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Long view — Palestinian opinion on peace and the end-state, 2000–2026

Across twenty-five years of polling, one pattern holds: the answer depends on which options are on the menu. When pollsters offer only negotiated frameworks (two states, one equal state, confederation), a two-state solution on the 1967 lines usually wins a plurality or majority: 59% in Arab Barometer’s October 2025 survey and 56% in PCPSR’s August 2026 poll. When a maximalist option is also offered, such as “liberation of the entire historic Palestine” or “a Palestinian state from the river to the sea,” that option has repeatedly won large majorities: 60% (Washington Institute, June 2014), 64% (PCPSR, December 2023), and 74.7% (AWRAD, November 2023). That is not universal: in PCPSR’s October 2003 poll the all-Palestine option drew 23%, and in AWRAD’s late-2024 polls 20–22%. Support for the bare label “two-state solution” fell from 71% in 2006 (PCPSR’s own estimate) and 51–55% in 2012–2014 to a low of 27–34% in 2022–2024, then recovered to 44–45% in 2025–2026. JMCC’s parallel series, which reads only two options (two states or one bi-national state), had two states at 42–58% in every poll from 2001 to 2016, still in first place, at 29–39%, through 2021. Over the same years, an answer nobody was offered, a Palestinian state on all of Palestine, grew from 6–11% (2004–2012) to 17–25% (2018–2023). In September 2026 two states returned to 48%. PCPSR tracked support for armed attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel until September 2023; it ranged from 38% to 67% and ran far higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. Few polls ask directly whether Jews should leave. The closest measures found here are the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse “expulsion” option (15% in 2017, 17% in 2018) and INSS’s West Bank option of a Palestinian state without a permanent Jewish presence (28% in 2025, 26% in 2026). Across the wider Arab world, opposition to recognizing Israel runs at 84–89% (Arab Opinion Index, 2022–2025).

Jump to: Trend tracker — what Palestinians think over time · Palestinian views on peace and the end-state, 2000–2026 · Arab public opinion in the region · Palestinian Polling After October 7 · Israeli public opinion · Other Palestinian social and political attitudes · How pollsters change or remove questions · Pollsters to watch · Reliability and methodological caveats · Poll PDF library · Sources — peace, solutions, and regional polling

Related: Solutions (Two-State, One-State & Beyond) · Right of Return · 2000 Camp David, Clinton's Parameters and Taba Talks · Israel-Palestine Poll Numbers

Related research: Palestinian attitudes toward the West and the United States — public polling, cultural attitudes, and dated Hamas, PA/Fatah/PLO, PIJ, and Hezbollah rhetoric; researched November 1, 2026.

Current read — August 2026

Palestinian opinion cannot be summarized as uniformly moderate or uniformly pro-Hamas. In PCPSR’s latest survey, 24% identified with Hamas, 27% chose armed struggle as the most effective route to statehood, 44% chose negotiations, and 56% preferred a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders when it was offered alongside confederation and a single equal-rights state. Hardline views remain substantial and are often stronger in the West Bank, but the latest evidence does not support treating them as a timeless consensus.

Debate use

Cite the pollster, fieldwork date, population, exact wording, and response options. Approval of the October 7 decision, party identification with Hamas, satisfaction with Hamas, preference for armed struggle, and approval of attacks on civilians are different measures. Do not substitute one for another.

Pinker’s historical Gallup baseline—not a current Palestinian estimate

Pinker uses 2001–2007 cross-national Gallup data to show that Muslim attitudes toward “Western values” were multidimensional: distrust of U.S. policy coexisted with support for speech, democratic participation, and women’s rights, while support for 9/11 was a small minority in that survey. He also reports later declines in support for jihadist violence. Use that evidence to reject timeless civilizational claims, but use the dated, population-specific PCPSR results below for current Palestinian arguments. → Gallup evidence and change over time

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Trend tracker — what Palestinians think over time

This section pulls every comparable series in the note into one place, so change over time can be read at a glance. Each row follows one question family asked repeatedly, usually by one pollster. The detailed tables, exact wording, and page-linked sources are in the thematic sections below; the two series that appear only here are tabled at the end of this section.

Majority tracker

Each cell is the average of the polls in that series for that year, rounded. A dark cell means the average was above 50%. Annual averaging can hide single polls on either side of 50%: JMCC’s two-state preference, for example, topped 50% in 16 individual polls, but only five yearly averages clear the line. The scorecard below counts individual polls.

What has been over 50%, and when

Counts are individual polls. “Majority” means more than 50% of all respondents; 50% exactly is not counted.

What the majorities add up to

• Consistent majorities: reconciliation after a peace deal (every poll, 2000–2013); support for a peace process or agreement (every poll, 2006–2012); two states on the 1967 lines when the only rivals are other negotiated outcomes (12 of 14 polls); and, after the war began, calling Hamas’s October 7 decision correct (5 of 6 polls).
• Never a majority: one equal state or a bi-national state (0 of 82 readings across PCPSR, JMCC, and An-Najah); teaching children to give up the claim to all of Palestine; expecting permanent peace; believing coexistence with a Palestinian state is possible; and negotiations as the most effective means.
• Swings across 50%: support for attacks on Israeli civilians (22 of 52 polls), a return to armed intifada (12 of 30), armed struggle as the best means (4 of 13), and the bare two-state label (13 of 47, none since 2017). An all-of-historic-Palestine option won majorities when it was offered alongside two states in 2014 and late 2023, but drew 20–28% in 2003 and 2024–2026.
• Direction since 2023: negotiations (44%) now lead armed struggle (27%) in PCPSR’s forced choice, two-state preference is back to 47.9% (JMCC) and 56% (PCPSR menu), and the October 7 “correct” figure fell from 72% to about 50%.

Themes over time

Panel A shows two-state support by question type; B the alternatives, including the all-Palestine answers; C recognition and reconciliation; D peace; E violence; F means. The detail for each line is in the section linked from the scorecard above.

Series that appear only in this tracker

Return to an armed intifada (PCPSR), 2011–2023

PCPSR asks which options respondents support “in the absence of negotiations.” From 2011 to 2019 the option read “a return to an armed intifada”; from 2020 it became “a return to armed confrontations and intifada.”

One state with equal rights (PCPSR), 2012–2023

PCPSR asked whether respondents support “a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality” (2012–2019). From 2021 it asked about “the position articulated by Abbas” in favor of equal rights in one state for two peoples. The March 2021 and June 2021 figures come from the summary line on the one-state solution. Support never exceeded 36%.

Reading the tracker

• Rows marked * in the heatmap combine pollsters. Their cells are comparable in direction, not to the point.
• The PCPSR label row includes one pre-2012 value: 71% in 2006, from PCPSR’s own 2019 policy report. The 2003–2010 two-state preferences sit in the menu row.
• “All of historic Palestine, when offered” mixes PCPSR, the Washington Institute, AWRAD, and INSS. INSS 2025–26 is West Bank only.
• The dedicated AWRAD row makes the wording change visible: 74.7% chose “A Palestinian state from the river to the sea” in November 2023; the annual 2024 cell is 21%, averaging 22% in October and 20% in November–December for “State on the basis of historic Palestine.” AWRAD recorded the December answer as spontaneous.
• Gaps are real gaps: a blank cell means the question was not asked or not published that year. Do not read a trend across them.

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Palestinian views on peace and the end-state, 2000–2026

This section collects polls of Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza since 2000 that measured five things: support for peace with Israel, the preferred framework for a solution, one state versus two states, the departure or expulsion of Jews and Israelis, and the goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine. Figures are reported as the pollster published them. Linked PDFs open to the cited page through PDF++. Earlier PCPSR, AWRAD, and Washington Institute files already in the vault are linked where they are the source.

Headline finding — the menu decides the answer

Two-state support is not a single fixed number. In PCPSR’s December 2023 poll, “an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel based on the 1967 borders” drew 28% when respondents could also choose “continued struggle until the liberation of the entire historic Palestine” (64%). In the same pollster’s August 2026 poll, the 1967-borders option drew 56% when the only alternatives were confederation and one equal state. Before comparing numbers across polls, check whether a maximalist option was offered. → Poll 90, Q44, p. 27 (file not included in this release) · Poll 97, p. 13 (file not included in this release)

Question types and how they differ

Two-state support over time

PCPSR series (West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza)

PCPSR (Khalil Shikaki’s Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research) interviews about 1,200–1,270 adults face to face each quarter. Two kinds of item run through its archive. From 2003 to 2010 the full-text reports mostly measured two states against named alternatives such as one state or all of Palestine. From 2011 onward the regular polls ask whether respondents support or oppose “the two-state solution” as a bare label. The joint Palestinian-Israeli polls (with the Truman Institute through 2015, then the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse) use the same bare-label wording. PCPSR’s 2019 policy report put Palestinian support for the concept at 71% in 2006, falling to 43% by June 2018. → PCPSR policy report, Jan 2019, p. 4 (file not included in this release)

2003–2010: two states compared with alternatives

2012–2026: bare-label support for “the two-state solution”

Poll 84 (June 2022) is an outlier within the run: support fell from 40% to 28% in one quarter and recovered to 37% in September 2022 (Poll 85, not in the archive; figure reported in Poll 86). PCPSR attributed the fall to a rise in the belief that settlement expansion had made the solution impractical, to 70%. Early-2020 support below 40% was, in PCPSR’s words, “the lowest reported by PSR since the signing of the Oslo agreement” at that point. → Poll 84, p. 5 (file not included in this release) · Poll 75, p. 1 (file not included in this release)

PCPSR’s own long-run note on a related item: support for mutual recognition “peaked at 66% in early 2006, and has since been declining steadily” (joint poll 32).

