page 195)

The Government Must Not Have the Right to Lock You Up for What You Say (Page 197)

In many European countries, the introduction of far-reaching and ill-defined hate speech laws now poses a serious threat to freedom of speech. (Page 197)

There Must Be Limits to the Power of Private Actors to Censor Political Debate (Page 198)

democratic citizens accused of violating state-sponsored restrictions on free speech at least have a chance to defend themselves in a court of law. By contrast, citizens who are fired, have their social media accounts suspended, or can no longer access basic financial services like credit cards often have little or no recourse; their fate hinges on anonymous people making decisions in accordance with rules and procedures that may not even be fully public. (Page 198)

The first step should be to ban companies from firing their employees for saying unpopular things. (Page 199)

Second, key financial institutions like Mastercard, the credit card company, and Stripe, the payment processing service, effectively serve as public utilities. (Page 199)

I believe that it is a clear threat to the culture of free speech for private companies to decide what can or can’t be said about issues from public health to trans rights. (Page 200)

Building a Culture of Free Speech (Page 201)

Governments must not be able to throw people in jail for what they say. Private actors like giant corporations should be constrained in their ability to shape the contours of public debate. But to uphold a genuine culture of free speech, we also need protections against the kind of “tyranny of the prevailing opinion” that Mill identified as a serious threat more than 150 years ago. (Page 201)

According to Jonathan Rauch, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, at least four warning signs help to distinguish healthy instances of what he calls a “critical culture” from worrying indications that people are being “canceled” for their views: Punitiveness: Cancellations often involve severe punishments such as suffering the revocation of titles or honors or being fired from a job. Deplatforming: Cancellations often involve demands to “deplatform” offending individuals so that they cease to be able to express their views. Organization: Cancellations often involve collective efforts to punish offending speakers through coordinated petitions or social media campaigns. Secondary boycotts: Cancellations often seek to exert pressure on any institutions or publications with which the person who is being criticized is affiliated, aiming to render that person “radioactive.” (Page 202)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The culture of free speech is under serious threat around the world. In Western democracies, part of this threat comes from a surprising source: while the left has long championed the importance of free speech, recognizing its centrality in historical struggles against oppression, many progressives have of late derided its defenders as “free speechers” and advocated for a “consequence culture” that holds people to account for unpopular statements.
• Traditional arguments about free speech are mostly about the benefits of this social practice, such as the ability to make scientific progress. While these arguments remain relevant, the strongest reasons to hold on to free speech, especially at a time of deep polarization, have to do with the bad things that would happen in its absence.
• Because the people making decisions about what speech to allow or to ban are by definition powerful, limits on free speech usually serve to entrench their hold over society; it is naive to think that a pervasive social practice of censorship would systematically serve the “right” causes. Limits on free speech also increase the stakes of elections. If members of a political movement believe that losing the next election will hamper their ability to keep advocating for their cause, they will become much less likely to abide by its outcome. Finally, free speech functions as a crucial safety valve that allows people to organize against all kinds of injustices; limiting free speech therefore makes it harder to achieve social progress.
• It is possible to take proactive steps to uphold a genuine culture of free speech. States should not be able to punish their citizens for what they say, however heinous. The power of private actors like big corporations to undermine the culture of free speech must be limited, for example by rules that make it illegal for companies to fire employees for their political views or for providers of basic financial services to refuse service to customers on ideological grounds; similarly, social networks should voluntarily limit their ability to favor some political causes over others. Finally, all of us can help to stand up for a culture of free speech by being on guard against the key tactics that make the difference between a healthy critical culture and an unhealthy cancel culture. (Page 204)

Chapter 11 THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION (Page 206)

many schools have introduced race-segregated affinity groups, some as early as kindergarten. (Page 206)

In a pluralistic society, freedom of association will always lead to some amount of “homophily,” the well-documented tendency of people to seek out those who resemble them. But the practices that are now in vogue go much further. In particular, many progressive educators believe that they must proactively encourage students to define themselves by virtue of the identity groups into which they were born. (Page 208)

The rise of progressive separatism is rooted in two complementary intellectual transformations: the embrace of strategic essentialism and new worries about omnipresent threats to the psychological safety of marginalized groups. But the fundamental findings of comparative politics and group psychology help to explain why this kind of separatism is likely to be dangerously counterproductive. For in the long run, it will succeed only in encouraging a zero-sum competition between different ethnic blocs. The only realistic alternative is to double down on the long-standing dream of integration—encouraging students and citizens to think of themselves in terms of broader groups that include members from many different backgrounds. (Page 208)

THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE SEPARATISM (Page 208)

categories of race and gender that “we consider natural or merely representational are actually socially constructed.” (Page 208)

insight. According to parts of the left, the lack of a biological basis for popular notions of race is a strong reason to stop using such categories. (Page 209)

Gradually, left-leaning institutions came to see it as their task to protect people in their care from these ever-present dangers, and started to fear that interactions with members of other identity groups were especially likely to cause such harms. In the formulation of Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, they embraced a new and increasingly pervasive form of “safetyism.” (Page 211)

The idea of strategic essentialism and the expansion in notions of harm both helped to shape how organizational leaders responded to the demands of a diversifying workplace. (Page 211)

THE PROGRESSIVES WHO CHAMPION WHITE IDENTITY (Page 212)

In the past two or three decades, by contrast, progressive separatists have also started to encourage whites to identify by their ethnic origin. (Page 213)

skin. As she writes in White Fragility, whites are “rarely asked to think about ourselves or fellow whites in racial terms… . But rather than retreat in the face of discomfort,” whites should embrace that racial label. (Page 213)

WHAT SOCIAL SCIENCE CAN TEACH US ABOUT HOW TO FOSTER EMPATHY AND COHESION (Page 214)

Human Beings Are Groupish (Page 215)

The Promise of Intergroup Contact (Page 216)

The evidence from hundreds of studies all over the world is overwhelming: when people who hold prejudices about outsiders come into contact with them under the right circumstances, they develop a much more positive view of them. (Page 217)

When Intergroup Contact Does (and Doesn’t) Work (Page 217)

WHY THE PRACTICES PROPOSED BY PROGRESSIVE SEPARATISTS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (Page 218)

WHY ENCOURAGING WHITES TO EMBRACE RACE IS LIKELY TO BACKFIRE (Page 222)

Nothing in human nature determines that people who happen to be white will always be motivated by racial solidarity with other people who share a similar skin color. It is perfectly possible for them to define membership in the relevant in-group in terms that have nothing to do with race. They can come to think of themselves as New Yorkers, devout Catholics, or proud Americans, for example. (Page 223)

Progressive separatism is a dead end. Its vision of the future is neither realistic nor attractive. (Page 224)

THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION (Page 225)

Children who grow up without going to school or playing with those who belong to different ethnic groups are much more likely to develop noxious prejudices. (Page 226)

Housing policy is also important. In the past, outright discrimination was the main reason for residential segregation. Today, strict zoning laws and byzantine regulations regarding new building projects help to explain why some neighborhoods remain predominantly white. Giving people more opportunities to interact as neighbors and classmates hinges, in part, on seemingly wonkish measures such as more permissive zoning laws. (Page 228)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Many important institutions have recently embraced practices, from affinity groups to Black-only dorms, that separate people on the basis of their skin color or sexual identity. They believe that it is their duty to encourage people to define themselves in terms of the identity groups into which they are born and to protect them from the ever-present danger of harm posed by members of dominant groups. Historically, this new form of “progressive separatism” can be understood as the love child of two major intellectual influences: strategic essentialism and safetyism.
• Human beings are groupish: they tend to favor members of the in-group and discriminate against members of the out-group. But whom they think of as insiders and how they feel about outsiders depends on historical circumstance. In particular, contact between different groups can reduce long-standing prejudices when four conditions are met: they enjoy equal status within the situation; they have common goals; they have to work together to achieve them; and they are expected to get along.
• The norms and customs encouraged by progressive separatists systematically violate the four conditions that allow members of different groups to forge a bond. They encourage members of different identity groups to see each other as always having a big difference in status; they discourage an emphasis on shared forms of identity that make common goals more salient; they reduce opportunities to work together; and they create incentives for conflict.
• Some progressive separatists don’t just encourage members of historically marginalized groups to define themselves in terms of their ethnicity; they also encourage whites to do so. This is highly counterproductive. These practices are motivated by the hope that whites who are deeply conscious of their racial identity will become antiracist activists. But in practice a greater identification with their skin color is likely to make them fight for their collective interests, encouraging more zero-sum conflict between different demographic groups.
• A better solution to the persistent problem of segregation is a redoubled commitment to integration. The goal must be to create more contexts and opportunities in which people from different groups can interact and cooperate. (Page 229)

