Abdul El-Sayed’s taxing Billionaire Wealth proposal
Proposal
I believe in right-sizing our tax code to take on the outsized power of excess wealth in our economy and democracy. The ultrawealthy should no longer be able to hide behind loopholes that leave them paying lower tax rates than the rest of us. Toward that end, I support taxing capital gains over $1 million at the same rate as ordinary income and closing the stepped-up basis loophole. I also support taxing inheritance greater than $1 million like ordinary income and imposing a progressive tax on wealth held by trusts. I support raising the marginal tax rate on earnings over $1 million and a billionaire tax on wealth over $1 billion. In addition, I support a cost of living exemption on federal taxes up to $50,000. I’ll also fight to close the Social Security payroll tax cap to make sure the rich pay their fair share so that Social Security stays solvent well into the future.
Abdul El-Sayed’s tax position is a progressive wealth-and-income redistribution package. The basic idea is: wages are taxed too heavily relative to wealth, billionaires can legally avoid taxes through capital gains, trusts, inheritance rules, and the Social Security payroll cap, so the tax code should shift burden away from ordinary earners and toward concentrated wealth.
His listed proposals are mirrored on BallotReady: tax capital gains over $1 million like ordinary income, close stepped-up basis, tax inheritances over $1 million like ordinary income, tax wealth held in trusts, raise marginal tax rates over $1 million, impose a billionaire wealth tax over $1 billion, exempt the first $50,000 from federal taxes, and close the Social Security payroll tax cap. Source: BallotReady Abdul El-Sayed profile
What He’s Arguing
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Wealth should not be taxed more lightly than work
His strongest moral point is that a worker pays taxes every paycheck, while wealthy households can accumulate huge unrealized gains without annual income tax. Capital gains are usually taxed only when assets are sold, and often at preferential rates. This is why progressives argue that billionaires can look undertaxed relative to their true wealth growth.
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Close the “buy, borrow, die” path
Closing stepped-up basis is central. Under current law, inherited assets generally receive a new tax basis at death, which can erase lifetime capital gains for income-tax purposes. Critics on the left see this as one of the biggest ways wealthy families pass untaxed gains across generations. Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on stepped-up basis
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Treat large inheritances more like income
He wants inheritance over $1 million taxed as ordinary income. That is more aggressive than simply reforming the estate tax. Philosophically, he is saying: if someone receives a massive transfer of wealth, that should not be treated more favorably than someone earning wages.
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Tax trusts because they preserve dynastic wealth
Trusts can be used for legitimate estate planning, but also to preserve family wealth and reduce tax exposure. A progressive tax on wealth held by trusts is aimed at preventing families from avoiding wealth-transfer rules through legal structures.
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Use the rich to shore up Social Security
Social Security payroll tax applies only up to a wage cap. In 2026, that cap is $184,500, so wages above that are not subject to Social Security tax. Source: PolitiFact on the Social Security tax cap
El-Sayed’s view is that removing or closing the cap would make high earners pay more and improve solvency.
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Offset middle-class taxes with a $50,000 cost-of-living exemption
This is the populist balancing piece. He is not only saying “tax the rich”; he is also saying ordinary people should keep more of their first dollars earned.
Best Counterarguments
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A wealth tax is hard to administer and easy to game
The strongest technical objection is that taxing wealth is much harder than taxing income. Public stocks are easy to value, but private businesses, real estate, art, intellectual property, family partnerships, and trusts are harder. Annual valuation could create disputes, avoidance, litigation, and complex loopholes. The Tax Foundation argues wealth taxes face serious valuation, avoidance, and compliance problems. Source: Tax Foundation on wealth taxes
Strong version:
Taxing billionaires sounds simple until the government has to value every private company, trust, partnership, and illiquid asset every year.
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It may reduce investment and entrepreneurship
Critics argue that capital gains, inheritance, trusts, and billionaire wealth are often tied to business ownership. If taxes on capital rise too much, investors may take fewer risks, founders may sell earlier, firms may move assets abroad, or wealthy people may shift into less productive tax shelters. The concern is not sympathy for billionaires; it is whether taxing capital too aggressively reduces investment, productivity, and long-term wages.
Strong version:
The goal is to tax idle dynastic wealth, but the policy may also hit productive business capital and reduce future growth.
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Taxing unrealized wealth creates liquidity problems
A billionaire’s wealth may be stock in a company, not cash. If the government taxes wealth annually, the owner may need to sell shares or borrow to pay the tax. For public stocks, that may be manageable; for private companies, farms, startups, or family businesses, it can be much harder. Brookings notes that wealth taxation can address real problems in the tax code but comes with implementation challenges. Source: Brookings on taxing wealth
Strong version:
A person can be “rich” on paper but not have the cash flow to pay an annual wealth tax without selling ownership.
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Taxing inheritance over $1 million as ordinary income may hit more than the ultra-rich
A $1 million threshold sounds high, but in places with expensive homes, family businesses, farms, or retirement assets, it could reach upper-middle-class families, not just billionaires. A critic would say the policy should target dynastic fortunes, not families passing on a house or small business.
Strong version:
If the target is billionaires, a $1 million inheritance threshold is too low and could punish ordinary estate planning.
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Closing the Social Security payroll cap changes the program’s design
Social Security was built as a contributory social insurance program: workers pay in, then receive benefits based partly on earnings, with capped taxes and capped benefits. If high earners pay far more without receiving higher benefits, Social Security becomes more explicitly redistributive. That may be morally defensible, but critics say it weakens the earned-benefit logic that makes Social Security politically durable.
Strong version:
Removing the cap may improve solvency, but it turns Social Security more into welfare-style redistribution and less into earned social insurance.
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A $50,000 federal tax exemption could be extremely expensive
Exempting the first $50,000 from federal taxes would reduce taxes for many households, but it could also dramatically shrink federal revenue unless offset by very large taxes elsewhere. Critics would ask whether taxes on millionaires and billionaires can reliably pay for that exemption, especially if wealthy taxpayers avoid, defer, relocate, or litigate.