Gallup series (West Bank and East Jerusalem only)

Gallup asks about an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Since 2023 it has not surveyed Gaza.

Two states versus the alternatives

These polls asked respondents to choose among frameworks. Percentages are of all respondents unless noted. “Maximalist” means an option for a Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine, or liberation of all of it.

Reading the Pulse “elimination” tables

In 2017 and 2018 the Pulse removed two-state supporters first, then assigned the remaining respondents to one democratic state, then apartheid, then expulsion. In 2018 the expulsion option “was offered to those who have rejected all three above.” The 15% and 17% figures are therefore the respondents whose most moderate acceptable option was expulsion. They are not the total share who would accept expulsion if asked directly. In 2022 and 2024, each option was asked separately, so the figures overlap and can sum to more than 100%. → Pulse Jun 2018, p. 5 (file not included in this release)

Two other 2024 surveys asked about two states without a full menu. AWRAD’s May 2024 poll (n=1,500) found 54% support for a two-state solution, 39% in the West Bank and 77% in Gaza. → AWRAD May 2024, p. 1 (file not included in this release) Zogby’s September 2024 poll (n=1,243) asked respondents to rate each outcome. A “two-state solution in which Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, evacuates settlements, with international guarantees for Palestinian sovereignty” was at least somewhat desirable to 78% in Gaza, 54% in the West Bank, and 81% in East Jerusalem. A single state with “full equality and share in governance” was at least somewhat undesirable to 58% in Gaza and 79% in the West Bank, but desirable to 78% in East Jerusalem. → Zogby Sep 2024, p. 10 (file not included in this release)

JMCC series: two states, a bi-national state, or all of Palestine (2000–2026)

The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre has asked nearly the same question since 2000: “Some believe that a two-state formula is the favored solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, while others believe that historic Palestine cannot be divided and thus the favored solution is a bi-national state on all of Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal representation and rights. Which of these solutions do you prefer?” (wording from Poll 72, p. 10 (file not included in this release)). Only those two options are read. JMCC then records answers the respondent volunteers, marked with an asterisk: “These answers were not included as part of the options read to the interviewee.” The volunteered answers are a Palestinian state (in 2016–2019 labeled “Historic Palestine”) and an Islamic state. Because nobody is prompted with them, those shares are floors, not full measures of support.

Three patterns stand out. Two states led every JMCC poll from 2000 to 2021 and peaked at 57.9% in February 2006. The volunteered all-Palestine answer roughly doubled, from 6–11% in 2004–2012 to 17–25% in 2018–2023, even though it was never offered. In September 2026, the first JMCC poll with a Gaza sample since the war, two-state preference returned to 47.9%, with Gaza (59.6%) well above the West Bank (40.0%).

An-Najah National University series, 2008–2018

An-Najah’s Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies (Nablus) ran numbered West Bank–Gaza polls from at least 2004 (No. 6, May 2004) until No. 57 (October 2018), usually with about 1,360 face-to-face respondents (for example 860 West Bank and 500 Gaza in Poll 49; margin of error about ±3%). Releases were published as web pages; Polls 52–57 also attach full tables. No numbered poll after No. 57 was located on the university site. Copies of the 39 web releases and five table files are in Polls/Archive/An-Najah/.

Two states

The 2008 item described two states “on the land of historic Palestine,” and the 2018 items asked about viability rather than support, so they are not the same measure as the 2013–2014 support question.

One state or a bi-national state

Negotiations

Armed action

Two dating problems in the releases: Poll 33 (published March 24, 2008) gives its fieldwork as “20–22 January,” the same week as Poll 32, so March is more likely; Poll 54 (published May 2, 2017) gives “28–30 April 2016,” which is almost certainly 2017. Poll 46’s release (March 5, 2013) does not state fieldwork dates.

Maximalist goals: all of historic Palestine and Israel’s existence

Overview chart — acceptance, rejection, and conditional arrangements

Read the four panels separately

This is not one continuous time series. Direct recognition or legitimacy, an all-historic-Palestine outcome, continuing struggle after a negotiated two-state outcome, and conditional negotiated arrangements are related but non-equivalent measures. “Oppose recognition,” “deny a right to exist,” “prefer all historic Palestine,” and “continue resistance after two states” must not be merged into one percentage. None of those answers, by itself, measures support for expelling Jews.

What the combined record supports

The clearest direct questions are sparse. INSS’s West Bank-only surveys found 54% denying Israel’s right to exist in 2025 and 46% in 2026, while 38% and 41% respectively said Israel does have that right. Those answers coexist with Arab Barometer’s national 59% preference for a negotiated two-state outcome in 2025; the questions measure different things, and neither result can substitute for the other. Earlier series more often asked about conditional recognition, an all-Palestine goal, or what should happen after a two-state agreement. The chart maps those related measures without treating unlike questions as an interchangeable trend.

Open the one-page chart PDF (file not included in this release) · Open the audited chart data (file not included in this release)

Source prompt: Michael Robbins, Amaney Jamal, and Mark Tessler, “Palestinians Want a Two-State Solution,” Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2026 · underlying Arab Barometer report, pp. 6–8 (file not included in this release)

New observations added to this synthesis

• AWRAD, August 2010 — retained as context, not plotted: 78.2% rated historic Palestine from the Jordan River to the sea as an “essential” Palestinian national homeland in a final-status agreement. This was a five-category rating item; it did not specify exclusive sovereignty or ask respondents to choose that outcome over two states. → AWRAD tables
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: 28% (December 2022) and 36% (July 2024) supported a compound package component combining mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as their peoples’ homelands with an end to the conflict, reciprocal action against terrorism, and no further claims. This is not identical to the older PCPSR mutual-recognition item. → Pulse 2022, p. 18 (file not included in this release) · Pulse 2024, p. 22 (file not included in this release)
• Washington Institute’s recurring post-two-state item: “Continue resistance until all historic Palestine is liberated” measured 63% West Bank/65% Gaza (2014), 58%/65% (2015), 55%/44% (2017), 37%/47% (2018), 56%/54% (2019), 62%/58% (2020), and 58% in Gaza-only 2022. Ten of thirteen observed region-wave values exceeded 50%; at least one region exceeded 50% in six of seven waves. “Resistance” was not defined as necessarily violent. → Washington Institute, A Nation Divided · Gaza 2022
• Excluded from the chart: a Washington Institute synthesis reports 25% agreement that Israel has a permanent right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, but it discusses November 2015 and July 2016 polls together without identifying the underlying wave or publishing its response table. The figure is therefore retained as partial-access evidence rather than plotted at a falsely precise date; its arithmetic 75% complement is not treated as a separately observed rejection response.

Maximalist-goal records by pollster and territory

Jews and Israelis leaving: the direct measures

What was and was not found

No located poll asked Palestinians a stand-alone yes/no question such as “Should all Jews leave?” The closest direct measures are the Pulse “expulsion” option and INSS’s option of a Palestinian state without Jews. “From the river to the sea” and “liberation of the entire historic Palestine” do not state what happens to Jewish residents, so they should not be quoted as support for expulsion.

Peace, coexistence, recognition, and reconciliation

2000s baseline

PCPSR’s Poll No. 3 (December 19–24, 2001; n=1,357), taken during the Second Intifada, found broad support for reconciliation after an agreement alongside high support for armed attacks:

• 71% supported an immediate return to negotiations.
• 73% “would support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.” 85% would then support open borders. → Poll 3, p. 3 (file not included in this release)
• “But only 6% would support adopting school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches children not to demand return of all Palestine to Palestinians.” → Poll 3, p. 3 (file not included in this release)
• 41.1% said reconciliation is “not possible ever,” even after a peace agreement. → Poll 3, p. 10 (file not included in this release)
• Support for attacks: 92% against soldiers, 92% against settlers, and 58% against “civilians inside Israel.” → Poll 3, p. 1 (file not included in this release)

Jacob Shamir’s 2007 USIP study of the joint PCPSR-Truman polls found Palestinian support for a Clinton/Geneva permanent-status package of 39% (Dec 2003), 54% (Dec 2004), 46% (Dec 2005), and 44% (Jun 2006). “Among Palestinians, December 2004 was the only point in time where a majority of the public (54 percent) supported this permanent-status framework package.” Support for the “end of conflict” component ran 42%, 69%, 64%, and 58%. In June 2006, 51% of Palestinians believed a political settlement “could never be achieved.” On changing school curricula to teach against irredentist aspirations, “no more than 13 percent of Palestinians” agreed. → Shamir, Table 1, p. 41 (file not included in this release) · p. 42 (file not included in this release) · p. 46 (file not included in this release)

Reconciliation and school curricula, 2000–2013 (PCPSR)

Two items recur in PCPSR’s early polls: support for “reconciliation between the two peoples” after a peace agreement and a Palestinian state, and support for a school curriculum “that recognizes Israel and teaches children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.”