Chapter 12 THE PATH TO EQUALITY (Page 231)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• In recent years, America has started to pursue race-sensitive public policies at all levels of government. Even decisions with existential stakes, such as who should get priority for lifesaving vaccines, are now being made on the basis of considerations of equity. And while the initial justification for such policies assumed that they would prove temporary, its advocates increasingly envisage this approach as a standard operating procedure for governments going forward.
• Advocates of equity make two claims that are meant to show why universal policies are morally unacceptable. First, more universal policies supposedly force us to ignore the role that racism continues to play in reality. And second, they are supposedly incapable of attenuating disparities between different identity groups or dealing with the long-run repercussions of past injustices, like slavery. But on closer inspection, universal policies turn out to be more attractive than they first appear. They do not make us incapable of recognizing or remedying the existence of racial discrimination. They can help to attenuate racial disparities because a universal welfare state will in any case channel more resources to groups whose members are disproportionately in need. And finally, they are even conformable with reparations for past injustices, which should be based on individual descent rather than broad identity categories.
• At the same time, the ideal of equity turns out to be far less attractive than it seems at first sight. Philosophically, it suffers from two major drawbacks: First, because equity merely focuses on the disparities between different ethnic groups, it is possible to achieve equity by making a few members of a historically marginalized groups very rich; an equitable society could therefore be a highly unequal one. Second, it is possible to achieve equity by making members of all groups worse off; an equitable society could therefore be a very poor one.
• These objections are not merely theoretical. Some of the first applications of equity, including the guidance on vaccines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, likely led to worse outcomes for all demographic groups. Race-sensitive public policies also tend to entrench divisions between different identity groups, making future conflict more likely. Finally, such policies tend to be highly unpopular among all demographic groups, making it harder to sustain support for a generous welfare state and the improvements it promises in the long run.
• The legal framework embraced by both progressive judges like Ruth Bader Ginsburg and conservative judges like Antonin Scalia can set better guidelines for when to adopt race-sensitive public policies. There should always be a strong presumption against the state making how it treats people depend on identity markers like the color of their skin. This presumption can be superseded only when three strict conditions are met: There must be a compelling state interest in pursuing the policy. The policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. And race-neutral alternatives to the policy must be unavailable. For all these reasons, it is both a moral and a practical mistake to turn identity-sensitive public policies into standard operating procedure. (Page 252)

Chapter 13 ON STRUCTURAL RACISM, GENDER, AND MERITOCRACY (Page 255)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The concept of structural racism rightly points out that forms of racial discrimination can persist even though no individual person has negative views about members of marginalized groups. This is an important addition to our conceptual repertory for describing real injustices. But advocates of the identity synthesis go wrong when they claim that the new concept of structural racism should supplant older notions. It is possible for members of marginalized groups to hold dangerous prejudices against members of groups that are comparatively “privileged.” A failure to recognize this makes it harder to understand the world or to combat certain kinds of hate crime.
• Some people feel that their gender does not match their biological sex. We should allow them to live as they wish and celebrate the greater acceptance of trans people. But it is a mistake to think that the importance of the concept of gender makes the concept of biological sex incoherent or unimportant. In some contexts, including medicine, institutions need to take an individual’s biological sex into account. A recognition of the enduring relevance of both sex and gender can help us to find humane compromises in situations that feature genuine trade-offs between the legitimate interests of different groups, such as prisons or sports competitions.
• The promise of social mobility is broken for many people. This makes it tempting to blame meritocracy, claiming that the ideal merely serves to uphold an unjust system. But if taken seriously, this remedy would have disastrous effects. A world in which top positions are not even supposed to go to the most deserving would be less affluent because unqualified people would ascend to important positions of leadership and everyone would have fewer incentives to develop their talents. A better solution is to hold on to the ideal of meritocracy, striving to create a society in which people truly have equal opportunities—and those who don’t end up in the most prestigious or lucrative positions also get to lead a good life.
• The critiques of the main applications of the identity synthesis in part III can serve as a model for how to respond to similar cases. The key is to take the concerns and injustices that motivate these positions seriously; to show where the supposed remedies to these problems go wrong; and to demonstrate how a universalist approach can do better at addressing these injustices than the newly fashionable solutions that are rooted in the identity synthesis. (Page 265)

PART IV In Defense of Universalism (Page 268)

