Distilled Knowledge
1967 source comparison
Moser interview fact-check checks the original text: Nasser’s intentions (local expanded ebook PDF p. 403), defensive-war classification (p. 408), expansion of objectives (p. 409), and Jordan’s initiation/warning (pp. 410–411). These passages address distinct questions and must be retained together; the PDF counter is not an assumed print folio.
Source contribution
Shlaim interprets the “iron wall” as a recurring Israeli grand strategy: establish unassailable strength, negotiate from superiority, and prefer deals with states or elites over Palestinian national claims. The book’s value is the long diplomatic record and its challenge to self-exculpatory histories; its master-framework claim must still be tested against rival doctrines, leaders, periods, and Arab agency.
- The framework distinguishes deterrent strength from the hoped-for later accommodation.
- The historical record includes both genuine security pressures and choices that foreclosed or narrowed diplomacy.
- Similar behavior is not by itself proof that later leaders consciously inherited Jabotinsky’s doctrine.
- A framework that explains both negotiation and its absence risks becoming unfalsifiable unless it states contrary evidence.
Routes: Deterrence and negotiation · Primary essay and argument map · Writing brief
Evidence boundary
Treat “iron wall” as Shlaim’s interpretive thesis, not a self-proving label. Verify episodes against primary documents and competing histories before attributing motive or causation.
DESCRIPTION
This book helps to understand the debate within Israel about the possibility of peace with the Palestinians.
Read this beside the primary text
This is Avi Shlaim’s historical thesis, not Jabotinsky’s 1923 essay. Start with The Iron Wall (Jabotinsky, 1923) for the primary argument, its sequel, the colonization-versus-expulsion distinction, and the strongest case both for and against using “the iron wall” as Israel’s master strategy.
Research orientation
Shlaim’s strongest claim is not that Jabotinsky advocated permanent war. It is that the doctrine had two stages—unassailable strength, then bargaining from strength—and that Israeli governments repeatedly implemented the first while postponing or narrowing the second. His clearest supporting episodes include the Ben-Gurion–Sharett struggle, Suez, missed diplomatic openings, Lebanon, and the contrast between Rabin’s Oslo turn and later unilateralism.
The strongest counter-case is that policy resemblance does not prove ideological inheritance; Israeli politics contained real Sharett, Eshkol, Rabin, treaty, partition, withdrawal, and negotiation countercurrents; Arab and Palestinian agency cannot be reduced to reactions to Israel; and a framework that treats force, diplomacy, failed peace, and successful peace alike as confirmation risks becoming unfalsifiable. The safest verdict is that the iron wall identifies a recurring military-first tendency, not a complete causal history. → Peace Offers
Reliability boundary inside this long note
The early “AI Summary” chapter blocks below contain chronology and labeling errors and should not be quoted as authoritative. Prefer the book’s extracted/highlighted text, page-linked PDF passages, and the audited synthesis in The Iron Wall (Jabotinsky, 1923).
My Summary
Main Ideas, Takeaways & Similarities
Questions
I. What is the problem?
A. How is this problem formulated?
B. Why is this problem important?
C. What is the history of this problem?
D. Which prominent personalities have been interested in this problem?
II. What solutions to the problem are there?
A. What are the conclusions reached?
B. By what argument(s) is the conclusion reached?
C. What facts or assumptions serve as premises?
D. When a prominent personality offers a solution, does he also argue for or against other prominent personalities? Does he raise objections to alternative solutions? Does he consider objections to his own solutions?
III. Evaluation
A. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative formulations to the problem?
