Demoralization

oikophobia - declining national pride

Whiteshift - Eric Kaufmann, p.348 (file not included in this release)

The French philosopher Pascal Bruckner views white guilt as a trope that appeals to whites’ narcissistic desire to keep Europeans at the centre of world affairs, even as demographic, economic and political power flows elsewhere. Everything bad that happens in the world is a result of white actions, past or present. Bruckner ridicules the left-modernist emphasis on victimhood as the fount of moral authority, asking the reader to imagine a schoolyard in which the sins of the fathers are visited on the children. The kids introduce themselves as descendants of slaves or slave traders, colonized peoples or colonizers, bandits or crime victims. They compete to unearth the title-deeds of victimhood from their family histories. Bruckner, despite being Jewish, sees the Holocaust as the West’s second Golgotha, ‘as if Christ died a second time there’. The new ‘penitent state’ rewrites history as a series of shameful episodes, with the categories of victim and victimizer producing absolute moral clarity.

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.51 (file not included in this release)

As critic Bruce Bawer has documented in The Victims’ Revolution, this new hybrid ideology, which combined the critical theory of society with the identity politics of the New Left, had a corrosive effect on department after department. “Once, the humanities had been concerned with the true, the good, and the beautiful; now they were preoccupied with an evil triumvirate of isms—colonialism, imperialism, capitalism—and with a three-headed monster of victimhood: class, race, and gender oppression,” Bawer lamented. “Once, the purpose of the humanities had been to introduce students to the glories of Western civilization, thought, and art—to enhance students’ respect, even reverence, for the cultural heritage of the West; now the humanities sought to unmask the West as a perpetrator of injustice around the globe.”

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.53 (file not included in this release)

The language, too, has been devoured by the critical ideologies. The vocabulary of subversion in Prairie Fire, dismissed at the time as fringe and marginal, has become the lingua franca of academia. A search of the scholarly journals yields 105,000 results for “white supremacy,” 61,000 for “white privilege,” 52,000 for “neocolonialism,” 35,000 for “monopoly capitalism,” 34,000 for “male privilege,” 29,000 for “male supremacy,” and 28,000 for “institutionalized racism.”39 There are now thousands of academics producing derivative scholarship that establishes dominance not through quality, but through volume. They promote their ideas in a circular fashion, agreeing with and promoting one another while insulating themselves from the very possibility of criticism.

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.53 (file not included in this release)

The purpose of flooding the discourse with these concepts is not merely to shape public consciousness, but to precondition the population for leftwing political conclusions. Marcuse called this process “linguistic therapy,” which he described as “the effort to free words (and thereby concepts) from the all but total distortion of their meanings by the Establishment” and to initiate “the transfer of moral standards (and of their validation) from the Establishment to the revolt against it.”

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.193 (file not included in this release)

Whatever one calls it—“Abolitionist,” “decolonizing,” “liberatory”— the new pedagogy marks a significant advancement from Freire’s original pedagogy of the oppressed. The second generation of theorists has retained the basic structure of his revolutionary neo-Marxism, then burrowed into the soft ground of identity and learned how to manipulate the primal emotions of guilt, shame, envy, and pride. They have taken Freire’s analysis of “capitalism as the root of domination”65 and added a racial politics that can guide students into identity-driven activism.

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.182 (file not included in this release)

The running theme of this pedagogy is the production of guilt. In another training, a consultant for San Diego Unified explained that white teachers were guilty of “spirit murdering” black children and that their “whiteness reproduces poverty, failing schools, high unemployment, school closings, and trauma for people of color.” The cure, according to the district, is racial renunciation and “antiracist therapy for White educators,” who must “acknowledge,” “confront,” and “use” their whiteness for the cause of “antiracism”17 and, in the words of one school official, “racial healing.”18 Such is the tenor of the critical pedagogy in practice: whiteness is seen as a malevolent, invisible force that shapes the material world and manifests as a sickness within an entire race.

America’s Cultural Revolution- How the Radical Left — Christopher F_ Rufo (Annotated), p.107 (file not included in this release)

The influence of Davis’s long march through academia is profound. When Davis broke down the door of the UCSD registrar’s office as a graduate student, she demanded racial quotas, critical theory, Marxist ideology, and “white studies” to unmask the oppressive nature of European culture, and a general critique of “capitalism in the Western world, including the crucial roles played by colonialism, imperialism, slavery, and genocide.” She wanted a reading list of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, and Che Guevara, and a curriculum designed to “reject the entire oppressive structure of America.”

The War on the West - Douglas Murray, p.180 (file not included in this release)

Western leaders treated as mass murderers by their own citizens — Not Stolen - Jeff Fynn-Paul (Annotated), p.11 (file not included in this release)

Deep Research

Western Demoralization and Declining Patriotism in the West

Western Demoralization: Self-Critique vs. Self-Hatred

In recent decades, many observers have noted a trend of “Western demoralization” – a loss of confidence and pride in Western nations’ own values and history, accompanied by intense self-criticism. This phenomenon has been described by philosophers as oikophobia, literally “fear/hatred of one’s home,” which is seen as the inverse of xenophobia . British thinker Roger Scruton popularized the term in 2004, defining it as “the felt need to denigrate the customs, culture and institutions that are identifiably ‘ours’” . In the 21st century, what might have begun as healthy self-reflection in Western societies appears, in some cases, to have transformed into what one scholar calls “aggressive and pathological self-hatred” among Western elites . This “obligatory” self-loathing is characterized by a narrative that Western civilization is uniquely evil or guilty, far outstripping a balanced critique of historical wrongs . Critics of this trend argue that it has deep roots – pointing out that similar cycles of civilizational self-doubt have occurred throughout history when great powers enter periods of decline . Nonetheless, they contend that the past 10–15 years have seen a sharp acceleration of Western self-critique crossing into self-denigration.

