The transcript’s overall argument is that China’s apparent military advantage is less decisive than it looks, especially in a Taiwan conflict.
- Ukraine’s drone war offers Taiwan a defensive model. Ukraine’s use of cheap aerial and maritime drones, combined with anti-ship missiles, has badly constrained Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The video argues Taiwan could use similar asymmetric tools to make a Chinese blockade or amphibious landing prohibitively costly.
- A Taiwan invasion remains uniquely difficult. China would have to cross the Taiwan Strait, operate through bad weather and limited landing areas, suppress Taiwanese defenses, and sustain forces without a land border. The video argues these constraints make Chinese ships and landing forces vulnerable to drones and missiles.
- Japan is becoming a more active regional military power. Japan’s Taiwan Strait transit, expanding defense aid, stronger ties with the United States and regional partners, and shift away from strict postwar restraint are presented as signals that Japan could intervene if China attacked Taiwan.
- Japan’s geography is strategically important. The Japanese island chain, especially Okinawa and the Miyako Strait, could restrict Chinese naval access to the Pacific and complicate efforts to prevent U.S. intervention. U.S. bases in Japan also raise the risk that a Taiwan war would rapidly widen.
- Japan’s new long-range weapons increase deterrence. The Type 25 anti-ship missile and hypersonic glide vehicle are described as giving Japan greater ability to threaten Chinese naval formations, selected mainland targets, North Korea, and parts of Russia’s Far East. The broader point is that Japan is acquiring credible counter-strike capability.
- Xi’s military purges may weaken the PLA. Officially framed as anti-corruption measures, the purges are portrayed as partly political: removing officers who resist Xi or question ambitious timelines, including a Taiwan invasion. The video argues that replacing experienced commanders and breaking informal trust networks may produce caution, dishonesty, and weak initiative in wartime.
- The United States is expanding its missile-launch capacity through Rapid Dragon. The system lets C-130s and C-17s airdrop palletized cruise missiles without permanently modifying the aircraft, potentially turning a large transport fleet into dispersed auxiliary missile carriers. This could complicate Chinese air-defense planning and enable large salvo attacks from standoff range.
- But munitions production is the limiting factor. More launch platforms matter only if the United States can produce enough cruise missiles. The transcript stresses that expensive precision weapons are consumed faster than they can be replaced, prompting a push for cheaper, scalable missiles.
The strongest theme is that modern warfare increasingly favors distributed, cheap, autonomous, and numerous weapons over concentrated conventional platforms. Still, the claims that Ukraine has made a Chinese invasion “impossible,” Japan can “wipe out China,” or PLA purges have decisively broken China’s military are rhetorical overstatements, not conclusions established by the evidence presented.
Content
00:00:00 - Ukraine Just Did Something UNTHINKABLE to China… Invading Taiwan Is NOW IMPOSSIBLE
00:16:53 - Japan Just PROVED They Can WIPE Out China Anytime, Anywhere
00:32:59 - Japan Deployed Something China Was PRAYING Would Never Exist… Xi Is in PANIC
00:52:40 - Xi Tried to Build China’s STRONGEST Army… He BROKE It Instead
01:13:48 - China Has a New Problem… U.S. Just Did Something No One Thought Possible
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Transcript
Ukraine Just Did Something UNTHINKABLE to China… Invading Taiwan Is NOW IMPOSSIBLE
0:00 · For years, China had been building up to this moment. 2027 was the year that many thought it would happen. The invasion of Taiwan that President Xiinping has always threatened. But a wrench has been thrown into the works. China’s war machine has been forced to shut down before it ever started rolling. And it’s all thanks to a nation thousands of miles away. Ukraine has ended China’s invasion of Taiwan. And even the US is shocked by the impact that Ukraine has had on Xi’s plans.
0:28 · What Ukraine has been doing doesn’t even directly involve Taiwan. Yet, it still makes Xi furious.
0:36 · China’s plans are being held up as its president is frustrated. And it’s all happening because of what Ukraine has been doing in its defense of its territory against Russia. Over more than four long years of fighting, Ukraine has turned everything that China thought it knew about how an invasion of Taiwan would go on its head. To the point where it’s not too much [music] of a stretch to say that Ukraine has played a massive role in making it impossible for China to invade or annex Taiwan at any point in the near future. That sounds like a bold claim, right?
1:04 · But it starts to make a lot more sense when you realize that the Ukraine war has brought with it new tactics and ways of fighting that all nations in Southeast Asia, most of all Taiwan, have been watching and are in the process of adopting. What Ukraine has done is lay down the blueprint for what a smaller nation has to do to defend itself against a military force that seems to be far more powerful on paper. The blueprint isn’t specific to [music] Ukraine. It can work for any nation that chooses to adopt it.
1:31 · And in the specific case of Taiwan, the blueprint could be a complete war [music] ender for China. What has been happening these last four years has caught Xi completely offguard. Every assumption he made about his invasion of Taiwan has been ground into dust.
1:47 · [music] Before we get to that, let’s look at the Chinese plan. Ever since Xi came to power, he has spent massive amounts of resources transforming China into one of the world’s most impressive military powers. For years, military spending has been through the roof in China, and Xi isn’t pulling the plug on the cash waterfall anytime soon. The 3 years up to 2026 saw China increase its annual defense budget by 7.2% per year, and 2026 will bring with it another 7% increase.
2:14 · The payoff for all of this spending was the creation of a force that should be more than capable of taking Taiwan. Global Firepower says that China has built the world’s third strongest military. The Chinese Navy is the world’s largest in terms of pure asset numbers and it’s second largest behind the [music] US when it comes to tonnage. China has aircraft and helicopter carriers. It has over 3,500 aircraft in its air force, including almost 1,500 fighter jets.
2:39 · By all accounts, China has evolved from once being the sick man of Asia to the region’s most dominant military force, at least on paper. All of this force buildup was supposed to play a huge role in what China has in store for Taiwan.
2:56 · The strategy was going to be simple and traditional, built from what Xi thought he knew about modern military tactics.
3:02 · First blockade, then a trit. The last few years have made it clear that China intends to use its massive navy to create a blockade around Taiwan that is designed to strangle the Taiwanese military. A blockade prevents exports from flowing out and imports from entering [music] Taiwan, and it’s a feasible strategy. We only need to look at what both Iran and the US have been doing in the straight of Hormuz to see that. The so-called Justice mission 2025, which China held between December 29th and 30th, shows what China has in mind.
3:31 · The military exercise was held all around Taiwan, and it involved Chinese ships and aircraft transiting the East China Sea, the Philippine Sea, and up to the Taiwan Strait. As part of the war games, China simulated a blockade around Taiwan, which China intends to implement both to lead into an amphibious invasion and to feed into the attrition part of its strategy. Speaking about attrition, the other point of China building up such a massive military force was so that it could overwhelm Taiwan through sheer resources alone. That was and still is Russia’s strategy in Ukraine.
4:02 · In fact, it is the strategy that Russia has been using since the era of the Soviets and even long before. Simply have more of everything. more soldiers, tanks, ships, planes, equipment, and everything else. Eventually, the enemy will have to crumble because traditional warfare is resource inensive, and the smaller country always has fewer resources than the larger nation. That was the Chinese plan for Taiwan.
4:24 · Blockade, invade, and a trit. China’s problem and Taiwan’s salvation is what we mentioned earlier in the video. This strategy only works when your opponent fights the same kind of war you fight.
4:35 · That’s not what Ukraine has been doing against Russia. And it means that all of the assumptions that China made about its invasion of Taiwan, both naval and on the ground, simply don’t exist anymore. What Ukraine has done is show that modern warfare strategies enable a smaller nation to put up a brutal defense against an invading force.
4:53 · That’s what we’re seeing in Ukraine right now. It’s still a war of attrition, only that war isn’t about the sheer volume of resources anymore. It’s about coming up with the most cost effective means of destroying what your enemy brings to the battlefield. You can probably already guess what we’re going to be talking about here. Drones.
5:09 · Ukraine has them. Taiwan wants them. And China bears them. China’s desired invasion of Taiwan was never going to be a simple task. No matter how much money, manpower, and metal that Xi threw at it.
5:21 · There was still plenty to overcome. The Taiwan Strait offers very rough seas for much of the year, which can get so bad that they would force breaks in the invasion effort. There are limited possible landing beaches accessible via the straight and all will be loaded with Taiwanese defenses. Monsoons, typhoons, mountains, and a fearsome defense force all await any Chinese soldiers who are involved in that invasion. The original plans for invading Taiwan still saw China preparing for massive casualties that could easily number in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions.
5:51 · It’s this sheer cost that has led to China spending so much time preparing for an invasion that if we only looked at the pure numbers should see it wipe the floor with Taiwan’s military. Missiles have become key to China’s strategy.
6:04 · Though it knows that Taiwan has the defenses needed to protect itself fairly well from them. The naval blockade was even more important, though that comes with two downsides. First, any ships used in the blockade can’t be used in the invasion itself. Second, and far more importantly, ships that are part of China’s blockade become sitting ducks.
6:23 · This is where things start to shift, and the blueprint that Ukraine has laid down against Russia really comes to the four.
6:29 · If a naval blockade is China’s plan, then Ukraine can provide Taiwan with precisely what it needs to overcome that blockade. Despite Taiwan being a much smaller nation, how do we know? The Black Sea reveals all. But before we dig into that, this is why we make the military show to explain how power really moves on the battlefield. If you’re new to the channel, make sure you hit subscribe to see more videos like this. What China hopes to do in the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding waters is similar to what Russia hoped to do in the Black Sea.
6:58 · Taking advantage of its dangerous warships, Russia wanted to turn the Black Sea into a death zone for Ukraine’s cargo ships. in addition to making the waterway a safe route through which Russia could funnel troops and equipment into the Ukrainian mainland by way of Crimea and Russia itself. But now the Black Sea is practically bereft of the famous Russian fleet that took its name from the body of water. Ukraine’s maritime and aerial drones are a huge part of the reason why and they can be the game changer that Taiwan needs to flip Xi’s plans on their head.
7:25 · Ukraine’s maritime drones have been a constant fixture in the Black Sea for years and they made headlines again on May 3rd.
7:34 · unleashed against a pair of Russian shadow fleet tankers in Novaras.
7:38 · Ukraine’s drones caused major damage to ships stationed in the port. Novarasisk is where the Black Sea fleet now [music] lingers after Ukraine’s drone and missile attacks force it out of its traditional base in Sevastapole. What we see here is Ukraine thumbming its nose at Russian naval power once again. And it does it using an asymmetric strategy that traditional warships simply can’t handle. Over a third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been taken out of the Ukraine war by drones and missiles.
8:02 · What was meant to be a blockade carried out by ships that Ukraine couldn’t hurt has been turned into a humiliating retreat for Russia that nobody expected when Putin launched his invasion. We mentioned a blueprint earlier. What Ukraine has done in the Black Sea can be transplanted into the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding waters. Russia has been practically defeated in the Black Sea.