B. Has the importance or history of the problem ever been misrepresented?
C. Are the solutions logically related to the premises?
D. Are the facts true? Are the assumptions acceptable? Are the objections answerable?
AI Summary
Highlights
Preface
- Author rejects beyond 1967 borders
- Brutal colonial power (Israel)
- Benny Morris “radical revision”
Prologue
-
Return to Zion
-
Failure to assimilate to Europe + upsurge in nationalism
-
Western Values
-
Theodor Herzl
- The Jewish State book
The bride is beautiful, but she is marred to another man”
- Natives primitive & backward-yet give full civil rights
-
Palestine was distant providence of Ottoman Empire; Arab national movement was only beginning to develop there
-
Chaim Weizmann
- Chief architect between Zionist and Britain
- Political vs. Practical Zionists
- Political
- Priority to diplomatic
- Practical
- Organization of Jewish immigration
- Land acquisition; settlements
- Economy
- Political
- Economic self-interest of Arabs would temper their opposition
- Balfour Declaration; major triumph
- Countered by the promise to Hussein, sharif of Mecca, of independent Arab kingdom
- Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916
- Accepted Arabs as partners running Palestine; but not in negotiating the future of the country
- Arab resistance and violence forced Britain to reassess its own wartime commitments to Zionism
- Winston Churchill’s white paper of 1922; limited British support for Jewish national home
-
Ze’ev Jabotinksy
- Spiritual father of the Israeli right
- Odds with Weizmann
- New Zionist Organization
- Irgun
- Cultural superiority of Western civilization
- Root dispute with Zionist leadership
- Territorial integrity
- Immediate declaration over whole area
- Did NOT want to remove Arabs from Palestine
- Erect an Iron Wall of Jewish military force—agreement among all Zionists
- Wanted to negotiate from a position of strength
- Peace coexistence would be possible
-
Zionist movements as NOT a monolithic political movement, but a collection o rival political parties.
-
Labor vs Revisionist Zionism; Difference on use of force
-
David Ben-Gurion
- Unflinching realism
- Realized Arab opposition was utter rejection; inescapable
- Seek support of external power
- Gradualist strategy of obtaining land
-
February 1947–Britain unable to come up with solution referred Palestine problem to United Nations
- Invaluable chapter of international legitimacy for the creation of an independent Jewish state
-
Arabs, Arab Higher Committee, Arab League, have done very little to prepare for statehood, rejected UN plan.
Important
Summary (AI)
- Chapter 1: The Emergence of Israel 1947–1949
Chapter 1 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim discusses the early foundations of Zionism and its relation to the Arab world. Here are the key points:
- Origins of Zionism: The chapter starts by exploring the roots of Zionism in the late 19th century, emphasizing its goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.
- Key Figures and Concepts: It highlights the contributions of Theodor Herzl, the father of political Zionism, and his vision of a Jewish state.
- Zionist Strategy: The chapter discusses the strategic approach of the Zionist movement, including its reliance on the support of major powers and its non-recognition of a Palestinian national entity.
- Jewish-Arab Relations: The complex relations between the early Zionist movement and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine are examined.
- Chaim Weizmann’s Role: The chapter details Chaim Weizmann’s efforts in securing British support for Zionism, leading to the Balfour Declaration.
- Herzl’s and Weizmann’s Approaches to Arabs: It contrasts Herzl’s and Weizmann’s perspectives on the Arab population in Palestine and their potential reactions to the Zionist project.
- Revisionist Zionism: The emergence of Revisionist Zionism, led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, and its ideological differences with mainstream Zionism are discussed.
- The Iron Wall Concept: Jabotinsky’s concept of the “Iron Wall,” advocating for a strong Jewish military force to ensure the success of the Zionist project, is a significant focus.
- Chapter 2: Consolidation 1949–1953
Chapter 2 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” focuses on the period following World War I and the Zionist movement’s strategic and diplomatic efforts. Here’s a concise summary:
- Zionist Interpretation of Balfour Declaration: The chapter discusses Zionist aspirations for a Jewish national home in Palestine, emphasizing their expansive territorial goals.
- Chaim Weizmann’s Influence: Weizmann’s role in securing British support, notably the Balfour Declaration, and his strategies in dealing with the Palestine Arabs and British policy are highlighted.
- Jewish-Arab Relations Post-Declaration: The growing tensions and conflicts between Jewish settlers and Arab residents in Palestine following the Balfour Declaration are explored.
- Revisionist Zionism and Jabotinsky: The emergence of Revisionist Zionism under Ze’ev Jabotinsky, advocating for a more aggressive approach to establishing a Jewish state, is detailed.
- Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” Concept: Jabotinsky’s idea of creating an “Iron Wall” of military strength as a strategy for Jewish settlement in Palestine is discussed, illustrating a more militant stance compared to mainstream Zionism.