Strong version:
The middle-class tax cut is politically attractive, but the math may depend on optimistic assumptions about how much revenue rich-person taxes can actually collect.
Bottom Line
El-Sayed’s tax plan is strongest as a fairness argument:
The current tax code often taxes labor more reliably than wealth, lets unrealized gains escape tax for decades, and allows large fortunes to move through trusts and inheritance rules. His plan tries to reverse that.
The strongest counterargument is practical and economic:
His plan may overestimate how easy it is to tax wealth, underestimate avoidance and valuation problems, and risk discouraging investment while creating a more complex tax code. The fairest-sounding taxes are not always the most administrable or growth-friendly taxes.
If these taxes and policies were implemented how much more money (estimated) would it bring in and how would the percentages change by income/wealth brackets change for who’s paying tax revenue?
Short answer: the rich-tax side could plausibly raise about $3–5+ trillion over 10 years, but the $50,000 federal tax exemption could cost about $4–5+ trillion. So the full package might be anywhere from roughly revenue-neutral to a net tax cut, unless the billionaire/wealth/inheritance taxes are designed very aggressively.
Estimated 10-Year Revenue
| Policy | Rough 10-year estimate | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Tax capital gains over $1M as ordinary income + close stepped-up basis | ~$220B–$300B | Medium. Similar Biden proposal was estimated around $289B over 10 years. Source: PwC summary of Biden FY2025 tax proposals |
| Raise marginal income tax rate on earnings over $1M | ~$100B–$250B | Medium-low. Depends on new rate. |
| Tax inheritances over $1M like ordinary income | ~$500B–$1T | Low. Very design-sensitive and would overlap with estate/step-up changes. |
| Progressive tax on wealth held by trusts | ~$100B–$400B | Low. Depends heavily on anti-avoidance rules. |
| Billionaire wealth tax over $1B | ~$500B–$1.5T+ | Low. Biden’s broader billionaire minimum tax over $100M was estimated at ~$503B; Warren/Sanders-style wealth taxes were estimated in the $2T+ range, but they had broader bases. Source: CBO analysis of Biden budget |
| Close / lift Social Security payroll tax cap | ~$1.4T over 10 years if earnings over $250K are taxed | High. CBO estimates ~$1.427T for subjecting earnings above $250K to payroll taxes. Source: CBO payroll tax cap option |
| Gross revenue from rich-tax side | ~$3T–$5.5T | Medium-low overall |
Then the big offset:
| Tax Cut | Rough 10-year cost | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Federal tax exemption up to $50,000 | ~$4T–$5.1T | Medium-low. A close Penn Wharton proxy for a large standard-deduction expansion estimated ~$5.1T over 10 years. Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model |
So my best estimate:
| Version | Net 10-year effect |
|---|---|
| Without the $50K exemption | Raises roughly $3T–$5.5T |
| With the $50K exemption | Roughly -$2T to +$1.5T, depending on how aggressive the wealth/inheritance taxes are |
| Most realistic central guess | Around revenue-neutral to +$500B over 10 years |
How Tax Burden Would Shift
Baseline: federal taxes are already progressive, but payroll taxes make the middle class pay a large share. In 2021, CBO found the top income quintile received about 59% of income and paid 84% of federal taxes, though 2021 was unusual because capital gains were very high. Source: CBO distribution report
A rough shift under El-Sayed’s package:
| Group | Current rough federal tax burden | After package, likely direction |
|---|---|---|
| Bottom 40% | Low or negative income tax; still pays payroll taxes | Income tax likely near zero or more negative; payroll still matters unless exemption touches payroll |
| Middle 40% | Significant payroll tax, modest income tax | Big income-tax cut from $50K exemption; share of total revenue falls |
| Top 20% | Pays large majority of income taxes and most capital taxes | Share rises further, especially from capital gains, inheritance, trust, and payroll cap changes |
| Top 1% | Pays around mid-40% share of individual income taxes in many IRS measures; less of payroll taxes | Could rise toward 55%–65% of individual income tax revenue, depending on design |
| Billionaires / ultrawealthy | Often pay tax when income/gains are realized, not annually on wealth growth | Much larger share if wealth tax and step-up repeal are enforceable |
Plain English Version
If implemented, the plan would probably do three things:
- Move more of the federal tax burden onto millionaires, billionaires, heirs, trusts, and high earners.
- Cut or eliminate federal income taxes for many lower- and middle-income households.
- Make Social Security financing more dependent on high earners by taxing wages above the current cap.
The catch is that the $50,000 exemption is so expensive that it could eat up most or all of the revenue from the rich-tax proposals unless the billionaire and inheritance taxes are very strong and very enforceable.
Show me the percentages of each group and how much they’d pay in % each year of tax revenue
Below is the cleanest estimate. There is no official score of El-Sayed’s exact plan, so these are rough annual shares of federal tax revenue based on CBO/IRS distribution data plus the likely effects of his proposals.