8:25 · And while Russia’s navy was always weaker than it appeared and certainly not as modern as China’s, Xi will have seen what happened to Putin’s warships, the lessons of the Black Sea have been taken to heart. It doesn’t matter how big or strong your warships might be when you have to bring them closer to the enemy, and especially when they have to stay in one spot as part of a blockade, they become vulnerable to missiles and drones. By following the Ukrainian blueprint, Taiwan could use maritime and aerial drones to shatter China’s blockade. Oh, and Taiwan is also in a much better position than Ukraine on the anti-hship missile front.
8:55 · As the Taipei Times revealed on March 11th, Taiwan has around 1,000 of its domestically developed Shiongfang 2 and three anti-hip missiles waiting to go, along with 400 US-made Harpoon missiles.
9:09 · The former are strong enough to devastate entire aircraft carriers.
9:13 · Taiwan knows that what Ukraine can deliver could be the key to ruining China’s plans. Ukraine knows it, too.
9:18 · And it’s no coincidence that Ukraine is building partnerships and links throughout Asia, including with one unexpected nation that we’ll reveal toward the end of the video to send a message to China that Xi’s ambitions will be thwarted. Taiwan and Ukraine have been slowly building a stronger relationship since Putin launched his invasion, likely because Taiwan sees plenty of parallels between what Putin did and what Xi intends to do. As far back as November 2023, Taiwan was signing memorandums of understanding with Ukraine as it attended a conference dedicated to helping Ukraine rebuild.
9:49 · Taiwan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine for much of the invasion. And the budding relationship has only been growing stronger since the sixus were signed in Poland in 2023. 2 years later, Taiwan signed another pact with Ukraine.
10:02 · This time to launch a medical program providing doctor training, medical equipment, and [music] other support.
10:07 · Taiwan has stopped short of providing military aid to Ukraine, likely to avoid sparking tensions in the Indoacific. But what has started as a humanitarian relationship seems to be on the verge of evolving. On January 23rd, the Indoacific Defense Forum reported that Taiwan is now looking to partner with Ukraine to develop its drone capabilities. Such a move would make official the sorts of partnerships that have already been developing through private channels. the forum reports would also likely support initiatives launched in Taiwan, such as the 5-year drone development program that Taiwan launched back in 2025.
10:36 · The relationship between Taiwan and Ukraine is growing stronger, and much to Xi’s dismay, it’s clear that Taiwan recognizes that Ukraine has created the blueprint for batting back a Chinese naval invasion.
10:49 · Other nations in the Indoacific have been paying attention to what Ukraine has done against Russia, and they’re also mimicking the drone tactics.
10:56 · Thailand has been using Ukrainian-like drones to target Cambodian forces. The Telegraph reports at the 2026 Defense Services Asia exhibition in Malaysia, drones were front and center. The exhibition revealed there is a massive demand throughout Asia for the types of weapons that Ukraine has been deploying.
11:12 · Even heading west of the Indoacific and into the Gulf region, there are signs of what may be to come between Ukraine and Taiwan. Ukraine has signed decadel long defense deals with several Gulf nations that have been impacted by the war between the US and Iran, and drones lie at the heart of those deals. Putin is obviously angry to see Ukraine gaining so much influence in Asia. But Xi will be even more furious.
11:32 · He is watching literal decades of investing in making China a dominant military power go up in smoke as drones become the go-to weapons for the various types of nations that China is trying to intimidate with its power. Xi has watched as Taiwan carefully engineered its partnership with a very willing Ukraine. And he now knows that any attempt to launch an invasion would inevitably lead to Ukraine offering drones and expertise to Taiwan. That’s what Ukraine is doing in the Gulf.
11:58 · And the fact that it’s happening at all shows Xi that he can’t even rely on Putin and his forces to distract Ukraine from building these kinds of relationships. The goal for China was to isolate Taiwan. Ukraine looks set to make sure that doesn’t happen. And there’s still the twist in the tale that’s coming up. Before we get to that, there’s what Xi intended to do and what is actually going to happen.
12:19 · The intention for Xi was to use what was happening in Ukraine as both a distraction and a potential training ground for Chinese soldiers. While the world watched Ukraine, it wouldn’t be paying attention to China and its Taiwan ambitions. When the US unleashed Operation Epic Fury against Iran, that was another distraction. After all, the US is one of the nations that is most likely come to Taiwan’s defense if China invades. Though often contradictory in his statements, US President Donald Trump has claimed that Taiwan will be safe for as long as he is president. Any distractions [music] such as the one in Iran is good for Xi.
12:48 · China has even reportedly sent about 200 soldiers into Ukraine. The Hill said in April 2025, supposedly so that they could learn lessons from what they see on the front lines. The Ukraine war was supposed to be key to China’s invasion of Taiwan.
13:04 · Now, that same war is delivering the lessons and perhaps soon the equipment that will allow Taiwan to defend itself.
13:10 · The reality that Xi has been forced to accept is simple. China fears what drones could do to its ships if it tries to launch an invasion of Taiwan. Ukraine and Taiwan aren’t even cooperating on drone production yet. And that fear is still evident because Xi knows that Ukraine has delivered the blueprint for what Taiwan needs to do. We’re also seeing evidence that the entire calculus [music] of China’s Taiwan invasion has changed. You remember that we mentioned that most believe that China’s plan was [music] to invade Taiwan in 2027. That doesn’t seem to be the case anymore.
13:37 · Sky News reports that US intelligence agencies believe that China is no longer planning to invade in 2027 and is instead looking to gain control over the island without any form of military strike. That’s a complete turnaround and it isn’t a coincidence. Small and cheap aerial drones, especially those that have ranges long enough to overcome such novel Chinese ideas as building a mobile pier to aid in its invasion of Taiwan, will be lethal to China.
14:02 · The maritime drones that have been sinking Russian ships in the Black Sea could be just as dangerous to Chinese warships, whether those are the vessels that are trying to form a blockade or ships attempting to sail through the Taiwan Strait for an amphibious landing. And though you might argue that China has more naval might that it can bring to bear against Taiwan than Russia has inside the Black Sea, and you’d be correct. China also can’t move its troops into Taiwan via land, as Russia could in Ukraine. It’s amphibious and aerial landings or nothing.
14:31 · Ukraine’s drone focused blueprint is tailorade to overcome both. And now for the twist in the tail. It’s not just Ukraine and Taiwan that will be worrying Xi. Over in India, there are signs that Ukraine is building its influence, too.
14:43 · Though India is much like China in that it has happily been taking advantage of lower Russian oil prices forced by sanctions, there has also been a shift in India’s defense posture since the Ukraine war began. A nation that once saw 76% of its weapon imports come from Russia between 2009 and 13 has been reducing its purchases of Russian weapons to the point where they only accounted for 36% of imports between 2019 and 23. And one of the nations that is replacing Russia as a weapons provider to India may be Ukraine.
15:10 · On January 29th, it was revealed that India had purchased VBAT drones that are combat tested in Ukraine, which is a sign that one of China’s biggest rivals for Asian dominance is also starting to learn lessons from the nation that has provided such a powerful blueprint, Taiwan. This is a problem for China. If India starts supporting Ukraine and vice versa, it becomes a much harder target for China to penetrate. Obviously, the same goes for Taiwan, as we’ve explained, as well as the entire Indoacific region.
15:39 · After so many years of playing catch-up, the world’s largest militaries, the point where it became the frontunning power player in the Indoacific, China is now having to reassess every plan it ever had for exerting its military dominance. And there is now a chance, no matter how small, that China might even decide to cancel its plans for Taiwan altogether, and instead focus on another nation that possesses territory to which China lays claim. That nation is Russia.
16:02 · And Putin may soon find that the true endgame of his Ukraine invasion is that he becomes the final domino to fall in a series of geopolitical events that he never saw coming. His invasion made Ukraine stronger. Ukraine’s development of its drone-based defense has inspired other smaller nations such as Taiwan. China now faces serious problems in the Indoacific due to the shift in what we thought we knew about modern warfare.
16:27 · And that shift could lead to China turning its attention north so it can go after Russian lands where a big part of the population already speaks Chinese.
16:36 · Could it be that Xi and Putin are going to turn against one another? That would be a turn of events that seemed almost impossible just a few years ago when Taiwan seemed to be China’s focus. But we may already be seeing the start of China creeping into Russia. Xi has been taking advantage of Putin’s mounting desperation for a while now. After spending years acting as though the Chinese subjugation of Taiwan was an inevitability, President Xi Jinping just got a wakeup call. Something deadly has just entered the Taiwan Strait, and it’s delivered a show of force that has humiliated China. But here’s the twist.
Japan Just PROVED They Can WIPE Out China Anytime, Anywhere
17:09 · The show of force didn’t come from Taiwan. It was another of China’s enemies in the Indo-acific that just revealed that it can wipe out China any time and anywhere. Japan has entered the arena and it did so with a bang. On April 17th, the news broke that a Japanese warship had just pulled off something that caught China completely off guard. In the aftermath of China carrying out about 40 days of military drills in the Taiwan Strait, Japan responded with a show of force of its own.
17:37 · It sent the JSuchi, which is one of its most powerful destroyers, into that very straight where it lingered for 14 hours before choosing to leave of its own accord. China didn’t send ships. It knew that it couldn’t do anything about what Japan did. A 14-hour slap to Xi’s face was delivered in a move that is historic, defiant, and as you’ll learn if you keep watching, a clear signal to China that Japan’s passive military strategy of the past is long gone. This is a move that has clear geopolitical and geographic ramifications, none of which are good for China or its allies.
18:10 · Before we dig into all of that, there’s the ship that Japan sent to consider.
18:14 · There’s a good reason why China didn’t try to match might for might with Japan’s destroyer, as the JSuchi is a special ship. Commissioned in March 2001, the ship has some solid basic specs. It can travel at a top speed of 30 knots, which is roughly equivalent to 35 mph, [music] and it comes equipped with a wide range of weapons that make it a threat to both naval and aerial targets. An Oto Malara 76 mm gun is joined by a pair of 20 mm falank close-in weapon systems that are capable of shredding through targets as they rattle off rounds at a rate of up to 4,500 per minute.
18:44 · The Japanese ship is also equipped with eight SSM1B anti-ship missiles, a pair of 324mm torpedo tubes, and two 16 cell vertical launching systems, one of which carries evolved Sea Sparrow surfaceto-air [music] missiles. China absolutely did not want to mess with this ship. If Xi tried, the JSC Kazuchi has everything that it needs to deal with a threat, no matter what form that threat takes. But China already knew that it would have to stew in its humiliation.
19:11 · Despite all of Xi’s attempts to project power in and around Taiwanese waters, the arrival of the JSE Gazuchi and its 14-hour stay is far from the first time that Japan has sent a signal like this to Xi in recent years.