Declining Patriotism and National Pride in the US and UK

One measurable aspect of “Western demoralization” is a decline in patriotism and national pride in many Western countries, especially among younger generations. In the United States, surveys have documented a clear erosion of national pride over the last 20–25 years. Gallup polling found that in January 2001, 87% of U.S. adults said they were extremely or very proud to be American – a figure that surged to 90% after the 9/11 attacks . Since then, pride has steadily declined: in 2023–2025 only about 58% of Americans express being “extremely or very proud” of their country – the lowest level in Gallup’s records . The drop has been especially steep in the past decade and is most pronounced on the political left and among the young . For example, from 2021 to 2025 only 41% of Generation Z Americans said they were very proud of being American, compared to 71–83% of older generations (Gen X, Boomers, Silent) . This generational patriotism gap did not exist 20 years ago, indicating a recent cultural shift. Another striking data point: a 2023 Wall Street Journal/NORC poll found that only 38% of Americans now say patriotism is “very important” to their life, down from 70% who said so in 1998 . Love of country, once nearly a given in American identity, is no longer a consensus value. Notably, this decline has been heavily polarized – with Republicans’ self-professed patriotism remaining high (over 90% proud in 2023), while pride among Democrats has plummeted to record lows (only 36% proud in 2023, down from over 60% a year prior) . In short, Americans today are far less unified in national pride than they were in the early 2000s, reflecting broader political and cultural divisions.
Britain has experienced a parallel trend. The British Social Attitudes survey reveals a significant decline in traditional patriotism over the past decade. In 2013, 86% of Britons said they were proud of British history; by 2023, only 64% did – a 22-point drop . Likewise, the share of people who “would rather be a citizen of Britain than any other country” fell from 62% to 49% in that period . Pride in Britain’s democratic system, economic achievements, and global influence has also diminished markedly . The public is less likely to agree that Britain is “better than most other countries” or to support an “my country, right or wrong” attitude than a decade ago . Generational differences are stark here as well: in one survey, only 15% of UK youth (18–24) described themselves as “very patriotic,” versus nearly 50% of those over 60 . The shift is not confined to Anglo-American societies either – continental Western Europe has long had lower levels of overt patriotism (for instance, only 9% of Germans in a 2015 poll said they were “very patriotic,” a legacy of World War II guilt) . But even in those countries, pride and national confidence have tended to ebb further in recent years. For example, a majority of people now perceive that patriotism is declining: a 2024 Marist poll found 52% of Americans believe the country is less patriotic than a few years ago (only 14% perceive it to be more patriotic) . In the UK as well, commentators note a move toward a more subdued, even ambivalent, form of national identity.
Analysts offer various explanations for this decline in national pride. Some point to political polarization and disillusionment with national institutions; others cite generational changes, with younger people embracing more cosmopolitan identities. Gallup’s analysis ties the recent U.S. pride drop to factors like “greater pessimism about the economy, dissatisfaction with the state of the nation, widening ideological divides, and intense partisan rancor during the Trump and Biden years” . In Britain, the data suggests the public has become “less nationalistic and jingoistic and more reflective” about Britain’s role in the world . In fact, one striking interpretation of the British survey was that an “inclusive and self-critical sense of Britishness” is emerging, replacing older chauvinistic attitudes . In other words, many Westerners have consciously dialed down blind patriotism, aiming for a more measured or critical form of national loyalty. The question – and the crux of the “demoralization” debate – is whether this self-critical turn has gone too far, eroding the positive aspects of patriotism altogether.

