Skip to content
Read • Question • ConnectAnthony’s notes & researchReturn with a new question
Anthony’s NotesA personal field guide
From the notebook

Locke: Two Treatises of Government Student Edition

John Locke

Book Cover

Locke- Two Treatises Of Government Student Edition — John Locke.pdf (file not included in this release)

My Summary

locke notes.pdf (file not included in this release)

AI Summary Misc

’TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT’ AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1688*

1. Traditional View: Justification of the Glorious Revolution (1688–89)

  • For centuries, Locke’s Two Treatises has been read as a theoretical defense of the Revolution of 1688, when William and Mary replaced James II.
  • Locke’s own Preface (1689) seems to support this: he hoped the book would “establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, King William” and justify the English people’s resistance to tyranny.
  • This interpretation became entrenched in political science and history, portraying Locke as the philosopher of the Revolution.

2. Laslett’s Revisionist Argument

  • Laslett argues this belief is false or at least misleading: Locke’s Treatises were not originally written to rationalize 1688, but rather as a call for revolution during an earlier political crisis.
  • Evidence shows much of the text predates 1688 and belongs to the Exclusion Crisis (1679–83), when Whigs like Locke’s patron Shaftesbury tried to block the Catholic Duke of York (later James II) from the throne.
  • Thus, Two Treatises is better seen as an “Exclusion Tract”, not a Revolution pamphlet.

3. Evidence for Earlier Composition

  • Filmer’s Patriarcha was reprinted in 1679–80 and became the central Tory text against Whig resistance. Locke’s First Treatise is a direct refutation of it.
  • Cross-references within the Treatises suggest Locke planned them as a single discourse, not two separate works.
  • Locke’s reading notes (his “Tablet”) and library records show he was consulting Filmer, Hooker, and related political works intensively in 1679–81.
  • References to James I as simply “King James” (anachronistic by 1689) suggest earlier composition.
  • Key issues Locke stresses—like the summoning and dissolution of Parliament—were central to Charles II’s reign (1670s–80s), not James II’s.

4. The Fate of the Manuscript

  • Locke himself explained that his book appeared fragmentary because “the papers that should have filled up the middle” were lost.
  • Laslett reconstructs the likely fate: parts of the manuscript were deliberately destroyed or hidden during political crackdowns (e.g., after Shaftesbury’s arrest in 1681, or Algernon Sidney’s trial in 1683).
  • A mysterious tract Locke referred to as De Morbo Gallico (“The French Disease”) may have been an early cover name for the Treatises. Parts of it were left in secret with friends, others destroyed to avoid incriminating him.

5. Composition Timeline (Laslett’s reconstruction)

  • Winter 1679–80: Locke begins what would become the Second Treatise (positive theory).
  • 1680: With Patriarcha published, Locke adds the First Treatise (negative refutation).
  • 1681: Locke revises and supplements, adding Hooker references, more chapters.
  • 1682–83: Further revisions, possibly chapters on tyranny and dissolution.
  • 1689: Final Preface written; some additions and framing made for publication.

6. Broader Implications

  • Locke’s Treatises were born in the heat of the Exclusion Crisis, making them radical for their time—arguing for resistance and even revolution when monarchy threatened liberty.
  • By the time of publication in 1689, they served conveniently to justify William and Mary’s accession, but their intellectual origins were a decade earlier.
  • Locke’s secrecy and reluctance to admit authorship reflected his awareness of the dangers, and perhaps unease about reconciling his political theory with his philosophy in the Essay on Human Understanding.

Key Takeaway

Locke’s Two Treatises should not be read solely as a celebration of 1688. It was conceived earlier as a radical Whig intervention in the Exclusion Crisis (1679–83). By 1689, the Treatises were reframed to support William III, but their origins lie in Locke’s collaboration with Shaftesbury and the Whig struggle against absolutism.

LOCKE AND HOBBES

1. Locke, Hobbes, and Filmer

  • Locke did not write Two Treatises as a direct refutation of Hobbes. His immediate target was Sir Robert Filmer and the doctrine of patriarchal absolutism.
  • Hobbes was politically marginal by the late 1670s, while Filmer’s Patriarcha had real influence in Tory circles during the Exclusion Crisis. Locke and Shaftesbury therefore treated Filmer as the “man of the moment.”
  • While Locke’s ideas indirectly reject Hobbes, his Treatises follow Filmer’s terms of debate. Locke would likely not have developed some of his arguments (like property) without Filmer pressing him.