19:24 · Back in September 2024, Tokyo bucked its long-standing trend of avoiding sending any of its warships through the Taiwan Strait when the Sazan Army made the voyage. In 2025, two more ships that are part of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force made the trip. The most recent humiliation for Xi is also the first time that one of Japan’s warships has transited the Taiwan Straits since Sanit Takayichi took office as Japan’s prime minister in October 2025. That’s a message in its own right. Just because Japan is under new leadership, that doesn’t mean it’s worrying about provoking China anymore.
19:57 · China should be able to respond to all of this. At least that’s the message that Xi and his cronies have been sending for years as the country built up a navy that is supposed to be the envy of the world. According to Global Firepower, China’s navy now has 841 assets, which makes it the world’s largest in terms of asset numbers. China is also second when it comes to total tonnage that can be shifted by its navy.
20:18 · So, the country has big ships that present a threat. The idea behind this buildup was to allow China to dominate the waters of the Indopacific region so overwhelmingly that countries like Japan will be too scared to even have their warships sail through waters in [music] which China has even a slight interest.
20:32 · Xi has much more than a slight interest in the Taiwan Strait. Japan just sent one of its top destroyers there anyway.
20:39 · As for China’s response, it’s the equivalent of writing an angry letter to decry somebody who just wound up and punched you square in the jaw. All that China has been able to muster up is a weak denunciation of the supposed provocation that Japan just participated in. Along with some even weaker news reports that tried to characterize what Japan did as an affront to Chinese efforts to maintain peace. Arab news reports that Guojaun, who is the spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, could do little more than call Japan’s deployment of its warship into the Taiwan Strait a display of force that is one of mistake upon mistake that threatens Chinese sovereignty.
21:11 · The hypocrisy that rings from that statement is unreal. Xi has been threatening Taiwanese sovereignty for years now, but that isn’t going to stop him from using his mouthpieces to make the same claims against nations that won’t dance to his tune. Nippon carried more of Guo’s words as the spokesperson tried to claim what Japan did undermines the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. And Japan crossed a red line that should never be crossed. Again, it’s a flabbergasting response given the constant threats and intimidation that China engages in against Taiwan in this very straight.
21:41 · But what stands out among all of this is that China issued a whole lot of words, but no sort of military response. China did claim to have tracked the Japanese vessel, though.
21:51 · That’s something, we suppose. No interception was attempted in waters that China tries to claim its own. But Xi and his cronies watched as a dangerous Japanese destroyer took a leisurely 14-hour journey through the Taiwan Strait. The reality that China doesn’t want anybody to know is that Xi started all of this, and he now looks like he’s too afraid to follow through.
22:10 · For 40 days between March and April, China had been practicing a naval blockade of Taiwanese waters in what was clearly meant to be a signal that Xi is drawing closer to pulling the trigger on an invasion than ever before. That blockade rehearsal followed on from China conducting a series of military drills around Taiwan in December 2025, which also simulated a blockade along with the seizure of key locations in Taiwan. That particular drill involved the People’s Liberation Army along with China’s Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
22:38 · Justice Mission 2025, as China dubbed it, also happened to take place right after the US rubber stamped an 11 billion weapons package to Taiwan, which is among the largest that the US has ever delivered. So, it’s Japan that is ruining the peace in the Taiwan Strait, is it? Something tells us that China has been doing a lot more to ruin the peace than anybody else. Japan itself has also been a target of China’s attempts to intimidate. In February, China sent a fishing fleet consisting of more than 20 boats into Japan’s exclusive economic zone, or EEZ.
23:08 · An EEZ is an area of the ocean that typically extends about 200 nautical miles from a nation’s territorial waters over which that nation has jurisdiction over resources.
23:18 · China sending fishing boats into that EEZ was meant to be a surface level provocation. A message from Xi that China could move into Japanese operated waters at any time and steal resources from under Tokyo’s nose. But the Chinese mission went deeper than that. China’s fishing fleet was actually a wolf in civilian clothing, as the ships were clearly there to do a lot more than fish. What that was exactly, we don’t know. Spying, perhaps?
23:40 · We never got the chance to find out, as Japan’s response to this incursion was to send military attack helicopters and patrol vessels armed with water cannons to force the Chinese fishing fleet to flee Japan’s waters. Therein lies a contrast. China sends boats into Japanese waters, and it’s met with a clear military response that tells Xi that he shouldn’t push his luck. Japan sends a warship on a 14-hour journey through the Taiwan Strait, which China considers its own, and nothing comes from the Chinese Navy.
24:07 · There was no instant response, no attempt to ward off the Japanese ship, just a humiliated Chinese president who could do little more than get one of his cronies to cry about the provocation. Xi should be crying about a lot more than that.
24:20 · Signals have been sent by Japan and Xi now knows that his plans to invade Taiwan are threatened. Several problems are now emerging for those plans and we’re going to dig into all of them. But before we do, you are watching the Military Show. We bring you the full picture that lies behind the headlines.
24:35 · So, hit subscribe to make sure you never miss a video. So, what Japan just did in the Taiwan Strait sent a message to Xi.
24:42 · Two messages, in fact. First, Japan has let China’s president know that he can’t just practice blockades of the Taiwan Strait and expect to get away with it.
24:50 · The JSA Kazuchi’s voyage through that waterway is basically Japan letting China know that no blockade will stop it. If Japanese ships want to sail, they will. But the second message, and far more important one from Xi’s perspective, is that Japan is no longer taking the passive military approach that has defined its place in the Indoacific for decades. That stance saw Japan commit for years to only defending its own borders. Japan didn’t really have a military, at least in the sense of a force that it could use to attack another nation. It had an army that was built for self-defense, but wouldn’t actively do things like send warships into waters that weren’t its own.
25:21 · But a lot has changed in Japan over the last two decades. Signs of this wholesale change in Japan’s doctrine were already starting to surface in September 2015.
25:32 · That’s when the BBC reported on new laws introduced by then Prime Minister Shinszo Abe, which allowed for a much broader interpretation of what the country’s constitution permits. That constitution, specifically article 9, which was introduced in the wake of World War II, says the Japanese people forever renounce war and the threat or use of force. Arbe’s new law introduced something dubbed proactive pacifism into the equation. In short, threats to Japan’s national security were making the constitution of the past seem like a relic.
26:00 · Pacifism only works when there isn’t another nation undergoing a massive military buildup that is clearly designed to make it the kingpin in the Indoacific. Over a decade later, the East Asia Forum declares that Japan’s quiet break from pacifism is getting a whole lot louder. The country has introduced its official security assistance or OSA mechanism, which allows it to provide Japanese defense equipment to what Japan considers to be like-minded countries. That program, which is put in [music] place in 2023, is clearly designed to equip nations battling against tyranny.
26:31 · The amounts of money that Japan has been handing out under this program are small in military terms. Just $12.5 million in 2023, up to $31.2 million in 2024, and then $44.3 million in 2025. You’re probably seeing a pattern here. With each passing year, Japan is spending more on military aid to other countries, with most of these donations being focused on nations that sit along the sea lanes that Japan considers to be vital to both trade and security. China covers a lot of those same lanes. Xi will clearly see the OSA as a threat.
27:03 · Japan has already announced that its OSA budget will be $116 [music] million in 2026, which more than doubles the amount the nation spent in 2025.
27:12 · What we’re seeing here is a sleeping giant awakening. It’s starting small.
27:17 · Millions of dollars in military assistance to countries that just so happen to oppose China, along with sending warships into the one waterway, where China wants to see no warships other than its own. But this is Japan slowly relinquishing the pacifism that has defined the nation’s foreign and defense policies for decades. Japan is waking up to the fact that it is the one nation out of all in the Indoacific beyond Taiwan itself that can throw a massive wrench into Xi’s plans for an invasion. And it’s not just about the military muscle that Japan wields.
27:42 · Xi will be watching and worrying because he knows that Japan represents a geographic trap for the entire Chinese navy if he chooses to invade Taiwan. China’s biggest problem with Japan is that Japan isn’t just one island. It’s one large island and a whole lot of smaller islands that extend into the East China Sea and provide the nation with advantageous positions in the Philippine Sea and if needed, the South China Sea.
28:06 · Let’s imagine a Taiwan invasion scenario for a moment. Xi’s perfect scenario would be that China could invade Taiwan with no other nations caring. That would allow Xi to dedicate China’s full naval force to Taiwan, but that isn’t going to happen. For China to pull off a Taiwan invasion while keeping the island’s allies at bay, it’s going to have to send its warships and submarines deep into the Pacific Ocean. Standing in China’s way is Japan natural geographical wall. China knows this. It calls this wall the first island chain which stretches from Okinawa in Japan’s south all the way through to Taiwan.
28:36 · In the East China Sea alone, there are the Senkaku Islands, which are tiny islands that are administered by Japan and contested by China. Seemingly insignificant due to their size, these islands lie just north of the Myako Strait through which China’s warships would have to pass to reach the Pacific Ocean. The Okinawa Islands are also part of the Rayuku archipelago, which includes the Myako and Yayyama Islands.
29:00 · Immediately, we see that Japan is a problem. China would want to head off any US force that comes to Taiwan’s aid, and it won’t be able to do that if Japan uses its warships to close off the Myo Straight. Xi has the option of trying to blockade the straight himself. As the South China Morning Post points out, that would give China the option of essentially holding Japan’s island chain hostage. However, this is far from a perfect solution. For one, if China’s warships are busy with a blockade, they’re not doing anything that could stop the US from sending ships across the Pacific.
29:27 · The Mako Strait would potentially become the site of a second naval battle far away from Taiwan, and Xi can’t afford to have his focus split.
29:36 · Speaking of split focus, Japan wouldn’t take China trying to create a blockade in Japanese territorial waters lightly.
29:41 · China could try, but Japan would likely unleash its warships as well as target China’s vessels with missiles launched from the mainland and from the small islands that China would want to make non-factors. Plus, there’s the Okinawa problem for Xi. That island may stand as the most impressive monument to the cooperation between the Japanese and American militaries that there is. Right now, the US maintains several military bases and a population of 80,000 people on Okinawa. Of those 80,000 people, almost 30,000 are active duty military personnel who come from all branches of the US armed forces.
30:12 · That US presence means that any direct attack that China launches against Okinawa, which would be almost inevitable if either country blockades the Mako Strait, would bring the US into the mix during the Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The US may well be in the mix anyway, but it would have an extra incentive if Chinese missiles suddenly started striking American bases. Japan has been quietly building up for something like this for a while.
30:35 · If it needs to create a blockade, it has the ships to do it. The likes of the JS Iazuchi would be invaluable, of course.
30:41 · But perhaps even more important would be Japan’s helicopter carriers, the JS Iumo and the JS Kaga. Those carriers don’t just carry choppers anymore. Japan has upgraded them so that they can each hold between 12 and 15 F-35Bs.
30:54 · Add that aerial firepower to 48 modern destroyers. And Japan has a navy that can rival China’s if not in asset numbers. than certainly in terms of firepower. At the very least, this is a navy that could carry out a mako straight blockade that would hold until the US arrives with its aircraft carriers and destroys. Perhaps she could hope that Japan just wouldn’t want to get involved in a fight over Taiwan. But those hopes have been dashed.