Focus on Historical Sins: How the West Tells Its Story

A central claim in the “Western demoralization” narrative is that educational and cultural institutions now fixate on the crimes and failures of Western nations, breeding a sense of shame or resentment towards one’s own country. In schools, curricula have increasingly highlighted episodes of racism, colonialism, and other injustices perpetrated by Western countries. For instance, in the U.S. there has been intense debate over teaching of slavery and race: The New York Times’ 1619 Project (2019) argued that America’s true founding was the introduction of African slavery, sparking controversy over an allegedly “anti-American” reinterpretation of history. Conservatives claim that such curricula engender an overly negative view of America in young people. President Donald Trump went so far as to declare that “many students are now taught in school to hate their own country,” asserting that schools “breed contempt for America’s heritage” . His administration in 2020 launched a “1776 Commission” to promote patriotic education as a countermeasure . While critics dismissed the 1776 Report as political propaganda, the very fact of this initiative underscored how mainstream the concern about classroom narratives had become.
Concrete examples of this pedagogical shift are often cited by those worried about demoralization. In his book on oikophobia, Benedict Beckeld describes encountering a teacher who told her students that Western civilization has been uniquely evil in its pursuit of colonialism and slavery – “with the implication that other civilizations have not engaged in such things” . This notion of singular Western guilt, critics note, omits context (virtually all major civilizations practiced conquest and slavery in history) and can foster a one-sided moral condemnation of the West. Likewise, there have been campaigns to rename schools originally named after figures like Thomas Jefferson or Winston Churchill, on the grounds that these national heroes were also complicit in racism or imperialism . In higher education, many universities have moved to “decolonize” their curricula – reducing emphasis on European canonical works in favor of non-Western or minority perspectives. Courses on the British Empire or American founding now often focus on the oppression and violence involved. A prominent historian, Howard Zinn, authored A People’s History of the United States which highlights America’s injustices from the perspective of the marginalized; that book has sold millions of copies and influenced countless classrooms. Conservative scholars like Daniel J. Mahoney argue that Zinn’s work “miseducates each rising generation in a mix of self-hatred and imbecilic para-Marxism”, presenting American history almost entirely as a litany of oppression . This may be hyperbole, but it reflects a genuine concern that students learn about what’s wrong with their country while hearing little about what’s admirable.
In Western Europe, a similar curricular reckoning is underway. British schools and cultural institutions, for example, have increasingly scrutinized Britain’s imperial past – its role in the slave trade, colonial exploitation, and episodes like the Amritsar massacre. Museums have updated exhibits to acknowledge stolen artifacts and colonial atrocities; some universities have even debated removing statues of imperialists or slaveholders (such as Cecil Rhodes at Oxford). These efforts aim to provide a fuller, more honest historical account, but they have provoked pushback from those who see an emerging bias towards self-flagellation. A senior researcher for Britain’s social attitudes survey noted that the “striking fall in pride in Britain’s history” in recent years likely reflects “high-profile public debate about empire, slavery and race” and a more critical public consciousness of those issues . Indeed, the survey report explicitly concluded that Britain is “somewhat more critical about its politics and its past” now . Conservative commentators, however, often frame this trend in dire terms: they accuse “woke” educators of fixating on national crimes in a way that “undermines national pride” . Right-leaning newspapers have run headlines about schools “indoctrinating shame” in their country’s heritage. Government officials in both the US and UK have at times intervened – for example, UK ministers in 2020 instructed that schools should teach the “benefits” of the British Empire and not just its evils, after complaints that only a “guilt narrative” was being taught.
Beyond schools, the broader culture has reinforced this introspective critique. During the racial justice protests of 2020, crowds in the US and UK tore down statues of historical figures deemed racist or imperialist (from Confederate generals to British slave traders). National holidays have seen contentious debates: e.g. should July 4th be a day of celebration or reflection on America’s failings? In 2021, some U.S. cities replaced Columbus Day with Indigenous Peoples’ Day to acknowledge Native suffering under colonization. And even popular media contributes – documentaries and books exposing historical injustices get wide attention. Pascal Bruckner, a French author, describes this Western tendency to assume a “penitential” stance: “for the past half-century or more, European ideas and debates have been informed by a sense of guilt… condemnation of the West has become a reflex response.” . He argues that modern Westerners often “lay claim to all that is corrupt and evil in humanity”, essentially putting all global sins on Western shoulders . For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, some Western commentators responded with self-blame (saying “we had it coming” due to our foreign policy) . Bruckner labels this attitude “Western masochism” – a sort of self-imposed guilt complex. The irony, he notes, is that it can become almost narcissistic: an attempt to retain moral high ground by confessing to endless sins. “Our superiority complex has taken refuge in the perpetual avowal of our sins,” Bruckner writes, calling it a “strange way of inflating our puny selves to global dimensions.” In other words, constantly portraying one’s own country as the worst villain can paradoxically be a way to feel morally important. Regardless of motive, the net effect of this educational and cultural focus is that many Western citizens, especially youth, are acutely aware of their nations’ historic misdeeds – perhaps far more than they are taught to appreciate their nations’ accomplishments. This imbalance is at the heart of what critics term “demoralization.”