Baseline sources: CBO says the top income quintile paid 69% of federal taxes in 2019 and 84% in unusual pandemic/capital-gains-heavy 2021. IRS/Treasury data show the top 1% paid 38.4% of federal individual income taxes in 2023, while the bottom 50% paid 3.3%. Sources: CBO, Tax Foundation / IRS data
All Federal Taxes: Income + Payroll + Corporate + Excise
| Group | Current rough share of annual federal tax revenue | After El-Sayed-style package, rough share |
|---|---|---|
| Bottom 50% | ~10%–15% | ~5%–8% |
| 50th–90th percentile | ~30%–40% | ~22%–30% |
| 90th–99th percentile | ~25%–30% | ~25%–32% |
| Top 1% | ~20%–28% | ~35%–45% |
| Ultrawealthy / billionaires inside top 1% | Small but concentrated; maybe ~3%–6% directly | Possibly ~8%–15%, depending on wealth tax design |
Individual Income Taxes Only
| Group | Current share of annual federal income tax revenue | After package, rough share |
|---|---|---|
| Bottom 50% | ~3% | ~0%–1% |
| 50th–90th percentile | ~25%–30% | ~10%–20% |
| 90th–99th percentile | ~30%–35% | ~25%–35% |
| Top 1% | ~38%–46% | ~50%–65% |
| Top 0.1% | ~18%–25% | ~25%–40% |
In Dollar Terms Per Year
Assume annual federal revenue around $5.6 trillion. CBO projected 2026 federal receipts around that level: individual income taxes ~$2.8T, payroll taxes ~$1.8T, corporate taxes ~$404B, customs duties ~$418B, and other ~$197B. Source: CBO budget outlook
| Group | Current annual federal taxes paid | After package, rough annual taxes paid |
|---|---|---|
| Bottom 50% | ~$560B–$840B | ~$280B–$450B |
| 50th–90th percentile | ~$1.7T–$2.2T | ~$1.2T–$1.7T |
| 90th–99th percentile | ~$1.4T–$1.7T | ~$1.4T–$1.8T |
| Top 1% | ~$1.1T–$1.6T | ~$2.0T–$2.5T |
| Ultrawealthy / billionaires | ~$170B–$340B directly | ~$450B–$850B, if wealth tax works |
Important Catch
If the $50,000 federal tax exemption is included, middle- and lower-income households pay much less federal income tax. That means the top 1% would pay a much larger percentage of total income-tax revenue, even if total federal revenue does not rise dramatically.
So the basic shift would be:
Bottom and middle pay much less federal income tax; upper-middle may pay similar or slightly more; millionaires, heirs, trusts, and billionaires pay much more; the top 1% becomes responsible for something like half or more of all individual income-tax revenue.
Give me what percentage the top 10% would pay of the yearly tax revenue in totality if and if not the $50,000 federal tax exemption was implemented
Estimated share of total yearly federal tax revenue paid by the top 10%:
| Scenario | Top 10% share of total federal tax revenue | Plain meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Current system, rough baseline | ~50%–55% | The top 10% already pays about half of all federal revenue when counting income, payroll, corporate, excise, and other federal taxes. |
| El-Sayed rich-tax policies, without $50K exemption | ~55%–60% | Their share rises because capital gains, inheritance, trusts, billionaire wealth, and Social Security cap changes mostly hit the top 10%. |
| El-Sayed rich-tax policies, with $50K exemption | ~60%–68% | Their share rises more because lower- and middle-income households would pay much less federal income tax. |
My best single-number estimate:
| Scenario | Best estimate |
|---|---|
| Without $50K exemption | ~58% of total yearly federal tax revenue |
| With $50K exemption | ~64% of total yearly federal tax revenue |
The $50K exemption matters because it reduces the tax contribution of the bottom 90%, especially through the individual income tax. So even if total federal revenue does not rise much, the share paid by the top 10% goes up sharply.
So with El-Sayed tax policies, the top 10% would only pay 5-10% more of taxes?
Yes, as a share of total federal tax revenue, roughly.
My estimate was:
| Scenario | Top 10% share of all federal tax revenue |
|---|---|
| Current system | ~50%–55% |
| El-Sayed taxes, without $50K exemption | ~55%–60% |
| El-Sayed taxes, with $50K exemption | ~60%–68% |
So compared with today:
- Without the $50K exemption: top 10% pays about 5 percentage points more of total federal revenue.
- With the $50K exemption: top 10% pays about 10–15 percentage points more of total federal revenue.
But an important distinction:
That does not mean each top-10% household pays only 5–10% more in taxes.
It means their share of the total federal tax pie rises by that amount.
Their actual tax bills could rise much more, especially for people with:
- income above $1 million
- large capital gains
- major inheritances
- trusts
- wealth above $1 billion
- wages above the Social Security payroll cap
For example, a doctor earning $300k may see a moderate increase mainly from Social Security cap changes. But a billionaire founder, private-equity partner, heir, or investor with huge capital gains could see a very large increase.
The reason the total-share increase looks modest is that the top 10% already pays a huge share of federal taxes under the current system. Moving from ~53% to ~63% is actually a major redistribution of the federal tax burden.
Give me an example of an individual billionaire and how much more money and % of money they’d pay for one year
Example: Elon Musk, using Forbes’ real-time estimate of about $946.7 billion net worth as of June 27, 2026. Source: Forbes Real-Time Billionaires
Because El-Sayed does not specify the billionaire tax rate, here are illustrative possibilities.
If The Billionaire Tax Is An Annual Wealth Tax
| Assumed billionaire tax | Taxable wealth above $1B | One-year tax owed | % of total net worth |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1% over $1B | ~$945.7B | ~$9.46B | ~1.0% |
| 2% over $1B | ~$945.7B | ~$18.91B | ~2.0% |
| 3% over $1B | ~$945.7B | ~$28.37B | ~3.0% |
So if El-Sayed’s “billionaire tax” meant a 1% annual tax on wealth above $1 billion, Musk would pay roughly $9.5 billion more in one year than he would under current federal law on unrealized wealth.
If He Also Sold $10B In Stock That Year
Under current federal law, long-term capital gains are generally taxed up to 20%, plus the 3.8% net investment income tax, for a top federal rate of about 23.8%. Source: Tax Policy Center on capital gains
Assume he sells $10B of stock with almost all of it taxable gain:
| Tax system | Federal tax on $10B realized gain |
|---|---|
| Current law, ~23.8% | ~$2.38B |
| El-Sayed-style ordinary income treatment, assume ~39.6% + 3.8% = 43.4% | ~$4.34B |
| Extra tax from capital-gains change | ~$1.96B more |
Combined Example
If Musk had $946.7B net worth and sold $10B in stock:
| Scenario | Extra one-year tax under El-Sayed-style policy |
|---|---|
| 1% billionaire wealth tax + higher capital gains tax | ~$11.4B more |
| 2% billionaire wealth tax + higher capital gains tax | ~$20.9B more |
| 3% billionaire wealth tax + higher capital gains tax | ~$30.3B more |
Plain English:
Under a 1% billionaire wealth tax, someone like Musk could owe about $9.5B per year just for holding the wealth, plus roughly $2B more if he realized $10B in capital gains. That would be about 1.2% of his net worth in this example.