The gap between the two columns is the recurring finding: large majorities endorsed reconciliation after a state, while no more than 13% accepted teaching children to give up the claim to all of Palestine.

Recognition and peace packages over time

Coexistence and whether peace is possible

Support for a peace agreement and the peace process, 2004–2025

Means: negotiations versus armed struggle

PCPSR asks: “In your view, what is the best means of achieving Palestinian goals in ending the occupation and building an independent state?” (wording from Poll 90, Q48, p. 29 (file not included in this release)).

INSS’s West Bank phone surveys found negotiations preferred by 43% (September 2025) and 52% (June–July 2026), with armed struggle at 17% and 12%. Those are smaller samples, from a different mode and population, and should not be spliced into the PCPSR series.

JMCC series on means, 2000–2026

JMCC’s wording changed. From 2000 to 2003 the options were the Intifada, negotiations, or both; from 2010 the question became “In general, what is the best method to achieve the Palestinian people’s goals of ending the occupation and establishing a state?” with peaceful negotiations, armed resistance (armed intifada), and non-violent resistance. Figures are percentages of all respondents.

JMCC’s September 2026 figure for armed struggle (13.3%) is less than half PCPSR’s August 2026 figure (27%). The two use different option lists, so the gap is a measurement difference as much as a difference in opinion.

Attacks on Israeli civilians: PCPSR’s long series

PCPSR asked about “armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel” from the Second Intifada until September 2023. From 2011 the item was a four-point scale (“Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I…”); the figures below add “strongly support” and “support,” and “oppose” and “strongly oppose,” from the published tables, so sums can differ from PCPSR’s rounded text by a point. PCPSR dropped the item from Poll 90 onward (see PCPSR five-year question-retention audit — 2021–2026).

2001–2008 (summary figures, all respondents)

• July 2001: 58% support, 39% oppose. → Poll 2, p. 2 (file not included in this release)
• December 2001: 58% (see 2000s baseline). May 2002: 52% (“from 58% last December to 52% in this poll”). → Poll 4, p. 3 (file not included in this release)
• August 2002: 52% support, 46% oppose “bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel,” while “more that 90% support armed attacks against soldiers and settlers.” → Poll 5, p. 1 (file not included in this release)
• November 2002: 53% support, 43% oppose. April 2003: 57% support, 40% oppose. → Poll 6, p. 2 (file not included in this release) · Poll 7, p. 4 (file not included in this release)
• March 2008: 67% support, 31% oppose. June 2008: 55%. December 2008: 48%. → Poll 27, p. 5 (file not included in this release) · Poll 28, p. 4 (file not included in this release) · Poll 30, p. 5 (file not included in this release)

2011–2023 (four-point scale)

Across 2011–2023, Gaza support ran 10–56 points above the West Bank. Total support reached 60% or more after the 2014 Gaza war (64–65%), in late 2015 and early 2016 during the wave of stabbing attacks (60–64%), and in March 2023 (61%).

Birzeit University (Center for Development Studies)

• February 2001: “53% of respondents support suicide or other attacks against civilians inside Israeli cities, while 40% oppose such attacks.” Birzeit noted that in 1994, at the start of Oslo, “only 18% of the public supported suicide attacks.” → Birzeit Poll 3, p. 4 (file not included in this release)
• February 2004: “A majority (67%) supports stopping operations against Israeli civilians; the approval of 51% of them was conditioned on Israeli approval to end violence against Palestinian civilians.” → Birzeit Poll 15, p. 3 (file not included in this release)
• March 2006, after Hamas’s election win: 35% supported Hamas “carrying out suicide attacks in Israeli cities compared with 75% in June 2001”; 60% opposed. → Birzeit Poll 25 (file not included in this release)

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Arab public opinion in the region

These polls cover publics in Arab states and, where available, Turkey and Israel’s Arab citizens. Several include a Palestinian sample, which makes a like-for-like comparison possible: same question, same pollster, same survey round. Four pollsters carry most of the weight here:

• Arab Opinion Index (AOI), Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha. About 11–16 Arab publics per round, face to face, 2011–2025, Palestine included in every round. The nine English “in brief” reports are archived in Polls/Archive/Arab Opinion Index/.
• Arab Barometer, Princeton and regional partners (PCPSR in Palestine). Waves VII (2021–22), VIII (2023–24) and IX (2025–26).
• Pew Global Attitudes, 2003, 2007, 2013 and 2014. Its 2013–2014 surveys add Turkey and Israel.
• Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Gulf, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon surveys, 2014–2023.

Bottom line: how Palestinians compare

• Recognition of Israel: Palestinians sit inside a near-unanimous regional consensus, not above it. In AOI 2024/25, 91% of Palestinians opposed recognition, against an 87% average. Libya, Jordan, Mauritania and Kuwait were higher. The regional average has stayed between 84% and 89% in every round since 2011.
• “An Arab cause”: Palestinians are among the least likely Arabs to call the Palestinian cause a collective Arab cause. They were lowest of the countries surveyed in 2017/18 (64%) and 2019/20 (66%), and 69% in 2024/25 against an 80% average. About a quarter say it is the Palestinians’ cause alone.
• Two states: Palestinians fall in the middle of the regional range. Arab Barometer found 51% before the war (October 2023), against 38% (Lebanon) to 71% (Mauritania) elsewhere in 2023–24.
• Coexistence: in 2014, 63% of Palestinians said Israel and a Palestinian state cannot coexist. That was less pessimistic than Lebanon (79%) or Tunisia (71%) and more pessimistic than Egypt (48%) or Jordan (39%).
• Where Palestinians stand out: on violence against civilians. In Pew’s 2014 survey, 46% of Palestinian Muslims said suicide bombing of civilians can often or sometimes be justified. No other Arab public in that survey was above 29% (Lebanese Muslims).
• Wars move regional opinion quickly:
  • Saudi views of Hamas went from 10% positive (August 2023) to 40% (Nov–Dec 2023).
  • Moroccan support for normalization fell from 31% to 13%.
  • Kuwaiti two-state support rose from 32% to 54%.

How Palestinians compare on shared questions

Recognition of Israel and the Palestinian cause

The AOI asks: “Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country?” The overall share opposed has barely moved in fifteen years, through the Arab Spring, the Abraham Accords, and the Gaza war.

By country, % opposed (support in brackets; blank = not reported for that country in that round). Sources: AOI 2019/20, Fig. 87, p. 56 (file not included in this release) · AOI 2022, Fig. 72, p. 47 (file not included in this release) · AOI 2024/25, Fig. 48, p. 38 (file not included in this release)

Reading notes:

• The two Abraham Accords signatories in the AOI moved in opposite directions. Morocco’s opposition fell to 67% in 2022 (20% supportive, the highest of any country in any round), then went back to 89% after the Gaza war. Sudan’s went 79%, 72%, 84%.
• Saudi Arabia always looks lowest, but mostly because a third to a half of Saudi respondents decline to answer. Open Saudi support for recognition has never exceeded 6%.
• Syria (74% opposed, 17% support in 2024/25) was surveyed for the first time after the fall of the Assad government. In the same round, 70% of Syrians opposed an agreement with Israel that did not return the Golan Heights. → AOI 2024/25, Fig. 44, p. 35 (file not included in this release)
• Most people who opposed recognition gave political reasons rather than religious ones. In 2024/25, the most common reason was that Israel is “a settler-colonial state occupying Palestine” (31.5%). → AOI 2024/25, Table 5, p. 38 (file not included in this release)

Is the Palestinian cause an Arab cause? Share agreeing that it “concerns all Arabs and not the Palestinian people alone”:

The AOI reports do not explain the Palestinian figure. One plausible reading, offered here as an interpretation rather than a finding, is disillusionment with Arab governments: in the same polls Palestinians are among the most opposed to Arab normalization with Israel.

Earlier cross-national readings

Two-state support across Arab publics

Arab Barometer asks respondents to choose among a two-state solution on the 1967 borders, one state for Jews and Arabs, a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, or “other.” The 2023–24 wave (fieldwork through about April 2024) found:

In every country, two states outpolled one state and confederation; the largest “other” answers (which include a military solution or a Palestinian state over all the land) were Kuwait 23%, Jordan 22% and Lebanon 17%. Arab Barometer’s Wave IX data, presented in the Munich Security Conference’s 2026 Middle East report, put two-state support at up to two-thirds across the Arab publics surveyed. → Arab Barometer on MSC 2026

The Washington Institute’s Saudi poll of Nov 14–Dec 6, 2023 put a different question: just 16% of Saudis agreed that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution” on the 1967 borders. Yet 86% agreed there “will have to be political negotiations for a Palestinian-Israeli agreement some day.” In Gaza, the same Hamas two-state proposal drew 50% agreement in July 2023. → Washington Institute, Oct 10, 2023 · Washington Institute, Dec 21, 2023

Coexistence: can Israel and a Palestinian state live side by side?