- Chapter 3: Attempts at Accommodation 1953–1955
Chapter 3 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” focuses on key developments in the Zionist movement and its relationship with Britain and the Arab world post World War I. Here are the main points:
- Zionist Diplomacy and British Support: The chapter discusses Chaim Weizmann’s role in securing the Balfour Declaration and establishing a relationship with Britain for Zionist goals.
- Jewish-Arab Relations: It addresses the complexities and tensions in Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine, following the Balfour Declaration.
- Weizmann’s Strategy: Weizmann’s strategic approach to the Arab issue and the pursuit of British support are explored.
- Emergence of Palestinian Nationalism: The chapter highlights the rise of Palestinian nationalism and its leaders, including Hajj Amin al-Husseini.
- British Policy Shifts: It examines the shifts in British policy towards Zionism and its impact on Jewish-Arab relations.
- Revisionist Zionism: The chapter also delves into the emergence of Revisionist Zionism under Ze’ev Jabotinsky, including the “Iron Wall” doctrine.
- Post-World War I to late 1920s: Focus on Zionist diplomacy, British support, and rising tensions in Palestine.
- 1917: Balfour Declaration.
- 1920s: Emergence of Palestinian nationalism and Revisionist Zionism.
- Late 1920s: Shifts in British policy and increased Jewish-Arab tensions.
- Chapter 4: The Road to Suez 1955–1957
Chapter 4 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” delves into the interwar period and the evolving relationship between the Zionist movement, Britain, and the Arab community. Here are the main points:
- Interwar Zionism: The chapter examines Zionist strategies and diplomacy during the interwar period.
- British Policy and Arab Response: It discusses the shifts in British policy towards the Zionist movement and the Arab response to these changes.
- Chaim Weizmann’s Leadership: The chapter highlights Weizmann’s leadership and his efforts to maintain British support for the Zionist cause.
- Arab Nationalism: The rise of Arab nationalism and its opposition to Zionism are explored.
- Revisionist Zionism: It also covers the emergence of Revisionist Zionism under Ze’ev Jabotinsky and its ideological and strategic differences with mainstream Zionism.
- Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” Doctrine: The chapter delves into Jabotinsky’s advocacy for a strong Jewish military presence as a means to secure Zionist objectives.
- 1920s-1930s: The focus is on the Zionist movement’s interaction with British policies and the Arab community during the interwar years.
- Emergence of key figures in Zionist leadership and their strategic approaches.
- Growth of Arab nationalism and its impact on the Zionist project.
- Shifts in British policy and its effects on the Jewish-Arab dynamics in Palestine.
- Chapter 5: The Alliance of the Periphery 1957–1963
Chapter 5 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” covers significant developments in the Zionist movement and its interactions with the Arab population and British policy. Here are the key points:
- Zionist Strategies and British Policy: The chapter discusses the evolving strategies of the Zionist movement in the context of British policies and the changing dynamics in Palestine.
- Jewish-Arab Relations: It examines the complex relations between Jewish settlers and the Arab population, highlighting the rising tensions and conflicts.
- Key Zionist Figures and Ideologies: The chapter focuses on the roles and ideologies of significant Zionist leaders, their vision for a Jewish state, and their approaches to handling the Arab question.
- British Mandate and Political Shifts: The shifts in British policy during the mandate period and their impacts on the Zionist movement and Jewish-Arab relations are analyzed.
- Rise of Arab Nationalism: The chapter also delves into the rise of Arab nationalism and its response to the Zionist movement.
- The chapter mainly covers the period of the British Mandate in Palestine, emphasizing the developments from the 1920s to the 1930s.
- It includes key events, policy shifts, and ideological developments within the Zionist movement during this period.
- Chapter 6: Poor Little Samson 1963–1969
Chapter 6 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” discusses the period during and after World War II, focusing on the Zionist movement’s strategies, the Holocaust’s impact, and the path to the establishment of Israel. Key points include:
- Holocaust and Its Impact: The chapter covers the Holocaust’s profound impact on the Zionist movement and Jewish aspirations for a state.