Has Abdul or the Democratic Socialists of America said what they’d recommend as a annual wealth-tax rate
Short answer: I found no specific annual wealth-tax rate from Abdul El-Sayed himself. He says he supports a “billionaire tax on wealth over $1 billion,” but the version I found does not specify whether that means 1%, 2%, 5%, a minimum tax, or something else.
For DSA, it depends which DSA body you mean:
| Source | Specific rate? | What they say |
|---|---|---|
| Abdul El-Sayed | No rate found | Supports “a billionaire tax on wealth over $1 billion,” but I found no annual percentage rate. |
| National DSA platform | No clear rate found | Calls for “Tax the Rich,” but the public platform language I found does not specify an annual wealth-tax rate. Source: DSA Program |
| California DSA | Yes, but one-time | Endorsed California’s Billionaire Tax Act: a one-time 5% tax on individuals worth over $1 billion. Source: California DSA |
| Sanders / Ro Khanna proposal, DSA-adjacent democratic-socialist lane | Yes, annual | Proposed a 5% annual wealth tax on U.S. billionaires. Source: Forbes |
| Warren/Jayapal/Boyle Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act | Yes, annual, broader than billionaires | Commonly framed as an annual wealth tax on fortunes above $50M, with higher rates above $1B; recent coverage says it could raise $6.2T. Source: Common Dreams |
So the clean answer is:
Abdul: no rate specified that I found.
National DSA: no single official annual rate found.
California DSA: endorsed a one-time 5% billionaire tax.
Sanders/Khanna: proposed a 5% annual billionaire wealth tax, which is probably the closest current “democratic socialist” benchmark.
What effects would these policies have the economy? How would billionaires deal with getting a 5% tax on their wealth annually like in Sanders proposal when they’d have to sell their stocks (since most of their wealth is in invested capital not cash) and transfer it to the government? Wouldn’t that take money away from the economy, giving it to the government, and therefore would harm the economy thus reducing taxes for the next year? Would this cause people to invest less, companies invest less and have long term effects? Analyze how this would harm the economy and then compare to countries that have implemented similar policies and how it affected their economy, positive and negatives.
Yes, a 5% annual billionaire wealth tax would likely have real economic costs, especially because it is much higher than most existing wealth taxes. The key issue is that billionaires usually do not hold most of their wealth in cash. Their wealth is mostly stock, private-company equity, real estate, partnership interests, intellectual property, and control stakes. So to pay a 5% annual wealth tax, they would usually have to do some mix of:
- Sell shares/assets
- Borrow against assets
- Force companies to pay dividends
- Move residence/assets if possible
- Restructure ownership through trusts, foundations, foreign entities, or private holding companies
- Reduce future investment or delay taking companies public
A 5% annual tax is very large. If someone has $100 billion, a 5% annual tax is $5 billion every year. If their assets grow 7% that year, the government takes most of the real return. If their assets grow 2%, the tax exceeds the return, meaning their fortune shrinks unless they sell assets.
Important Correction
It would not literally “take money out of the economy” in the simple sense. The government receives the money and then spends it, transfers it, pays debt, or invests it. So the money does not disappear.
But it does change who controls capital:
Instead of the billionaire allocating capital through private investment, the government reallocates it through public spending, transfers, debt reduction, or public investment.
That can be good or bad depending on which side allocates the money more productively.
How It Could Harm The Economy
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Forced Selling Could Reduce Founder Control
If a billionaire founder owns a large company stake, paying 5% annually may require selling shares every year. Over time, that can dilute control. For someone like Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, or Jensen Huang, their wealth is largely tied to company ownership. A 5% annual tax could force repeated sales of shares.
That could:
- reduce founder control
- create market pressure on the stock
- push founders to take dividends or compensation
- discourage founders from keeping large ownership stakes
- encourage companies to stay private or move ownership structures offshore
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It Could Reduce Investment Incentives
A wealth tax taxes the stock of wealth whether or not the asset produces cash. That makes the after-tax return on investment lower. If you believe a startup could become worth $10 billion, an annual 5% wealth tax on your ownership stake changes the payoff dramatically.
This matters especially for:
- startups
- private companies
- venture capital
- founders with illiquid equity
- family businesses
- long-horizon R&D-heavy firms
The Tax Foundation argues wealth taxes can reduce saving, investment, and capital formation, and notes many OECD countries repealed them because of administrative difficulty, avoidance, and capital flight. Source: Tax Foundation, “The High Cost of Wealth Taxes”
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It Could Encourage Avoidance Instead Of Productive Activity
The richer the taxpayer, the more access they have to tax lawyers, valuation specialists, trusts, private foundations, family offices, and international structures. So instead of simply paying the tax, many would spend heavily on avoidance.
That creates economic waste:
- lawyers and accountants fight over valuations
- assets move into harder-to-value forms
- private companies avoid clear market pricing
- taxpayers litigate IRS valuations
- capital may be shifted abroad
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It Could Reduce Future Tax Revenue If It Shrinks The Tax Base
Your instinct here is right. If the tax reduces investment, lowers asset values, causes wealthy people to leave, or leads to avoidance, then the taxable base can shrink. That means the government may collect less than projected in later years.
This is one reason wealth-tax revenue estimates vary so much. The policy may raise a lot in year one, but over time people adapt.
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It Could Hurt Workers If Business Investment Falls
The harm is not mainly “poor billionaires have less money.” The serious concern is whether less private capital investment means:
- fewer startups
- slower productivity growth
- fewer high-growth firms
- lower wages over time
- reduced business formation
- less domestic capital ownership
A wealth tax aimed at billionaires can partly fall on workers if it reduces the capital stock or business expansion.