31:15 · Just weeks after becoming Japan’s prime minister, Sani Takayichi declared that any Chinese use of military force against Taiwan would be considered a survival threatening situation by Japan. Even without the clear shift from its self-defense focused doctrine that we have been seeing, this is a clear indication that Japan would battle against China if Xi follows through on his plans for invading Taiwan. There is no ambiguity here. This is explicit.
31:40 · Japan is telling China that what Xi plans to do constitutes enough of a threat for Japan to respond with military force. Xi believed himself to be the power broker in the Indoacific.
31:50 · With one warship, Japan has proven that isn’t the case, leaving China’s president humiliated. This is a classic Japanese understatement that the message is loud and clear. As for what happens next, there is going to be more wrangling between China and Japan. On April 20th, First Post reported that China has sent warships to conduct drills in the Pacific region that uncoincidentally take place as the US, Japan, and the Philippines begin their own joint military exercises. China is trying to claw back some of its lost pride.
32:17 · But its message won’t be all that loud when Japan is showcasing the very partnerships [music] that make China so worried in the first place. And thousands of miles away, one of Xi’s allies is feeling the shock waves. It was only on April 15th that Vladimir Putin sent a pair of frigots and a supply ship from Russia’s Pacific fleet to China for a 5-day visit. The timing of Japan’s move in the Taiwan Strait won’t have escaped Putin’s notice. Xi got the main message, but Japan also let Putin know that whatever desperate attempts he’s making to cuddle up to Xi aren’t going unnoticed.
32:47 · An ultramodern Japanese destroyer is the perfect answer to the creaking frigots that Russia sent to China. Japan sends something deadly into the Taiwan Strait. Neither Xi nor Putin can do anything about it. The balance of power in East Asia has shifted and not in a way China, North Korea, or Russia will appreciate. Japan just deployed two new missiles that greatly extend its range and capabilities to execute counter strikes.
Japan Deployed Something China Was PRAYING Would Never Exist… Xi Is in PANIC
33:13 · What’s more, both are entirely homegrown creations. Their deployment means that large swavthes of territory both at sea and on land that were previously only reachable by US forces stationed [music] in Japan are now firmly in Japan’s sights. The status quo in the region has changed in Japan’s favor, perhaps permanently. Here’s the inside scoop on these two new missiles and why China, North Korea, and Russia are so alarmed by their deployment. Somewhat confusingly, both of the new missiles are [music] named Type 25.
33:43 · The Type 25 surfaceto- ship missile and the Type 25 high-speed gliding projectile. The naming is a quirk of Japanese weapon designation policy. New items are designated by the fiscal year in which they entered service. The two new missile types were formally deployed on March 31st, 2026, the last day of the Japanese 2025 fiscal year. So although they differ substantially in terms of specs and capabilities, both share the same name, Type 25.
34:12 · What makes these two new systems particularly noteworthy is that they’re Japan’s first domestically developed standoff missiles and the first to be deployed to active units. To be fair, the first of the two, the Type25 surfaceto- ship missile or SSM, is actually an upgrade of an existing missile, the Type 12. You might expect given the missile’s name and Japanese naming convention, the Type 12 was introduced in 2012 or Q1 2013. In fact, although development was completed in 2012, it was only officially inducted into service in 2015.
34:42 · We’ll chalk that off to further quirks in Japanese [music] designation conventions. The Type 12 is a truckmounted anti-ship missile developed by Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. It’s also an upgrade from the aging Type 88 SSM. As the name suggests, the Type 88 was introduced in the late 1980s. The type 12 upgrade added modern capabilities like an inertial navigation system or INS with midcourse GPS guidance. It also boasted greatly improved precision thanks to enhanced terrain contour matching and target discrimination capabilities.
35:16 · Based on procurement orders, roughly 50 Type 12 systems are estimated to have been deployed in total. Later, a ship launched version of the Type 12 called the Type 17 SSM2 was introduced in, you guessed it, 2017. Intended for deployment on Japan’s Mayerclass destroyers, it doubled the land-based Type 12’s range to around 250 mi.
35:33 · Now, the Type 25 extends that range again to around 620 mi, roughly five times greater than the Type 12, and that’s precisely what has the Chinese and North Korean militaries on the edge of their seats. For the first time, Japan has its own true standoff capability. Ukraine’s development of locally produced Flamingo, Neptune, FP7, and FP9 missiles freed it from dependence on Western systems like Storm Shadow or Scalp missiles for its longrange standoff strikes against Russia.
36:03 · Now, Japan has the same flexibility, as we’ll see a little later on, that could be critical in the years ahead. Technically speaking, a missile is generally considered to be a standoff weapon if it has a range exceeding around 90 mi. At that range, the missile can be launched from outside the effective range of most enemy air defenses. Technically though, the Type 12 is already a standoff missile. But that’s not the case when considering China’s missile air defenses.
36:29 · Sure, China’s Russian S300 system and domestically made HQ15 analog only have an effective range of around 124 mi, and the HQ9’s range is roughly equivalent to the Type 12’s. However, China’s HQ22 system has a range of around 105 mi. Its Russian S400 has a maximum range approaching 250 mi and its HQ19 intended as a longrange analog of the US’s THAAD around 1,864 mi.
36:57 · Compared to the latter three systems, the Type 12 can’t be considered a standoff missile. But with a range roughly 2 1/2 times that of China’s most extensive air defenses, the Type 25 SSM is certainly a standoff missile. What’s more, Japan intends to further extend the range of future iterations to around 932 mi. But even at its current range of 620, the Type25 changes the game in and around both China and North Korea. The Type 12’s limited range meant that it functioned primarily as point defense.
37:28 · The Type 25’s range converts the missile into a longrange precision strike capability that’s capable of targeting both naval formations and selected land-based objectives. The upgrade was approved by the Japanese Congress or Diet in December 2020. Mass production reportedly began in fiscal year 2023 with deployment accelerated to fiscal year 2025. The Japanese made good on that commitment, even if they squeaked in on the last day of the year. In terms of specs, not too much is known at this point, such as the size of the warhead it carries, the speed, etc.
37:56 · What we do know is that the Type25’s airframe was redesigned to reduce its radar signature, essential for survivability against modern air defense systems. It’s propelled by a compact turboan engine optimized for sustained lowaltitude cruise, further minimizing detection during long endurance flights. The Type25’s guidance combines inertial navigation systems and satellite positioning with terrain referencing and terminal radar imaging.
38:23 · The combination enables engagement of moving maritime targets with the finest of Japanese precision. The missile can also receive midcourse updates via network enabled data links, integrating inputs from maritime patrol aircraft, coastal radar stations, or other surveillance assets in real time. It also ticks another vital box when it comes to modern land-based missiles, mobility. The system is mounted on a highmobility transporter erector launcher that’s installed on an 8x8 wheeled chassis.
38:53 · Each launcher carries six missile canisters and can conduct rapid salvo launches before swiftly relocating. As the war in Ukraine has aly demonstrated in an age of ubiquitous surveillance and kamicazi drones, the ability to shoot and scoot makes all the difference.
39:08 · Taking advantage of Japan’s mountainous geography, launcher units can disperse across coastal areas or island positions, fire, and reposition quickly before the enemy can lock on for counter strikes. While the system is certain to be rolled out broadly across the Japanese armed forces, the choice of locations for the initial deployments is strategic. How so? The first operational units have been stationed at Camp Kangun in Kunamoto Prefecture. From this base, a wide range of Chinese and North Korean targets are now within range.
39:36 · The entire Korean Peninsula is now also within Japan’s range for offensive strikes on land-based or naval targets, including all of North Korea. Respected comrade Kim Jong-un, as the people call the Supreme Leader of North Korea, could always strike Japan with missiles. So could his father, Kim Jong-, who preceded Kim Jong-un as Supreme Leader and ruled from 1994 until he died in 2011 when his son took over. Kim Jong- also inherited the ability to strike Japan from his father, Kim Ilong, the founder and first leader of North Korea.
40:07 · By the mid 1990s, Kim, the eldest, had developed the Hasang 7 ballistic missile, also known as Nodong, [music] and put it into serial production. But he died in 1994, the year before it entered service. A modified version of the notorious Scud with a range of around 800 m, the Nodong could reliably reach out and touch Osaka, Tokyo, and most of southern and central Japan. And since then, with each successive generation of the Kim dynasty, the reach of North Korea’s capabilities has only grown.
40:36 · In addition to the Nong, the current Kim also has the Hasang 10 at his disposal, an intermediate range ballistic missile with a range of at least 1,500 mi. That’s sufficient to hit all of Japan from the North Korean mainland. He also has fullrange ICBMs.
40:53 · The Hasang 14 has an estimated range of at least 4,000 mi, and the Hasang 15 is supposedly capable of reaching the continental US. Both could undoubtedly reach Japan. And there are more. For decades, North Korea could strike Japan from standoff distance and beyond. While Japan couldn’t pose the equivalent threat, it could only defend itself against incoming missiles using the layered air defenses such as its Patriot Pack 3 and Aegis SM3. Now, the extended range of the Type 25 SSM levels the playing field. You hit us, we hit you.
41:24 · Or maybe we hit you first. These options are now available to Japan, and they give Japan the same kind of leverage over China. Well, not quite the same, but close enough. The difference comes down to the sheer size of [music] China.
41:36 · The Type 25 can comfortably cover the entirety of North Korea. China, on the other hand, extends over almost 6 million square miles, and there’s the East [music] China Sea between it and Japan. With a 620 mi range, the Type25 SSM only covers a small arc of total Chinese territory. Still, what it does cover is concerning enough for Xi.
41:56 · Spread out across the length of Japan’s sprawling islands, numerous high-v value targets on the mainland will be in range. The juiciest targets are undoubtedly in China’s Far East, Shanghai is now within range, as are major cities, ports, and industrial hubs like Hangu and Ningbo. These aren’t just large population centers hosting some of China’s most important companies and industries and driving its global trade.
42:19 · The Type 25 also brings key military installations into its crosshairs.
42:24 · Jiangio Airport at Hangu is a major military air base housing the Chinese Air Force, the PLAAF’s 83rd Brigade.
42:32 · China’s JH7A fighter bombers operate from this base. There’s another major base in nearby Ningbo, the Ningbo Naval Base. It’s the headquarters of the PLA Navy’s East Sea Fleet and a major command center for naval operations in the East China Sea. Also within range of the Type25 is nearby Fuj Base located near the city of Fuju. This air base is a key node in the concentration of forces opposite Taiwan [music] and a base for China’s air defense missile systems. And there are many more important facilities that Xi would definitely rather be out of range.
43:03 · That’s how it’s been until now. Similar to the case with North Korea, China has enjoyed the advantage of being able to hit Japan with standoff [music] missiles, while the reverse was not true. The DF-21D, often called a carrier killer, entered service in the early 2010s. Technically an anti-hship ballistic missile, it can, of course, also effectively strike non-moving [music] targets on land. With a range of up to 1,336 mi, it [music] can reach Japanese territory, including the US bases on Okinawa.