2. Locke’s Polemical Choices

  • Locke’s First Treatise quotes Filmer meticulously, showing he treated him seriously. By contrast, Locke rarely mentions Hobbes by name—only one passing, imprecise reference to Leviathan in the Second Treatise.
  • This suggests Locke wasn’t secretly writing “against Hobbes by proxy” but genuinely confronting Filmer.
  • Leibniz, among others, saw Locke’s Treatises as standing in deliberate contrast with Filmer, not Hobbes.

3. Locke’s Relationship with Hobbes

  • Locke certainly absorbed Hobbesian ideas indirectly. Phrases and arguments in both Essay and Two Treatises echo Hobbes, though Locke often seemed unaware of their origin.
  • Locke probably read Hobbes early in life but not again when composing the Treatises. His notebooks contain virtually no Hobbes citations.
  • Hobbes remained a “gravitational constant”: Locke couldn’t escape his influence, even when not consciously engaging with him.

4. Natural Law and the Essay

  • A tension exists between Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding and Two Treatises.
  • In the Essay, Locke is skeptical of natural law’s demonstrability, aligning at times with Hobbesian doubts. In the Two Treatises, however, he speaks confidently of natural law as universally binding and plain to reason.
  • Richard Tyrrell criticized Locke on this point, pressing him to clarify his doctrine of natural law. Locke wavered, never fully reconciling the Essay’s empiricism with the Treatises’ reliance on natural law.

5. Locke: Philosopher vs. Political Theorist

  • Locke deliberately separated his philosophy (Essay) from his political theory (Two Treatises). He wanted them read independently.
  • The Treatises were not an “application” of the Essay’s epistemology; they were written in a different mood and for a different purpose (political principle and policy, not philosophical system).
  • The Treatises lack the definitional rigor of the Essay: key terms like consent, law, freedom, and reason are used but not philosophically defined.

6. Locke vs. Hobbes: Style and Impact

  • Hobbes built a closed, systematic philosophy where politics followed from definitions. Locke rejected this synthetic method.
  • Hobbes’s Leviathan changed political theory but had little impact on political practice—it was too rigid, rationalist, and “dated.”
  • Locke’s Treatises, by contrast, blended principle with policy: guidance on what people would actually accept, limits of loyalty, and workable prescriptions. This pragmatic quality explains why Locke’s work shaped political habits and institutions, while Hobbes remained more a literary-philosophical influence.

Key Takeaway

Locke’s Two Treatises was a refutation of Filmer, not Hobbes, though Hobbes’s shadow inevitably lingered in Locke’s thought. Locke drew selectively from Hobbesian phraseology and themes but reshaped them into a Whig, anti-absolutist, and practical political theory. His separation of philosophy from political writing meant that the Treatises succeeded not as an extension of the Essay but as an independent work of political persuasion — less systematic than Hobbes, but more effective in shaping constitutional government and liberal tradition.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF ‘TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT’

1. Foundational Principles

  • Humans as God’s workmanship: Locke begins with the claim that men are God’s property, not their own (II §6). From this follows:
    • All men are equal and free relative to one another.
    • No natural hierarchy (kings over subjects, fathers over children) is divinely ordained.
  • Filmer’s patriarchal claims are refuted: observation and reason show paternal authority is temporary, tied to preservation of children (II §§80–81).
  • Thus, humans are “born free” (II §61), because they are born rational. Freedom = action by one’s own reason, bounded by the law of nature.

2. The Sovereignty of Reason

  • Reason as law of nature: “The law of nature is the law of reason” (I §101). Reason = God’s voice in man; it makes us free.
  • Reason is sovereign over individuals and relationships; it binds man to man (II §172).
  • Unreasonable aggressors who deny others’ freedom may be destroyed “as beasts” (II §172). Locke applies this language to despotic kings like Charles and James Stuart.

3. The Executive Power of the Law of Nature

  • Each individual has the executive power of natural law (II §§6–13): the right to punish offenders, both for personal wrongs and to uphold reason’s authority.
  • This “natural political virtue” underlies both government and civil society.
  • The state of nature is real: observed in primitive tribes, in international relations, and in dealings between individuals without a superior (e.g. a Swiss trading with an American Indian).
  • It is not a state of war (contra Hobbes). War is incidental, though common in the international sphere.