Evidence From Other Countries
Most real-world wealth taxes are far below 5% annually.
| Country | Wealth tax experience | Effects |
|---|---|---|
| Norway | Still has wealth tax, around 1%–1.1% on net wealth above thresholds | Raises revenue and supports egalitarian tax system, but has caused wealthy outmigration and complaints from entrepreneurs. Reuters reported the tax raises about 0.6% of GDP, while critics argue it weakens business competitiveness. Source: Reuters on Norway’s wealth tax |
| Switzerland | Long-standing cantonal wealth taxes, generally low rates, often below 1% | More sustainable because rates are lower, system is familiar, and Switzerland has no broad private capital-gains tax for many individuals. It raises meaningful local revenue but is not equivalent to a 5% billionaire tax. |
| France | Replaced broad wealth tax with real-estate-focused wealth tax in 2018 | Repeal/reform benefited the wealthy and cost public finances around €3.4–€3.5B per year in short-run estimates, but the old tax was criticized for capital flight and weak investment incentives. Source: INSEE on France’s 2018 capital tax reforms |
| Sweden | Repealed wealth tax in 2007 | Repeal was driven by concerns over capital flight, avoidance, and limited revenue. Sweden still has a large welfare state, but funds it more through broad-based taxes, especially labor and consumption taxes. |
| Germany | Wealth tax effectively ended after constitutional problems in 1997 | Concerns included unequal valuation of assets and constitutional issues. |
| Spain | Has wealth tax and a solidarity tax on large fortunes, but with exemptions and limits | Rates can be higher on paper, but exemptions, regional differences, and caps often reduce actual burden. |
The OECD found that the number of OECD countries with individual net wealth taxes fell from 12 in 1990 to 4 in 2017, largely because of efficiency costs, capital flight, avoidance, administrative difficulty, and limited revenue. Source: OECD, “The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes”
But The Evidence Is Not One-Sided
A 2024 NBER paper using Scandinavian data found that wealth taxes do cause wealthy people to move, but the aggregate economic effects were modest: a 1 percentage point increase in the top wealth tax rate reduced the stock of wealthy taxpayers by about 2%, while reducing employment by about 0.02%, investment by 0.07%, and value-added by 0.10%. Source: NBER, “Taxing Top Wealth”
That is the best pro-wealth-tax evidence: the economic damage may be real but not catastrophic at moderate rates.
But here is the key:
That study concerns wealth-tax changes around Scandinavian-style rates, not a U.S. 5% annual billionaire tax.
A 5% annual tax is much more aggressive than Norway’s roughly 1%–1.1% wealth tax or Switzerland’s generally sub-1% cantonal taxes. The behavioral response could be much larger.
Positive Effects
A wealth tax could have benefits:
-
Raises revenue from people who often avoid income realization
Billionaires can borrow against assets and avoid selling, meaning they may pay little tax relative to wealth growth.
-
Reduces dynastic wealth concentration
It can slow the accumulation of inherited or founder wealth.
-
Funds public investment
If used for infrastructure, childcare, education, health care, basic research, or debt reduction, the money could raise long-term productivity.
-
Reduces political inequality
Supporters argue concentrated wealth becomes concentrated political power.
-
May push idle wealth into more productive use
A tax on wealth can pressure owners to earn returns above the tax rate instead of passively holding assets.
Negative Effects
The strongest harms are:
-
Valuation problems
Hard-to-value private companies, art, real estate, trusts, and illiquid stakes become battlegrounds.
-
Liquidity problems
People may owe taxes without cash income.
-
Capital flight and avoidance
Wealthy households can move, restructure, or hide assets.
-
Lower investment
The after-tax return to risk-taking falls.
-
Forced selling
Billionaires may need to sell stock or control stakes annually.
-
Revenue instability
If markets fall, wealth-tax revenue falls too.
-
Government allocation risk
The policy assumes government will use the money better than private capital markets. Sometimes it will; sometimes it will not.
My Bottom Line
A modest wealth tax, like 0.5%–1%, can plausibly raise revenue and reduce inequality with manageable damage if designed well.
A 5% annual billionaire wealth tax is much more radical. It would likely raise large revenue at first, but also create strong incentives for avoidance, relocation, forced selling, reduced investment, and valuation battles. It would probably reduce billionaire wealth concentration substantially, but at the cost of some private investment and entrepreneurial incentives.
The fairest summary:
A 5% annual wealth tax would not simply remove money from the economy, but it would shift capital allocation from private owners to the state. If the government invests the money productively, the economy could benefit. If it mostly funds consumption, bureaucracy, or inefficient programs, the long-term effect could be slower investment, lower capital formation, and lower future tax revenue.
Compare Abdul’s policies to other nations if they have implemented any of them and what have been the results?
Below is a comparison of Abdul El-Sayed’s tax ideas with countries that have tried similar policies. The key pattern: many countries tax wealth/capital more than the U.S. in some ways, but very few use an aggressive annual wealth tax like Sanders’ 5% billionaire proposal.