43:30 · China’s ground launched CJ10 or DH10 cruise missile is capable [music] of precision strikes up to 930 mi away.
43:39 · And its DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile has a range of 2,485 mi, enough to cover the whole of Japan and then some. Like with North Korea, the Type25 SSM’s extended range allows it to reach into sensitive parts of China in the same way, significantly leveling the playing field for Japan.
43:58 · There’s also a third region where the new missile upends the status quo somewhat. Russia from Saporro in the north. Type 25s could fly over Russian territory and hit Hailong Jian and Jilin provinces in China. The region is considered one of China’s bread baskets, but it’s also a key transportation corridor. Rail hubs like Sui Fenhi and the Liao Xi corridor are vital for land transport to China’s northern ports.
44:20 · The border areas have become vibrant hubs in recent years thanks to the thriving trade that has resulted from Russia being compelled to redirect much of its trade to China due to Western sanctions.
44:33 · Deep and very costly plans are well underway to extend the logistical infrastructure further out, particularly the links to Russia’s nearby Far Eastern ports. Much of this critical node in the burgeoning Chinese-Russian alliance is now in Japan’s crosshairs if it ever came to a kinetic conflict between the two nations. In fact, several of those key Russian Far Eastern ports are now also within the Type25’s range. To be fair, Japan doesn’t need standoff weapons to reach out and touch Russia with things that go boom.
44:58 · At their closest points, the two nations are only separated by 26 or 27 mi across La Peru Strait, which separates Japan’s Hawkaido from Russia’s Sakalin. Ukraine has simple FPV drones that can strike further. But the Type25’s extended range brings many more troublesome targets into range for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Major ports and military installations. The Russian Pacific Fleet stationed at Vladivosto is suddenly within Japan’s reach.
45:25 · Kabarovsk is a major administrative and military center and is the headquarters of Russia’s eastern military district. Japan’s relationship with Russia has rarely been easy with tensions heightened recently because of Japan’s pro- Ukrainian position. Russia has held the same standoff missile advantage over Japan as China and North Korea for some time.
45:44 · That advantage has now gone. Japan may not be able to strike much of Russia with its Type 25s, but the regions it can touch could derail Russia’s far eastern defenses and scupper its economic integration with China. Both would be massive strategic defeats for Putin. Looking for the latest military news and incisive analysis from all the world’s major hotspots? That’s what we deliver here on the Military Show.
46:06 · Subscribe to the channel now to stay fully informed about all of the most important stories and developments. Now, you may be wondering why a nation with such a high level of technical proficiency like Japan hasn’t developed offensive standoff capabilities until now. It was a matter of choice.
46:21 · Following its devastating defeat in World War II, Japan adopted a defenseonly military posture. It would only produce and purchase weapons to defend itself against threats, but not offensive weaponry. That posture was made possible by Japan’s formal military alliance with the US. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which took effect in 1960, the US is obliged to defend Japan if it’s attacked. But the upshot is that all of the offensive weaponry in Japan is packed by US forces at its roughly 15 major bases in the country.
46:50 · In terms of standoff capabilities, the US could strike China, North Korea, or Russia from the F-15E Strike Eagles and F-35A Lightning 2s stationed at bases like Kadana air base on Okinawa. Like they’ve been doing in Iran, these aircraft can fire longrange standoff missiles like the AGM158 Jassim and AGM88G ARGMER.
47:12 · But from Japan’s perspective, extensive as it is, that security blanket is no longer sufficient. The security equation in the region has changed dramatically.
47:20 · The pace of development of offensive weaponry by China and North Korea is frenetic and the risks for Japan rise exponentially with it. Alarmed by these developments, Japan presented a much revised, much more hawkish national security strategy or NSS in 2022. The new NSS pointedly picked out China as its main threat with Russia being defined as a major threat. It mandates a near doubling of defense spending to reach 2% of GDP by 2027, double the informal 1% cap that had been in place previously.
47:48 · But perhaps most importantly, for the first time, Japan formally committed to acquiring counter-strike capabilities. Japan had opened the door to offensive weaponry.
47:57 · It could now use standoff missiles like the Type25 to target enemy bases if an armed attack is imminent. And as you can see from the introduction of the two new Type 25 missiles, Japan isn’t wasting any time turning the mandate into reality. The second recently unveiled missile with the designation type 25 also falls into the category of standoff missiles, but it has a different mission profile. The Type 25 Hypervelocity Gliding Projectile or HVGP.
48:24 · The HVGP is Japan’s first operational hypersonic glide weapon. The iteration that’s just been deployed, Block One, has an estimated range of 185 to 310 mi.
48:35 · But that’s not what makes it special.
48:36 · The missile is launched via a solid fuel rocket booster that separates at high altitude. This allows the glide vehicle to descend at hypersonic speeds exceeding MAC 5 over 3,700 mph while performing erratic maneuvering trajectories to evade interception. The HVGP carries a conical boost glide warhead with small control fins for lateral and vertical adjustments. And like its namesake, it uses satellite navigation, inertial systems, and terminal radar infrared imaging for guidance. Due to its smaller range, the HVGP doesn’t offer Japan the same deterrent value as the longer range SSM.
49:11 · It’s primarily designed for remote island defense rather than counter-strike operations. But what it lacks in range, it makes up for in sneakiness and versatility, and that makes it ideal for shorter range counter-strike operational profiles. The HVGP’s maneuverability makes it extremely difficult to track and bring down. It’s great for attacking enemy bases, targeting high-v value assets like command nodes, amphibious assault groups, and carrier decks using armor-piercing or explosively formed projectile warheads.
49:38 · In closely contested island chains, HVGPs could create a deterrence all on their own.
49:46 · Enemy ships and missile launch sites would be forced to stay beyond their range for fear of stealthy, practically impossible to intercept missile attacks.
49:53 · With sufficient numbers in place, the combination of Type25 SSMs and HVGPS could significantly extend Japan’s defensive envelope to cover the East China Sea and regions near Taiwan.
50:04 · Current block ones are primarily for training and bedding in. The Block 2 variants scheduled for the 2030s will have ranges of 1,300 to 1,800 m. That will make them even more of a counter-strike threat than the current Type 25 SSM, both in terms of range and maneuverability. Japan also has plans for additional ship and air launched variants for fiscal year 2027 to create a layered distributed strike architecture. That architecture integrates domestic systems like the two new type 25s with established systems from Japan’s allies, primarily the US.
50:36 · Japan is planning to deploy US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles on all eight of its Aegis destroyers. Also in March 2026, the Congo class destroyer JS Chokai was successfully upgraded to launch tomahawks. It’s the first time a Japanese warship has been able to strike targets over 1,000 mi. The JS Chokai reportedly completed crew training and modifications at Naval Base San Diego ahead of schedule with live fire tests scheduled for August 2026 before returning to Cabo Naval Air Base.
51:04 · There’s just one problem. Japan might have to wait a while before its Tomahawks are delivered. Japan ordered 400 Tomahawks, 200 each of the Block 4 and Block 5 variants in a $ 1.7 billion contract in 2024. Deliveries were planned to be completed in 2027.
51:20 · However, the US has made such heavy use of tomahawks against Iran that an already thin supply chain has been disrupted. The US has been rapidly plowing through its stockpiles at an unreplaceable rate. Before the war, it had anywhere from 3,00 to 4,500 of the block 4 and 5 variants on hand. It reportedly burned through 400 within the first 72 hours against Iran and 850 in the first month. Meanwhile, annual production has been hovering between just 60 and 90 per year.
51:47 · Sure, the US Department of Defense and Rathon established new agreements in February 2026 to ramp up production to 1,000 tomahawks per year, but that’s going to take a while, and the needs of the US armed forces are always likely to come first. For Japan, the situation only hammers home the strategic value of being able to develop its own advanced weaponry. We’ve already seen something similar with Ukraine’s endless struggles to get its hands on increasingly scarce pack 3 missiles for its Patriot systems.
52:16 · Indeed, the war against Iran is placing increasing pressure on US stockpiles of all kinds of weapons that are at the heart of all its allies defenses. You can see why military and political leaders from around the world, from the EU to Japan, are calling for the kind of weapons self-sufficiency that Ukraine has already been forced to develop.
52:34 · Japan’s new Type25 missiles have already given the likes of Xi, Kim, and Putin plenty of extra food for thought.
Xi Tried to Build China’s STRONGEST Army… He BROKE It Instead
52:40 · China’s military is being wiped out from within as the country’s leader, Xi Jinping, carries out sweeping purges of highranking officials. No one appears to be safe as even the most respected generals with decades of experience are being shown the door. Xi believes this approach will help build a more loyal, modern, and effective army. He’s wrong.
53:03 · Numerous experts instead argue that his antics are shattering the military’s foundational strength and cohesion, setting the People’s Liberation Army, PLA, back several decades and plunging the Chinese armed forces into a crisis from which they may never recover. So to understand this story, the first question to answer is why? Why? Right when China is expanding its military, [music] building the largest navy on Earth, and projecting more power than ever before, would Xi Jingping risk destabilizing his own military?
53:35 · The answer quite simply comes down to [music] control. In 2017, during the 19th Party Congress, Xi laid out plans for the construction of a truly worldclass military force. By 2020, he wanted the PLA’s ground forces to become fully recognized with worldleading armored vehicles and advanced information technologies opening up new strategic capabilities.
54:00 · By 2035, he anticipates the full modernization of the military to be complete. And by 2049, which is also the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, worldclass status will have been achieved through modernization and investment [music] in state-of-the-art systems. Xi hopes to see the Chinese military live up to its [music] potential and become one of the most fearsome fighting forces ever assembled.
54:27 · It may never be able to match the United States military, but Xi wants to at least narrow the gap between the two nations. This will in theory grant China more power and freedom to pursue its long-term strategic goals like the muchtalked about reunification with Taiwan with less risk of the country’s enemies interfering. But Xi doesn’t just want a more powerful high-tech military.
54:53 · He also wants one that raises the benchmarks with discipline, professionalism, and loyalty. He wants an army that never says no. in which every member of personnel, from the lowliest recruits to the highest ranking officers, is fully committed to the cause and entirely willing to obey whatever orders they receive from the ruling party without [music] question or hesitation. An army that he and he alone controls. There’s no room in an army like that for free thinkers, for people who might upset the order or go against the grain.
55:23 · And so those kinds of people are being systematically removed as we speak.
55:32 · Are we already in World War II? Because [music] depending on what you read, it can feel like we’re living in completely different realities. And keeping up with the news isn’t the hard part anymore.
55:42 · It’s figuring out what’s actually true.
55:44 · Take this story covered by nearly 200 sources [music] across the spectrum. It reports the US military says its blockade of Iranian ports has completely halted economic trade within [music] 36 hours. But just one day earlier, another story mostly covered by nearly 80 sources, most being left-leaning, said marine traffic in the straight of Hormuse was barely affected on the first day of the blockade. [music] So which is it? Total shutdown, barely a disruption, or can both be true?