Xenophilia: Loving “the Other” and Dismissing the Home

Hand-in-hand with strong self-critique often comes a phenomenon some label xenophilia – an affinity for foreign cultures coupled with a disdain for one’s own. In describing oikophobia, scholars repeatedly note that Western self-loathing frequently goes along with idealizing non-Western peoples. As one commentator put it, “the ‘Other’ is celebrated (but only as a helpless victim) and…the nations that once made up the Western world are seen as uniquely guilty of every sin.” In other words, Western discourse tends to magnify the West’s faults while romanticizing or excusing the faults of others. Roger Scruton observed that modern Western oikophobes “deride all the ordinary forms of patriotism and local attachment as forms of racism, imperialism or xenophobia” – yet in the same breath, they laud distant cultures and regimes about which they often know little . This attitude was on display as early as the 1960s: for example, radical Western students in 1968 praised Communist China’s Maoist revolution (viewing it as authentic and liberating) even while condemning their own liberal-democratic governments as oppressive . Such instances reflect a pattern: Western intellectuals sometimes reflexively side with any “anti-Western” force or ideal, under the assumption that if it’s non-Western, it must be more virtuous.
Pascal Bruckner warns against this uncritical valorization of the foreign. “Let us beware of anyone who values the foreigner only out of disdain for himself,” he writes; “His self-aversion will end up infecting his sympathies.” By this he means that a person who hates their own culture might champion others not out of true respect, but as an inverse way to attack their own society – a dynamic that can distort one’s judgment. For instance, some Western academics in recent years have downplayed or excused non-Western human rights abuses (like Islamist extremism or Chinese authoritarianism), reasoning that “we (the West) have no right to judge” other cultures given our own past sins. Bruckner calls this “misplaced cultural sensitivity”, noting that it creates absurd double standards: Western societies become hyper-self-critical, while even genuinely oppressive practices elsewhere (e.g. the subjugation of women under fundamentalist regimes) escape criticism because they are shielded by the mantle of cultural relativism . As he dryly points out, Westerners in this mindset sometimes treat non-Western peoples as if they lacked agency or moral responsibility – as eternal victims who can do no wrong – which is itself a patronizing view .
Sociologically, one can see increasing openness to other cultures in Western public opinion, which is a positive trend in many respects. Immigration and diversity are more accepted now than decades ago. In the UK, for example, despite the divisive Brexit debate, surveys find majority support for the economic and cultural benefits of immigration – a dramatic shift toward pro-immigrant sentiment . The 2023 British Social Attitudes report notes the ascendancy of a “civic nationalism” that defines being British in terms of current citizenship and commitment, rather than birth or heritage . People increasingly say that someone can be “truly British” regardless of ancestry, so long as they embrace British civic life. This inclusivity is seen as a welcome evolution by many. Yet the same report also found that those with this primarily civic sense of Britishness were less proud of Britain’s history and more critical of its past, compared to those with a more ethnic/traditional view of British identity . In other words, a cosmopolitan, globally-minded outlook (which values multiculturalism) correlates with a skeptical attitude toward one’s own national past. The risk, demoralization critics argue, is that Western societies may tip from healthy cosmopolitanism into unhealthy self-disregard. For example, public displays of national pride have become contentious. Beckeld recounts that “the waving of one’s own flag is decried as xenophobic while other nations are encouraged to display pride in their cultures” . It’s not uncommon in some Western countries for individuals flying their national flag outside of a sports context to be viewed with suspicion, whereas celebrating foreign cultures is automatically seen as enlightened. This asymmetry – harsh judgment for “pro-Western” sentiment, indulgence for “pro-Other” sentiment – is a hallmark of the xenophilia/oikophobia mindset.
In summary, alongside declining patriotism, many Western countries exhibit a curious phenomenon: a readiness to exalt foreign cultures or peoples (especially those seen as historically oppressed by the West) as morally superior, while harshly scrutinizing their own culture. Whether it’s the popularity of world music and cuisines, the vogue for non-Western spiritual practices, or political narratives that center non-Western voices, there is nothing wrong with any of these in themselves. Indeed, global awareness and admiration for other cultures is broadly positive. The concern raised by “critical anti-demoralization” thinkers is one of balance: they ask whether Westerners are losing the ability to also appreciate what is good in their own heritage. As Scruton put it, the antidote to oikophobia is not a return to crude xenophobia, but a moderated oikophilia – “a love of one’s own” home and traditions that is compatible with liberty and with respecting others . Western countries, in this view, need not choose between self-hatred and chauvinism; they can both acknowledge historical wrongs and take justifiable pride in their achievements. We will now look at some of the prominent books, articles, and discussions that have explored this issue of Western self-confidence (or lack thereof).

Books, Articles, and Podcasts on “Western Demoralization”

The debate over declining patriotism and Western self-critique has spurred a rich body of commentary in the past ten years. Writers from across the political spectrum have tackled whether the West’s loss of morale is a serious problem – and, if so, how to address it. Below is a selection of notable books, articles, and podcasts on this subject, especially focusing on U.S. and UK perspectives:

• Douglas Murray – The War on the West (2022). British author Douglas Murray argues that Western civilization is under an ideological assault that emphasizes only its sins and failures. In this book (subtitled “How to Prevail in the Age of Unreason”), Murray documents how academia, media, and even corporations have adopted a narrative highly critical of the West – from denouncing Enlightenment figures as irredeemable racists to blaming contemporary Western society for global problems. Murray, who is a staunch defender of classical liberal values, contends that constant Western self-criticism has crossed into a kind of cultural suicide. “Self-criticism is intrinsic to the Western tradition… But the moment where self-criticism turns into self‑laceration, then self‑hatred, and eventually… self‑destruction [has arrived],” he warned in a 2025 lecture . The War on the West expands on this idea, with Murray calling out what he sees as hypocrisy (for instance, Western institutions denouncing their own histories while ignoring far worse abuses elsewhere ). The book and Murray’s related speeches emphasize that Western societies should not abandon pride in their principles – such as free inquiry and individual rights – even as they reckon with past wrongs. Murray has been a prominent voice in American media as well, appearing on podcasts (e.g. The Joe Rogan Experience) to discuss why “well-meaning people have been fooled by… anti-West rhetoric” and how to restore a balanced appreciation of Western achievements .
• Benedict Beckeld – Western Self-Contempt: Oikophobia in the Decline of Civilizations (2022). Beckeld is a philosopher who provides a deep historical take on the issue. His book examines oikophobia (hatred of one’s own) not as a new phenomenon but as a recurring phase in the lifecycle of great powers . He points out that ancient Athens, Rome, and later imperial Britain all went through periods where their intellectual elites became disillusioned with their own civilization, often coinciding with periods of decadence or decline . Beckeld’s thesis is that the United States (and the West broadly) is currently in such a phase. In a Quillette article summarizing his work, he defines oikophobia simply as “the opposite extreme of xenophobia” – instead of irrational fear of foreigners, it’s an irrational disdain for one’s own culture. The book explores examples of oikophobia in modern academia and politics (many of which we’ve touched on: renouncing national symbols, extreme historical revisionism, etc.) and tries to diagnose why this attitude takes hold. Beckeld notes that oikophobia often emerges in very prosperous, powerful societies – essentially as a luxury of those who no longer have external threats to worry about. His work has been discussed on podcasts like The Jim Rutt Show (episode “Western Self-Contempt”) where he elaborated on finding an “Aristotelian golden mean” between xenophobia and xenophilia . Beckeld’s book is a recent and thought-provoking contribution, attempting to place today’s “demoralization” in the broad sweep of civilizational history.
• Pascal Bruckner – The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism (2006, English edition 2010). Bruckner, a French intellectual, was slightly ahead of the curve in identifying this trend. Writing in the mid-2000s, he observed a widespread “cult of guilt” in Europe – a mindset that forever positions the West as the source of all evil . Bruckner argues that while remorse for past wrongs is appropriate, Western societies have taken it to an extreme, turning guilt into a paralytic ideology. He famously wrote that “the entire world has become a court of justice, the West is in the dock and must plead guilty” – encapsulating how Westerners indict themselves for global problems. In The Tyranny of Guilt, Bruckner explores how this psychology developed after World War II (with the Holocaust and decolonization weighing on European conscience) and how it intensified after events like 1960s student revolts and the Vietnam War. One of Bruckner’s key points is that perpetual guilt can become self-serving. It allows Westerners to maintain a sense of moral high ground by saying “look how terrible we are”, which oddly still centers the West in every story . This dynamic of “masochistic narcissism” is the “tyranny” he warns of – it inhibits clear-eyed analysis of world issues and can even impede reform (since it wallows in blame rather than solving problems). Bruckner also makes a critical distinction: Western values themselves (like human rights, equality, rule of law) shouldn’t be rejected just because Westerners failed to live up to them in the past. In fact, he reminds readers that Western civilization, for all its crimes, also pioneered the self-corrective mechanisms that address those crimes: “Although the West industrialized slavery, it didn’t invent it. But it did invent its abolition.” Likewise, Western thought produced the very ideals of universal dignity that we now use to condemn the West’s own former injustices. This nuanced perspective – acknowledging historical evils while also acknowledging the West’s unique role in overcoming them – is Bruckner’s antidote to totalizing guilt. The book remains influential and is frequently cited in discussions about whether Europe’s post-colonial remorse has gone too far.
• Theodore Dalrymple – The New Vichy Syndrome (2010) and podcast interviews (2020s). Theodore Dalrymple (pseudonym of Dr. Anthony Daniels) is a retired British psychiatrist and essayist known for his unsparing critiques of cultural pessimism. In The New Vichy Syndrome: Why European Intellectuals Surrender to Barbarism, he compares modern Europe’s defeatist attitude to the capitulation of France’s Vichy regime in WWII. Dalrymple argues that a sense of cultural exhaustion and self-disgust in Europe has made it unwilling to stand up for itself in the face of internal challenges (such as radical Islamism or crime). Fast-forward to the 2020s, and Dalrymple continues to comment on Western self-loathing. In August 2025 he appeared on The Catholic Current podcast in an episode titled “Why Does the West Hate the West?” to discuss “the self-loathing that has become so common amongst Westerners, especially academics and elitists.” He explores causes – from the legacy of the world wars to affluent guilt – and consequences, like the erosion of Western cultural confidence. Dalrymple often emphasizes how privileged Western societies have become uniquely obsessed with their imperfections, whereas non-Western countries (even those with severe problems) do not engage in similar constant self-beratement. His perspective is a “critical against demoralization” one: he believes Western nations have a lot worth defending (rule of law, intellectual freedom, etc.), and that endless self-critique undermines the appreciation of these strengths. His colorful writings in outlets like City Journal and Taki’s Magazine frequently lampoon what he sees as Western intellectuals’ tendency to “slander their own civilization” while ignoring brutalities elsewhere.
• Other Noteworthy Contributors: Many others have delved into this topic. British historian Niall Ferguson has spoken of “Western civility suicide,” and Victor Davis Hanson (an American classicist) wrote The Dying Citizen (2021) which laments the decline of national civic pride. Author Shelby Steele examined white guilt in America and how it shapes politics (in his book White Guilt, 2006). Journalist Yascha Mounk and the group More in Common have studied polarization around teaching history – finding that people perceive more disagreement than truly exists (for example, most Americans of both parties actually agree students should learn both the honorable and shameful parts of U.S. history) . On the explicitly pro-Western side, organizations like the Claremont Institute produce articles (e.g. “Don’t Hate Yourself” by Daniel Mahoney) urging Americans to reject “oikophobic” narratives and take pride in the American Founding . Publications such as Quillette, Law & Liberty, The New Criterion, and The American Conservative have all hosted debates on whether Western civilization is in an undue crisis of confidence. And of course, the subject comes up frequently on popular podcasts and YouTube channels. For instance, the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson often emphasizes the need to recognize the West’s admirable achievements (individual rights, prosperity, technological progress) rather than only its sins – a theme in some of his lectures and discussions with guests. Even entertainment commentators like Bill Maher have bemoaned that young Americans “think this country is evil and racist” because of a lack of balanced historical perspective. The sheer volume of books and media on this topic in the last decade testifies that Western demoralization is a widely perceived phenomenon that people are trying to understand and address.