| Abdul Policy | Other Countries With Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Annual wealth tax / billionaire tax | Norway, Switzerland, Spain, France formerly, Sweden formerly | Wealth taxes can raise revenue and reduce wealth concentration, but many countries repealed them because of avoidance, valuation problems, capital flight, and limited revenue. OECD says the number of OECD countries with net wealth taxes fell from 12 in 1990 to 4 in 2017. Source: OECD |
| Tax capital gains more like ordinary income | Denmark, France, UK, Canada, Australia, Norway | Many countries tax capital gains, but usually with special rules, discounts, exemptions, or lower effective rates. Very high capital-gains rates can discourage realization: people delay selling assets, hold wealth longer, borrow against assets, or move capital. |
| Close stepped-up basis / tax gains at death | Canada has deemed disposition at death | Canada generally treats death as if assets were sold, so unrealized capital gains can be taxed at death. This prevents permanent escape from capital-gains tax, but creates liquidity issues for family businesses, farms, and estates unless exemptions/deferrals exist. |
| Tax inheritances more heavily | UK, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Spain | Inheritance/estate taxes are common, but often have exemptions for spouses, family businesses, farms, and primary residences. Japan and South Korea have very high top inheritance tax rates, but this can create succession problems for family-owned firms. |
| Wealth held in trusts taxed more aggressively | UK, Canada, Australia, some EU countries | Trust taxation exists to prevent avoidance, but wealthy families often adapt through legal structures, foundations, offshore entities, or timing strategies. Strong anti-avoidance rules matter more than headline rates. |
| Higher marginal income tax rates over $1M | Nordic countries, Germany, France, UK, Canada, Australia | High earners often face top marginal rates between roughly 45% and 55% when national/local taxes are included. These countries can sustain higher tax burdens, but they usually tax broad middle-class consumption and payroll too, not only the ultra-rich. |
| Remove or raise Social Security payroll tax cap | Medicare-style uncapped payroll taxes exist in U.S.; many countries have broader payroll/social contribution systems | Removing the cap would raise significant revenue. CBO estimated that taxing earnings above $250,000 for Social Security would raise about $1.4 trillion over 10 years. Source: CBO |
| Large federal exemption / tax-free first $50K | Many countries have personal allowances, but usually much smaller relative to income | A large exemption cuts taxes for low/middle earners but is expensive. To fund it, countries usually rely on VAT/consumption taxes, payroll taxes, or broad-based taxes, not only taxes on billionaires. |
Wealth Tax Lessons
The closest comparisons are Norway, Switzerland, Spain, France, and Sweden.
| Country | Policy | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Norway | Annual wealth tax around 1%–1.1% above thresholds | Raises revenue and supports equality, but has caused wealthy outmigration and complaints from entrepreneurs. Reuters reported the tax raises about 0.6% of GDP. Source: Reuters |
| Switzerland | Cantonal wealth taxes, usually low rates, often below 1% | More stable because rates are low, the system is long-standing, and Switzerland often has favorable capital-gains treatment. It is not comparable to a 5% annual billionaire tax. |
| France | Former broad wealth tax, later narrowed to real estate wealth tax | France partially repealed its wealth tax in 2018. INSEE found the reform benefited the very wealthy and cost public finances around €3.4–€3.5B per year in the short term. Source: INSEE |
| Sweden | Repealed wealth tax in 2007 | Repeal followed concerns about capital flight, avoidance, and weak revenue. Sweden still funds a large welfare state, but mainly through broad income, payroll, and consumption taxes. |
| Spain | Wealth tax plus solidarity tax on large fortunes | Exists, but exemptions, regional rules, and caps reduce its force. It raises some revenue but is not a simple “tax billionaires 5% yearly” model. |
Capital Gains / Step-Up Basis
El-Sayed’s idea to tax capital gains over $1M like ordinary income is similar to proposals in the U.S. Democratic Party and some high-tax countries, but most countries still preserve special treatment for capital.
Canada is the best comparison for closing stepped-up basis. Canada generally has a “deemed disposition” at death, meaning unrealized gains can become taxable when someone dies. That solves the U.S. “buy, borrow, die” loophole better than the American system, but it requires exceptions and deferrals to avoid forcing sales of farms, family businesses, or illiquid estates.
Inheritance Taxes
Heavy inheritance taxation exists in many rich democracies. Japan and South Korea have some of the highest top inheritance rates. The upside is less dynastic wealth. The downside is that heirs of family businesses may need to sell shares or restructure ownership to pay taxes.
That matters for Abdul’s idea of taxing inheritances over $1M like ordinary income. A $1M threshold would be much broader than a billionaire-only tax and could hit upper-middle-class estates in high-cost areas unless carefully designed.
Main Takeaway
Other countries have implemented pieces of Abdul’s agenda, but usually in less aggressive, more complex forms:
- Wealth taxes exist, but usually around 0.1%–1.1%, not 5%.
- High marginal income taxes exist, but they usually come with broad taxes on the middle class too.
- Capital gains and inheritance taxes exist, but with many exemptions.
- Closing stepped-up basis is feasible, as Canada shows, but liquidity problems must be managed.
The biggest lesson:
Abdul’s tax agenda is directionally similar to European social-democratic taxation, but his billionaire/wealth-tax language, if interpreted as a 5% annual tax, would be much more aggressive than most successful real-world systems.
Below is a deeper country-by-country and policy-by-policy comparison. Big picture first:
Abdul El-Sayed’s tax agenda resembles left-social-democratic tax policy in goals, but not always in design. Other rich countries often tax capital, inheritances, payroll, and high income more aggressively than the U.S., but they usually fund large welfare states through broad taxes on the middle class too, especially VAT/payroll taxes. They rarely rely only on billionaires.
1. Annual Wealth / Billionaire Tax
Abdul supports a “billionaire tax on wealth over $1 billion,” but I have not found him specifying the rate. If interpreted like Sanders/Khanna’s 5% annual billionaire wealth tax, that would be far more aggressive than most real-world wealth taxes.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Norway | Annual wealth tax around 1%–1.1% above thresholds. | Raises revenue and supports equality, but has encouraged wealthy outmigration and complaints from entrepreneurs. Reuters reported it raises about 0.6% of GDP, while critics say it weakens business competitiveness. Source: Reuters on Norway’s wealth tax |
| Switzerland | Cantonal wealth taxes, generally low, often below 1%. | More stable because rates are low, long-standing, decentralized, and Switzerland often exempts private capital gains on movable assets. It is not comparable to a 5% annual billionaire tax. |
| France | Former broad wealth tax, later narrowed to real estate wealth tax in 2018. | Reform/repeal benefited the wealthy and cost public finances about €3.4–€3.5B per year in short-run estimates, but the old tax was criticized for capital flight, avoidance, and weak investment incentives. Source: INSEE on France’s capital tax reform |
| Sweden | Repealed wealth tax in 2007. | Repeal followed concerns about capital flight, avoidance, limited revenue, and discouraging domestic capital ownership. Sweden still has a large welfare state, but funds it mostly through broad income, payroll, and consumption taxes. |
| Germany | Wealth tax ended after constitutional problems in 1997. | Main issue was unequal valuation of different asset types, especially real estate versus financial assets. |
| Spain | Wealth tax plus “solidarity tax” on large fortunes. | Exists, but regional variation, exemptions, and caps reduce effective burden. It raises revenue but is not a simple high-rate billionaire tax. |
OECD’s broad finding is important: the number of OECD countries with individual net wealth taxes fell from 12 in 1990 to 4 in 2017, mainly because of administrative costs, avoidance, capital flight, narrow bases, and limited revenue. Source: OECD, Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes
Assessment: A modest wealth tax around 0.5%–1% has real-world precedent. A 5% annual billionaire tax would be much more radical and would likely create stronger incentives for avoidance, relocation, forced stock sales, and reduced founder control.
