Big‑picture Map Of Moral Philosophy

Center Node: Moral Philosophy

Metaethics (Foundations: meaning, truth, authority)
- Semantics of Moral Language
  - Cognitivism — moral sentences are truth‑apt (propositions that can be true/false)
    - Evidence: logical embedding (if/then, not), apparent contradictions, inferential roles
    - Variants: naturalist realism; non‑naturalist realism; subjectivism/relativism (still truth‑apt)
  - Non‑cognitivism — moral sentences primarily express attitudes/commands
    - Emotivism (approval/disapproval), Prescriptivism (universalizable imperatives)
    - Expressivism / Quasi‑realism — sophisticated attitude semantics that preserves logic and truth‑talk
    - Core test: Frege–Geach (handle embedded moral statements without losing validity)
- Metaphysics of Morality (What moral facts would be like)
  - Realism — stance‑independent moral facts (naturalist or non‑naturalist)
  - Anti‑realism
    - Constructivism — truths fixed by justified procedure (what free & equal agents could not reasonably reject)
    - Relativism — truth indexed to persons/cultures/standards
    - Error Theory — positive moral claims are systematically false
- Normativity & Reasons (Why ‘should’ bites)
  - Categorical ought — binds regardless of goals (moral ‘ought’)
  - Hypothetical/instrumental ought — means‑end, goal‑conditioned
  - Internalism vs. Externalism about reasons — must reasons link to the agent’s motivations?
  - Pro tanto vs. All‑things‑considered — defeasible reason vs. net verdict after weighing reasons
- Epistemology (How we know)
  - Reflective Equilibrium — adjust principles/judgments to coherence
  - Methodological pluralism: cases, principles, consequences, virtues, rights
- Semantic/Conceptual Tools
  - Thin vs. Thick terms — right/wrong/ought (thin) vs. cruel/generous (thick = descriptive + evaluative)
  - Supervenience — no moral difference without some non‑moral difference
Normative Ethics (Frameworks: how to decide right/wrong)
- Consequentialism (Utilitarian family)
  - Rule: maximize value (e.g., well‑being)
  - Strengths: clarity, harm/benefit sensitivity
  - Pressure points: permits troubling trade‑offs, demandingness
- Deontology (Kantian/duty/constraints)
  - Rule: respect duties/rights; do not use persons merely as means
  - Strengths: protects individuals against aggregative harms
  - Pressure points: duty conflicts, rigidity
- Virtue Ethics (Aristotelian)
  - Rule: act as a virtuous agent would; aim at flourishing (eudaimonia)
  - Strengths: character, context, development
  - Pressure points: indeterminacy, contested virtues
- Contractualism / Contractarianism
  - Rule: what no one could reasonably reject; or what rational bargainers would agree to
  - Strengths: person‑centered justification, fairness
  - Pressure points: baseline/“reasonable” disputes
- Rights Theories
  - Rule: respect claim‑rights (bodily integrity, property, association)
  - Strengths: shields individuals from majorities
  - Pressure points: which rights/weighting in conflicts
- Care Ethics
  - Rule: sustain responsive, non‑dominating relationships; attend to dependency
  - Strengths: captures care, vulnerability, partiality
  - Pressure points: scaling to institutions, impartial justice
- Pluralism (e.g., W. D. Ross)
  - Rule: multiple prima facie duties (fidelity, non‑maleficence, beneficence, justice…)
  - Strengths: realism about moral complexity
  - Pressure points: adjudicating conflicts
Applied Ethics (Cases: using the tools)
- Standard Workflow
  - 1. Clarify the claim type — categorical moral wrong vs. instrumental advice
  - 1. Fix meanings — ‘wrong’ = decisive all‑things‑considered reason not to do it; ‘ought’ = categorical or hypothetical?
  - 1. Ask for a reason — rights‑based, harm‑based, duty‑based, virtue‑based, contractualist, or consequentialist?
  - 1. Specify the mechanism — whose rights/harm, how (coercion, deception, risk), evidence magnitude, preventability
  - 1. Scope the verdict — pro tanto vs. all‑things‑considered; exceptions/overrides
  - 1. Cross‑framework check — do multiple theories converge?
- Diagnostics in live debate
  - Embedding & contradiction (semantic adequacy)
  - Motivation link (judgment–action connection)
  - Consistency & generalizability across similar cases
Quick Translation Guide (Common Confusions)
- “I don’t like it” → attitude; ask for a reason (rights/harm/duty/virtue/contract)
- “It’s bad for your goals” → instrumental ought, not a categorical moral wrong
- “It violates rights” → which right, source, and mechanism of violation?
- “It causes harm” → what harm, to whom, probability, preventability, less‑restrictive alternatives?
What “Wrong/Ought” Usually Mean in Debate
- Wrong (typical use): decisive, all‑things‑considered reason not to act (often rights‑violation or unjustified harm)
- Ought (two senses): categorical (moral) vs. hypothetical (means‑ends)
Cross‑links
- Semantics ↔ Logic of debate (Frege–Geach)
- Metaphysics ↔ Authority of reasons (realism/constructivism)
- Normativity ↔ Motivation (internalism/externalism)
- Framework choice ↔ Applied verdicts (convergence strengthens conclusions)