Pew asked the same question in seven publics in 2013 and 2014: can “a way be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully”?

Pessimism rose between 2013 and 2014 by 15 points in Turkey, 14 in Tunisia and 8 in Egypt. The question returned in Pew’s 2026 Israeli-Palestinian survey (Palestinians 21% yes, 68% no; see Palestinian views on peace and the end-state, 2000–2026), but Pew did not re-ask it in other Arab countries.

Normalization with Israel

• Arab Barometer 2021–22: in nine of the eleven countries surveyed, fewer than one in five supported normalization agreements. Palestine 6%, Egypt 5%, Jordan 5%, Libya 7%, Mauritania 8%, Iraq 14%, Lebanon 17%; the exceptions were Sudan (39%) and Morocco (31%), both Abraham Accords signatories. → Arab Barometer, Sep 12, 2022
• Arab Barometer 2023–24: in none of seven surveyed countries did more than 13% favor normalization with Israel. Morocco fell from 31% to 13%. Among Moroccans who called Israel’s campaign in Gaza a “genocide,” support was 9%. → Arab Barometer, Jan 2025
• Palestinians, Arab Barometer IX (Oct 2025): 88% oppose Arab-Israeli normalization in principle. → AB9 Report 2, pp. 7–8 (file not included in this release)
• Washington Institute, 2020–2022: Gulf opinion on the Abraham Accords was roughly split in late 2020 in the UAE and Bahrain, then turned negative. By March 2022 only about 19–25% in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE viewed the accords favorably. → Washington Institute, Jul 15, 2022
• Washington Institute, Saudi Arabia, Nov–Dec 2023:
  • 96% agreed that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel.”
  • Support for allowing business contacts with Israelis fell from 43% (November 2022) to 17%.
  • → Washington Institute, Dec 21, 2023
• Washington Institute, August 2023 (Saudi Arabia and UAE, n=1,000 each): 70% of Saudis and about 71% of Emiratis agreed at least somewhat that Israel’s mass protests show it is “a weak and deeply divided country that can be defeated someday.” → WINEP crosstabs, pp. 12–13 (file not included in this release)

Hamas and October 7 across the region

The Washington Institute noted that, unlike in Saudi Arabia, Hamas had majority approval in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt in late 2023, “in several cases unprecedented” since 2014. The Saudi series shows the pattern the authors describe: Hamas gains during or after each war with Israel, and the gain fades over time.

Violence against civilians

Pew asked Muslims whether “suicide bombing or other forms of violence against civilian targets” can be justified “to defend Islam from its enemies.” Its July 2014 report:

• Palestinian territories: 46% of Muslims said often or sometimes justified (Gaza 62%, West Bank 36%). The figure was 62% in 2013.
• Other Arab publics: Lebanese Muslims 29% (Shia 37%, Sunni 21%; 74% in 2002). Egypt 24%. Jordan 15%. Tunisia 5%.
• Turkey and Israel: Turkey 18%. Israeli Muslims 16%.

→ Pew, Jul 1, 2014

This is the one shared question on which Palestinians sit well outside the regional range. It is also the question most tied to the conflict itself, so it fits the pattern in PCPSR’s own series (see Palestinian views on peace and the end-state, 2000–2026), where support for attacks on Israeli civilians tracks the level of violence.

Threats and outside powers (AOI 2024/25)

• Asked which state poses the greatest threat to the Arab nation, 44% named Israel, 21% the United States and 6% Iran. → AOI 2024/25, p. 45 (file not included in this release)
• 84% agreed that Israeli policies threaten the region’s security and stability; 77% said the same of U.S. policies. → AOI 2024/25, p. 46 (file not included in this release)
• Rating policies toward Palestine, 62% called South Africa’s good or very good, Turkey 49% and Iran 45%. Only 11% said the same of the United States (76% bad). → AOI 2024/25, p. 41 (file not included in this release)

Arab citizens of Israel

• Pew 2003: 62% of Arabs in Israel said a way can be found for Israel to exist while Palestinian rights and needs are met. → Pew 2003
• Pew 2014: 64% of Israeli Arabs said Israel and a Palestinian state can coexist peacefully, the most optimistic group in the region; 13% said they cannot. → Pew, Jun 25, 2014
• Pulse, July 2024: 72% of Israeli Arabs supported the two-state concept (up from 60% in 2022). Asked about one Palestinian state in which Jews lack full citizen rights, 17% supported it and 55% opposed. → Pulse Sep 2024, p. 2 (file not included in this release) · p. 13 (file not included in this release)

Gaps in regional coverage

• Iran and Turkey. None of the regular pollsters in this note asks Iranians these questions, so there is no comparable Iranian series. Turkey appears only in Pew’s 2013–2014 surveys and in AOI ratings of Turkish policy.
• Gulf states. Gulf publics other than Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait are mostly covered by the Washington Institute’s commissioned surveys, which ask different questions from AOI and Arab Barometer.
• Stale comparisons. Pew has not re-asked its coexistence and suicide-bombing questions in Arab countries since 2014.

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Palestinian Polling After October 7

No major poll below asked, “Do you support Hamas’s military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades?” The main questions instead asked whether respondents supported or believed Hamas was correct to launch the October 7 operation. Those are related, but not identical.

Transcript claim corrected

The claim that 89% supported Hamas’s military wing is not supported by the located instruments. The closest early-war figure in the Matau–LightBulb debate audit is AWRAD’s approximately 76% support for the Hamas-led October 7 “military operation.” That was not a question about institutional support for the al-Qassam Brigades, and it cannot be substituted for approval of deliberately attacking civilians.

Latest comparable result

PCPSR’s August 2026 Poll No. 97 did not repeat the question asking whether Hamas’s October 7 decision was correct. The latest result for that specific item is therefore October 2025, not August 2026. The August 2026 party, strategy, and peace-process results are summarized separately below.

xychart-beta
    title "PCPSR: Hamas's October 7 Decision Was Correct"
    x-axis ["Dec 2023","Mar 2024","Jun 2024","Sep 2024","May 2025","Oct 2025"]
    y-axis "Percent saying correct" 0 --> 100
    bar [72,71,67,54,50,53]

Latest PCPSR snapshot — August 2026

PCPSR Poll No. 97 was conducted face-to-face on August 5–8, 2026, with 1,270 adults: 830 in the West Bank across 83 residential localities and 440 in Gaza across 44 localities. PCPSR reported a ±3.5 percentage-point margin of error. Residents of militarily occupied or otherwise inaccessible Gaza areas were interviewed in shelters; the wartime sampling caveats below therefore remain important.

Updated finding

The newest survey shows a mixed and regionally divided public. West Bank respondents were more likely than Gazans to identify armed struggle as the most effective route and to oppose pre-withdrawal Hamas disarmament. Gazans were more likely to choose negotiations, prefer the specified 1967-borders two-state option, and say armed resistance had failed. Meanwhile, Hamas party identification fell to a minority in both territories, although it remained higher in Gaza than in the West Bank.

PCPSR five-year question-retention audit — 2021–2026

Scope and standard

This audit compares PCPSR’s regular West Bank–Gaza polls from Poll No. 81 (September 15–18, 2021) through Poll No. 97 (August 5–8, 2026): Nos. 81–93 and 95–97, sixteen releases in total. The official archive does not list a regular Poll No. 94, so no questionnaire is inferred for that number.

“Removed” below means that an exact or substantively equivalent item no longer appears in PCPSR’s publicly released questionnaire or results report after the stated poll. That is not proof that PCPSR never asked the question internally. This distinction matters because Polls 81–92 were released as fuller question-and-answer documents, whereas several later releases are labeled press releases and may publish less of the underlying instrument.

One-off questions tied to a particular news event—COVID restrictions, the Gilboa prison escape, the Ukraine war, Israeli elections, the Oslo anniversary, or a specific ceasefire proposal—are not counted as “taken out.” The table focuses on questions repeated enough to form a series.

Long-running questions that disappeared from the published series

Selected last observations — not current estimates

In Poll 89, the final wave before this block disappeared, 54% overall supported or strongly supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel (46% West Bank; 67% Gaza), while 41% overall opposed or strongly opposed them. In the same poll, 72% perceived corruption in Hamas-controlled institutions; 57% said people could not criticize their governing authority without fear; 73% expected reconciliation to fail; and 58% expected local economic conditions to worsen over the next three to five years. These figures describe September 2023 only and must not be presented as post-October 7 or current opinion.

Questions removed earlier or later in the five-year window

Last published values in the discontinued wartime items

Poll 92, the final wave with the paired war-crimes and video-exposure questions, found 97% saying Israel had committed war crimes, 9% saying Hamas had committed war crimes, and 9% saying they had seen the specified October 7 videos (6% West Bank; 13% Gaza). Poll 96, the final wave asking whether Hamas committed the depicted atrocities, found 10% saying yes and 86% saying no. Poll 96 also produced the final “correct decision” result: 53% overall, 59% West Bank, and 44% Gaza.