2. Tax Capital Gains Like Ordinary Income
Abdul supports taxing capital gains over $1 million at ordinary income rates.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Denmark | Top capital gains rate around 42%, among the highest in Europe. | Denmark sustains this within a high-tax, high-service model. But it also taxes broadly; it does not fund the welfare state only through the rich. Source: Tax Foundation Europe capital gains rates |
| Norway | Capital gains on shares taxed at an effective top rate around 37.8%. | Works within Norway’s broader egalitarian tax system, though capital taxation remains politically controversial. |
| France | Capital gains generally taxed through a flat system plus surcharges; top listed-share rate around 34%. | France lowered some capital-tax burdens in 2018 to encourage investment; this benefited high-income households and reduced revenue. |
| Switzerland | Often 0% tax on private capital gains from movable assets like shares. | Switzerland pairs low capital-gains taxation with wealth taxes and other taxes. This shows countries mix tools differently. |
| U.S. currently | Preferential long-term capital gains rates, top federal rate generally 20% plus 3.8% NIIT. | Encourages holding assets and creates “buy, borrow, die” planning. |
Assessment: Taxing capital gains more heavily is common, but full ordinary-income treatment is not universal. High capital-gains taxes can raise fairness but increase the “lock-in effect”: investors delay selling assets to avoid tax, which can reduce market efficiency and revenue.
3. Closing Stepped-Up Basis / Taxing Gains At Death
This is one of Abdul’s strongest and most internationally defensible proposals.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Canada | Has “deemed disposition” at death: a person is treated as if they sold capital property immediately before death, unless exceptions apply. | This prevents unrealized gains from escaping tax forever. But it creates liquidity issues for estates with illiquid assets, so Canada has spouse rollovers and exemptions. Source: Canada Revenue Agency on deemed disposition at death |
| U.S. currently | Step-up in basis generally wipes out capital gains at death. | This is central to “buy, borrow, die”: hold appreciated assets, borrow against them, then pass them to heirs with reset basis. |
Assessment: Compared with a 5% annual wealth tax, closing stepped-up basis is more administrable because it taxes at a clear event: death or transfer. It still needs protections for farms, family businesses, and illiquid estates.
4. Taxing Inheritances More Heavily
Abdul supports taxing inheritances greater than $1 million like ordinary income.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Japan / South Korea | Very high top inheritance tax rates. | Helps reduce dynastic concentration, but can pressure heirs of family-controlled firms to sell shares or restructure ownership. |
| UK | Inheritance tax, with exemptions and reliefs. | Raises revenue but has many avoidance strategies and reliefs for business/agricultural property. |
| France / Germany / Belgium | Inheritance taxes with family relationship rules and exemptions. | Revenue and fairness depend heavily on design. Close relatives often receive preferential treatment. |
| OECD overall | 24 OECD countries levy inheritance or estate taxes. | But these taxes raise only about 0.5% of total tax revenue on average among countries that levy them, largely because of exemptions, planning, and narrow bases. Source: OECD inheritance taxation report |
Assessment: Inheritance taxation is common, but Abdul’s $1 million threshold would be more aggressive than a billionaire-only policy. In high-cost areas, it could reach upper-middle-class estates unless carefully adjusted for spouses, homes, farms, and family businesses.
5. Taxing Trust Wealth
Abdul supports a progressive tax on wealth held by trusts.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| UK / Canada / Australia / EU countries | Trusts are regulated and taxed to prevent avoidance. | Strong anti-avoidance rules help, but wealthy families adapt with foundations, offshore entities, timing strategies, and valuation planning. |
| U.S. currently | Trusts can face compressed income-tax brackets, but sophisticated estate planning remains powerful. | Dynastic trusts and valuation discounts can preserve wealth across generations. |
Assessment: This is less about headline rates and more about enforcement. If trust rules are weak, wealth taxes and inheritance taxes leak. If rules are strong, they become complex and litigation-heavy.
6. Raising Top Marginal Income Tax Rates
Abdul supports raising the marginal tax rate on earnings over $1 million.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Nordic countries | High top marginal rates, often around 50%+ including local taxes. | Sustainable because citizens receive broad services, and taxes are broad-based. They also tax middle earners much more than U.S. politicians usually admit. |
| UK / Germany / France / Canada / Australia | Top rates often in the 45%–55% range depending on region. | Common in advanced economies. Can raise revenue but may affect migration, compensation structure, and avoidance at very high incomes. |
| U.S. historical | Had much higher statutory top rates in mid-20th century. | Effective rates were lower than headline rates due to deductions and shelters. |
Assessment: This is one of Abdul’s more normal international proposals. Many wealthy democracies have higher top marginal rates than the U.S. The catch: they usually pair this with broad taxes, not only millionaire taxes.
