Subjectivism and Objectivism

I. Introduction: The Enduring Question of Moral Foundations

A. Overview of the Central Debate

One of the most fundamental and persistent inquiries in philosophy concerns the nature of morality: Are moral values and principles grounded in an objective reality, existing independently of human consciousness, or are they essentially human constructs, shaped by individual perspectives, emotional responses, or cultural consensus? This question delves into the very essence of right and wrong, exploring whether moral truths are discovered or invented.1 The significance of this debate is profound, as its resolution—or the understanding of its complexities—deeply influences personal conduct, the structuring of societal norms, the formulation of legal systems, and the conduct of international relations. How one approaches this question shapes the understanding of moral disagreements, the possibility of moral progress, and the ultimate authority and justification of moral claims.2

The core of the debate, therefore, revolves around whether moral properties and facts exist in the world in a manner akin to other facts, whether moral statements are expressions of emotions or descriptions of this reality, and whether such statements can be true or false in the way factual statements are.2 These are not merely abstract philosophical puzzles; they resonate through many contemporary social, political, and legal disagreements. Debates concerning issues such as human rights, social justice, and ethical governance often implicitly hinge on whether the moral claims being made are asserted as universal truths or as culturally or individually specific values. The philosophical exploration of moral subjectivism and objectivism provides a crucial framework for understanding the deeper, often unacknowledged, underpinnings of these practical contentions.

Furthermore, many individuals experience a tension in their own moral intuitions. There is often a simultaneous pull towards subjectivist ideas, such as the importance of tolerance for diverse cultural practices 3, and objectivist convictions, such as the unequivocal condemnation of acts like genocide as universally and abhorrently wrong.5 This inherent tension in everyday moral thinking underscores the need for careful philosophical analysis to clarify the coherence and implications of these often mixed intuitions. The enduring appeal of both sides of the debate suggests that common moral experience is complex and not easily captured by a simplistic affirmation of one stance over the other.

B. Purpose and Scope of the Report

This report aims to provide a comprehensive and balanced exploration of the moral subjectivism versus moral objectivism debate. It will examine the core tenets of each position, the principal arguments advanced in their support, their major theoretical expressions, and the key philosophical proponents associated with them. Additionally, it will delve into the significant criticisms leveled against each stance and consider the practical implications of adopting either perspective. The scope will also include an examination of alternative frameworks that seek to navigate or transcend this traditional dichotomy. The report will proceed by first defining moral subjectivism and objectivism, then exploring the arguments for each, critically examining these arguments, comparing their approaches to key moral phenomena, discussing alternative views, and finally, considering the practical consequences of this fundamental debate.

II. Defining the Philosophical Landscape: Subjectivism and Objectivism

A. Moral Subjectivism: Morality as Mind-Dependent

Moral subjectivism is the meta-ethical position asserting that moral values, truths, and principles are not independent, external realities but are, in some fundamental way, constructed by or dependent upon the human mind, emotions, beliefs, or attitudes.1 According to this view, moral statements derive their truth or falsity from these internal states or social agreements, rather than from correspondence to objective moral facts existing independently of human cognition or feeling.8

This implies that what is deemed “right” or “wrong” is not fixed and universal but can vary. This variation might occur from person to person, a view known as individual relativism or ethical subjectivism proper, where moral principles are a matter of personal acceptance.10 Alternatively, it might vary from culture to culture, a position known as cultural relativism, where morality is seen as a social construct determined by collective beliefs and practices. In either variant, the core assertion is that there are no moral facts that would exist if there were no minds or conscious awareness to apprehend or create them.8 Consequently, moral judgments are understood to reflect the perspective, sentiments, or conventions of the judger, rather than describing an objective feature of the action or situation being evaluated. The truth of a moral claim like “Lying is wrong” is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of individuals or groups.7

B. Moral Objectivism: Morality as Mind-Independent

In direct contrast, moral objectivism posits that moral values, truths, and principles exist independently of human minds, opinions, or cultural conventions.1 Moral statements, from this perspective, can be true or false based on these objective moral realities, which are, in principle, discoverable or apprehensible through reason, intuition, or other means.1

This position entails that certain actions are inherently right or wrong, universally and transculturally, irrespective of what any particular individual or society might believe.11 Moral facts are considered to be part of the fabric of reality, akin in their objectivity, if not in their mode of existence, to scientific or mathematical facts.9 If morality is objective, then moral judgments aim to correspond to these independent moral truths. This allows for the possibility that individuals, or indeed entire cultures, can be mistaken in their moral beliefs if those beliefs fail to align with the objective moral order.14 The statement “Genocide is wrong,” for an objectivist, is not merely an expression of disapproval but a claim about an objective moral truth.

The distinction between subjectivism and objectivism, while appearing stark, can be nuanced. The terms themselves are not always employed as absolute binary opposites within moral discourse. Some philosophical theories, such as certain forms of constructivism, endeavor to articulate a type of “objectivity” that, while not entirely divorced from human experience, is nonetheless grounded in human reason or intersubjective agreement rather than arbitrary individual preference.15 For instance, “objective judgment” can refer to a belief supported by evidence compelling for any rational being, which may not necessitate moral facts existing in the same way as physical objects.8 This suggests that the initial, sharp dichotomy might be mediated by positions that seek universality through rational procedures or shared human standpoints.

Furthermore, the manner in which “subjectivity” and “objectivity” are defined often carries implicit assignments regarding the burden of proof. Objectivity is frequently associated with concepts like “reality, truth, and reliability,” whereas subjectivity is linked with the “possibility of error, unreliability, and bias”.8 Such framing can lend an initial air of desirability or default status to objectivism, thereby placing the onus on subjectivists to argue against this perceived norm. Indeed, a common motivation for embracing forms of moral relativism is the “perceived untenability of moral objectivism,” implying that objectivism is a position that requires defense against critiques.3 Some philosophers also note that moral realism, a strong form of objectivism, often appears to be the “default view” because of the intuitive sense that certain actions are wrong independently of anyone’s attitudes towards them.16 This underlying dynamic, where objectivism often begins with an intuitive appeal and subjectivist arguments frequently emerge as critiques of objectivism’s claims or its perceived shortcomings, is an important aspect of the broader debate.

• ! If your moral objectivism is based on God, then why do so many people disagree with the morals from the Bible. Who is right? Is it simply a person’s subjective interpretation of the Bible?

III. The Case for Moral Subjectivism: Perspectives on Mind-Dependent Morality

Moral subjectivism encompasses a range of theories that, despite their differences, share the core conviction that morality is not an objective feature of the external world but is instead grounded in human perspectives, feelings, or social constructs.