Chapter 14 A RESPONSE TO THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS (Page 271)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Advocates of the identity synthesis have long thought of philosophical liberals as their main adversaries. To evaluate the identity synthesis and its attack on liberalism, it makes sense to boil this tradition down to its main claims. Such a “rational reconstruction” would focus on three propositions. First, the key to understanding the world is to examine it through the prism of group identities like race, gender, and sexual orientation. Second, supposedly universal values and neutral rules merely serve to obscure the ways in which privileged groups dominate those that are marginalized. And third, to build a just world, we must adopt norms and laws that explicitly make the way the state treats each citizen—and how citizens treat each other—depend on the identity group to which they belong.
• Liberals can give a convincing response to this attack while taking the most valuable insights from the identity synthesis on board. To understand the world, they point out, we must pay attention to a broad set of categories, including—but not limited to—forms of group identity like race, gender, and sexual orientation. In practice, universal values and neutral rules do often exclude people in unjust ways, but an aspiration for societies to live up to the standards they profess can allow them to make genuine progress in treating their members fairly. And to build a more just world, societies should strive to live up to their universalist aspirations instead of abandoning them.
• The identity synthesis portrays itself as an ambitious ideology that seeks to make the world a better place. But its vision is ultimately neither realistic nor desirable. One of the core appeals of liberalism is that it aims higher. (Page 282)

Chapter 15 A BRIEF CASE FOR THE LIBERAL ALTERNATIVE (Page 284)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The history of humanity is an annal of cruelty. But these persistent injustices are no reason to despair. For there are some societies that have, by historical standards, made enormous progress in treating their members as equals. These societies have embraced political institutions inspired by the basic tenets of philosophical liberalism.
• The core of the liberal tradition is a rejection of the forms of supposedly natural hierarchy that have traditionally justified historical rulers; according to liberals, all humans are created equal. Liberals derive three fundamental principles for just institutions from this premise: They believe in collective self-determination, allowing all of us to make the rules by which we live. They believe in individual freedom, allowing each of us to determine how we want to lead our lives. And they believe in political equality, ensuring that the way the state treats people does not depend on the identity group to which they belong.
• These principles are attractive in their own right. But they also have important empirical benefits. In particular, collective self-determination helps to avoid the worst forms of government abuse, from politically motivated persecutions to famines. Individual freedom helps to keep the peace, allowing each of us to stay true to our conscience even if we are in the minority. And political equality helps to avert the most destructive forms of intergroup competition, making sure that all of us get a fair shake even if we don’t run the government.
• Liberal democracies vastly outperform alternative regime forms on metrics that most people have strong reason to value. Nearly all of the richest and happiest countries in the world are liberal democracies. So are those with the highest human development index. This is no mere coincidence: liberal institutions have helped sustain peace and affluence. (Page 295)

Conclusion HOW TO ESCAPE THE IDENTITY TRAP (Page 297)

• So here are six pieces of advice for arguing and organizing against the identity trap in a way that is full-throated, doesn’t court unnecessary risk, and has some chance of actually persuading your interlocutors. (Page 305)

  1. Claim the Moral High Ground (Page 306)

The best way to avoid these pitfalls is to overcome the internalized feeling of shame. So when I notice that I feel nervous about arguing for a position that is unpopular among many of my friends and colleagues (as I have in parts of this book), I remind myself that I am proud of the views I hold. I have thought about them long and hard. They are rooted in a noble tradition that has done a tremendous amount of good for the world. And though I recognize that I am, like everyone else, likely to be wrong about some important things, the views I hold are—virtually by definition—the ones that seem to me most likely to prove right. This makes it a little easier to speak from a position of calm confidence. (Page 307)

2. Don’t Vilify Those Who Disagree (Page 307)

The most radical advocates of the identity synthesis often refuse to accept that people may disagree with them for legitimate reasons; it is precisely their tendency to confuse political disagreement with moral failure that has transformed public discourse for the worse over the course of the past decade. (Page 308)

3. Remember That Today’s Adversaries Can Become Tomorrow’s Allies (Page 308)

4. Appeal to the Reasonable Majority (Page 309)

5. Make Common Cause with Other Opponents of the Identity Synthesis . (Page 311)

Many critics of the identity synthesis have decried it as a form of “Marxism.” It is easy to see why. Marxism and the identity synthesis share both a disdain for the traditional institutions of parliamentary democracy and a deep enmity to liberalism. Some Marxist thinkers, like Frantz Fanon, Paulo Freire, and Herbert Marcuse, even continue to influence advocates of the identity synthesis. But to equate the two ideologies is to miss that the differences and tensions between them are at least as important as their similarities. (Page 312)

The principal roots of the identity synthesis lie in the postmodern rejection of grand narratives, including Marxism. Its adherents believe that identity-based categories like race, gender, and sexual orientation, not economic categories like class, are the key prism for understanding the world. That helps to explain why Marxist writers, from old stalwarts like Adolph Reed Jr. to young scholars like Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, have become some of its most forthright critics. As Reed has lamented, “The disposition to catalog and aggregate neatly rounded-off identities is in no meaningful way radical.” (Page 312)