4. Property

  • Original communism: the earth was given in common (II §25).
  • Locke’s innovation: property arises from labour: “Every man has a property in his own person… The labour of his body… makes it his property” (II §27).
  • Limits: spoilage restriction (II §36), “enough and as good” left for others (II §31).
  • Introduction of money by consent removes limits, enables inequality (II §§46–50).
  • Locke uses “property” broadly—“lives, liberties, and estates” (II §123). It symbolizes all rights and connects abstract liberty to concrete society.
  • Critics: his theory is incomplete, ambiguous, tilted toward property-owners, silent on slavery and unlimited accumulation, yet remains original and influential.

5. From State of Nature to Political Society

  • Inconveniences of the state of nature: no impartial judge, men judges in their own cases, insecurity of property.
  • Remedy: individuals consent to form a community, resigning their natural executive power (II §89, §95–99).
  • Community establishes a legislative (to make laws), executive (to enforce), and federative (foreign affairs). Legislative is supreme (II §134ff).
  • Majority rule follows logically: consent of each binds him to the collective decision.
  • Obligation rests on both:
    1. Consent (explicit or tacit, e.g. using land or roads: II §§119–122).
    2. Natural political virtue (reason requires mutual responsibility).
  • Freedom is positive: enlarged by law and government. “Law… is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent” (II §57).

7. The Concept of Trust

  • Political power is a fiduciary trust, not a contract: governors are trustees for the people.
  • When trust is breached, government is dissolved; power reverts to the people (II §§221–222, §240).
  • The people judge breaches; ultimate appeal is to God—i.e., revolution.
  • Trust doctrine grounds Locke’s defense of resistance and the right to alter or abolish governments.
  • Locke’s doctrine implies humans tend to act responsibly toward others, enabling representative government and majority rule.
  • Ensures governors’ interests must align with the governed.
  • Provides ethical basis for popular sovereignty and justifies revolution when trust is broken.

Key Takeaway

Laslett shows that Locke’s political theory rests on the idea of natural political virtue: reason as God-given law binding all men equally. From this flow equality, liberty, natural rights, and the right of enforcement in the state of nature. Property (both material and broad “lives, liberties, estates”) is the linchpin connecting natural freedom to civil society. Government is established by consent to secure property, limited by the trust placed in it, and dissolvable when that trust is violated. This doctrine both justifies resistance to tyranny and grounds Locke’s enduring influence on liberal constitutionalism.

AI Summary (First Treatise)

Chapter I – Introduction (§§1–4)

Main Ideas

  • Locke opens by targeting Filmer’s claim that kings derive authority from Adam, passed down by hereditary succession.
  • He announces his aim: to dismantle the supposed natural right of kings over their subjects.
  • Method: Locke will show (a) Adam had no such authority, and (b) even if he had, no one can prove a line of succession from him.
    Most Important Passages
  • §1 – Locke states his purpose: “I shall not meddle with the general grounds of government, but confine myself to Adam’s title…”
  • §2–3 – Frames the debate: Filmer’s theory makes all men slaves by nature, except the heir of Adam.
  • §4 – Locke rejects this at the outset, promising to show that both Adam’s supposed authority and its transmission are baseless.

Chapter II – Of Paternal and Regal Power (§§5–20 approx.)

Main Ideas

  • Locke dismantles the conflation of paternal power with political power (a recurring theme carried into the Second Treatise).
  • Argues:
    • Parental authority is for the benefit and preservation of children, not absolute dominion.
    • Filmer wrongly equates parental rule over children with a king’s rule over subjects.
    • Political power is by consent, not by natural right of parents.
  • Locke distinguishes natural dependence of children (temporary) from political subjection (which must come from agreement).
    Most Important Passages
  • §6–7 – Locke notes Filmer’s “strange confusion” between the two powers.
  • §9 – On parental authority: “Children are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it.” (anticipates Second Treatise VI).
  • §12–13 – Critiques Filmer’s claim that paternal power entails dominion over life and property.
  • §16–20 – Locke’s conclusion: paternal power is limited, temporary, and nothing like regal power.

Chapter IX – Of Monarchy by Inheritance from Adam (§§79–86 approx.)