7. Closing The Social Security Payroll Tax Cap
Abdul supports closing the payroll tax cap to improve Social Security solvency.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Many European systems | Social insurance contributions often have caps, but structures vary. Some countries use broader payroll/social contributions. | High payroll taxes can fund generous benefits, but they also raise labor costs. |
| U.S. Medicare tax | Already uncapped, with an additional high-income Medicare surtax. | Shows the U.S. can administer uncapped payroll-style taxes. |
| U.S. Social Security | Currently capped because benefits are also capped. | Removing the cap would raise large revenue but make Social Security more redistributive. CBO estimated taxing earnings above $250,000 would raise about $1.4T over 10 years. Source: CBO Social Security payroll tax cap option |
Assessment: This is feasible and high-revenue. The conservative counter is that it changes Social Security from an earned-benefit program toward a more explicitly redistributive tax-and-transfer program.
8. $50,000 Federal Tax Exemption
This is where Abdul’s plan differs most from European social democracy.
| Country | Similar Policy | Results |
|---|---|---|
| Most OECD countries | Have personal allowances, zero-rate brackets, or credits. | But they are usually not so large that broad middle-class taxation disappears. |
| Nordic countries | High services, but broad taxation. | Middle-class citizens pay significant income/payroll/VAT taxes. |
| U.S.-style proposal | A very large exemption would sharply reduce federal income taxes for low/middle earners. | Politically attractive, but expensive. It would require very high revenue from the rich or spending cuts/deficits. |
Assessment: A $50,000 exemption is populist, but it is not how most high-service countries fund government. Europe’s lesson is: big welfare states usually require broad tax bases.
Overall Results From Other Nations
| Policy Area | What Worked | What Failed / Backfired |
|---|---|---|
| Wealth taxes | Can reduce concentration and raise some revenue at low/moderate rates. | High avoidance, valuation disputes, capital flight, low revenue, repeal in many countries. |
| Capital gains taxation | Higher rates can increase fairness and revenue. | Too high can create lock-in, avoidance, and lower realizations. |
| Taxing gains at death | Canada shows it is feasible. | Needs exemptions/deferrals for illiquid estates. |
| Inheritance taxes | Common and defensible for reducing dynastic wealth. | Often raise little because exemptions/planning narrow the base. |
| Trust taxation | Necessary to prevent avoidance. | Complex, lawyer-heavy, difficult to enforce. |
| Payroll cap removal | Raises large, reliable revenue. | Raises labor costs and changes Social Security’s contributory design. |
| Large exemption for ordinary earners | Helps low/middle earners. | Very expensive; not how most social democracies finance spending. |
Bottom Line
Abdul’s policies are not random. Almost every piece has a real-world analogue. But the international evidence suggests three lessons:
- Closing stepped-up basis and taxing inheritances better are more proven than a large annual wealth tax.
- A modest wealth tax can work, but a 5% annual billionaire tax would be far above most successful examples.
- European-style social democracy usually depends on broad taxation, not only taxing billionaires.
So the strongest balanced conclusion is:
Abdul’s plan is plausible as a fairness agenda, especially on capital gains, step-up basis, inheritance, and Social Security. But if the billionaire tax is interpreted as a 5% annual wealth tax, that would be much more aggressive than most international examples and would likely create serious avoidance, investment, valuation, and migration problems.
Compare Nordic countries middle class tax rates with U.S. middle class rates
Yes. The basic answer is:
Nordic countries do not fund their welfare states just by taxing the rich. Their middle class pays substantially higher taxes than the U.S. middle class, especially through labor taxes and VAT.
1. Taxes On The Average Worker
OECD’s “tax wedge” measures income tax + employee payroll/social contributions + employer payroll/social contributions, minus cash benefits, as a share of total labor cost.
| Country | Single average worker tax wedge, 2025 | One-earner couple w/ 2 children, 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 30.0% | 19.6% |
| Denmark | 35.8% | Not in snippet, but employee net rate for married worker w/ children: 26.1% |
| Norway | 36.4% | 31.4% |
| Sweden | 41.1% | 36.8% |
| Finland | 42.5% | 38.7% |
| OECD average | 35.1% | 26.2% |
Sources: OECD Taxing Wages 2026: U.S., OECD: Sweden
, OECD: Norway
, OECD: Finland
, OECD: Denmark
Plain English Example
If an employer spends $100 to employ an average worker:
| Country | Goes to taxes/social contributions | Worker + benefit value left |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. | ~$30 | ~$70 |
| Denmark | ~$36 | ~$64 |
| Norway | ~$36 | ~$64 |
| Sweden | ~$41 | ~$59 |
| Finland | ~$43 | ~$57 |
So compared with the U.S., the average worker tax burden is roughly:
- Denmark: +6 percentage points
- Norway: +6 percentage points
- Sweden: +11 percentage points
- Finland: +12.5 percentage points
2. Consumption Taxes / VAT
This is the huge difference people often miss.
| Country | Standard VAT / sales tax |
|---|---|
| United States | No federal VAT; state/local sales taxes vary |
| Denmark | 25% VAT |
| Sweden | 25% VAT |
| Norway | 25% VAT |
| Finland | 25.5% VAT |
Source: Tax Foundation VAT rates in Europe
This means Nordic middle-class citizens pay more not only when they earn money, but also when they spend it.
3. Total Taxes As Share Of GDP
This shows the overall size of the tax system.
| Country | Tax revenue as % of GDP, 2023 |
|---|---|
| United States | Below 30% |
| Denmark | 44.0% in 2023 / 45.2% in 2024 preliminary |
| Finland | Above 40% |
| Sweden | Above 40% |
| Norway | Above 40% |
OECD reports that in 2023 Denmark had the highest tax-to-GDP ratio at 44.0%, and Finland, Sweden, and Norway were also above 40%. The U.S. was among countries below 30%. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2025
Bottom Line
Nordic countries tax the wealthy, but their model is not “make billionaires pay and leave the middle class alone.”
It is closer to:
High taxes on almost everyone, especially the middle and upper-middle class, in exchange for universal health care, childcare support, paid leave, education, pensions, and stronger social insurance.
So if someone says, “Let’s have Nordic-style benefits,” the honest tax answer is:
That would almost certainly require higher taxes on the U.S. middle class too, especially through payroll taxes, income taxes, or a VAT. You cannot realistically fund a Nordic welfare state only by taxing millionaires and billionaires.