56:12 · That divide and coverage is exactly why we use ground news to help keep us informed on the multiple active [music] conflicts happening around the world. If you only saw one of those headlines, you’d walk away with just one perspective and a completely different understanding of what’s going on. Ground News pulls in thousands of news stories every day and organizes [music] them by topic, showing you bias, reliability, and ownership for every source, so you can see every angle in one place. One feature we’ve been using a lot lately is [music] blind spot.
56:43 · It shows you stories heavily covered by one side of the political spectrum, but barely talked [music] about by the other. No matter where you fall politically, breaking out of the echo chamber gives you a more accurate understanding of what’s really happening. And [music] that’s incredibly important when it comes to breaking through the fog of war. So go to ground.news/military show or scan the QR code for 40% [music] off the unlimited access Vantage plan and it brings the price down for less than the price of a cup of coffee. So give ground news a shot for yourself.
57:16 · Beginning in 2022 and continuing all the way through into 2026, Xi Jinping has orchestrated an unprecedented purge of China’s military leadership with more than 100 senior officers and dozens of generals and lieutenant generals removed from their posts with dozens more currently classed as either missing or under investigation. These aren’t just random officers or relatively low-level individuals. They’re some of China’s most experienced military leaders.
57:44 · In late 2024, for example, the country’s former defense minister, Weung Ho, was investigated on charges of corruption and eventually expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, CCP, with his rank of general in the Rocket Force being revoked. Weii’s successor, Lee Shang Fu, [music] also mysteriously vanished from public life in 2023 before being removed from office and expelled from the party, setting a record as the shortest serving minister of national defense in history.
58:17 · Liu Chiao, commander of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, was another big name to fall, being officially expelled from the party in July 2024. And in 2025, the purge picked up pace with numerous generals, including Heri Dong and Meow Hua being accused of what the CCP called extremely serious crimes. 2026 hasn’t shown any signs of this trend subsiding.
58:41 · In fact, in January, China announced [music] the removal of two of the top generals on its central military commission, Lao Zen Lee [music] and Jang Yosha. Lao dedicated his entire life to the military, enlisting in the PLA in 1983 and graduating from the PLA National Defense University a year later.
59:00 · He went on to play an integral role in the Sino Vietnamese conflicts, [music] which lasted throughout the 1980s through to 1991, famously helping defend the line against no less than 36 separate Vietnamese assaults. As the years went by, he rose up the ranks, becoming chief of staff of the 65th Group Army in 2009,
59:23 · chief of staff of the People’s Armed Police in 2015, chief of staff of the PLA Ground Force later that same year, and chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC in 2023.
59:35 · Jang enjoyed a similarly successful career. The [music] son of General Jang Jong Shun, another highly successful and decorated PLA figurehead, Jang joined the military in 1968 and fought in the Sino Vietnamese war. There, when he was only in his mid20s and serving as a company commander, Jang demonstrated a remarkable level of tactical aptitude far beyond his years. His unit was pinned down while attempting to assault a fortified hilltop position.
1:00:03 · Understanding that any additional attempts at a frontal assault were sure to fail, Jang made a bold request. He asked for an entire battalion, four times larger than his own unit, to carry out a jungle flanking maneuver. The regimental commander ultimately approved the request and the surprise attack worked. The Vietnamese defenses were breached and the Chinese soldiers celebrated a valuable victory. Only 5 years later, Jang was in charge of the main assault in the Battle of Lashan, the biggest engagement of the entire Sino Vietnamese border war. Again, his tactics were both bold and ambitious.
1:00:38 · His strategy, which involved the military’s first complete infantry artillery coordination plan since the Cultural Revolution, involved massive amounts of artillery support, way beyond what any regimental commander would usually ask for or be entitled to. But once more, it worked out. Despite facing a massive Vietnamese counterattack, Jangs men held their position against six enemy regiments. Thanks in no small part to the artillery backing them up.
1:01:03 · He proven his abilities and earned the many promotions that followed with Jang becoming a major general in 1997, lieutenant general in 2007, and general in 2011. In 2017, he was awarded the prestigious position of vice chairman of the CMC. But in late 2025, he disappeared from public view. Then in January, he and Lao were officially removed from their post. All of a sudden, all of their years of experience counted for nothing. All of their service, sacrifice, and prestige were wiped out overnight.
1:01:35 · Xi and his most loyal supporters will argue that this was all for a noble cause. The official party line is that these mass removals of major military officers aren’t part of a political purge. is simply the result of Beijing clamping [music] down on corruption. The CCP claims that the PLA had been suffering from a serious and long-running corruption problem involving officers embezzling funds, buying their way to higher ranks, falsifying documents, and so on. There’s certainly some evidence to support this argument.
1:02:06 · And as Xi supporters note, a corrupt military cannot possibly reach that allimportant worldclass status that China is aiming at. The military would never be able to attain the high standards of credibility and quality it strives for if it’s filled with officers who lie, steal, and cheat on a regular basis. As a result, the party says it was left with no other option but to investigate and punish those who had broken the rules. The CCP also argues that the party must always remain in full control of the military.
1:02:35 · There cannot be any risk of coups or fragmented command chains, which is another supposed justification for the ongoing removal of highranking officers and the replacement with figures who may not have as much experience but are seen as more loyal and trustworthy. Many analysts, however, argue that the party stance doesn’t stand up to forensic inspection.
1:02:56 · The Jamestown Foundation, for example, published a lengthy analysis entitled, “Jang Yosha’s differences with Xi Jinping led to his purge,” using open- source data from various official Chinese sources to argue that the charges against Jang, as well as possibly other figures implicated in the purge are less to do with corruption and more to do with disagreements with Xi Jinping’s policies.
1:03:19 · Namely, the report noted that both Jang [snorts] and Lao had resisted directives that they felt were unrealistic, particularly regarding a possible invasion of Taiwan by 2027, with Jang arguing that 2035 was a much more realistic target. It seems, therefore, that Xi isn’t necessarily punishing corruption, but disobedience, rooting out anyone who would dare stand up and tell him no.
1:03:42 · As Helena Learda, a researcher at Merik puts it, “Official narratives after the purge of Jang and Lao make it clear that the dismissals were political in nature and based on a perceived or real lack of loyalty to Xi and his goals. But in eliminating those who might challenge him, many analysts argue that Xi is making the PLA significantly weaker and undermining his own worldclass military aspirations. But before we look closer at that, this is why we make the military show to explain how power really moves.
1:04:13 · If you’re new here, hit subscribe so you don’t miss what’s next. On the surface, it looks as though Xi is both culling corrupt officers and getting rid of people who could undermine his authority [music] in the future. In the process, look deeper and his real objective begins to emerge.
1:04:31 · He’s not just targeting individuals.
1:04:34 · He’s targeting connections, the informal but important networks of power that link different people and groups within the military. Known in Chinese as Guani, these kinds of networks exist in some shape or form in every military all over the globe. They’re a natural and almost inescapable consequence of how the military world works. [music] Soldiers who enlist at the same time and undergo basic training at the same facility will always share a certain kind of kinship.
1:05:01 · For example, [music] senior officers will often mentor the most promising troops under their command and keep in touch with them even if they move around to other units or locations later in their careers. People who serve together will naturally develop bonds and will often be willing to help or look out for one another in the future should the opportunity arise. So even though militaries on paper appear to run purely according to rank, orders, and formal chains of command, there’s also an underlying layer of relationships that influences how things work.
1:05:30 · That’s especially true for a military as vast and complex as China’s, where Guani are not formally recognized or regulated, but quietly shape the way the overall system functions. [music] When a Chinese soldier has a problem, for example, he might not necessarily want to follow the official channels dealing with delays and bureaucracy. He might instead reach out to his old commanding officer for advice or contact a former squadmate. From the personnel’s perspective, there are numerous benefits to this system.
1:05:59 · It’s often faster and simpler, for example, for members of the military who know and trust one another to assist each other without having to go through the system and weigh through layers of red tape and approval processes. Guani enables trust, fosters communication, and compensates for the overly strict and rigid top-down structures that exist through the PLA.
1:06:22 · Indeed, writing for war on the rocks, [music] Jamestown Foundation fellow and Chinese military expert Christopher Nye notes, in China, relying on informal networks is how an officer actually navigates the system. It’s the mechanism through which one secures a promotion, obtains political shelter during an investigation, and even negotiates for battlefield command or prioritize ammunition.
1:06:43 · These guanchi coales into an umbrella, the essential patronage infrastructure that provides the security and resources necessary to function within a totalizing party state. It’s thanks to Guan Xi, for example, that Chang Yosha was able to get approval when he requested a full battalion of reinforcements and all the artillery support he wanted during the Sino Vietnamese war. He was the son of a famous and wellrespected general. He had a network of connections and he called in some favors from people who knew his father’s name.
1:07:15 · Later in his career, Jang continued to leverage his connections to achieve his aims. While serving as commander of the Shenyang military region in the late 2000s, for example, he spearheaded a military housing program that involved using military land [music] allocations to arrange huge construction deals between local governments and commercial developers.
1:07:36 · This was hugely beneficial for military personnel as it secured muchneeded housing for literally thousands of officers and Jang did it in a way that helped to bypass some of the formal constraints [music] that would have usually made such a feat almost impossible. There have been countless other similar stories throughout Chinese military history in which personal networks have helped personnel overcome bureaucratic hurdles or achieve [music] things that simply wouldn’t have been possible had they operated according to the rigid rules of the system.
1:08:04 · High-ranking commanders, for example, have been able to recognize the most talented and ambitious recruits within their own networks and elevate them to higher roles. Officers have also leveraged their connections to assist with everything from weapons procurement to interdep departmental coordination.
1:08:22 · Cynics could argue that these kinds of connections cause bias or imbalance in the military [music] machine. Those who know better, meanwhile, will argue that these networks are natural and healthy byproducts of that machine. They’re the inevitable result of dedicating oneself to the military. Soldiers at all levels will always form connections with the people around them. And an officer who does their duty, mentors subordinates, rewards those who apply themselves, and cultivates trust across different departments, hasn’t broken any kind of code. They’ve done their best with the role they were given.
1:08:54 · Unfortunately, that’s not how Xi sees it. As N notes, China’s leader has a tendency to view informal networks with perpetual suspicion. For him, there’s always some level of risk attached to Guan Xi.
1:09:08 · Because if enough high-ranking officers form their own connections and [music] clicks, they could consolidate their power to defy party orders or shape the military as they see fit, not as he sees fit. Xi Jinping’s ideal army is one [music] in which the high command is atomized, with officers and officials who are competent, replaceable, and fiercely loyal to nobody but the Supreme Leader. He doesn’t want them making connections with one another or bending the rules now and then to save time or help each other out.
1:09:36 · He wants a system that is strictly regulated and perfectly predictable where every member of personnel, no matter their experience or seniority, does exactly as they’re told every single time. And so he’s cutting the people who don’t fit that vision and shattering those informal networks at the same time. He clearly thinks it’s the right move, the only way to achieve his aims. In reality, [music] it’s likely doing much more harm than good.