Conclusion: Between Pride and Penitence – Finding a Balance

The evidence suggests that in the past 10–20 years, Western societies – notably the U.S. and UK – have indeed become less reflexively patriotic and far more self-critical regarding their national histories. Polling bears out a drop in traditional national pride, especially among younger and more liberal citizens . Educational curricula and public discourse now give much greater weight to past crimes like slavery, colonialism, racism, and other injustices perpetrated by Western countries. As a result, many people in the West have a heightened awareness of what their nations have done wrong. This represents, in part, a commendable moral evolution – an attempt to be honest and not whitewash the darker chapters of history. Yet, taken to an extreme, it can also foster a sense that one’s own nation (or even Western culture at large) is fundamentally bad, leading to a kind of moral disorientation or cynicism. Those who adopt a critical viewpoint against demoralization argue that this development has reached a worrisome point. They contend that a “collapse in self-confidence” is evident, a psychological condition you’d expect in a nation defeated in war or struck by catastrophe, not in societies at peace and affluence . According to these critics, Western nations risk losing the unifying patriotism and cultural self-respect that underpin civic cohesion and resilience. If citizens are taught only to resent their country or view its history as an unbroken chain of crimes, what will motivate them to preserve its institutions or strive for its improvement?
On the other hand, it’s important to recognize that not everyone sees the decline of chest-thumping patriotism as a bad thing. From a more liberal or progressive standpoint, being “less patriotic” in the jingoistic sense might simply mean people are more humble and globally minded, or more aware of ethical issues. The key insight from research is that there is actually a broad middle ground that most ordinary citizens agree on. Despite the political noise, surveys indicate most Americans (across party lines) want history education that is neither glossing over sins nor demonizing the nation. For example, over 90% of Democratic voters polled said students should learn about the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and figures like Washington and Lincoln in a positive light (hardly the stance of America-haters), and similarly 80% of Republican voters said students must learn about slavery, segregation, and other injustices (so it’s not true that conservatives want to “erase” the bad parts) . These findings suggest that the perception of a West deeply at odds with itself may be inflated by pundits – in reality, there is consensus that history and national identity should be taught in a balanced way, instilling informed patriotism rather than blind pride or self-hate.
Ultimately, the debate over Western demoralization comes down to balance and perspective. Nations, like individuals, benefit from honest self-reflection to correct mistakes – but they also require a measure of self-esteem and belief in their core values to thrive. The Western tradition itself provides a clue to navigating this: it has long emphasized the capacity for reform and self-improvement (self-criticism is intrinsic to the West, as Douglas Murray noted ). Those alarmed by demoralization are essentially saying: let’s not abandon that positive Western trait – the striving for a more perfect union – by drowning it in despair or cynicism. As Roger Scruton wrote, the opposite of oikophobic self-loathing is not a return to hateful xenophobia, but rather oikophilia: an affirmative love of one’s own home and culture that acknowledges faults while still feeling a duty to cherish and protect the good in it . Such a healthy patriotism can coexist with a cosmopolitan respect for others. In practical terms, this might mean teaching students that their country’s history has both shameful episodes and heroic, admirable accomplishments, and that they are inheritors of both. It means citizens can protest injustices in their nation because they hold it to high standards, not because they reject it outright.
Whether the pendulum in Western societies has swung too far toward self-critique is a matter of continuing discussion. What is clear is that the conversation has been robust: dozens of books, articles, and podcasts in the last decade have wrestled with how the West sees itself. This very engagement is arguably a sign of Western strength – the ability to have an open debate about national identity and values. Going forward, the resolution likely lies in a moderation of extremes. A generation from now, we may find Western schools teaching a curriculum that neither whitewashes atrocities nor inculcates blanket shame – but rather encourages students to learn from the past to improve the future, while appreciating the liberal democratic ideals that make such critical learning possible. In the end, critics of Western demoralization do not want uncritical nationalism; they want a confident West that can face its past honestly without losing faith in its own worth. It’s a delicate equilibrium, one that societies will continue to negotiate in the years ahead. As one commentator succinctly put it: Hatred [of one’s own culture] inspires nothing constructive; the cultivation of civic affection allows even strangers to build a common world and live in peace with one another . Finding that path – loving one’s country enough to unite for its betterment, while loving justice enough to admit its wrongs – is the challenge the modern West must embrace to avoid the pitfalls of demoralization.
Sources:

• Gallup News – American Pride Slips to New Low (June 2025)
• Wall Street Journal/NORC Poll (March 2023) summarized in Magnolia Tribune – “Why is patriotism in decline?”
• British Social Attitudes 2023 – findings reported by The Guardian
• The Guardian (Patrick Butler, 2024) – “Pride in Britain’s history falls sharply in survey”
• YouGov (Will Dahlgreen, 2015) – “Patriotism in Britain reduces with each generation”
• Marist Poll (July 2024) – “Majority Thinks U.S. is Becoming Less Patriotic”
• Daniel Mahoney, The American Mind (May 2022) – “Don’t Hate Yourself”
• Jonathan Wilson, Blue Book Diaries (Jan 2021) – “Many Students Are Now Taught in School to Hate Their Own Country” (analysis of 1776 Commission report)
• Pascal Bruckner, The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism (2009, trans. 2010) – reviewed in The Guardian (Andrew Anthony)
• Benedict Beckeld, Western Self-Contempt: Oikophobia… (Cornell Univ. Press, 2022) – excerpt in Quillette (Oct 2019)
• Douglas Murray – quotes from Yale Buckley Institute event (Nov 2025) ; Murray’s The War on the West (Broadside, 2022) described in press
• Theodore Dalrymple – The Catholic Current podcast (Aug 21, 2025)
• More in Common (L. S. and S. Mounk, Dec 2022) – “Defusing the History Wars” poll data (as cited by PPI) .