- British Policy and Jewish Immigration: It examines British policies towards Palestine, particularly regarding Jewish immigration, which became increasingly restrictive.
- Zionist Movement’s Response: The strategies and responses of the Zionist movement to these challenges, including armed resistance and diplomatic efforts, are explored.
- UN Partition Plan and State of Israel: The chapter discusses the United Nations’ partition plan for Palestine and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in 1948.
- Arab-Israeli Conflict: It delves into the immediate outbreak of conflict between the new state of Israel and neighboring Arab countries.
- Late 1930s to 1940s: Key developments in Zionist strategies and British policies during World War II.
- 1947: UN Partition Plan for Palestine.
- 1948: Declaration of the State of Israel and the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
1963-1965
- Levi Eshkol becomes prime minister after Ben-Gurion resigns
- Eshkol continues nuclear ambiguity policy with U.S. and focuses on strengthening conventional military
- Relations with U.S. improve under President Johnson; Eshkol visits in 1964
- Border incidents flare up with Syria over water and territory disputes
- Egypt remains quiet to avoid provoking Israel while fighting war in Yemen
- Major escalation occurs with attack on Samu village in Jordan in 1966
1966-1967
- Tensions increase with more radical Syrian regime and rise of Palestinian guerrilla groups
- Israel shoots down 6 Syrian MiGs on April 7, 1967
- Crisis begins on May 11 when Israel threatens action against Syria
- Egypt moves troops into Sinai and closes Straits of Tiran on May 22
- Cabinet decides on war with Egypt on June 4
- Six-Day War begins when Israel launches surprise air strike on June 5
- Israel captures Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem in six days
Timeline
- 1963: Eshkol becomes Israeli PM
- 1964: Eshkol visits Washington
- 1965: Border clashes with Syria over water
- 1966: Samu raid against Jordan
- April 1967: Six Syrian MiGs shot down
- May 1967: Countdown to war over Straits of Tiran closure
- June 5, 1967: Six-Day War begins
- June 10, 1967: Israel captures territories from Egypt, Syria and Jordan
Timeline:
- 1963-1969: Period covered in the text, primarily focusing on Levi Eshkol’s tenure as Prime Minister of Israel.
- 1963: Eshkol becomes Prime Minister; succeeds Ben-Gurion.
- 1964: Yitzhak Rabin becomes Chief of Staff.
- 1964: Eshkol’s visit to the United States; discussions on Israel’s arms needs and water desalination.
- 1965: Rafi party formation by Ben-Gurion, Dayan, and Peres.
- 1965: General elections in Israel; Eshkol’s Alignment wins 45 seats.
- 1966: Major Israeli attack on Samu in Jordan.
- 1967: Six-Day War; Israel captures Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan Heights.
Key Points:
- Levi Eshkol’s Leadership: Characterized by a preference for consensus, moderation, and an emphasis on economic and defense matters.
- Foreign Relations and Defense: Focus on strengthening Israel’s military capabilities and maintaining a balance between defense and diplomacy.
- Israeli-American Relations: Improvement under Eshkol, with visits to the U.S. and discussions on military and economic aid.
- Political Dynamics in Israel: Eshkol’s tenure saw internal political challenges, including the formation of Rafi party by Ben-Gurion and others, advocating a more aggressive policy towards Arab states.
- Approach to Arab-Israeli Conflict: Eshkol’s administration aimed for peaceful coexistence, but faced challenges like the Samu raid and escalating tensions with Syria.
- Six-Day War: Culmination of escalating tensions in the region, leading to a significant military victory for Israel and territorial expansion.
- Chapter 7: Immboilism
The pages from Avi Shlaim’s “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” that you’ve asked me to summarize cover the period from 1969 to 1971, focusing on key events in Israeli politics and its relations with Arab states. Here’s a summarized timeline and main points in bullet format:
- 1969-1974: Immobilism Era
- Golda Meir becomes Prime Minister in 1969, known for her intransigent and uncompromising stance, especially towards the Arab world.
- Meir adopts two key principles: no return to prewar borders and no withdrawal without direct negotiations and peace treaties.