1:10:04 · Because when you get rid of so many senior officers all in such a short span of time, you’re not just eliminating individuals, but destroying the very system that they were holding together.
1:10:13 · These aren’t low-level soldiers. They’re people with decades of command experience and proven records of competence and success at the highest levels. That sort of experience and the skills that come with it don’t just appear overnight. There aren’t ready grown replacements for chiefs of staff just waiting in the wings. Ready and able to step seamlessly into high ranking positions in one of the biggest military forces the world has ever seen to oversee complex operations, coordinate strategy across different branches and make life or death decisions under pressure.
1:10:43 · Xi is actively investigating, arresting, and expelling the precious few people who could fulfill these kinds of roles to the world-class standard he strives for. And he’s replacing them with people who may be more loyal and far less likely to go behind his back, but also have nowhere near that same level of trust, authority, and respect. New commanders are being thrust into positions they don’t know.
1:11:05 · Inheriting organizations they didn’t build and teams that don’t fully trust them and asked to operate according to the strictest tightest of rule sets where even a single false move can be career ending. So what happens next? These new commanders become excessively wary. They operate with the utmost caution. Constantly frightened of making the wrong move, saying the wrong thing, or even being seen with the wrong person. They double check everything, avoid even the tiniest of risks, and follow every procedure to the letter.
1:11:35 · Bit by bit, this will inevitably affect the wider culture of the Chinese military. Eventually, it’s likely to reach a point where personnel at all levels are less focused on performance or excellence and instead on their own survival. And when that happens, the very power that China wants to project will inevitably begin to crumble.
1:11:53 · Because modern warfare demands speed, initiative, and bold decision-making abilities. But China is building an army that lacks all three of those key factors. An army that’s slow, hesitant, and gripped by fear. The further down this path Xi goes, the worse it could get as his military becomes more disciplined and loyal. It’s also likely to become less honest. Real feedback will disappear. Genuine voices of dissent will be silenced, and there will no longer be people willing to speak up and say when something isn’t a good idea or a plan might have flaws.
1:12:24 · Instead, Xi will have an army of sickopants praising his every move, terrified to show even the slightest semblance of disagreement.
1:12:33 · That’s an incredibly dangerous dynamic because if there’s nobody there to speak the truth, China may make major military decisions based on lies. As he becomes more confident in his country’s capacities, for example, Xi could launch an attack on Taiwan even sooner than expected, which could quite easily become the flash point for a far larger conflict, dragging in other nations from all over the world, including the United States and Europe, and potentially triggering a global conflict the likes of which the world has sought to prevent for so many decades.
1:13:02 · And it’s all because of one man’s hubris and inability to cope with the very idea of anyone else encroaching on his dominance. Xi Jinping wants to build the perfect military, a force that’s modern, disciplined, and loyal to a fault. He’s doing everything in his power to achieve it, removing those he sees as rivals, tightening authority, and reshaping the system from the top down. But in removing the so-called corruption, he’s also eradicating flexibility. In destroying informal networks, he’s wiping out trust.
1:13:33 · And in demanding loyalty, he’s discouraging honesty. And the effects of this may not be all that noticeable during peace time. But when conflict comes, which it almost certainly will, the damage he’s done will be impossible to hide. For decades, there have been only two ways for fighter jets and bombers to carry and launch air fired missiles. Either the missiles were carried internally within a bombers’s bomb bay or lugged, that is attached externally on pylons under the wings with lugs.
China Has a New Problem… U.S. Just Did Something No One Thought Possible
1:14:02 · These two methods have been and continue to be highly effective, limited only by the number of missiles a particular plane can carry during a single deployment and the number of planes deployed in any given operation. Now the US has turned that equation on its head. The Pentagon has come up with an ingenious new system that promises to greatly expand the number of aircraft capable of deploying cruise missiles [music] and the number of missiles they can carry. the rapid dragon system.
1:14:30 · It looks like a gamecher, especially in the Indo-Pacific theater where the US has been actively seeking new ways of overwhelming and neutralizing Chinese air defenses. Even better, Rapid Dragon doesn’t require any expensive new equipment to be built or even any drastic modifications to existing tech.
1:14:53 · In fact, the idea makes so much sense, you wonder why no one has thought of it before. Here’s what makes Rapid Dragon so unique and how it could swing the balance of power in the Far East decisively in the US’s favor. In 2023,
1:15:08 · the US Air Force’s research laboratory defined Rapid Dragon as a palletized munitions experimentation campaign exploring feasibility and operational advantages of airdropping longrange palletized munitions from existing airlift platforms such as the C130 and C17 without aircraft modifications.
1:15:30 · In layman’s terms, Rapid Dragon converts cargo aircraft into weapons carriers that can deploy cruise missiles and potentially other standoff or self-defense weapons by releasing them on pallets via the plane’s rear cargo ramps. In other words, it turns a cargo aircraft into a bomber whose weapons load is theoretically limited only by how many pallets will fit in the cargo bay. Now, cargo planes have been used to drop bombs on enemies since at least World War II.
1:15:59 · During the bombing of Warsaw in 1940, for example, the Germans used JU52 transport planes as auxiliary bombers. The US started to use C130 cargo planes to drop blue 82 daisy cutter during the Vietnam War and continued using the technique in the 1991 Iraq war and in Afghanistan with larger GBU43B MOAB bombs. But those are bombs, not missiles.
1:16:27 · The planes have to fly much closer to their targets to deploy them than to deploy standoff cruise missiles.
1:16:34 · The risks are tolerable when the enemy, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, has meagga air defenses. But when facing off against sophisticated multi-layered defenses like those in and around China, the carpet bombing raids of previous generations often carry unacceptable risks for the aircraft dropping them. Hence, the rise of standoff cruise missiles, which can be launched from beyond the range of air defense systems and even more advanced fighter jets and bombers to launch them.
1:17:03 · But the problem of limited launch capacity remains. Now you just can’t roll missiles out of the hatch of a transport plane like you can with glide bombs. Nevertheless, the US has been experimenting with ways of launching missiles from cargo plane since Vietnam.
1:17:19 · In 1974, the US actually demonstrated the feasibility of launching an ICBM from practically anywhere when it test fired a 57 ft 88,000 lb LGM30 Minuteman airdrop from a C5A galaxy. The following decade, a lowerc cost alternative to the B1 bomber known as the cruise missile carrier aircraft or CMCA was designed.
1:17:45 · The idea was to reconfigure Boeing 747200 cargo airframes as specialurpose cruise missile launchers with a capacity of 50 to 100 AGM86 ALCM missiles. The missiles would be released rapidly by a rotary launcher on the side of the tail fuselage and dynamically targeted by an onboard control system. The CMCA was never fully developed, but Rapid Dragon builds on the same core idea, adapting existing aircraft into standoff arsenal ships at lower cost.
1:18:15 · The key concept that made this possible was first explored in 2003 by graduate students at the Air Force Institute of Technology when they deployed missiles from the rear of transport aircraft using parachuted pallet trays. The idea was further fleshed out during the 2010s, culminating in Rapid [music] Dragon. The program debuted in 2019 and was developed further from 2020 to 2021 by a team of US Air Force development groups and industry partners.
1:18:45 · Initial tests at Whitands Missile Range in New Mexico during 2021 validated the release of representative missiles from both the C17A and ECG130 SJ aircraft. By the end of 2021, the concept was ready for live fire testing. In its first and final live fire test over the Gulf of Mexico on December 16, 2021, an armed rapid dragon received target data from a distant commander control node in flight on board an MC130J cargo plane.
1:19:17 · It then used the data to target its armed AGM 158B joint air-to-surface standoff missile or Jassim missile was air dropped and successfully deployed its payloads with a live missile destroying its naval target.
1:19:33 · Just under a year later in November 2022, the first European theater live fired demonstration of a JSUM airdrop from an MCU 1300J in a rapid dragon pallet was conducted at Andoya space test range in Norway as part of the Atrius 2022 military exercises. And now in 2026, the experimentation phase is over and Rapid Dragon is ready for action.
1:19:59 · In April 2026, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center or AFL CMC announced the establishment of Dragon Cart, the official program of record to arm mobility aircraft with so-called palletized munitions. That means Rapid Dragon isn’t an experiment anymore. It’s an official operationalized US military program. This designation is an important step and underscores how serious the US military is about the rapid dragon dragon cart project.
1:20:30 · The project’s program of record status guarantees long-term budget allocation and formal integration into future force planning. In May 2026, the program entered the transition phase between experimentation and operational deployment [music] with fielding expected in 2027 through the middle tier acquisition rapid fielding pathway. How it works is both technologically advanced and remarkably simple.
1:20:56 · Rapid dragon is like a smart and disposable bomb bay in a box that includes an interface allowing targeting information to be fed to the munitions from a distant fire control center. The missiles are loaded into palletized launch modules which are in turn loaded onto transport aircraft. Loading is done through standard cargo handling systems already widely used across the air mobility command fleet.
1:21:21 · After being released from the rear ramp, the pallet stabilizes under a parachute before releasing cruise missiles sequentially in midair. Sounds like a relatively simple low tech solution, right? In a sense, it is. The system uses unmodified standard US military cargo aircraft and missile deployment requires no additional crew skills beyond those needed for regular air drops of supplies or vehicles. But let’s not downplay the technological and procedural ingenuity that makes it possible.
1:21:51 · Unlike many legacy defense programs, Dragon Cart is structured to maximize government data rights and maintain government control of the technical baseline. According to Kent Müller, the systems engineering program manager and program architect with the Dragon Cart program, Dragon Cart is literally the born digital dream come true. It’s a system that was born inside modelbased systems engineering models.
1:22:17 · Modelbased systems engineering or MBSSE is a methodology that uses formal models rather than documents to define, design, and verify complex systems. It represents a fundamental shift in how engineering organizations capture and communicate system requirements, architecture, and behavior. Instead of relying on documents, MBSSE uses integrated machine readable models as the single source of truth. So, how does that apply to Dragon Cart?
1:22:48 · As Müller explained, because we own the engineering, if a new payload needs a launch module that is slightly longer, we just model it, do the load path analysis, and send that model to our production vendors. So, by assembling proven existing technologies and novel ways, and maintaining strict control over the digital architecture, the program office has eliminated traditional roadblocks, allowing for rapid scaling and future upgrades.
1:23:14 · What’s more, this modular rapid iteration system has already been proven in action. The size of the deployment boxes in tests was configurable, ranging from four to 45 AGM 158B JSUM ER or extended range cruise missiles. But that’s far from the only missile that Rapid Dragon cart is intended to deploy.
1:23:36 · In the long term, according to the AFL CMC, the program office seeks to streamline the battle space by developing a single common air-to-surface munition that’s affordable, adaptable, and possesses significant standoff range. Now, the design of that missile should allow for it to be deployable from both palletized and lugged launch configurations. But until that design is finally delivered, the Rapid Dragon cart system has been designed to handle a variety of existing cruise missiles and several new ones.