Main Ideas

  • Locke takes on Filmer’s central thesis: that Adam’s authority descended by inheritance to kings.
  • Refutation points:
    1. No evidence Adam had absolute dominion (Filmer assumes, Locke denies).
    2. No clear heir to Adam: Cain, Abel, Seth? Scripture is silent.
    3. Even if Adam had such authority, the line of descent is untraceable, making Filmer’s doctrine impossible to apply.
  • Therefore, hereditary monarchy cannot rest on Adam’s supposed right.
    Most Important Passages
  • §79 – Locke: “It is a hard matter to know who is Adam’s heir in all the world…”
  • §81–82 – The absurdity of Filmer’s claim: no one can demonstrate the present king is the heir of Adam.
  • §85–86 – Locke’s conclusion: Filmer’s doctrine, if taken seriously, destroys all legitimate governments and throws mankind into endless confusion.

Takeaway

  • Chapter 1 sets the target: Filmer’s Adamic theory.
  • Chapter 2 attacks the false equivalence between paternal and political power.
  • Chapter 9 shows Filmer’s system is not only false but also impracticable — it cannot yield a workable basis for monarchy.

AI Summary (Second Treatise)

Chapter I — Of Political Power (§§1–3)

Main ideas

  • Sets aside Filmer’s patriarchal thesis and defines political power distinctly from paternal, marital, masterly, and despotic power.
  • Canonical definition: “a right of making laws … for the regulating and preserving of property … and in the defence of the commonwealth … only for the public good.” (§3)
    Passages to mark
  • §2–3 (the definition and the distinction among kinds of power).

Chapter II — Of the State of Nature (§§4–15)

Main ideas

  • Natural condition: perfect freedom and equality; no natural subordination. (§4–5)
  • Law of nature = reason, which obliges all not to harm others in life, health, liberty, or possessions. (§6)
  • In SOCN each person has the executive power to enforce the law of nature. (§7)
  • The “inconveniences” (partiality, lack of settled law and impartial judge) motivate civil society. (§§13–15)
    Passages
  • §4–6 (freedom/equality; law of nature).
  • §7 (natural executive power).
  • §13–15 (why SOCN is unsafe/uneasy).

Chapter III — Of the State of War (§§16–21)

Main ideas

  • State of war = “force without right.” (§16)
  • Attempting to put another under absolute power initiates a state of war; defensive killing can be justified. (§§18–19)
    Passages
  • §16 (definition). §18–19 (absolute power attempt; thief example).

Chapter IV — Of Slavery (§§22–24)

Main ideas

  • Legitimate slavery only as a continuation of a just war against an aggressor; one cannot consent to slavery in the sense of alienating one’s life. (§§22–24)
  • Famous line: “Slavery is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive.” (§24)
    Passages
  • §22 (liberty vs. absolute power). §24 (definition of slavery).

Chapter V — Of Property (§§25–51)

Main ideas

  • Mixing labor with unowned nature generates private property. (§27)
  • Provisos: enough-and-as-good left for others; no spoilage (bounded by perishability). (§§31–32)
  • Labor accounts for the bulk of value; cultivation multiplies productivity. (around §§40–43)
  • Money arises by consent, enabling durable accumulation and inequality within consented bounds. (§§46–50)
    Passages
  • §27 (labor-mixing). §31–32 (spoilage/“enough and as good”). §36–37 (enclosure & improvement). §40–45 (labor’s share; the step to money). §46–50 (consent to money and accumulation).

Chapter VI — Of Paternal (Parental) Power (§§52–73)

Main ideas

  • Should be called parental power; mother and father share it. (§52)
  • Two components: temporary tuition during minority; perpetual honor due to parents. (§§67, 70–71)
  • Parental and political power are distinct in origin, scope, and end. (§§63, 71)
    Passages
  • §52 (parental, not strictly paternal). §63 (freedom grounded in reason). §67, §70–71 (limits and distinction).

Chapter VII — Of Political or Civil Society (§§77–90)

Main ideas

  • Civil society requires a common judge and settled law; domestic relations (conjugal, parental, master-servant) don’t yet equal civil society. (§§77–89)
  • Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society (no common judge above the monarch). (§90)
    Passages
  • §77–78 (society types). §88–89 (origin of legislative/executive). §90 (why absolute monarchy fails).