- Golda Meir’s Leadership
- Strong, decisive leadership style, often intolerant of opposition.
- Saw world in black-and-white terms, particularly in relations with Arabs.
- Her administration characterized by military activism and diplomatic immobility.
- War of Attrition (1969-1970)
- Egypt, under Nasser, intensifies military action to force Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.
- Israel adopts a defensive strategy, leading to heavy casualties and economic strain.
- Escalation of conflict with extensive use of Israeli Air Force.
- American Peace Efforts and Israeli Response
- U.S. proposes peace plans (Rogers Plan) based on UN Resolution 242, seeking Israeli withdrawal and resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.
- Israeli government, led by Meir, rejects these proposals, prioritizing security concerns over territorial adjustments.
- Egyptian and Israeli Military Strategies
- Israel’s strategy focused on maintaining status quo along cease-fire lines.
- Egyptian strategy aimed at exhausting Israel’s military and economic capabilities.
- Internal Israeli Politics
- Debate within Israeli government and among public between ‘hawks’ advocating a strong military stance and ‘doves’ pushing for negotiation and compromise.
- Golda Meir’s government faces criticism for lack of flexibility in pursuing peace opportunities.
- Shifts in International Relations
- Growing Soviet involvement on Egypt’s side, challenging Israel’s military supremacy.
- Increased dependence of Israel on U.S. for strategic support and arms, leading to greater susceptibility to U.S. political pressure.
- Diplomatic Stalemates and Opportunities
- Missed opportunities for diplomatic resolutions due to hardline positions.
- Growing realization of the need for a different approach to achieve peace, leading to the consideration of interim agreements.
Timeline
- March 1969: Golda Meir elected prime minister of Israel
- March 1969: War of Attrition begins between Israel and Egypt
- December 1969: Rogers Plan proposed by US for Arab-Israeli peace
- February 1971: Egypt indicates willingness for peace with Israel under certain conditions
- February 1971: Anwar Sadat proposes interim agreement to reopen Suez Canal
- December 1971: Meir makes concessions on interim agreement with Egypt
Key Points
Golda Meir’s Premiership (1969-1974)
- Elected PM in 1969 at age 71 when Levi Eshkol dies
- Strong, assertive personality, saw issues in black-and-white terms
- Intransigent and self-righteous attitudes, especially regarding Arabs
- Opposed Palestinian nationalism, rejected idea of Palestinian right to self-determination
- Favored hardline territorial policies after 1967 war
- Relied heavily on advice from hawkish advisers like Yisrael Galili and Moshe Dayan
War of Attrition with Egypt (1969-1970)
- Egypt tries to use force to regain Sinai after 1967 war, Israel responds forcefully
- Inconclusive outcome, but boosted Egypt’s morale and motivation
- Israel fails to correctly assess outcomes and lessons of the war
Diplomatic Efforts and Peace Plans
- Multiple peace plans proposed but rejected by Israel as imposing unacceptable concessions
- Some plans showed promise but not pursued vigorously enough by Israel
- Missed opportunities for interim agreement with Egypt to reopen Suez Canal
- Strong ties with US meant Israel could resist diplomatic pressure
Jordan
- Meir saw Jordan/King Hussein as best route to resolve Palestinian issue
- Extensive outreach to Hussein but no political progress on Palestinian question
- Practical cooperation on security, economic matters but no real “Jordanian option”
- 1969-1974: Immobilism Era
- Chapter 8: Disengagement 1974-1977
The section of Avi Shlaim’s “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” that you’ve provided (pages 487-520) covers a crucial period in the history of Israel and its relations with neighboring Arab states and the Palestinian issue. Here’s a concise summary and timeline of the main points and facts:
Summary
- Yitzhak Rabin’s Premiership (1974-1977): Rabin, a political novice, becomes Prime Minister of Israel. He prioritizes Israeli security and partnership with the United States.
- Rabin’s Government: Known for its freshness and internal conflicts within the Labor Alignment, Rabin’s government faces challenges in dealing with the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, economic issues, and territorial compromises.