A. Individual Relativism (Ethical Subjectivism Proper): Morality as Personal

Individual relativism, often used interchangeably with ethical subjectivism proper, asserts that moral principles are fundamentally a matter of personal, individual acceptance.10 According to this view, what is right or wrong is relative to each individual’s unique beliefs, feelings, or preferences.17 Each person, therefore, is considered the ultimate authority in determining their own moral framework, and there are no objective or universal moral standards that apply to everyone.18

A common analogy used to illustrate this position is that of taste: just as preferences for food vary from person to person without any objective basis for declaring one taste superior to another, so too do moral values.17 For example, an individual relativist might maintain that an act like suicide could be morally right for one person in a particular situation but morally wrong for another person in a similar situation, depending entirely on their individual perspectives.17 This perspective is encapsulated in the idea that a moral judgment like “Stealing is wrong” is comparable to a statement of personal preference such as “I dislike Brussels sprouts”.19

Arguments for individual relativism often emphasize the importance of personal autonomy and the right of individuals to determine their own moral compass.18 This stance is frequently invoked in opposition to laws that seek to prohibit “victimless immoral practices,” such as certain forms of gambling or consensual sexual activities, with the rhetorical question, “Who is to judge?“.17 This question challenges the legitimacy of imposing one particular moral viewpoint on others when morality itself is considered an individual matter. While not always explicitly named as proponents of this specific variant, philosophers like David Hume, with his emphasis on moral sentiments arising within the individual rather than being properties of actions themselves, can be seen as providing a philosophical backdrop for such views.10

B. Cultural Relativism: Morality as Social Construct

Cultural relativism posits that moral values, concepts, and principles are best understood within their own cultural context and should not be judged by the standards of a different culture.20 Morality, in this view, is relative to a particular society or culture; what is considered right or wrong is determined by societal acceptance, customs, and conventions.10 There are no universal moral truths that transcend cultural boundaries.3

A primary argument for cultural relativism stems from the observation of profound cultural diversity in moral beliefs and practices across different societies and historical periods.3 Anthropologists have documented a vast array of moral codes, from differing views on marriage and family to contrasting norms regarding property and respect for life. This empirical observation of diversity is often used to argue against the existence of universal moral values and to support the claim that morality is a product of specific cultural environments.

Cultural relativism also emerged, in part, as a response to Western ethnocentrism—the tendency to view one’s own culture as superior and to use its standards as a benchmark for judging other cultures.20 Proponents argue that a relativistic outlook promotes understanding and respect for different ways of life, encouraging observers to appreciate cultures on their own terms rather than imposing external judgments. Key figures in establishing and popularizing this concept include anthropologists such as Franz Boas, who first articulated the idea that “civilization is not something absolute, but… is relative” 20, and his students Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovits, who further developed and disseminated these ideas.3 Within anthropology, cultural relativism has served as an important methodological tool, helping researchers to escape their own unconscious cultural biases and to make sense of unfamiliar cultural practices in their proper context.20

C. Emotivism: Morality as Emotional Expression

Emotivism offers a distinct and more radical subjectivist perspective. It is a meta-ethical theory claiming that ethical sentences do not express propositions—that is, statements that can be true or false—but rather serve to express emotional attitudes or to influence the behavior of others.10 Colloquially, it is sometimes referred to as the “hurrah/boo” theory, suggesting that moral utterances like “Charity is good” are akin to saying “Hurrah for charity!” and “Stealing is wrong” is like saying “Boo to stealing!“.21

As a form of non-cognitivism, emotivism denies that moral judgments are cognitive states like beliefs, which aim to represent the world accurately.11 Instead, moral language is seen as primarily expressive or evocative. A.J. Ayer, a prominent proponent, argued that when one says, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” one is not stating anything more factually than if one had simply said, “You stole that money.” The addition of “wrongly” does not add to the factual content of the statement but merely evinces the speaker’s moral disapproval.21 Similarly, a general moral statement like “Stealing money is wrong” is considered to have no factual meaning and expresses no proposition that can be either true or false; it simply expresses certain moral sentiments.21

C.L. Stevenson, another key figure in the development of emotivism, agreed with Ayer that ethical sentences express the speaker’s feelings. However, Stevenson added that they also possess an imperative component intended to change the listener’s feelings or attitudes, and he considered this dynamic, persuasive aspect to be of greater importance.21 For Stevenson, moral arguments are not typically aimed at demonstrating factual truth but at influencing the attitudes of others, often by drawing attention to the potential consequences of actions.21 A simplified encapsulation of the emotive sentiment can be found in Ernest Hemingway’s assertion: “So far, about morals, I know only what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after”.10

D. General Arguments Supporting Subjectivist Viewpoints

Beyond these specific theories, several general arguments are commonly advanced in support of a broadly subjectivist or relativist understanding of morality.

One significant line of reasoning is the argument from the perceived untenability of moral objectivism. Many individuals and philosophers embrace moral relativism or subjectivism because they find that attempts to establish a single, objectively valid, and universally binding set of moral principles have historically failed or encountered formidable objections.3 The persistent disagreement among moral objectivists themselves about the nature and content of objective morality, coupled with the historical decline of overarching religious frameworks that once provided a common basis for moral claims, contributes to this skepticism.3

Relatedly, some proponents draw on cognitive relativism, a broader philosophical stance suggesting that truth in general is relative to a particular standpoint, conceptual scheme, or linguistic framework. If all knowledge is, in some sense, framework-dependent, then moral truth, too, would be relative to a specific normative standpoint, often that of a particular culture or individual.3

The claim that moral relativism promotes tolerance is another frequently cited argument. The idea is that recognizing the relative validity of one’s own moral norms can foster humility, reduce ethnocentrism, and encourage a more tolerant and understanding attitude towards different cultural practices and beliefs.3

Furthermore, the Individual Dependency Thesis, closely associated with thinkers like David Hume, supports subjectivism by arguing that moral rightness or wrongness is contingent upon an individual’s feelings or sentiments. Hume famously contended that if one examines an action considered vicious, such as willful murder, the “vice” itself cannot be found as an objective property of the action through empirical observation. Instead, the feeling of disapproval arises within the individual upon reflection; morality is thus “more properly felt than judg’d of,” suggesting that moral qualities are projections of human sentiments rather than objective features of the world.10 This highlights the perceived lack of objective moral facts discoverable in the external world.

Many of these arguments implicitly or explicitly engage with David Hume’s famous distinction between “is” statements (descriptive claims about the world) and “ought” statements (normative or moral claims). The observation that cultures possess diverse moral codes (an “is” statement) is often used to support the conclusion that morality ought to be considered relative, or that no single moral code is universally correct. This move from description to prescription is a complex philosophical step. While objectivists might argue that the descriptive fact of moral diversity does not logically necessitate the normative conclusion of relativism 9, for many subjectivists, the sheer breadth and depth of moral disagreement strongly suggest that morality is a human construction rather than an objective discovery.

The appeal to tolerance as a justification for subjectivist views also reveals an interesting tension. While relativists often argue that their perspective fosters tolerance 3, this claim can become problematic if tolerance itself is asserted as an objective or universal moral good. If all moral values are indeed relative, then the value of tolerance must also be relative. Consequently, a culture that values intolerance would, by its own standards, be morally “right”.17 This implies that relativism cannot consistently advocate for universal tolerance without contradicting its own foundational premise that there are no universal moral values.9 This internal tension highlights a challenge for one of the common pragmatic justifications offered for relativistic viewpoints.