Major questions PCPSR retained

The post-October 7 redesign did not remove the entire political trend battery. The following question families continued into the later polls, though wording, candidates, or response options sometimes changed:

• Basic support for a two-state solution.
• Whether settlement expansion has made two states impractical.
• Chances of establishing a Palestinian state within five years.
• Preferred or most effective means of ending the occupation and achieving statehood.
• Support for nonviolent resistance, armed intifada, joining international organizations, dissolving the PA, and pursuing one state.
• Satisfaction with President Abbas and demand for his resignation.
• Hypothetical presidential and legislative voting.
• Party identification and whether Hamas or Fatah is more deserving of leadership.
• Whether the PA is a national achievement or a burden.
• Highest Palestinian national goal.

Two recurring items were paused or narrowed rather than permanently removed. Perceived corruption in PA institutions disappeared from the immediate post-October 7 reports but returned by Poll 96 and continued in Poll 97. Personal and family safety was asked nationally before and during the first war wave, became West Bank-only in several wartime polls, and returned as a West Bank–Gaza comparison in Poll 97.

Debate rule — absence is not a result

Do not carry the last observed percentage forward after PCPSR stops publishing a question. In particular, the September 2023 answer about attacks on Israeli civilians is not a measurement of current opinion, and the October 2025 answer about the October 7 decision is not an August 2026 result. A discontinued question creates an evidence gap; it does not show that opinion stayed constant or that it reversed.

What can and cannot be inferred

The public record shows questionnaire redesign and changing publication coverage, especially after October 7. It does not, by itself, establish why PCPSR removed an item. Plausible explanations include limited questionnaire space, wartime access and safety constraints, shifting policy relevance, changed officeholders or candidates, and a move toward war-specific questions. A claim that PCPSR deliberately hid an unfavorable result would require evidence beyond the disappearance of the question.

Audit sources

• PCPSR regular-poll archive
• Poll 81 — September 2021
• Poll 85 — September 2022
• Poll 88 — June 2023
• Poll 89 — September 2023, last prewar regular poll
• Poll 90 — November–December 2023, first post-October 7 wave
• Poll 92 — May–June 2024
• Poll 93 — September 2024
• Poll 95 — May 2025
• Poll 96 — October 2025
• Poll 97 — August 2026

What The Results Show

• Support or retrospective approval of the October 7 attack was very high immediately after the attack, around three quarters of respondents in the major polls.
• In the PCPSR polling, approval was consistently higher in the West Bank than in Gaza.
• That difference matters. Gazans endured the immediate consequences of Hamas’s attack and Israel’s military campaign: deaths, displacement, destroyed homes, shortages, and governance under Hamas.
• Approval declined over time, reaching 50% overall by May 2025, then rose slightly to 53% in October 2025. PCPSR did not ask that question in August 2026, so no later comparable value should be inferred.
• The August 2026 results point in more than one direction: Hamas identification and preference for armed struggle were minority positions, negotiations led the forced-choice strategy question, and a specified 1967-borders two-state option won majority support. At the same time, large majorities opposed Hamas disarming before a full Israeli withdrawal and doubted the practicality of a two-state solution.
• These results do not establish approval of every specific October 7 atrocity. They do show that large portions of the Palestinian public regarded the decision to launch the attack as justified or correct.

Important Polling Limits

• Polling during war is difficult: people may be displaced, inaccessible, fearful, grieving, or reluctant to speak openly.
• The Gaza sample was necessarily smaller and harder to reach than a normal peacetime sample.
• The wording matters greatly: “the operation was correct,” “support Hamas,” “support armed resistance,” “support the al-Qassam Brigades,” and “support killing civilians” are different questions and should not be treated as interchangeable.

Sources

• Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), AWRAD’s 2023 Public Opinion Poll of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
  https://www.awrad.org/en
• Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, polling archive
  https://pcpsr.org/en/node/154
• PCPSR, December 2023 poll, including the 72% overall / 82% West Bank / 57% Gaza result
  https://pcpsr.org/en/node/961
• PCPSR, October 2025 Poll No. 96, including the latest repeat of the October 7 “correct decision” question
  https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/1000
• PCPSR, August 2026 Poll No. 97, latest West Bank–Gaza survey
  https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/1014
• PCPSR, August 2026 Poll No. 97 full report
  https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2097%20English%20press%20release%2012Aug2026%20rev%20%28002%29.pdf
• Washington Institute analysis comparing post-October 7 Palestinian polling
  https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-public-opinion-after-october-7

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Israeli public opinion

Israeli polling is kept here for comparison with the Palestinian results above.

Palestinians and Israelis on the same questions, 2000–2026

Every point in the top three rows comes from a poll that asked Palestinians and Israelis the same question at the same time: the PCPSR–Truman Institute joint polls (2000–2015), the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse (2016–2024), Gallup and Pew. “All Israelis” includes Arab citizens (about a fifth of adults). Where the pollster published only the Israeli Jewish figure, the chart shows it as a dashed line. The bottom row has no Israeli mirror question. All values are in Palestinian-Israeli matched series 2000-2026.csv (file not included in this release), with a source URL for each joint-poll point; the joint-poll press releases are archived as text in Polls/Archive/PCPSR Joint/.

What the matched series show

• Two states: Israelis were more supportive than Palestinians in almost every joint poll from late 2009 to 2022 (for example 63% vs 53% in Dec 2013). Both fell together. In July 2024, Palestinian support (40%) was higher than all-Israeli support (31%; Israeli Jews 21%), which last happened in June 2009 (61% vs 59%). Gallup 2025: Palestinians 33%, Israelis 27%.
• One equal state: never a majority on either side. Both publics sat around 30% in 2012–2013; by 2024 it was 25% of Palestinians and 21% of Israelis.
• Mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people: majorities on both sides in 2003–2008. Palestinian support fell below half from 2009 (39–44% in 2012–2015); Israeli support fell to 44% by June 2015.
• Reconciliation after a peace deal: 65–84% on both sides in every joint poll from 2000 to 2008, the most consistent shared majority in the data.
• Distrust and claims to the land are mirror images: 94% of Palestinians and 86% of Israeli Jews said the other side cannot be trusted (2024); 89% and 87% saw their own people as the rightful owners of the whole land.
• Force: when offered four options, Palestinians choosing armed struggle rose from 21% (2017) to 40% (2022); Israeli Jews choosing “a definitive war” rose from 12% to 26%.

Israeli opinion on Gaza control, resettlement, and West Bank annexation

The panel’s claim that fewer than 20% of Israelis support Gaza annexation and fewer than 35% support West Bank annexation does not survive as a timeless statistic. Current results depend heavily on wording, population sampled, and whether the question asks about military control, annexation, Jewish settlement, transfer of Palestinians, or a negotiated partition.

Sources: IDI, August 2025 Israeli Voice Index data · IDI 2026 West Bank policy survey · JPPI, August 2026 Israeli Society Index.

Pew’s February–March 2025 survey separately found that about one-third of Israelis wanted Israel to govern Gaza after the war and that 44% said West Bank settlements help Israeli security while 35% said they hurt it. Pew Research Center.

Finding

A majority of Israelis in the IDI 2025 survey opposed reestablishing Gaza settlements, and a 2026 all-Israel sample did not show majority support for West Bank annexation. But support was substantial—roughly one-third overall and higher among Jewish respondents. The panel’s “under 20%” Gaza number is not supported by the current polling located here.

Debate rule for annexation polls

Before quoting a percentage, record:

1. Population: all Israeli adults, Jewish Israelis only, or voters in a party bloc?
2. Object: Gaza, all of the West Bank, Area C, settlement blocs, or a named territory?
3. Policy: military control, civilian governance, settlements, sovereignty/annexation, or population transfer?
4. Alternatives: binary support/oppose or forced choice among several plans?
5. Date and wartime context: opinion moved as hostage negotiations, fighting, and government proposals changed.

Related: Israel - United States Relations · Solutions (Two-State, One-State & Beyond) · LonerBox - Antisemitism, Hamas, US Leverage and Gaza Debate Panel

Israeli mirror measures — coexistence, one-state, and expulsion

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Other Palestinian social and political attitudes

These tables predate the build-out above. Footnote [1] is Pew’s The World’s Muslims (fieldwork 2011–2012); the others are the Washington Institute (July 2023), PCPSR (September and December 2023, March 2024), and AWRAD (November 2023). Headings were demoted one level; the content is unchanged.

POLITICS

RELIGION

SOCIETY

ECONOMY

MARRIAGE

ISRAEL & PEACE

POST OCTOBER 7TH

[6]

[6]

[1] Pew Research (2011-2012) The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society | Pew Research Center

[2] Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2023) (https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/6866)

[3] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (September 2023)(https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf)

[4] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (Nov-Dec 2023) (https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2090%20English%20Full%20text%20Dec%202023.pdf)

[5] Arab World for Research & Development (Nov 2023)(https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/polls2023/Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20Gaza%20War%202023%20-%20Tables%20of%20Results.pdf)

[6] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (March 2024)(https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2091%20English%20press%20release%2020%20March%202024.pdf)

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How pollsters change or remove questions

Long series only mean something if the question stays the same. This section logs every documented change to the question families tracked in this note: wording changes, dropped items, new event-driven items, and cuts to who gets surveyed. For each change it records when it happened, any reason the pollster gave, the surrounding context, and whether there is evidence of political pressure. The PCPSR 2021–2026 detail is in PCPSR five-year question-retention audit — 2021–2026; this section covers all pollsters from 2000.