- Jordan and Palestinian Relations: Rabin’s policy towards Jordan and the Palestinians is marked by restraint and caution, aiming to postpone major decisions. He rejects negotiations with the PLO and maintains a tough stance against the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- Sinai II Agreement (1975): Negotiated with Egypt, this agreement represents a significant step in Israeli-Egyptian relations but avoids addressing the broader Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Lebanon Civil War (1975-1976): Rabin’s government grapples with the complexities of the Lebanese Civil War, balancing between intervention and maintaining the status quo.
- Political and Personal Challenges: Rabin’s government faces internal political crises and international challenges, including strained U.S.-Israel relations and personal controversies leading to Rabin’s resignation in 1977.
Timeline
- June 1974: Yitzhak Rabin becomes Prime Minister of Israel.
- 1974-1975: Rabin’s government focuses on Israeli security, economic challenges, and territorial issues with neighboring Arab states.
- January 1975: Military disengagement agreement with Egypt (Sinai II) is signed.
- April 1975: Outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, posing new challenges for Israeli foreign policy.
- 1975-1976: Ongoing political and economic challenges within Israel and in its foreign relations.
- 1976: Deadlock in Arab-Israeli conflict negotiations; no major progress is made.
- Early 1977: Rabin faces political and personal crises, leading to his resignation in April.
Timeline
- June 1974: Yitzhak Rabin becomes prime minister of Israel
- August 1974: First meeting between Rabin and King Hussein to discuss possible Israeli withdrawal from West Bank
- October 1974: Arab League summit recognizes PLO as sole representative of Palestinians
- March 1975: Kissinger shuttle diplomacy for interim agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sinai II) fails
- September 1975: Sinai II agreement signed between Israel and Egypt
- 1976: Stalemate in Arab-Israeli peace process
- April 1977: Rabin resigns as prime minister
- May 1977: Likud wins election, ending Labor party dominance
Key Points
- Rabin was first native-born Israeli prime minister, with background as soldier and diplomat
- Focused on Israel’s security and strategic partnership with United States
- Government plagued by infighting between factions of ruling Labor party
- Rejected territorial concessions to Jordan/Palestinians due to domestic politics
- Pursued interim agreement with Egypt (Sinai II), trading land for peace
- Sinai II had important U.S. role - stationed forces and funded Israel
- Refused negotiations with Syria over Golan Heights
- In Lebanon, tried to balance Syrian influence vs. Israeli interests
- Faced growing economic woes and political scandals at home
- Rebuffed by new U.S. President Carter over Palestinian issue
- Resigned over financial scandal, replaced as PM by Shimon Peres
- Labor party defeated in 1977 election after nearly 30 years in power
[1]
https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/11e5ada4-94e0-414d-8ce3-f67090389fcd/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 487 - 520.pdf - Chapter 9: Peace with Egypt (1977-1981)
The document “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim, covering pages 521-560, discusses significant events and policies in Israeli history, particularly focusing on the period from 1977 to 1978. Here’s a summary of the key points in bullet format, followed by a timeline:
- Likud’s Victory in 1977: The election victory marked a significant shift in Israeli politics and foreign policy, with a move from Labor’s pragmatic approach to Likud’s ideological stance, particularly regarding the occupied territories.
- Likud’s Ideology: Greater Israel was a central tenet, including the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) as integral parts of Israel. Likud strongly opposed Jordanian sovereignty or Palestinian self-determination in these areas.
- Menachem Begin’s Influence: Influenced by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his experiences in the Holocaust, Begin had a hardline stance against Arab hostility and was committed to Jewish control over Jewish destiny.
- Peace with Egypt: Begin’s government showed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions, aligning with UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The government did not plan to annex the West Bank or Gaza Strip immediately.
- Sadat’s Journey to Jerusalem: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem aimed at peace negotiations, breaking psychological barriers in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations: Discussions centered around territorial concessions, Palestinian self-determination, and the nature of peace. The talks experienced various ups and downs due to ideological differences and political pressures.
- 1977: Likud wins Israeli election, marking a policy shift.
- 1977-1978: Period of intense negotiations and diplomatic activities between Israel and Egypt, including Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.