Like Marxists, conservatives have an ambivalent relationship to questions of identity. Some conservatives fall into an identity trap of their own by maintaining that the ethnic, cultural, or religious groups that traditionally dominated their countries hold greater value and should therefore continue to have special powers and privileges. (Page 312)

there is a kind of overlapping consensus among critics of the identity synthesis. A surprisingly wide and varied set of political and religious traditions give their adherents reasons to view with deep skepticism any worldview that puts group identities like race and ethnicity at its moral and epistemological center. (Page 314)

6… . But Don’t Become a Reactionary (Page 314)

similar danger now confronts some critics of the identity trap. Its opponents are united by what they oppose, not by what they endorse. This creates a temptation to outsource their moral judgments to their opponents. Instead of militating for a positive vision of the future, these critics of the identity trap have started to rail against anything that somehow seems “woke.” In other words, they have become guilty of what, drawing on an idea by Emily Yoffe, I once called 180ism: “the tendency of many participants in public debate to hear what their perceived enemies have to say and immediately declare themselves diametrically opposed.” (Page 315)

Opponents of the identity synthesis need to be guided by a clear and consistent compass of their own. In my case, this compass consists of liberal values like political equality, individual freedom, and collective self-determination. (Page 315)

Appendix WHY THE IDENTITY SYNTHESIS ISN’T MARXIST (Page 323)

I showed in part I, it simply isn’t true that the main intellectual roots for the identity synthesis are Marxist. On the contrary, its original impetus stems from postmodern thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard who were deeply concerned about what they called “grand narratives,” including both liberalism and Marxism, (Page 323)

opposition to grand narratives made thinkers like Foucault and Lyotard highly skeptical of the liberal principles on which postwar democracies in Europe claimed to be based. (Page 324)

Jean-Paul Sartre, rightly interpreted the rejection of universal truth and the skepticism about stable categories of identity as a full-frontal attack on the fundamental assumptions underwriting Marxism; after all, postmodernism also amounted to a critique of those who claimed to speak on behalf of the proletariat or made confident proclamations about the determinist laws of historical progress that supposedly foretold the imminent arrival of communism. (Page 324)

a rational reconstruction of the identity synthesis would focus on three key claims: The key to understanding the world is to examine it through the prism of group identities like race, gender, and sexual orientation. Supposedly universal values and neutral rules merely serve to obscure the ways in which privileged groups dominate those that are marginalized. To build a just world, we must adopt norms and laws that explicitly make the way the state treats each citizen—and how citizens treat each other—depend on the identity group to which they belong. (Page 324)

It would be easy to offer a rational reconstruction of the core claims of Marxism that looks strikingly similar: The key to understanding the world is to examine it through the prism of social class. Supposedly universal values and neutral rules merely serve to obscure the ways in which privileged classes dominate those that are oppressed. To build a just world, we must adopt norms and laws that explicitly make the way the state treats each citizen—and how citizens treat each other—depend on their economic condition. (Page 325)

The first substantive dissimilarity is obvious. The two traditions disagree about the fundamental prism through which to see the world: (Page 325)

Marxists have traditionally theorized the proletariat as a universal class. The goal of the revolution, according to them, is to overcome all class antagonism by putting proletarians in charge and abolishing all class distinctions. This gives Marxism a utopian promise of a future in which classes disappear and all humans can finally stand in solidarity with each other—a utopian promise that the identity synthesis notably lacks. (Page 326)

Some scholars, like Karen and Barbara Fields, advocate for the parallel goal of “race abolitionism”: echoing the utopian goal that Marxists embrace with regard to class, they hope for a future in which this category of analysis has ceased being useful. But adherents of the identity synthesis strenuously reject that goal as misguided or unrealistic. Embracing a form of strategic essentialism that has ceased to be strategic, they have resigned themselves to a future in which the most basic aspects of reality, from how two friends should interact to who should receive scarce medical goods, should forever depend on categories of identity. As a result, adherents of the identity synthesis are stuck with a vision of the future in which social and political reality will forever continue to be structured by conflict, or at least by significant tensions, between different identity groups. They therefore lack the utopian promise that made Marxism so intoxicating. (Page 326)

Something similar is true for Marxism and the identity synthesis. The two ideologies have important structural similarities because they share a core purpose: to oppose and overcome philosophical liberalism. (Page 327)