Bottom line

Pollsters rarely explain why a question disappears. In this archive, the only stated reasons are practical: safety and access in Gaza (PCPSR, JMCC, Gallup, Pew). No located document shows a question being dropped because of political pressure. There is, however, a documented record of pressure on pollsters: a mob ransacked PCPSR’s office over a 2003 refugee poll, the PA imposed reporting rules on NGOs in 2015, and in 2024 the Israeli army accused Hamas of falsifying a PCPSR poll. Timing also lines up with politics: new questions follow leaders’ statements and wars, and several sensitive items vanished at the October 2023 redesign. Timing is not proof of motive, so the log below separates stated reasons from context.

When questions change: six patterns

1. After a shock, the questionnaire is rebuilt. The first post-October 7 PCPSR poll (No. 90, Nov–Dec 2023) dropped a whole block of items, including attacks on Israeli civilians, and added a wartime set (the October 7 decision, atrocities, war crimes). The 2014 Gaza war produced a special PCPSR poll; the 2017 U.S. Jerusalem decision produced new items at JMCC and An-Najah.
2. Leaders’ statements become questions. After Mahmoud Abbas told the UN General Assembly on September 24, 2021 that “circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one state,” PCPSR began asking about it directly (from Poll 82, Dec 2021), “reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as ‘apartheid’ and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples.” → Jerusalem Post, Sep 24, 2021 · Poll 82, p. 5 (file not included in this release)
3. Access and safety cut the population, not just the question. Gallup: “Gallup was not able to survey Gaza in 2024 because of ongoing security issues.” Pew (2026): “We are still unable to survey in Gaza,” and it “could not conduct fieldwork in the West Bank or Gaza in recent years due to security concerns.” JMCC’s September 2025 poll “did not include the Gaza Strip given the inability to provide a random sample due to the current circumstances in the Strip.” PCPSR kept Gaza but, “to ensure the safety of our data collectors,” sampled only areas without daily fighting and shelters. → Gallup, Sep 30, 2024 · Pew, Sep 15, 2026 · JMCC 104, p. 2 (file not included in this release) · PCPSR Poll 91, p. 2 (file not included in this release)
4. Design changes to improve measurement. PCPSR moved from two states versus named alternatives (2003–2010) to a bare-label support question (from 2012), then added a three-option menu (from Sep 2024). The Pulse replaced its 2017–2018 “elimination” design with separate questions for each option (Dec 2022). JMCC replaced “only the Intifada / only negotiations / both” (2000–2003) with “negotiations / armed resistance / non-violent resistance” (from Apr 2010).
5. Partners and funders change. PCPSR’s joint polls with Hebrew University’s Truman Institute ended with Joint Poll 56 (June 2015, supported by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse (from 2016) was funded by the EU and the Netherlands (2017), the EU and Japan (2018), and the Netherlands and Japan through UNDP (2020–2024). PCPSR’s regular polls were done “in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung” through Poll 92 (June 2024) and “the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah” in Polls 95 and 97. JMCC’s recent polls (2017–2026) name the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung as partner. No document links a funder to a specific question change.
6. Whole series stop. Birzeit’s Center for Development Studies polls end in 2007, Near East Consulting’s monthly series in 2010, and An-Najah’s numbered polls in October 2018. None of the three archives gives a reason.

Change log, 2000–2026

Political pressure on pollsters: what the record shows

• Palestinian Authority and street pressure (2003). PCPSR’s Ramallah office was ransacked after it reported that only about 10% of refugees would choose to live in Israel if offered the right of return, with alternatives such as compensation or settlement in a Palestinian state. Protesters said the right of return was non-negotiable. PCPSR kept publishing refugee research; no question was withdrawn as a result. → Wikipedia: PCPSR · Kent Kroeger, “Palestinian survey research group breaks through the noise and propaganda”
• PA oversight of NGOs (2015). The PA required all Palestinian NGOs, including PCPSR, to submit their activities and funding to the cabinet. No question change is tied to it in the record. → Wikipedia: PCPSR
• Hamas, per the Israeli army (2024). On August 29, 2024, the IDF published a document it said showed a Hamas official falsifying Gaza results in PCPSR’s March 2024 poll. Khalil Shikaki called it “highly unlikely,” possibly “a forgery or an attempt by someone to lie to get money,” and “part of the political and psychological warfare.” PCPSR’s own investigation found the document copied figures from PCPSR’s press release, and in “two out of nine questions” it gave totals rather than Gaza figures. Misbar also found translation gaps and arithmetic errors in the IDF material. The allegation is unproven either way. → Jewish Insider, Sep 2024 · PCPSR Poll 93, p. 2 (file not included in this release) · Misbar, Sep 4, 2024 · Jerusalem Post, Aug 29, 2024
• Wording as politics. Sponsors choose frames. The Washington Institute and INSS, a U.S. and an Israeli institute, ask about “all of historic Palestine,” Israel’s “right to exist,” and a state “without Jews”; Palestinian pollsters more often ask about negotiated options and read out two states and a bi-national state. Both kinds of question are legitimate, but they measure different things (see Two states versus the alternatives). Critics have also faulted some surveys in the region for undisclosed methods and sampling; Justin Gengler, for example, faulted Washington Institute Gulf samples in 2017. → Good Authority, Oct 27, 2017
• Timing that invites suspicion. The attacks-on-civilians item disappeared in the first post-October 7 poll, and the October 7 “correct” item disappeared once the war wound down. Both fit a practical explanation (limited questionnaire space, a move to war-specific items) and a political one (avoiding politically costly results). No public evidence settles which. PCPSR’s switch of partner from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung to the Netherlands office falls between these changes but is not tied to either in any document.

How to use this log

Cite a series only across periods where the wording in this log is unchanged. When a question stops, report the last value with its date and say the question was dropped; do not carry it forward. When someone argues a pollster dropped a question for political reasons, ask for evidence beyond the timing.

Pollsters to watch

Organizations that poll Palestinians, Arab publics, or Israelis on the conflict often enough to track. Check these first for new releases. “Archived” means past reports are in Polls/Archive/.

Palestinian pollsters (West Bank and Gaza)

International and regional pollsters

Israeli pollsters (for the mirror questions)

Not representative, use with care

• Media website polls (for example Al Jazeera Arabic’s online votes): self-selected clicks, open to anyone and easy to flood. A 2015 Al Jazeera Arabic web poll reported 81% of more than 36,000 votes backing ISIS “victories”; it measures who clicked, not public opinion. Arabic outlets mostly republish PCPSR, JMCC, AWRAD, and Israeli polls, which are better read at the source. → Lowy Institute, 2015 · Jerusalem Post on a doctored poll shared by Al Jazeera Arabic, Aug 2024

• MIFTAH (Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy) hosts older copies of An-Najah and other Palestinian polls, for example An-Najah Poll 45. The site could not be reached for this note, so its copies were not archived.

• IACA (International Academic Campaign against Israeli Occupation and Apartheid): electronic polls of a hand-picked sample of activists and academics, some outside Palestine. Archived, not cited as public opinion.

• Advocacy-sponsored one-offs (for example, the 2011 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner poll for The Israel Project): check sponsor, fieldwork firm, sample, and full questionnaire before citing.

Reliability and methodological caveats

• Wording and options. See Two states versus the alternatives. The same pollster can get 28% or 56% for a 1967-borders state depending on whether a maximalist option is offered.
• Population. PCPSR, AWRAD, JMCC, and Arab Barometer sample the West Bank (usually including East Jerusalem) and Gaza. Pew and Gallup have surveyed only the West Bank and East Jerusalem since the war, and INSS only the West Bank. Gaza results often differ sharply from West Bank results. Since October 2023, Gazans have usually been less supportive of armed struggle and more supportive of negotiations.
• Mode and size. PCPSR, AWRAD, and Arab Barometer interview face to face. INSS 2025 (n=300) and INSS 2026 (n=400) used telephone interviews, with margins of error of about ±5.7 and ±4.9 points. AWRAD’s November 2023 wartime sample was 668.
• Sponsor and framing. The Washington Institute and INSS are U.S. and Israeli policy institutes; PCPSR, AWRAD, JMCC, and PCPO are Palestinian; the Arab Opinion Index is produced by the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Fieldwork for Washington Institute polls was done by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (Beit Sahour). Question framing differs across these sponsors, so compare within a series before comparing across series.
• Wartime fieldwork. Displacement, fear, and access limits affect every poll since October 2023. Arab Barometer VIII completed its Gaza interviews on October 6, 2023, the day before the attack, so it is the last clean pre-war baseline.
• Allegation about PCPSR data. On August 29, 2024, the IDF said documents from Hamas’s General Security Apparatus showed Hamas had manipulated results of PCPSR’s March 2024 poll “through on-the-ground influence.” The IDF stated there was no evidence of direct collaboration between Hamas and PCPSR. This is an allegation, not an established finding. No PCPSR response was located for this note. → Jerusalem Post, Aug 29, 2024
• Discontinued questions. See How pollsters change or remove questions and PCPSR five-year question-retention audit — 2021–2026: a question that stops being asked is an evidence gap, not a stable result.
• Volunteered answers. JMCC’s all-Palestine and Islamic-state answers were never read to respondents, so they understate how many would choose those outcomes if offered. Compare PCPSR’s October 2003 poll, which did offer all of historic Palestine (23%), with JMCC’s unprompted 13.3% the same month.
• Series breaks inside one pollster. PCPSR’s 2003–2010 items set two states against named alternatives, while its 2011–2026 item asks about the bare label. The two are charted differently for that reason. JMCC’s means question changed options in 2010, and its September 2025 poll covered the West Bank only.
• Non-probability samples. The IACA’s Poll 27 (May–June 2025) used a “purposive sample” of 559 mostly male, highly educated activists and academics, including respondents outside Palestine. It is archived but not cited as a measure of Palestinian opinion.