It is also important to distinguish the radical nature of emotivism from other forms of subjectivism. While individual and cultural relativism generally maintain that moral statements can be true or false (albeit relative to an individual or culture) 10, emotivism makes a more profound claim about the very nature of moral language. It denies that moral utterances are truth-apt propositions at all.21 For emotivists, a statement like “X is wrong” is not a description that is true or false relative to some standard; rather, it is an expression like “Boo to X!”, which does not carry truth-value. This distinction is critical: relativism alters the conditions or scope of moral truth, whereas emotivism removes moral language from the realm of descriptive truth altogether, leading to significant implications for the understanding of moral reasoning and disagreement.

IV. The Case for Moral Objectivism: Seeking Universal Moral Truths

Moral objectivism encompasses a diverse array of philosophical theories that, despite their varied approaches, converge on the central thesis that moral truths exist independently of human opinion, feeling, or cultural consensus. These theories assert that there are universal moral principles or facts that can, at least in principle, be known and applied.

A. Moral Realism: The Existence of Moral Facts

At the heart of many objectivist positions lies moral realism, which is the ontological claim that moral facts or properties exist objectively.11 Moral realists contend that moral statements purport to report these facts and are true if they accurately correspond to them; furthermore, they believe that at least some moral claims are indeed true.25 This view is inherently cognitivist, holding that moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false, much like beliefs about the empirical world.11

Moral realism stands in opposition to error theories (which assert that all moral claims are false because there are no moral facts to make them true) and non-cognitivist theories like emotivism (which deny that moral claims express truth-apt propositions at all).24 While the specific nature of these objective moral facts is a subject of debate among realists (e.g., whether they are natural or non-natural properties), the core assertion is that morality has a grounding in reality that transcends subjective human perspectives. Philosophers such as G.E. Moore, and contemporary thinkers like Peter Railton, David Brink (moral naturalists), Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit, and T.M. Scanlon (often associated with non-naturalist or non-reductive realism) have contributed significantly to the defense and articulation of various forms of moral realism.26

B. Natural Law Theory: Morality Inherent in Nature and Reason

Natural law theory is an ancient and enduring objectivist tradition which posits that moral standards are objectively derived from the nature of human beings and the nature of the world, or from a rational order inherent in the cosmos.27 According to this view, moral propositions possess objective truth-value because they are grounded in this inherent nature, which is accessible to human reason.27 The theory suggests that practical reason can discern certain intrinsic goods essential for human flourishing—such as life, health, knowledge, and social harmony—and that moral principles direct human action towards these goods.28

Because these fundamental goods and the principles of practical reason that guide us towards them are rooted in a shared human nature, natural law theorists argue for their universality.28 Historically, natural law theory has also maintained that positive laws (man-made laws) derive their authority, at least in part, from their conformity to these objective moral principles; an unjust law, one that violates natural law, may be considered no true law at all, or at least deficient in its binding force.27 Key proponents include ancient philosophers like Aristotle, who laid much of its groundwork by emphasizing reason and the good life, and Thomas Aquinas, who systematically integrated Aristotelian philosophy with Christian theology to develop a comprehensive theory of natural law.27 Contemporary philosophers like John Finnis have provided influential restatements and defenses of the tradition.27

C. Divine Command Theory: Morality as Ordained by God

Divine Command Theory (DCT) offers another route to moral objectivism by grounding morality in the will or commands of a divine being.29 According to DCT, an action is morally right because God commands it, and morally wrong because God forbids it.29 Moral obligations, therefore, consist in obedience to these divine commands, which are seen as expressions of God’s perfect nature or sovereign will.

This theory provides an objective metaphysical foundation for morality by positing God as the ultimate source and standard of goodness.29 It also offers a straightforward answer to the question “Why be moral?”, as it typically involves accountability to God, with the prospect of divine reward for righteousness and punishment for wrongdoing.29 Proponents of DCT include classical theologians like Thomas Aquinas (though his views are complex and also foundational for Natural Law), and more contemporary philosophers such as Robert Adams, who has developed a modified version of the theory to address common criticisms, and Philip Quinn.29

D. Kantian Ethics: Morality through Universalizable Reason (The Categorical Imperative)

Immanuel Kant provides one of the most influential objectivist ethical frameworks, grounding morality in the structure of reason itself.31 For Kant, the moral law is a truth of reason, and as such, it is binding on all rational creatures universally.31 The moral worth of an action, he argued, lies not in its consequences but in the motive from which it is performed—specifically, whether it is performed from a sense of duty, which means acting out of respect for the moral law.31

The supreme principle of morality, according to Kant, is the categorical imperative, an unconditional command of reason that dictates how rational agents ought to act. Kant offered several formulations of this principle, the most famous being:

1. The Formula of Universal Law: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.31 This serves as a test for the moral permissibility of actions: if a personal rule of conduct (maxim) cannot be consistently willed as a universal law for all rational beings without contradiction, then acting on that maxim is morally forbidden.
2. The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”.31 This formulation emphasizes the intrinsic worth and dignity of all rational beings, prohibiting their use merely as tools for achieving one’s own purposes.

Because the categorical imperative is derived from pure practical reason, independent of subjective feelings, cultural norms, or religious doctrines, the moral laws it generates are objective and universal, applying to all rational beings in all circumstances.31 Immanuel Kant himself is the definitive proponent of this ethical system.31

E. Utilitarianism: Morality as Maximizing Overall Good

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism which asserts that the morally right action is the one that produces the greatest amount of good, or happiness, for the greatest number of sentient beings, and minimizes pain or suffering.33 This is often summarized by the principle of utility.

Utilitarianism claims objectivity by proposing a standard for moral evaluation that is based on the observable or predictable consequences of actions in terms of well-being.34 The theory emphasizes impartiality: in calculating the overall good, everyone’s happiness or suffering is to be counted equally, without special preference given to oneself or one’s favored groups.34 While the experience of pleasure or pain is subjective, the utilitarian standard aims to be an objective measure by aggregating these experiences across all affected individuals. The classical proponents of utilitarianism are Jeremy Bentham, who famously attempted to develop a “felicific calculus” for quantifying pleasure and pain, and John Stuart Mill, who refined the theory by introducing qualitative distinctions between different kinds of pleasures.34

F. General Arguments Supporting Objectivist Viewpoints

Several general arguments lend support to the objectivist stance on morality. One prominent argument is the rational resolvability of moral disagreements. Objectivists often contend that many, if not most, moral disputes arise from factual errors, logical fallacies, emotional biases, or incomplete information. If these interfering factors can be identified and corrected through rational discourse and careful inquiry, then a resolution based on objective moral considerations is often possible.5

Another line of argument posits that some moral frameworks are rationally superior to others. For example, theories derived from Kantian reason or Aristotelian conceptions of human flourishing are presented as having a more robust rational foundation than subjective preferences or arbitrary cultural norms, thereby offering a basis for objective morality.5

The existence of widespread moral agreement across diverse cultures and historical periods on certain fundamental principles—such as prohibitions against indiscriminate killing, lying, and stealing, or affirmations of fairness and reciprocity—is also cited as evidence for a universal, objective morality.5 The modern international human rights movement, for instance, is often seen as reflecting a growing global consensus on certain objective moral entitlements.5

Finally, many find moral realism intuitively compelling. There is a strong, common-sense intuition that some actions, like torturing innocents for pleasure, are objectively and horrifically wrong, regardless of anyone’s opinion or cultural acceptance.16 This intuitive conviction lends prima facie support to the idea that moral truths are not merely subjective.