Western Demoralization in the United States (and Britain): Evidence, Trends, and Key Sources

Prepared on January 28, 2026

Executive summary

• Across multiple survey series, national pride/patriotism in the U.S. has declined over the last ~20–25 years, with the steepest drops among younger adults and Democrats. In 2025, Gallup found just 58% of U.S. adults were “extremely” or “very” proud to be American (lowest in its 25‑year trend).
• In Britain, British Social Attitudes (BSA) time-series data show declines since the mid‑1990s in several measures of national exceptionalism and attachment (e.g., preferring British citizenship over any other, believing Britain is better than most, believing the world would be better if people were more like the British).
• Self-critique and shame about national history are more common on the ideological left in both the U.S. and the UK. In the Harvard Youth Poll (Spring 2025), young Democrats were far more likely than young Republicans to say they feel “embarrassed” rather than “proud” to be American.
• Education is a major battleground rather than a settled “mainly crime-focused” story: there has been a real expansion of resources and institutional encouragement for teaching slavery/racism/colonialism, alongside a wave of state-level restrictions and self-censorship pressures reported by teachers (U.S.). In England, the national curriculum includes empire as a theme but leaves substantial discretion to schools.
• If “xenophilia” is defined as a preference for other countries/cultures over one’s own, available polling mostly measures adjacent concepts (e.g., “other countries are better than the U.S.”; “would rather be a citizen of another country”), and the trendlines move in the direction of weaker national preference/exceptionalism—especially among younger cohorts.
• A sizable commentary literature argues that these attitudinal shifts reflect elite cultural narratives that highlight Western wrongdoing while discounting achievements, often linking this to social trust decline, polarization, and institutional legitimacy crises. This report highlights prominent works and podcasts that take a critical stance against “demoralization.”

Key terms and how they map to measurable indicators

The conversation often mixes moral, cultural, and empirical claims. To keep evidence and interpretation separate, it helps to distinguish concepts from what surveys can actually measure:

National pride / patriotism: Survey items like “extremely/very proud to be [nationality]” (Gallup) or agreement that one would rather be a citizen of their country than any other (BSA).

Shame / resentment toward national history: Questions about feeling ashamed of the country, or about what makes people proud/ashamed in qualitative work (Pew focus groups).

‘Oikophobia’ (Scruton’s term): A philosophical/diagnostic label for a perceived disposition to denigrate one’s inherited home culture; not directly measurable, but partly proxied by pride/shame measures and by preferences for other countries.

Xenophilia: Strictly: attraction to/admiration for foreign cultures; in surveys, typically proxied by items indicating preference for other countries’ systems or citizenship, or by viewing other countries as “better” than one’s own.

What the polling shows

United States: national pride and ‘greatest country’ measures

1. Gallup (national pride, 25-year trend)

Gallup’s long-running question asks whether respondents are “extremely,” “very,” “moderately,” “only a little,” or “not at all” proud to be American. The headline trend is downward since the early 2000s, driven by sharp declines among Democrats and younger generations.

Source: Gallup, June 30, 2025 (see ‘Sources & links’).

2. Pew Research Center (U.S. as ‘greatest country’ vs others)

Pew has repeatedly asked whether the U.S. “stands above all other countries,” is “one of the greatest countries along with some others,” or whether “there are other countries that are better than the U.S.” From 2014 to 2023, the share saying “other countries are better” increased markedly.

Sources: Pew short reads (2014; 2023).

Britain: British Social Attitudes measures of national attachment / exceptionalism

British Social Attitudes (BSA) provides long-term, repeated items that are useful proxies for national attachment and exceptionalism. Below are selected time points from 1995–2023 on commonly cited measures.

Source: NatCen / British Social Attitudes, 2023 (‘National identity, patriotism and attitudes to Britishness’).

Pride vs shame: ideological splits

Cross-national qualitative and survey work suggests that pride/shame divides are strongly structured by ideology. Pew’s 2021 comparative project notes that in both the U.S. and UK, those on the right are substantially more likely to report pride, while those on the left are more ambivalent and more likely to report shame. Among U.S. youth, Harvard’s Spring 2025 poll finds a stark emotional split between young Democrats and young Republicans.

Source: Harvard IOP Youth Poll, 50th Edition (Spring 2025).

Do schools now mainly focus on national ‘crimes’? What evidence exists?

This claim is difficult to test in a single statistic because curricula are decentralized, and classroom practice varies by district, school, and teacher. But several observable indicators show (a) expanded institutional support for teaching slavery/racism/colonialism and (b) rising political conflict and policy intervention around those topics.

United States: expansion of resources + politicization + restrictions

Evidence of expanded resources and institutional encouragement:

• • The Pulitzer Center hosts a dedicated education portal with lesson plans and activities designed to bring The 1619 Project into classrooms.
• • Professional associations in social studies provide collections of teaching resources focused on racism/anti-racism and human rights.

Evidence of politicization/restriction pressures:

• • RAND’s teacher/principal surveys document that politicized topics (including classroom conversations about race, racism, or bias) are a major reported source of stress for educators.
• • RAND and other researchers also document ‘spillover’ and self-limiting behavior: teachers in places without formal restrictions sometimes still limit discussion of contentious topics because of the surrounding climate.

Britain (England): curriculum requirements and discretion

England’s national curriculum for history emphasizes chronological knowledge and includes suggested examples that explicitly reference ‘ideas, political power, industry and empire’ for the 1745–1901 period. However, the curriculum also notes that schools are not legally required to teach the bracketed example content, leaving room for local interpretation and emphasis.

Is ‘xenophilia’ increasing?

There is no single standard ‘xenophilia’ measure in major public polling. Still, several recurring items capture adjacent attitudes:

• • Preference for other countries over one’s own (e.g., Pew’s ‘other countries are better than the U.S.’).
• • Willingness to trade citizenship (e.g., BSA ‘would rather be a citizen of Britain than any other’).
• • Declining national exceptionalism (e.g., BSA ‘world would be better if others were more like us’; U.S. ‘stands above all other countries’).