Poll PDF library

Primary reports downloaded September 27, 2026, stored in 60.1.7 Books & Documents/Polls/, plus earlier files already in the vault.

PCPSR regular polls (West Bank and Gaza)

• PCPSR Poll 3 - Dec 2001.pdf (file not included in this release) — reconciliation, curricula, armed attacks during the Second Intifada
• PCPSR Poll 89 - Sep 2023.pdf (file not included in this release) — last prewar poll; attacks on civilians inside Israel (Q70)
• PCPSR Poll 90 - Dec 2023.pdf (file not included in this release) — first post-October 7 poll; “liberation of the entire historic Palestine” (Q44, p. 27)
• PCPSR Poll 91 - Mar 2024.pdf (file not included in this release) — the poll named in the IDF allegation
• PCPSR Poll 92 - Jun 2024.pdf (file not included in this release) · PCPSR Poll 93 - Sep 2024.pdf (file not included in this release) · PCPSR Poll 95 - May 2025.pdf (file not included in this release) · PCPSR Poll 96 - Oct 2025.pdf (file not included in this release) · PCPSR Poll 97 - Aug 2026.pdf (file not included in this release)
• Poll_88_English_full_text_June_2023.pdf (file not included in this release) (earlier vault copy)

Joint Palestinian-Israeli polls

• PCPSR Joint Poll 56 - Jun 2015.pdf (file not included in this release) — two-state and mutual recognition trend, 2014–2015
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse - Aug 2017.pdf (file not included in this release) · Palestinian-Israeli Pulse - Jun 2018.pdf (file not included in this release) — include the expulsion option
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse - Oct 2020.pdf (file not included in this release) · Palestinian-Israeli Pulse - Jan 2023.pdf (file not included in this release) · Palestinian-Israeli Pulse - Sep 2024.pdf (file not included in this release)

Other Palestinian polls

• Arab Barometer 8 Palestine Report 1 - Oct 2023.pdf (file not included in this release) — pre-war baseline
• Arab Barometer 9 Palestine Report 1 - Jan 2026.pdf (file not included in this release) · Arab Barometer 9 Palestine Report 2 - Apr 2026.pdf (file not included in this release) — solutions and normalization
• JMCC Poll 76 - May 2012.pdf (file not included in this release) · JMCC Poll 79 - Mar 2013.pdf (file not included in this release)
• Poll_by_Arab_World_for_Research_2023.pdf (file not included in this release) — AWRAD, November 2023
• Polling_-_Washington_Institute_for_Near_East_Policy.pdf (file not included in this release) — July 2023 crosstabs, plus August 2023 Saudi and UAE results
• Polling_-_Plaestinian_Public_Onion_about_Terorrism.pdf (file not included in this release) — PCPSR results compiled 2002–2023
• Pew - Israelis and Palestinians Coexistence Report - Sep 2026.pdf (file not included in this release) · Pew - Israelis and Palestinians Coexistence Topline - Sep 2026.pdf (file not included in this release)
• PublicOpinion_in_the_Israeli-Palestinian_Conflict-_Public_Works.pdf (file not included in this release) — Jacob Shamir, USIP Peaceworks 60 (2007), joint polls 2000–2007

Not downloadable as PDFs: Gallup and INSS results are published as web pages. (The Arab Opinion Index’s English “in brief” reports are PDFs and are now archived; its fuller Arabic reports were not downloaded.) The Washington Institute’s June 2014 poll slideshow (/uploads/Documents/other/PalestinianPollingReport_June2014.pdf) now returns a 404 error.

Archive — second round (September 28, 2026)

Downloaded from the links in Palestinian poll URLs since 2000.csv (file not included in this release) and stored in 60.1.7 Books & Documents/Polls/Archive/, one subfolder per pollster. Files are renamed “Pollster Poll N - Mon YYYY” where the fieldwork date could be read from the report.

Not archived: 62 SPSS (.sav) data files; 72 Arabic duplicates of JMCC releases; the ISEP “Perceptions in Palestine” reports, whose download requires submitting a personal-data form; and six PCPO files that return 404 (Polls 212–215, a Gaza war field study, one full report). The Geneva Initiative’s March 2024 poll is archived but is an image-only PDF with no extractable text, so it is not cited. Copies of every downloaded file also remain in Downloads.

Sources — peace, solutions, and regional polling

Palestinian polls

• PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No. 3, Dec 19–24, 2001 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/252
• PCPSR–Truman Institute, Joint Poll 8, June 2003 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/453
• PCPSR–Truman Institute, Joint Poll 17, September 2005 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/438
• PCPSR–Truman Institute, Joint Poll 32, June 2009 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/412
• PCPSR–Truman Institute, Joint Poll 50, December 2013 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/378
• PCPSR–Truman Institute, Joint Poll 56, June 2015 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/611
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 2017 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/696
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 2018 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/731
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 2020 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/823
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 2022 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928
• Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, 2024 — https://pcpsr.org/en/node/989
• PCPSR Poll 96, October 2025 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/1000
• PCPSR Poll 97, August 2026 — https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/1014
• Arab Barometer IX in Palestine, Report 1 — https://pcpsr.org/en/node/1006
• Arab Barometer IX in Palestine, Report 2 — https://pcpsr.org/en/node/1010
• Arab Barometer VIII Palestine Report, Part I — https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Arab-Barometer-PSR-Palestine-Report-Part-I-EN-.pdf
• JMCC Poll 76, May 2012 — https://www.jmcc.org/en/File/6f72y28530Y6f72/Poll-No-76-May-2012---Political-Leadership,-Corruption-and-Freedom-of-Speech
• JMCC Poll 79, March 2013 — https://www.jmcc.org/en/File/644dy25677Y644d/Poll-No-79,-March-2013---Reconciliation,-Obama-Visit-and-Security-Coordination
• AWRAD, Gaza war poll tables, November 2023 — https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/polls2023/Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20Gaza%20War%202023%20-%20Tables%20of%20Results.pdf
• INSS, Palestinian Public Opinion in the West Bank, September 2025 — https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-palestinians/
• INSS, Palestinian Public Opinion Survey, 2026 — https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-palestinians-2026/
• Pew Research Center, “Many Israelis and Palestinians Say They Cannot Coexist Peacefully – and Explain Why,” Sep 15, 2026 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/09/15/many-israelis-and-palestinians-say-they-cannot-coexist-peacefully-and-explain-why/
• Pew Research Center, Views of a Changing World 2003 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2003/06/03/views-of-a-changing-world-2003/
• Pew Research Center, 2007 Global Attitudes, ch. 5 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2007/06/27/chapter-5-views-of-the-middle-east-conflict/
• Gallup, “Dim Outlook for Peace in the Middle East,” Sep 30, 2024 — https://news.gallup.com/poll/650636/dim-outlook-peace-middle-east.aspx
• Gallup, “Peace Still a Distant Prospect for Israelis, Palestinians,” Sep 29, 2025 — https://news.gallup.com/poll/695582/peace-distant-prospect-israelis-palestinians.aspx
• Washington Institute, June 2014 poll — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-palestinian-poll-shows-hardline-views-some-pragmatism-too
• Washington Institute, June 2015 poll — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/long-term-palestinian-views-israel-two-states-now-one-state-later
• Washington Institute, June–July 2019 poll — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/half-palestinians-still-want-all-palestine-most-would-compromise-less
• Washington Institute, January–February 2020 poll — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-majority-rejects-two-state-solution-backs-tactical-compromises
• Washington Institute, June 2022 Gaza poll — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-shows-gazans-pragmatic-now-not-long-term
• Washington Institute, “What Do Palestinians Want?” (2014–2020 overview), Jul 23, 2021 — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-do-palestinians-want
• Jerusalem Post, “6 in 10 Palestinians reject 2-state solution, survey finds” (Greenberg poll, 2011) — https://www.jpost.com/diplomacy-and-politics/6-in-10-palestinians-reject-2-state-solution-survey-finds
• Jacob Shamir, Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, USIP Peaceworks 60 (2007) — vault PDF above