It is important to recognize that “moral objectivism” is not a monolithic doctrine. The theories discussed above ground objectivity in vastly different sources: the will of a divine being (Divine Command Theory), the inherent structure of reason (Kantian Ethics), the teleological order of human nature or the cosmos (Natural Law Theory), the empirical consequences of actions for well-being (Utilitarianism), or the existence of mind-independent moral facts (Moral Realism).11 This diversity means that criticisms targeting one form of objectivism may not apply to others. For example, the Euthyphro dilemma is a specific challenge to Divine Command Theory, while concerns about the commensurability and calculation of utility are particular to utilitarianism. The debate within objectivism—concerning which specific foundation for moral truth is correct—is often as intricate and contested as the broader debate between objectivism and subjectivism. A robust defense of moral objectivism typically requires not only arguing for the general principle of mind-independence but also providing a plausible and coherent account of what makes morality objective.

Furthermore, there is a significant interplay between normative ethics (theories about what actions are right or wrong and what makes them so) and meta-ethics (theories about the nature, foundations, and meaning of moral judgments). Many objectivist arguments draw strength from the perceived rational defensibility or universal applicability of specific normative theories like Kantianism or Utilitarianism.31 If a normative theory can compellingly demonstrate a universally applicable and rationally undeniable method for determining moral truths, it significantly bolsters the broader meta-ethical case for moral objectivism.

Despite these varied foundations, a recurring and significant challenge for all forms of moral objectivism is epistemological: if objective moral truths exist, how do human beings come to know or access them?.1 If moral truths are “out there,” independent of human minds, what faculty or method allows for their reliable apprehension? Natural Law theory appeals to reason and an understanding of human nature 28; Divine Command Theory may rely on revelation or sacred texts 27; Kantian ethics points to pure practical reason 31; and Utilitarianism involves empirical observation and calculation of consequences.35 Moral realists, particularly non-naturalists, may appeal to a faculty of moral intuition. The diversity of these proposed epistemic methods, and the persistent disagreements about their validity and reliability, constitute a formidable hurdle for objectivist accounts. If objective moral truths exist but there is no clear, agreed-upon, and reliable way to know them, their practical utility and binding force are arguably diminished. This “access problem” remains a key point of contention and a frequent line of attack from subjectivist perspectives.

V. Critical Examination: Challenges and Counterarguments

Both moral subjectivism and moral objectivism, in their various forms, face significant philosophical challenges and counterarguments that test their coherence and explanatory power.

A. Criticisms of Moral Subjectivism and its Variants (Individual Relativism, Cultural Relativism, Emotivism)

Subjectivist theories, while attempting to account for moral diversity and individual autonomy, encounter several potent criticisms.

One of the most frequently cited is the problem of moral infallibility and the inability to critique fundamental moral beliefs. If an individual’s sincere approval (in individual relativism) or a culture’s consensus (in cultural relativism) is what makes an action morally right, then it seems that individuals or cultures cannot be mistaken about their core moral beliefs.6 This would imply that a society practicing genocide, if it genuinely approves of such actions, is morally “right” by its own standards, a conclusion many find abhorrent and which is often raised as the “Hitler was right” objection to relativism.3 This prevents meaningful self-criticism within a culture or by an individual regarding their foundational moral stances.

Furthermore, subjectivism can make moral disagreement appear illusory. If “X is wrong” simply means “I disapprove of X” (for an individual subjectivist) or “My culture disapproves of X” (for a cultural relativist), then when two individuals or representatives of two cultures express opposing moral views, they may not be genuinely disagreeing about an objective matter of fact. Instead, they might merely be reporting their differing attitudes or cultural norms.6 This seems to mischaracterize the nature of many moral debates, which often feel like substantive disputes about what is truly right or wrong.

Defining the relevant “culture” or “individual” also poses difficulties. For cultural relativism, individuals often belong to multiple overlapping groups (nationality, religion, profession, family), each potentially having different moral norms. It becomes unclear which group’s standards should take precedence in cases of conflict.6 For individual relativism, if each person is their own moral authority, it can lead to a form of moral solipsism, where productive moral discourse or shared ethical frameworks become nearly impossible to establish.18

The concept of moral progress is also challenging for subjectivist theories. If morality is strictly relative to a particular time and place, it is difficult to account for changes like the abolition of slavery or the advancement of women’s rights as genuine moral improvements rather than mere shifts in opinion or societal preference.3

The often-claimed virtue of tolerance also presents a dilemma for relativism. While subjectivists frequently argue that their view promotes tolerance of diverse moral perspectives 3, they cannot consistently uphold tolerance as a universal or objective moral value. If a culture values intolerance, then according to cultural relativism, intolerance would be morally right for that culture.9

Emotivism, as a specific form of subjectivism, faces its own unique criticisms. The Frege-Geach problem, also known as the problem of unasserted contexts, highlights emotivism’s difficulty in explaining the meaning of moral terms when they are used in logical constructions where no emotion is being directly expressed, such as in conditional statements (“If lying is wrong, then you shouldn’t lie”) or questions (“Is lying wrong?“).21 If “lying is wrong” is merely an expression like “Boo to lying!”, such complex sentences become semantically puzzling. Critics also argue that emotivism oversimplifies moral discourse, reducing complex moral reasoning and deliberation to mere expressions of feeling or attempts to influence, thereby failing to capture the rational elements often involved in moral judgment.38

B. Criticisms of Moral Objectivist Theories

Moral objectivist theories, despite their appeal to universality and certainty, are also subject to a range of criticisms, both general and theory-specific.

A general challenge to moral objectivism and moral realism is the argument from moral disagreement. The existence of persistent and widespread moral disagreements, even among thoughtful and well-informed individuals and across different cultures, is often cited as evidence against the idea that there are objective moral truths.9 If such truths exist and are accessible, critics ask, why is there so much divergence in moral beliefs and practices? J.L. Mackie, for instance, argued that moral disagreement seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation in different ways of life, rather than being analogous to scientific disagreements that result from speculative inferences based on inadequate evidence.12

Metaphysical objections, often termed the “argument from queerness,” question the nature of objective moral facts or properties. If such entities exist, particularly if they are non-natural (as some realists propose), they would be unlike anything else in the universe. How these “queer” moral properties relate to natural, empirically observable facts is a profound puzzle.26

Epistemological objections focus on how human beings could come to know these objective moral truths.25 If moral facts are not straightforwardly empirical, what faculty (e.g., moral intuition, pure reason) grants access to them, and how can the reliability of this faculty be established? This is often referred to as the “grounding problem” or the “access problem”.39

Specific objectivist theories also face particular criticisms:

• Natural Law Theory is often challenged by the “is-ought” problem: how can one validly derive moral obligations (“ought” statements) from factual descriptions of human nature or the natural world (“is” statements)?.27 Furthermore, there are significant disagreements about what constitutes “human nature” or “natural purposes,” leading to divergent moral conclusions even within the natural law framework.
• Divine Command Theory famously confronts the Euthyphro Dilemma: Is an action morally right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally right?.29 The first horn implies that morality could be arbitrary (if God commanded cruelty, it would be right), while the second suggests that moral standards exist independently of God, undermining God’s sovereignty as the source of morality. Relatedly, the problem of abhorrent commands asks whether God could command something intuitively evil (like genocide), and if so, whether that would make it morally obligatory.29 Additional issues include the problem of God’s existence and the difficulties in reliably interpreting divine commands.30
• Kantian Ethics is criticized for its perceived rigidity and absolutism. The universal moral rules derived from the categorical imperative (e.g., the prohibition against lying) can seem too inflexible, not allowing for justifiable exceptions in complex moral situations (such as lying to save an innocent life).43 The framework may also struggle to adequately resolve conflicting duties when two or more absolute duties appear to clash.43 Its strong focus on duty and maxims can lead to a neglect of the actual consequences of actions.43 G.W.F. Hegel, for example, argued that Kant’s moral law provides no specific content for duties, being merely a principle of non-contradiction (formalism), and that it creates an unnatural internal conflict between reason and human desire.43
• Utilitarianism faces objections that it can justify intuitively wrong actions. If an action maximizes overall happiness, utilitarianism might endorse it even if it involves violating individual rights, punishing the innocent, or breaking solemn promises.35 It is also criticized for being too demanding, as its principle of impartiality seems to require individuals to constantly sacrifice their own interests and those of their loved ones for the greater good of strangers, conflicting with common intuitions about special obligations.35 Furthermore, there are significant problems with measuring and comparing utility or happiness across different individuals and for different types of experiences.35 The focus on aggregate good can also lead to a neglect of considerations of justice and individual rights.44

Many of these criticisms are not isolated but are deeply interconnected. For instance, the subjectivist’s difficulty in condemning abhorrent acts is closely related to its tendency to dissolve genuine moral disagreement and its struggles with the concept of moral progress. These are all consequences stemming from the denial of mind-independent moral truth. Similarly, for objectivism, the challenge posed by persistent moral disagreement is intimately linked to epistemological objections: if objective moral truths exist, the inability to consistently agree upon them or clearly know them raises profound questions about their accessibility and practical relevance. This interconnectedness implies that a successful defense of either broad stance requires addressing a cluster of related challenges rather than merely refuting isolated objections.

The evaluation of these meta-ethical theories often involves a tension between assessments of their practical unlivability or counter-intuitive consequences and assessments of their internal logical consistency or theoretical elegance. For example, Schopenhauer criticized Kant for presenting an idealized “ought” that was impractical for the real world, a concern about practical application.43 In contrast, the Frege-Geach problem is a highly theoretical challenge to the logical structure of emotivist moral language 21, and the Euthyphro dilemma questions the logical coherence of grounding morality in divine commands.29 The “too demanding” objection to utilitarianism, on the other hand, focuses on its practical implications for human life.45 This indicates that meta-ethical theories are judged on multiple criteria, and the relative weight assigned to these different types of criticisms can vary, influencing the perceived overall strength of a theory.

Finally, the role of “intuition” in these debates is complex and contested. Both subjectivists and objectivists may appeal to certain intuitions to support their views, while simultaneously criticizing the intuitions that seem to underpin the opposing stance. Objectivists often argue that moral realism aligns with the strong intuition that some actions are unequivocally wrong, independent of opinion.16 Subjectivists might appeal to intuitions about tolerance or the apparent diversity of cultural moral norms.3 However, a common critical strategy is to demonstrate that a theory leads to conclusions that violate widely held moral intuitions (e.g., utilitarianism potentially justifying the punishment of an innocent person 45, or subjectivism implying an inability to condemn atrocities 6). This dual use of intuition—as both a foundation for argument and a basis for critique—highlights its problematic status. Questions arise about whose intuitions should be privileged and whether intuitions are reliable guides to moral truth or are themselves culturally conditioned or emotionally biased. The debate itself often involves a clash of these fundamental intuitions, making definitive resolution particularly challenging.

VI. Navigating the Divide: Comparative Insights

A deeper understanding of the moral subjectivism versus objectivism debate emerges from a direct comparison of their core tenets and their approaches to fundamental moral phenomena like disagreement and progress.

A. Source and Nature of Moral Truths: A Comparative Overview

The various theories discussed under the broad umbrellas of subjectivism and objectivism offer distinct accounts of where moral truths or values originate and what their fundamental nature is. The following table summarizes these key distinctions:

This table provides a structured overview, allowing for a quick grasp of the core distinctions and relationships between these complex philosophical positions, reinforcing the textual explanations and serving as a valuable reference.

B. Addressing Moral Disagreement and the Possibility of Resolution

The phenomenon of moral disagreement is a critical testing ground for any meta-ethical theory, and subjectivist and objectivist perspectives offer contrasting interpretations and approaches to its resolution.

• Subjectivist Perspectives: From a subjectivist standpoint, moral disagreements are often understood as clashes of personal feelings, preferences, or deeply ingrained cultural norms rather than disputes about objective truth.37 If “X is wrong” means “I disapprove of X” or “My culture disapproves of X,” then two parties with opposing views are not necessarily contradicting each other about an external reality; they are simply expressing their differing subjective states or cultural frameworks.6 Consequently, rational resolution aimed at discovering a single objective truth is typically not considered the primary goal or even a possibility.12 Instead, “resolution” might involve attempts at persuasion (as in Stevenson’s emotivism, which sees moral language as aiming to influence attitudes 21), finding common ground based on shared subjective values, reaching a practical compromise, or simply agreeing to disagree. For emotivists, disagreements are fundamentally clashes of emotional attitudes or attempts to sway the listener, not factual disputes that can be settled by evidence.47
• Objectivist Perspectives: In contrast, objectivists generally view moral disagreements as situations where at least one party is mistaken about an objective moral fact or principle.5 The existence of disagreement does not, for the objectivist, necessarily undermine the existence of objective moral truth, just as disagreement in science or history does not negate objective facts in those domains. Resolution, therefore, is, in principle, possible through rational argumentation, the presentation of evidence, the uncovering of factual or logical errors in reasoning, or by appealing to the correct objective standard (be it reason, natural law, divine revelation, or calculations of utility).5 While objectivists acknowledge that resolving moral disagreements in practice can be immensely challenging due to ingrained biases, incomplete information, emotional interference, or the inherent difficulty of demonstrating the definitive objective standard, the theoretical possibility of rational resolution remains.

An important nuance in this comparison is the potential asymmetry in what “resolution” signifies for each camp. For objectivists, resolution ideally means convergence upon the singular, objective moral truth.12 For subjectivists, resolution is more likely to mean achieving a practical accommodation, fostering mutual understanding, or facilitating a shift in subjective stances, without any pretense of having discovered an ultimate, objective truth.46 This difference in the very aim of moral discourse can lead to parties in a debate talking past each other, as their fundamental goals for the conversation diverge.

C. The Concept of Moral Progress under Subjectivist and Objectivist Lenses

The idea of “moral progress”—for instance, the widespread abolition of slavery or the formal recognition of equal rights for women—is another area where subjectivist and objectivist views diverge significantly.

