Contractualism is a family of views that justify moral or political principles through a form of agreement or mutual justification. In T. M. Scanlon’s moral contractualism, an act is wrong when it cannot be justified by principles that no one could reasonably reject. The test concerns the reasons people have for accepting or rejecting principles, rather than whether an actual bargain has been signed. Source
Comparison with Kantian ethics
Scanlon gives affected individuals’ reasons a central role in assessing principles. He questions whether rational agency alone yields every substantive moral reason. This is a philosophical disagreement with Kantian approaches; calling the whole account a “heteronomous will” is not a neutral definition of contractualism.
Comparison with utilitarianism
Scanlon’s account gives a central role to individuals’ objections, rather than directly adding benefits and burdens into a single aggregate. The difficult cases concern which objections count as reasonable and how competing individuals’ reasons should be assessed.
The practical question is whether permission to act in this way could be justified to people occupying the affected positions. This is not a veto for any objection someone happens to raise. The standard of reasonable rejection itself needs a defense.
Application: Horn, Farha, and the limits of actual contracts. A criticism of duties grounded solely in actual bargains does not by itself refute Scanlon’s account.
Primary source: T. M. Scanlon, “How I am not a Kantian”, author manuscript, especially pp. 12–14 on reasonable rejection and affected individuals’ reasons.