On these proxies, the trend in both countries over the last decade is toward weaker exceptionalism and weaker preference for national in-group identification, particularly among younger and more left-leaning respondents.

Explanations argued by critics of ‘demoralization’

The following are common explanatory claims made by writers who are critical of ‘Western demoralization.’ They are interpretations, not polling facts; included here as the ‘critical viewpoint’ literature you requested.

• Narrative imbalance: institutions (media, universities, cultural gatekeepers) emphasize Western wrongdoing while minimizing Western achievements, producing moral asymmetry and a ‘shame’ orientation.
• Elite signaling and status: public denunciation of national traditions becomes a marker of sophistication or moral seriousness in high-status milieus.
• Civic education substitution: shared civic myths and unifying narratives are replaced by grievance-centered frames, weakening solidarity and trust.
• Polarization feedback loop: political identity becomes intertwined with national identity (as seen in U.S. partisan splits), turning patriotism into a partisan signal rather than a shared baseline.
• Economic/psychological drivers: stagnation, inequality perceptions, and social media dynamics elevate cynicism and ‘catastrophizing’ about one’s own society.

Books, long-form articles, and podcasts (critical viewpoint against demoralization)
Books (selected)
Roger Scruton — England and the Need for Nations (2004) — Introduces/uses ‘oikophobia’ as the opposite of xenophobia and argues for the moral and political importance of national belonging.
Douglas Murray — The War on the West (2022) — Argues that Western societies are being taught to view their own traditions as uniquely malignant and urges a defense of Western achievements and liberal institutions.
Jonah Goldberg — Suicide of the West (2018) — Argues that liberal-democratic capitalism is a ‘miracle’ that is endangered by tribalism/identity politics and weakening confidence in foundational institutions.
Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt — The Coddling of the American Mind (2018) — Links campus and youth culture shifts to rising fragility, safetyism, and intolerance—often discussed alongside broader legitimacy crises.

Articles / analysis outlets
Pew Research Center (Global Attitudes): pride/shame, ideological divides (2021) — Comparative framing for U.S. and UK attitudes toward national identity and cultural conflict.
NatCen / British Social Attitudes: national identity and Britishness (2023) — Time-series measures for British exceptionalism and attachment.
Gallup: American Pride Slips to New Low (2025) — Core U.S. time-series for national pride; strong party and generational splits.

Podcasts (starting points)
The Fifth Column — Often covers free speech, polarization, and the cultural dynamics around patriotism and ‘anti-West’ narratives.
The Dispatch Podcast / Advisory Opinions — Center-right analysis of U.S. institutions, civic trust, and cultural conflicts.
UnHerd — UK/Europe-focused interviews and essays engaging immigration, national identity, and ‘culture war’ debates.
New Books Network episodes (politics / history) — Useful for author interviews (e.g., Jonah Goldberg interview on Suicide of the West).

Sources & links (copyable)
Gallup — American Pride Slips to New Low (June 30, 2025): https://news.gallup.com/poll/692150/american-pride-slips-new-low.aspx
AP — Coverage of Gallup pride decline (June 30, 2025): https://apnews.com/article/0411dd2f28329a6b640d404db8626d3f
Pew — U.S. one of the world’s greatest countries (Aug 29, 2023): https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/08/29/majority-of-americans-say-us-is-one-of-the-greatest-countries-in-the-world/
Pew — U.S. is great but fewer say it’s the greatest (Jul 2, 2014): https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/07/02/most-americans-think-the-u-s-is-great-but-fewer-say-its-the-greatest/
Pew — Ideological divisions over cultural issues in U.S./UK (May 5, 2021): https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/05/05/ideological-divisions-over-cultural-issues-are-far-wider-in-the-u-s-than-in-the-uk-france-and-germany/
Harvard IOP — Youth Poll, 50th Edition (Spring 2025): https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/50th-edition-spring-2025
NatCen — British Social Attitudes 2023, national identity & Britishness (chapter): https://www.britsoc.co.uk/media-centre/press-releases/2024/june/bsa-41-pride-in-britain-has-diminished-amid-falling-trust-in-government-and-politics/
NatCen — BSA 2023 report PDF (chapter: National identity, patriotism and attitudes to Britishness): https://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/1wnfhhmq/bsa41_national_identity.pdf
Pulitzer Center — The 1619 Project Curriculum: https://pulitzercenter.org/lesson-plan-grouping/1619-project-curriculum
RAND — State of the American Teacher/Principal project page (includes politicized topics survey references): https://www.rand.org/education-employment-infrastructure/projects/state-of-the-american-teacher-and-the-american-principal.html
RAND — Policies restricting teaching about race/gender spill over (Feb 15, 2024): https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1108-10.html
Gov.UK — National curriculum in England: history programmes of study (2013): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-curriculum-in-england-history-programmes-of-study/national-curriculum-in-england-history-programmes-of-study
DFE PDF — Secondary national curriculum: History (2013): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7c66d740f0b626628abcdd/SECONDARY_national_curriculum_-_History.pdf
HarperCollins — The War on the West (publisher page): https://www.harpercollins.com/products/the-war-on-the-west-douglas-murray
Civitas — England and the Need for Nations (publisher page + PDF): https://www.civitas.org.uk/publications/england-and-the-need-for-nations/
New Books Network — Interview/episode page: Jonah Goldberg, Suicide of the West (Apr 25, 2018): https://newbooksnetwork.com/jonah-goldberg-suicide-of-the-west-crown-forum-2018