• Subjectivist Perspectives: Defining moral progress becomes problematic if there is no objective, trans-historical standard against which to measure change.3 If morality is entirely relative to individual or cultural preferences, then shifts in moral beliefs or practices are simply changes, not necessarily movements towards something objectively “better” or “worse.” What one era or culture deems progress, another might see as decline. Some subjectivists, particularly cultural relativists, might attempt to define progress internally—for example, a society becoming more consistent with its own professed (though still relative) core values, or achieving a greater degree of tolerance (if tolerance is a chosen value within that framework).48 However, the standard for such “progress” remains internal to the subjective framework.
• Objectivist Perspectives: Moral objectivism provides a more straightforward basis for the concept of moral progress. If there are objective moral truths, then it is possible for societies or individuals to move closer to understanding and conforming to these truths over time.48 Historical changes like the abolition of slavery, the condemnation of torture, or the expansion of human rights are often cited by objectivists as clear examples of moral progress, reflecting a better apprehension of objective moral principles concerning justice, dignity, and equality.

The very standard used to evaluate moral progress is itself a point of contention. Objectivists measure progress against purportedly objective moral truths. If subjectivists propose an internal standard, such as increased consistency with a society’s own values 48, an objectivist might question why that particular form of consistency, or why those specific societal values, should be considered morally significant or indicative of genuine progress. Unless the subjectivist can ground the value of their chosen standard for progress objectively—which would be inconsistent with their fundamental position—the notion of progress itself remains subject to the same relativist critique. This illustrates the profound challenge subjectivism faces in accounting for a robust, cross-cultural, or trans-historical understanding of moral improvement.

The debate between subjectivism and objectivism frequently involves a subtle interplay between descriptive claims (about how people do behave or what they do believe) and normative or meta-ethical claims (about how people ought to behave or what is truly right or wrong). For example, descriptive cultural relativism—the empirical observation that moral beliefs and practices do differ across cultures 10—is often used as a premise to argue for normative or meta-ethical cultural relativism—the claim that one ought not to judge other cultures by external standards, or that moral truth is simply relative to cultural frameworks.3 Recognizing this distinction is crucial, as objectivists can readily accept the descriptive fact of moral diversity while simultaneously rejecting the normative or meta-ethical conclusion that moral truth itself is relative. This distinction helps to clarify the logical structure of arguments within the debate and to identify potential inferential leaps, such as the is-ought fallacy.

VII. Beyond the Dichotomy: Exploring Alternative Frameworks

The traditional dichotomy between moral subjectivism and objectivism, while framing a central debate in meta-ethics, does not exhaust the landscape of philosophical thought on the nature of morality. Several alternative frameworks have emerged that attempt to navigate, bridge, or transcend this opposition, often by reconfiguring the understanding of moral truth and objectivity.

A. Moral Constructivism (e.g., John Rawls)

Moral constructivism proposes that moral truths are neither discovered as pre-existing objective facts (as in moral realism) nor are they merely expressions of antecedent individual attitudes or cultural norms (as in simpler forms of subjectivism). Instead, moral constructivists argue that moral principles and truths are constructed through a specified procedure of rational deliberation or agreement among agents, often under idealized conditions.15

A prominent example is Kantian constructivism, particularly as developed by John Rawls in his theory of justice. Rawls posits that principles of justice are those that free and equal rational persons, concerned to advance their own interests, would agree to under conditions of fairness. These conditions are famously embodied in his hypothetical “original position,” where parties choose principles from behind a “veil of ignorance,” depriving them of knowledge of their particular social status, talents, conceptions of the good, and other contingent facts about themselves.15 According to Rawls, “Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts”.15 The objectivity of these principles derives not from their correspondence to an independent moral order, but from the fairness and rationality of the constructive procedure itself.

Moral constructivism differs from traditional moral realism in that it denies a prior and independent moral order that the procedure aims to track.15 It differs from simple subjectivism because it aims for a form of objectivity grounded in rational procedure and intersubjective agreement, rather than mere individual preference or existing social conventions. The constructed principles are intended to have normative force for all who participate in, or are appropriately represented by, the constructive procedure.

B. Intersubjectivity as a Mediating Concept

Intersubjectivity offers another avenue for understanding morality that moves beyond a strict individual subjectivism versus mind-independent objectivism. This perspective emphasizes that moral understanding, values, and norms emerge from shared human experiences, interpersonal interactions, and social practices.51 It highlights the “sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals” as foundational to meaning and agreement.51

Philosopher Bernard Lonergan, for instance, describes spontaneous intersubjectivity—the realm of shared, pre-reflective needs, wants, and affective responses—as a primitive dimension of human community.52 This spontaneous layer then interacts dialectically with practical intelligence (how to meet needs and achieve goals) and consciously chosen values (what is truly good and worthwhile) to form a community’s ethical framework.52 For Lonergan, authentic moral living involves adhering to innate “transcendental precepts”—Be attentive, Be Intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible—which guide individuals towards genuine understanding and responsible action within this shared context.52

Intersubjective approaches differ from strict subjectivism because morality is not seen as a purely individual or private affair; it arises from and is validated within a shared social and experiential world. They differ from strict objectivism in that moral truths are not posited as entirely divorced from human experience and interaction; rather, they are co-constituted through processes of shared understanding, communication, and practice. Intersubjectivity thus offers a way to understand how moral norms can acquire binding force and a sense of shared validity within a community without necessarily being grounded in transcendent, mind-independent objective facts. It focuses on the dynamic interplay of shared meanings, practices, and reasoned agreement.

Both constructivism and many intersubjectivist approaches tend to redefine “objectivity.” Instead of objectivity as correspondence to mind-independent moral facts, these views often conceive of objectivity as arising from the validity or fairness of a procedure (as in Rawls’s original position 15) or through the attainment of authentic shared understanding achieved via adherence to rational and responsible norms of inquiry and deliberation (as in Lonergan’s transcendental precepts 52). This results in a form of objectivity that is conditional upon the soundness of the procedure or the authenticity of the shared understanding, rather than on a direct apprehension of an external moral reality. This can be seen as a more modest, yet potentially more defensible, conception of moral objectivity for those wary of traditional realist metaphysics.

A notable feature of many such alternative frameworks, particularly constructivism, is their reliance on idealized conditions or agents. Rawls’s “free and equal rational persons” operating under a “veil of ignorance” in the “original position” is a clear example of such idealization.15 The purpose of these idealizations is typically to filter out biases, ensure fairness, and model rational deliberation in its purest form. However, the gap between these idealized constructs and the complexities of real-world agents and situations can be a significant source of criticism. Questions arise regarding whether such idealized procedures are practically achievable, whether they accurately capture all morally relevant considerations, and whether principles derived from highly idealized conditions are truly applicable or binding in the non-ideal circumstances of everyday life. Thus, while these alternative theories may escape some of the challenges faced by traditional objectivism (such as the metaphysical “queerness” of moral facts), they encounter new critiques related to the justification, interpretation, and application of their idealized models.