Chapter VIII — Of the Beginning of Political Societies (§§95–122)

Main ideas

  • Only consent can subject one to political power. (§95)
  • Majority rule is implicit in the original compact. (§§96–99)
  • Tacit consent by enjoyment of land/protection binds one to obey while one so enjoys; it does not make one a perpetual member. (§§119–122)
    Passages
  • §95–99 (consent and majority). §115–116 (historical plurality of new polities). §119–122 (tacit consent and its limits).

Chapter IX — Of the Ends of Political Society and Government (§§123–131)

Main ideas

  • Ends: secure property (in the broad Lockean sense: “lives, liberties, and estates”) by settled law, impartial judges, and enforcement. (§§123–131)
    Passages
  • §124–131 (why we leave SOCN and what government must provide).

Chapter X — Of the Forms of a Commonwealth (§§132–133)

Main ideas

  • Forms depend on where the community places the legislative: democracy, oligarchy, monarchy (hereditary or elective), or mixed. (§132–133)
    Passages
  • §132–133 (taxonomy; reversion of supreme power if originally limited).

Chapter XI — Of the Extent of the Legislative Power (§§134–142)

Main ideas

  • Legislative is supreme but fiduciary: bounded by the common good and natural law. (§134)
  • Must govern by established laws, with known judges; no taxation without consent; no transfer of the legislative trust. (§§135, 138–142)
    Passages
  • §134–135 (first/fundamental law; supremacy as trust). §140 (taxation & consent). §141–142 (non-delegability; bounds).

Chapter XII — Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power (§§143–148)

Main ideas

  • Distinction of powers; legislative need not be always in being; prudential union of executive and federative (external) powers is common. (§§143, 145, 147)
    Passages
  • §143–147 (separation; why exec ≠ leg; federative).

Chapter XIII — Of the Subordination of the Powers (§§149–156)

Main ideas

  • People retain a supreme residual power to alter/remove the legislative when it betrays its trust. (§149)
    Passages
  • §149–156 (people’s supreme power; allegiance as obedience to law, not persons).

Chapter XIV — Of Prerogative (§§157?–168; key §§160–163)

Main ideas

  • Prerogative = power to act for the public good without prescription of the law, sometimes even against it, when law is silent and necessity presses. (§160–163)
    Passages
  • §160–163 (definition; examples; public good as limit).

Chapter XV — Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power Together (§§169–174)

Main ideas

  • Three powers differ in origin, scope, and end: parental (for children’s benefit), political (for subjects’ benefit/properties), despotical (over those who forfeit all property). (§§173–174)
    Passages
  • §173–174 (clear comparative summary).

Chapter XVI — Of Conquest (§§175–196)

Main ideas

  • Conquest ≠ consent; force cannot, by itself, create a title to govern. (§175–176)
  • Just conqueror’s rights limited: life/service of aggressors, not automatic title to estates; innocent family retains claims. (§§183, 190–193)
    Passages
  • §175–176 (“Conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing a house is from building one.”) §183; §190–193.

Chapter XVII — Of Usurpation (§§197–198)

Main ideas

  • Usurpation = “domestic conquest”: seizure of another’s right without title; it changes persons, not necessarily forms. (§197–198)
    Passages
  • §197–198 (definitions; why no legitimacy without consent).

Chapter XVIII — Of Tyranny (§§199–210)

Main ideas

  • Tyranny = exercise of power beyond right for private ends; where law ends, tyranny begins. (§§199–202)
  • Resistance to unlawful force is justified; personal sanctity of the prince may remain while illegal instruments are opposed. (§205)
    Passages
  • §199–202 (“Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins …”). §205 (limits of opposition; sacred person vs. illegal acts).

Chapter XIX — Of the Dissolution of Government (§§211–243)

Main ideas

  • Distinguish dissolution of society (e.g., foreign conquest) from dissolution of government. (§211)
  • Government dissolves when the legislative is altered, obstructed, delivered to a foreign power, or betrays its trust by invading property—putting itself in a state of war with the people. (§§220–222)
  • People need not revolt for “every little mismanagement,” but a long train of abuses justifies resuming their original liberty. (§225, echoing a famous phrase)
  • On “Who shall be judge?”—the people; where no earthly judge exists, the appeal lies to heaven. (§§240–241)
  • Final summary on when power reverts to the people. (§243)
    Passages
  • §211 (two kinds of dissolution). §220–222 (breach of trust; state of war). §225 (“long train of abuses”). §228 (answer to “this is rebellion”). §240–241 (people as judge; appeal to heaven). §243 (reversion of power).

Highlights