Second-round sources (archived PDFs in Polls/Archive/)

• An-Najah National University, Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies, Polls 32–57 (2008–2018) — https://www.najah.edu/en/search/?q=Public+Opinion+Poll (individual releases linked in the An-Najah tables)
• JMCC poll archive, English, 2000–2026 — https://www.jmcc.org/en/Category/4/polls
• JMCC Poll 105, September 2026 — https://www.jmcc.org/en/File/29187y168327Y29187/Poll-NO105-Marking-Three-years-since-the-events-of-October-7-2023
• PCPSR full-text polls (file store) — https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/ (for example, Poll 9: https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/p9epdf.pdf)
• PCPSR, final policy report on two-state support 2006–2018, January 2019 — https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Final%20policy%20report%20English%20Jan2019.pdf
• Birzeit University Center for Development Studies, opinion polls 2000–2007 — https://cds.birzeit.edu/opinion-polls/
• Near East Consulting, Palestinian Perception Polls 2009–2010 — https://www.neareastconsulting.com/surveys/all/files/2009/pppdec2009fin.pdf (December 2009 example)
• Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, poll archive — https://pcpo.org/polls/
• AWRAD, October 2024 poll — https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/October%202024%20Poll/AWRAD%20Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20English%20-%20Main%20Results%20-%20October%202024.pdf
• AWRAD, December 2024 poll — https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/December%202024/AWRAD%20Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20English%20-%20Main%20Results%20-%20December%202024.pdf
• AWRAD, May 2024 press release — https://www.awrad.org/files/server/polls/Poll%202024/AWRAD%20-%20Press%20Release%20-%20Palestinian%20Public%20Opinion%20Poll%20-%20May%202024.pdf
• Geneva Initiative, Palestinian polls — https://geneva-accord.org/polls/ ; April 2026 West Bank poll — https://geneva-accord.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Perceptions-and-Attitudes-towards-the-Two-State-Solution-in.pdf
• Fafo, Surveying Palestinian Opinion, February and May 2010 — https://fafo.no/images/pub/2010/10111.pdf
• Gallup, Measuring the State of Muslim-West Relations (2010) — https://news.gallup.com/file/poll/144959/MWRelations_2010_report.pdf
• Gallup Palestinian results, 2006–2015 — https://news.gallup.com/poll/21163/gallup-palestinian-survey-reveals-broad-discontent-status-quo.aspx · https://news.gallup.com/poll/103426/palestinians-broadly-support-peace-process.aspx · https://news.gallup.com/poll/161456/israelis-palestinians-pro-peace-process-not-hopeful.aspx · https://news.gallup.com/poll/186536/palestinians-poor-prospects-peace-security.aspx
• Pew Research Center, May 9, 2013 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2013/05/09/despite-their-wide-differences-many-israelis-and-palestinians-want-bigger-role-for-obama-in-resolving-conflict/ ; Jun 25, 2014 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/06/25/mounting-pessimism-about-two-state-israeli-palestinian-solution/
• Washington Institute, Jul 23, 2015 — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-shows-most-palestinians-practical-progress-tactical-compromises-israel ; Jun 27, 2017 — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-publics-tough-choices-violence-instability-hamas-jewish-state ; Jun 7, 2017 — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/surprising-opinions-palestinians
• Zogby Research Services for the Tony Blair Institute, Palestine 2023, 2024, 2025; Zogby, Palestinian poll September 2024 — archived PDFs

Regional polls

• Arab Center Washington DC, Arab Opinion Index 2025 — https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2025/
• Arab Center Washington DC, Arab Opinion Index 2022 executive summary — https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2022-executive-summary/
• Arab Center Washington DC, Arab Public Opinion about Israel’s War on Gaza (Jan 2024) — https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza/
• Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha), Arab Opinion Index “in brief” reports 2011, 2012/13, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017/18, 2019/20, 2022, 2024/25 — archived PDFs; index at https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/EN/Pages/About.aspx; 2024/25 report at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-index-2025-in-brief-en.pdf
• Arab Barometer, “How Do MENA Citizens View Normalization With Israel?” (Sep 12, 2022) — https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/09/how-do-mena-citizens-view-normalization-with-israel/
• Pew Research Center, “Mounting Pessimism about Two-State Israeli-Palestinian Solution” (Jun 25, 2014) — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/06/25/mounting-pessimism-about-two-state-israeli-palestinian-solution/
• Pew Research Center, “Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East” (Jul 1, 2014) — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/
• Washington Institute, “Polls Show Majority of Gazans Were Against Breaking Ceasefire; Hamas and Hezbollah Unpopular Among Key Arab Publics” (Oct 10, 2023) — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/polls-show-majority-gazans-were-against-breaking-ceasefire-hamas-and-hezbollah
• Washington Institute, “New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War” (Dec 21, 2023) — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war
• Arab Barometer, “How the Gaza War is Shaping MENA Public’s Support for the Two-State Solution” (Jan 2025) — https://www.arabbarometer.org/2025/01/support-for-the-two-state-solution-is-shifting-unexpectedly/
• Arab Barometer, “MENA Publics and the Future of Normalization with Israel” (Jan 2025) — https://www.arabbarometer.org/2025/01/14619/
• Arab Barometer, Wave IX data in the Munich Security Conference 2026 report — https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/arab-barometer-wave-ix-data-featured-in-munich-security-2026-report/
• Washington Institute, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Jul 15, 2022 — https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arab-public-opinion-arab-israeli-normalization-and-abraham-accords

News coverage and commentary (secondary)

• Times of Israel, “Pew poll finds majority of Israelis and Palestinians say two-state coexistence impossible,” Sep 20, 2026 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/pew-poll-finds-majority-of-israelis-and-palestinian-say-two-state-coexistence-impossible/
• Jerusalem Post, INSS 2026 survey coverage, Sep 16, 2026 — https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-908818
• Center for Security Policy, commentary on the AWRAD November 2023 poll — https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/palestinian-poll-shows-overwhelming-support-for-terrorism-and-suggests-that-international-attention-is-misplaced/
• Jerusalem Post, “Hamas falsifies Palestinian Survey Research Institute polls, IDF finds,” Aug 29, 2024 — https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-817000
• Haaretz, “A Grim Poll Shows Most Jewish Israelis Support Expelling Gazans,” Jun 3, 2025 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-03/ty-article/.premium/a-grim-poll-shows-most-jewish-israelis-support-expelling-gazans-its-brutal-and-true/00000197-3640-d9f1-abb7-7e742b300000
• Haaretz, “64% of Israelis See No Need for More Reporting on Gazans’ Sufferings,” Ido David Cohen, Jun 10, 2025 (aChord Center poll) — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-10/ty-article/.premium/64-of-israelis-see-no-need-for-more-reporting-on-gazans-sufferings/00000197-59e8-deed-a9bf-5def9d770000 · archive: http://archive.today/LlGFE
• Pew Research Center, “Israeli Views of the Israel-Hamas War,” May 30, 2024 — https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/30/israeli-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/ · report PDF: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/05/pg_2024.05.30_israeli-views-war_report.pdf · topline PDF: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/05/pg_2024.05.30_israeli-views-war_topline.pdf

Clippings and earlier links

PewForum-The_Worlds_Muslims.pdf (file not included in this release)
Polling-Washington_Institute_for_Near_East_Policy.pdf (file not included in this release)
Polling-Plaestinian_Public_Onion_about_Terorrism.pdf (file not included in this release)
Public_Opinion_in_the_Israeli-Palestinian_Conflict-_Public_Works.pdf (file not included in this release)
Poll_88_English_full_text_June_2023.pdf (file not included in this release)
Poll_by_Arab_World_for_Research_2023.pdf (file not included in this release)
twitter.com/EFischberger/status/1734953024630526327?t=l0Ixslg9rx3LzqTESE5dWw&s=19
A New Poll of Palestinians: Supporting Terror and Rejecting Peace
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HHP_Feb2024_KeyResults.pdf

Public Opinion Poll No (88) | PCPSR

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Poll: Over 70% Palestinians still maintain Hamas ‘correct’ to commit Oct. 7 atrocities | The Times of Israel

Over 70 Percent of Palestinians Support Hamas’s October 7 Terror Attack | National Review

Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (92) | PCPSR

• 73% of respondents answered that Hamas made the right decision by going to war on October 7 - the highest figure for this question since the war began.
• 96% of Palestinians who did not watch the videos from October 7 do not believe that Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians.
• 54% of Palestinians who saw the videos from October 7 do not believe that Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians.
• 79% of respondents believe that Hamas will win the war - the highest rate since the war began.
• 61% of respondents prefer that Hamas continues to control the Strip after the war (71% of West Bank residents and 46% of Gaza residents prefer this).
• In a hypothetical presidential election between Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Mahmoud Abbas would receive 5% of the votes and Ismail Haniyeh 46% of the votes. 46% announced they would not vote in the election.
• Support rates for Hamas and Fatah in general elections:
  • 17% would support Fatah
  • 41% would support Hamas
• Only 32% of respondents support a two-state solution.
• 52% support armed struggle as a way to end the occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state.Open: GZ8w44KXcAAFmSc.jpeg