Despite these challenges, these alternative frameworks often place a strong emphasis on practical reason and deliberation as central to the moral enterprise. This distinguishes them from purely emotive accounts of morality (like emotivism) and from forms of moral realism that might portray moral truth as something passively perceived or discovered. For constructivists and many intersubjectivists, morality is an active, rational, and social endeavor of figuring out how to live together justly and well, rather than merely a matter of expressing personal feelings or intuiting pre-existing rules. This focus aligns them, in spirit if not always in detail, with Kantian traditions that prioritize reason in moral judgment, while often seeking to embed that reason more firmly within social and procedural contexts.

VIII. Practical Implications: Why the Debate Matters

The abstract philosophical debate between moral subjectivism and objectivism has profound practical implications, influencing how societies approach the foundations of law, the justification of human rights, and the nature of moral discourse itself.

A. Foundations for Legal Systems and Justice

The stance taken on the nature of morality significantly impacts the philosophical basis for legal systems and the concept of justice.

If a subjectivist stance is adopted, particularly in its more relativistic forms, laws might be perceived primarily as expressions of the dominant preferences within a society, reflections of power dynamics, or codifications of prevailing cultural habits, rather than being grounded in objective principles of justice.17 This perspective can make it more challenging to critique laws as “unjust” if they accurately reflect the subjective will or established norms of the majority or those in power. As noted, an individual relativist might view all legal prohibitions as ultimately arbitrary, lacking a firm moral anchor beyond individual acceptance.17

Conversely, an objectivist stance allows for the aspiration that laws should reflect or embody objective moral principles such as justice, fairness, and fundamental rights.48 This provides a potential independent standard against which existing laws can be evaluated as just or unjust. Natural law theory, for example, explicitly links the validity and authority of positive law to its conformity with objective moral principles derived from reason or human nature.27 An objectivist framework can therefore offer a more robust basis for legal reform aimed at achieving greater justice, as it presumes there are objective moral benchmarks to strive for.

B. Justification and Scope of Universal Human Rights

The debate has critical implications for the justification and scope of universal human rights.

From a subjectivist perspective, particularly strong forms of cultural relativism, the concept of universal human rights is inherently problematic.48 If moral values are entirely relative to specific cultures or individuals, then there appears to be no objective basis for asserting that certain rights are inherent to all human beings and should be recognized universally. What one culture or individual deems a fundamental “right,” another may not, and there would be no overarching moral standard to adjudicate such differences. The 1947 statement by the American Anthropological Association, which cautioned against the imposition of a universal declaration of human rights due to the relativity of cultural values, exemplifies this tension.48

An objectivist stance, on the other hand, provides a much stronger philosophical foundation for the idea of universal human rights.48 If there are objective moral truths concerning human dignity, inherent worth, or fundamental human needs and capacities, then these can serve as the basis for rights that apply to all persons, irrespective of their cultural background or individual beliefs. The Declaration of Independence, with its assertion of self-evident, unalienable rights, reflects an objectivist underpinning.17 Objectivism allows for the argument that certain treatments of human beings are objectively wrong, and certain entitlements are objectively due to all, thus supporting the universality and moral force of human rights claims.

The belief individuals hold about the nature of morality—whether it is objective or subjective—can significantly influence how they engage in moral discourse, advocate for legal or social reform, or participate in human rights initiatives. One who believes in objective moral truths might argue with greater conviction for the universal applicability of certain standards and feel a stronger impetus to persuade others of this truth or to work towards laws and policies that reflect it. Conversely, one who believes morality is fundamentally subjective or relative might prioritize dialogue, the understanding of diverse perspectives, and the seeking of consensus or compromise, rather than advocating for a single “correct” moral viewpoint.3 This difference in approach can manifest in the strategies and rhetoric employed by social and political movements. For instance, human rights advocates often, whether explicitly or implicitly, appeal to objectivist notions of universal human dignity and inherent moral worth to justify their claims.

Furthermore, the subjective/objective debate bears upon the justification for international intervention or the universal enforcement of certain norms, such as those enshrined in international human rights law. An objectivist framework, which posits universal moral principles, might more readily provide a justification for intervention in cases where these principles are severely violated, arguing that objective moral wrongs are being committed that transcend national sovereignty. In contrast, a strong cultural relativist view would likely counsel against such interventions, viewing them as the imposition of one culture’s values upon another, and emphasizing the importance of respecting cultural self-determination.20 This demonstrates how abstract meta-ethical stances can inform concrete positions on complex geopolitical issues concerning the balance between state sovereignty and universal moral responsibilities.

Finally, in public discourse, there is often an implicit apprehension that embracing subjectivism or relativism could lead down a “slippery slope” towards moral nihilism or a complete breakdown of social order, where “anything goes”.9 While philosophers carefully distinguish between subjectivism/relativism (which still allow for personal or cultural moral frameworks) and nihilism (which denies the existence of any moral value whatsoever 19), this fear is a potent factor in the practical reception of subjectivist ideas. The concern, whether philosophically precise or not, is that a widespread acceptance of the idea that there is no objective right or wrong could erode the shared moral commitments perceived as necessary for a cohesive and functional society. This apprehension often pushes individuals towards an intuitive form of objectivism, as it seems to offer a more secure foundation for social morality.

IX. Conclusion: Synthesizing Perspectives and Avenues for Further Reflection

A. Recapitulation of the Complexity

The question of whether morality is subjective or objective probes the deepest foundations of ethical thought. The exploration reveals a fundamental tension between conceiving of morality as something discovered—objective truths or principles inherent in reality, reason, or divine will—and morality as something created or expressed—a product of human emotions, individual choices, or cultural conventions. It is crucial to recognize that neither “moral subjectivism” nor “moral objectivism” represents a single, monolithic doctrine. Each term serves as an umbrella for a diverse family of related theories, each with its own distinct arguments, nuances, and vulnerabilities. The debate is not a simple binary choice but involves navigating intricate arguments concerning metaphysics (the nature and existence of moral facts), epistemology (how we come to know moral truths), and semantics (the meaning and function of moral language).

B. The Enduring Nature of the Debate

Despite centuries of philosophical inquiry, no single answer to the question of morality’s ultimate grounding has achieved universal consensus among philosophers.25 The questions surrounding subjectivism and objectivism remain central to meta-ethics, continually re-examined and re-argued by successive generations of thinkers. This persistence likely reflects the profound complexities of human moral experience itself, which appears to contain elements that resonate with both perspectives: a sense of universal wrongness in certain actions alongside an appreciation for the diversity of cultural norms and individual values. The enduring nature of the debate suggests that it touches upon aspects of human existence and social life that are not easily resolved into a single, overarching theoretical framework.

The debate itself often proceeds in a dialectical fashion. Arguments for subjectivist positions frequently arise from perceived failures, inconsistencies, or untenable implications of objectivist theories, such as the difficulty in identifying or agreeing upon objective moral facts.2 Conversely, many criticisms leveled against subjectivism appeal to objectivist-leaning intuitions, such as the common conviction that acts like genocide are wrong regardless of cultural approval or individual opinion.19 This dynamic interplay, where each side refines its positions in response to the challenges posed by the other, indicates that the inquiry is not static but evolves as philosophers strive to develop more robust and coherent accounts of morality.