1:24:09 · The palletiz launch system was designed and built by Loheed Martin to carry and deploy several variants of its self-developed JSUM range. That includes the aforementioned AGM 158B JSUM ER, a stealthy land attack cruise missile with a range of 575 miles and its B2 variant featuring enhanced stealth and electronic warfare resilience. [music] It also includes the AGM 158C LRM or
1:24:37 · long range anti-ship missile which offers a similar range while carrying a more advanced guidance suite purpose-built for maritime warfare. and the upcoming JSUM XR that has a 1,000mi range. Yet, as capable as these weapons are, they’re also extremely expensive and take a long time to produce.
1:24:56 · Approximately 3,232 of the B variant of the JSUM ER are to be produced in total with orders for the US as well as Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, and Australia. The unit cost varies depending on the production lot, anywhere from 1 million to $1.6 $6 million per unit. That upper end is also typically what the upgraded B2 variant costs with a total production of $4,656.
1:25:24 · The C variant or LRASM anti-hship missile is significantly more expensive thanks to its additional autonomous target recognition, IR RF seekers, and data links. Unit costs can reach as much as $3.5 million per unit. Since it’s still in development, the total production and unit cost of the XR aren’t yet clear. But there’s a bigger issue than the cost. The production rate. Current production rates across all variants run at between 400 and 500 per year.
1:25:54 · A new 225,000 ft production facility was introduced in 2022 to increase production to around 1,000 units per year thanks to automated processes such as robotic paint lines and advanced testing. The problem is that the US can burn through those rapidly.
1:26:12 · During the four weeks of active bombing as part of Operation Epic Fury against Iran, the US is estimated to have burned through 45% of its precision strike missile stockpile, half of its THAAD interceptors, nearly half of its Patriot Pack 3 air defense missile inventory, roughly 30% of its tomahawks, and more than 20% of its long range Jasums. Those stock piles would take years to replenish, even at the extended production rate.
1:26:40 · Pentagon internal assessments already raising the alarm of a near-term risk of running out of ammunition. If the war in the Persian Gulf flares up again for a considerable period or the US gets entangled in further conflicts, for example, in Taiwan, the problem may become even more acute very quickly. Now, if daily news updates and deep dive analyses on the most important military and geopolitical developments are what you seek, make sure you subscribe to the channel.
1:27:07 · At the Military Show, you’ll find some of the most detailed, accurate, and insightful military content on YouTube.
1:27:16 · The Rapid Dragon will certainly extend the number of missiles that the US can deploy in quick succession. The F-22 Raptor can carry eight missiles on air-to-air missions, six AIM120 AM RAMs and two A9 Sidewinders. The F-35 Lightning 2 carries four AI 120 AM RAM air-to-air missiles internally while operating in maximum stealth mode.
1:27:37 · A new sidekick rack will expand the internal total to six AM RAMs, but short-range weapons like the Sidewinder have to be mounted on external wing pylons, which compromises the jet’s radar evading profile. The B-52 Strato Fortress can carry up to 20 Jum cruise missiles, eight internally and 12 externally, or 24 JSUM ERS or LRASM internally. Its external payload capacity is being upgraded to carry even heavier loads.
1:28:09 · The B1B Lancer can carry 24 just ER or LRASM cruise missiles internally. But with new external pylons, its total capacity could increase to 36 missiles.
1:28:21 · That’s a fearsome array of firepower.
1:28:24 · But here’s the rub. of the JSUM carrying bombers, the US only has 75 B-52s and 45 or 46 B1B Lances in active service. Now, in effect, the Rapid Dragon cart project will dramatically increase that total by turning hundreds of cargo transport planes into auxiliary bombers.
1:28:42 · The US has a massive fleet of cargo planes in service, including 222 C17A Globe Master 3s, 151 of the C130J Super Hercules, 126 of the C130H Hercules, 57 MC130Js, and 39 HC130Js.
1:29:06 · All of these can conceivably be turned into bombers simply by loading Dragon cart pallets into the storage bay instead of normal cargo. The US also has 52 C5M Super Galaxies in service.
1:29:19 · However, with their remaining service hours diminishing, these are likely to be saved for strategic transport missions rather than used as bombers.
1:29:28 · These cargo planes could dramatically increase the number of missiles deployable in a single multiplane mission. A C130 could launch 12 Jim Cruz missiles from a safe distance of 620 to 1,180 mi from the target with the use of two Rapid Dragon pallets. The larger C7 could accommodate four rapid dragon pallets, each carrying nine missiles for a total payload of 36 missiles with 1,100 lb warheads.
1:29:53 · But there’s no point building all that extra capacity for firing missiles if sufficient quantities of those missiles are not available and might take years and billions of dollars to replenish. That’s why as mentioned earlier in the long run the US intends to develop a single cost-effective highly scalable missile for use with a dragon cart system. In the meantime it’s fasttracking the development of several other lowcost highly scalable missile options for use in the pallets.
1:30:22 · And when it comes to procuring these missiles, the US is certainly putting its money where its mouth is. The Pentagon intends to spend $12 billion to buy nearly 28,000 cheap cruise missiles over the next 5 years to supplement its JSON procurement, a combination of both lugged and palletized options. The US has several programs underway to develop these lowcost missiles.
1:30:45 · In terms of the dragon cart project, the AFL CMC specifically identified the family of affordable mass munitions or FAM developed under the extended range attack munition or ERAM initiative as the preferred missile family for future dragon cart deployments. In particular, in May 2026, the Pentagon launched the lowcost containerized missiles or LCCM program in conjunction with defense manufacturers Anderil, Co-aspire, Lidos, and Zone 5.
1:31:18 · At the same time, it would be working with Castellion to scale lowcost hypersonic solutions. In total, the Pentagon intends to acquire 10,000 missiles across the program within 3 years. That’s a mammoth undertaking. But what kind of missiles can we expect to see in the LCCM mix? Anderil has announced that its contribution to the program will be the surface launch version of its Barracuda 500M missile, a weapon that can also be air launched.
1:31:46 · The missile has a stated payload capacity of up to 100 lb and an expected air launch maximum range of up to 500 m.
1:31:54 · The company says it plans to deliver a minimum of 1,000 of these weapons to the US military in each of the next 3 years.
1:32:02 · Lidos says it will supply an LCCM design that leverages existing work on its air launch AGM190A small cruise missile SCM, also known as Black Arrow. Originally developed for US Special Operations Command or SOCUM, the missile carries a roughly 200lb munition and has achieved a range of more than 400 nautical miles in testing. The company plans to deliver 3,000 of these units under the new framework deal.
1:32:26 · It’s as yet unknown which designs co-aspire and zone 5 will ultimately deliver, but they’re likely to be modifications of the missiles already developed by the company for the RAM program. And that looks like an exciting prospect.
1:32:42 · Co-aspire’s RAM designed is called the rapidly adaptable affordable cruise missile or rackom. It’s a modular lowcost cruise missile that leverages 3D printing to bring down costs and enable rapid production ramp up. The ER or extended range variant reportedly has a range of over 1,000 miles. The Rusty Dagger was ostensively built for supply to Ukraine, but has subsequently found a domestic home under the RAM program.
1:33:10 · It’s understood to have a range of between 150 and 280 mi, a payload in the 500 lb class, and a blast fragmentation warhead with at least some degree of penetrating capability. As for the lowcost scaling of hypersonic options mentioned in the budget proposal, Castellian manufactures the lowerc cost hypersonic Blackbeard missile, not too many of the exact specifications have been revealed, but we can derive some of them from official records.
1:33:35 · According to the Army’s proposed budget for the 2026 fiscal year, the goal of Blackbird GL or ground launched is to deliver approximately 80% of the precision strike missile increment for capability at a significantly reduced cost.
1:33:52 · Increment 4 seeks to increase the PRSM’s range from 310 mi to 620 mi. So 80% of that capability would give Blackbeard a range of around 500 mi. It’s unclear what kind of payload it will pack.
1:34:07 · Boeing’s new JDAM LR Cruise missile and its maritime strike variant also look like suitable options for use with a rapid dragon system. Both can deliver 500lb warheads to targets 375 mi away.
1:34:22 · Now, the Dragon cart system clearly opens up a new way for the US to greatly increase the number of cruise missiles it can deploy by greatly increasing the number of planes from which it can deploy them. But it also has strategic implications, especially for a nearpeer rival like China. That’s somewhat ironic since the name Rapid Dragon has a Chinese origin. It’s derived from a 10th century Chinese volleyfiring siege weapon known as the Giong Chur or Rapid Dragon cart.
1:34:49 · This was a kind of crossbow that could simultaneously launch large numbers of longrange crossbow missiles from a safe distance. Similarly, the present-day rapid dragon launch system is intended to saturate an enemy’s defenses from standoff weapon distances where the launching aircraft is not threatened. It can be rapidly fielded using existing fleets of airlift assets to offer the option of significant surges in mass attack missions at minimal cost and training.
1:35:16 · But in addition to offering more bombers more rapidly, Dragon Cart also allows the US a much greater variety in a multi-pronged attack. The US can now combine pallets of lowcost cruise missiles with higherend JSUM ERS and LRASM. The less expensive weapons could help saturate enemy airspace. While the stealthy JSUM ERS and LRASM hunt for more lucrative targets, the use of cargo planes already introduces ambiguity into adversary targeting calculations.
1:35:46 · Are those relatively harmless C7s carrying supplies to US troops stationed in the area? or are they ready to open the hatch and unleash dozens of precision cruise missiles? Chinese operational planners can’t be quite sure about what the planes are doing and what missiles they might be launching. When combined with secure data links and network targeting architectures, Dragon Cart also supports the distributed warfare concepts increasingly central to US operational planning.
1:36:16 · By dispersing long range fires across mobility aircraft fleets rather than concentrating them on a limited number of bombers or tactical fighters, the US increases its offensive scope while greatly complicating defense against them. That’s a serious monkey wrench in the plans to the painstakingly and expensively constructed Chinese anti-access and aerial denial networks designed to complicate US air operations across the Indo-Pacific by dispersing strike capability across cargo aircraft fleets.
1:36:47 · Washington complicates Chinese planning while preserving operational endurance during prolonged campaigns.
1:36:54 · But perhaps most importantly, the Dragon cart pilots don’t require any modifications to the launching aircraft.
1:37:01 · So there will be no modification costs for America’s cargo fleets. That also means that Dragon carts can be provided to allies or partners in any of the 63 other countries that operate C130s, making the system a very inexpensive way to provide standoff strike capabilities to partner forces as well. All in all, it’s an innovative and pragmatic system that keeps the US a step or two ahead of any of its rivals or allies. We’ll of course keep a close eye on developments and keep you updated.
1:37:31 · It’s certainly not the only US military development that’s keeping Chinese President Xi Jinping up at night. Check out this video to see why China’s prized aircraft carriers would lose to a 1970s US warship. And thanks for watching.