Individuals and societies, in their moral lives, often implicitly engage in a process akin to seeking what John Rawls termed “reflective equilibrium”—a state of coherence among particular moral judgments, general moral principles, and background theoretical beliefs about the nature of morality. The philosophical debate between subjectivism and objectivism can be seen as a high-level, systematic attempt to achieve such equilibrium for our understanding of morality as a whole. Engaging with these arguments forces a critical examination of how different levels of moral belief—from specific intuitions about right and wrong to abstract conceptions of moral truth—fit together, or fail to do so. This process can help individuals and communities clarify their own moral frameworks and strive for greater internal consistency and rational justification.

While the pursuit of truth is paramount in philosophical inquiry, it is also plausible that the appeal of different meta-ethical stances is subtly influenced by pragmatic considerations: which view better supports the kind of moral life, social order, or set of values we wish to foster? One might be drawn to objectivism because it appears to offer a firmer foundation for universal human rights and stable legal systems, which are widely seen as desirable social goods. Conversely, another might find relativism or subjectivism more appealing because they seem to promote tolerance, respect for diversity, and individual autonomy—values also held in high regard. This interplay between theoretical argumentation and desired practical outcomes is an inherent part of the ongoing human quest to understand and navigate the complexities of moral life.

C. Avenues for Further Reflection

The exploration of moral subjectivism and objectivism is far from concluded. Continued critical engagement with the arguments, assumptions, and implications of each traditional stance is essential. Furthermore, the development of alternative frameworks, such as moral constructivism and theories emphasizing intersubjectivity, offers promising avenues for transcending some of the limitations of the classic dichotomy. These newer approaches, by reconfiguring notions of objectivity or focusing on the procedural and social dimensions of moral justification, may provide more nuanced ways to account for both the universal aspirations and the particular expressions of human morality. Ultimately, the persistent philosophical inquiry into the foundations of morality remains vital, not only for theoretical clarity but also for providing conceptual tools and ethical guidance in addressing the complex moral challenges confronting individuals and societies.

Works cited

1. www.researchgate.net, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363526817_Moral_Subjectivism_vs_Moral_Objectivism#:~:text=Subjectivists%20argue%20that%20moral%20values,realities%20that%20can%20be%20discovered.
2. View of Moral Subjectivism vs Moral Objectivism | Filosofija. Sociologija, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.lmaleidykla.lt/ojs/index.php/filosofija-sociologija/article/view/4775/4089
3. Moral Relativism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/
4. What Is Cultural Relativism? - Special Education Learning - YouTube, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ootym1QloJs
5. Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ArgsForMoraObje
6. Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ChaSke
7. Ethical subjectivism - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_subjectivism
8. Objectivity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/objectiv/
9. 5.1: Moral Philosophy – Concepts and Distinctions - Humanities …, accessed May 19, 2025, https://human.libretexts.org/Courses/LumenLearning/Book%3A_Introduction_to_Philosophy-1(Lumen)/05%3A_Unit_4%3A_Metaphysics/05.1%3A_Moral_Philosophy__Concepts_and_Distinctions
10. www.acsu.buffalo.edu, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~degray/I2P11/LectureGuide14.pdf
11. Moral Realism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/moralrea/
12. subjectivism and objectivism - blacksacademy.net, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.blacksacademy.net/pages/px-007-pxqmso-subjectivism-objectivism.php
13. Distinguishing Between Ethical Relativism, Subjectivism & Objectivism - VIVA’s Pressbooks, accessed May 19, 2025, https://viva.pressbooks.pub/phi220ethics/chapter/what-is-subjectivism/
14. spot.colorado.edu, accessed May 19, 2025, https://spot.colorado.edu/~huemer/papers/obj.htm#:~:text=Since%20objectivism%20states%20that%20moral,2)%20what%20they%20claim%20is
15. Metaethics, Constructivism in | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/constructivism-in-metaethics/
16. What are the best secular arguments for moral realism? : r/askphilosophy - Reddit, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/1hx03lw/what_are_the_best_secular_arguments_for_moral/
17. “Moral Relativism” - Digital Commons @ Butler University, accessed May 19, 2025, https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=facsch_papers
18. Individual Relativism – UOLLB First Class Law Notes®, accessed May 19, 2025, https://uollb.com/blogs/uol/individual-relativism
19. (PDF) Moral Subjectivism vs Moral Objectivism - ResearchGate, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363526817_Moral_Subjectivism_vs_Moral_Objectivism
20. Cultural relativism - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_relativism
21. Emotivism - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism
22. Ethical Expressivism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/eth-expr/
23. Moral relativism - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism
24. Moral Anti-Realism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
25. Metaethics | EBSCO Research Starters, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/religion-and-philosophy/metaethics
26. Moral Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/
27. Natural Law | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/natlaw/
28. Natural Law Theories - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/
29. Divine Command Theory | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/divine-command-theory/
30. Divine Command Theory: A Critical Evaluation, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.segacs.com/twik/phil232-1.htm
31. Immanuel Kant - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/kantview/
32. Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
33. Ethics - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics
34. The History of Utilitarianism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/
35. Act and Rule Utilitarianism - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/
36. Moral Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/#ArgAgaMoraReal
37. Moral subjectivism versus moral relativism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/ARCHIVES/SPR2013/ENTRIES/moral-anti-realism/moral-subjectivism-versus-relativism.html
38. ethics - Why is emotivism unpopular? - Philosophy Stack Exchange, accessed May 19, 2025, https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/107554/why-is-emotivism-unpopular
39. Arguments against Moral Objectivism? Which are the best and worst? : r/askphilosophy - Reddit, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/9ohj3z/arguments_against_moral_objectivism_which_are_the/
40. Euthyphro’s Dilemma and Divine Command Ethics - DigitalCommons@Cedarville, accessed May 19, 2025, https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1021&context=cedar_ethics_online
41. Divine Command Theory - Queensborough Community College, accessed May 19, 2025, https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/ETHICS_TEXT/Chapter_7_Deontological_Theories_Natural_Law/Divine_Command_theory.htm
42. Divine Command Theory | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/divine-command-theory/#H3
43. Kantian Ethics (Criticisms) – Introduction to Ethics, accessed May 19, 2025, https://library.achievingthedream.org/epccintroethics1/chapter/kantian-ethics-criticisms/
44. Unit 6 : Utilitarianism - Introduction to Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://philosophyintrocourse.com/introduction-to-ethics-2020/week-5/
45. Utilitarianism, Act and Rule | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/#SSH5aiv
46. ethics - How might a moral subjectivist be able to debate morality …, accessed May 19, 2025, https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/121645/how-might-a-moral-subjectivist-be-able-to-debate-morality-with-a-moral-objectivi
47. Rationalism - The Decision Lab, accessed May 19, 2025, https://thedecisionlab.com/reference-guide/philosophy/rationalism
48. Moral Relativism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/moral-re/#H6
49. Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), accessed May 19, 2025, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/
50. Constructivism in Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/constructivism-in-metaphysics/
51. Intersubjectivity - Wikipedia, accessed May 19, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity

Lonergan, Bernard | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed May 19, 2025, https://iep.utm.edu/lonergan/**