- 1978: Camp David Accords signed, leading to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
Summary
Ideology and Foreign Policy
- The Likud party’s ideology centered around the concept of “Greater Israel”, which included Judea and Samaria (West Bank) as an integral part of Israel
- Likud denied any Jordanian or Palestinian claim to sovereignty over the West Bank
- Keeping control over the West Bank was seen as vital for Israel’s security
Sadat’s Journey to Jerusalem
- In November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made a dramatic visit to Jerusalem to try to make peace
- This broke down psychological barriers and was aimed at convincing Israelis that Egypt genuinely wanted peace
Plans for Palestinian Autonomy
- At Camp David, Begin put forward a plan for Palestinian “autonomy” (self-rule) in the West Bank and Gaza
- The plan was for administrative autonomy only, not territorial, to avoid compromising Israel’s claim over the land
- It left the question of sovereignty unresolved as a compromise
The Camp David Accords
- The accords were signed in 1978 after tough negotiations between Begin, Sadat and Carter
- They included principles for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza
- They also set out terms for an Egypt-Israel peace treaty involving Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
The Peace Treaty with Egypt
- The treaty was signed in 1979. It stood separately from the Palestinian issue
- It required complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and return of the land to Egypt
- In exchange, Egypt agreed to fully normalize relations with Israel
Timeline
- 1977: Likud party comes to power in Israel
- November 1977: Sadat visits Jerusalem
- September 1978: Camp David Accords signed
- March 1979: Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed
- January 1980: Israel completes withdrawal from western Sinai
- February 1980: Full diplomatic relations established between Egypt and Israel
[1]
https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/5312d1e9-4924-436e-9bc8-3f3dccb55c97/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 521 - 560.pdf - Chapter 10: The Lebanese Quagmire (1981-1984)
The provided pages (561-608) from “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim cover a range of events and policies relating to Israel’s military and political actions from 1981 to 1982, particularly focusing on the situation in Lebanon. Here’s a summary of the main points:
- Operation Babylon (1981): Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, a controversial move seen by some as an electoral stunt by Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister.
- Israeli Political Dynamics (1981): Likud’s election victory influenced by Operation Babylon, and the shift in Israeli government composition to a more right-wing, nationalistic stance.
- Golan Heights Annexation (1981): Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, seen as a violation of international law and a significant shift in Israeli policy, led to international condemnation and strained U.S.-Israel relations.
- Lebanon Invasion Planning (1982): Ariel Sharon, the Defense Minister, was the driving force behind the invasion plan of Lebanon, aiming to destroy the PLO and establish a friendly government in Lebanon.
- Operation Peace for Galilee (1982): The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, initiated as a response to attacks from the PLO, but also driven by broader geopolitical aims.
- Cabinet Decisions and Misrepresentations: The Israeli cabinet’s decision-making process was influenced by Sharon’s selective presentation of the invasion plan, leading to a larger conflict than initially approved.
- U.S.-Israel Diplomatic Dynamics: The U.S. response to Israel’s actions in Lebanon and the Golan Heights, highlighting the complexity of the relationship between the two countries during this period.
Summary
- The article discusses the origins and course of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, known as Operation Peace for Galilee
- Key figures involved include Israeli PM Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan, and Lebanese Christian leader Bashir Gemayel
- Sharon had ambitious plans to install a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon led by Gemayel and expel Syrian forces
- However, the Israeli cabinet only approved a limited operation to push PLO forces 40km from the border
- As the operation progressed, Sharon expanded its scope without cabinet approval, aiming to reach Beirut and link up with Christian forces
- This led to clashes with Syrian forces and a siege of Beirut to pressure the PLO to withdraw
- Under U.S. mediation, the PLO withdrew from Beirut to Tunisia in August 1982
- Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon but was assassinated days later
Timeline
- June 1982: Israel invades Lebanon, cabinet approves limited operation
- Early July: IDF reaches outskirts of Beirut, begins siege to pressure PLO
- Mid-August: PLO withdraws from Beirut following U.S. mediation
- 23 August: Bashir Gemayel elected President of Lebanon
- September 1982: Gemayel assassinated
[1]
https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/39d28b52-58a7-4b14-bdc0-d37594e2755a/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 561 - 608.pdf - Chapter 11: Political Paralysis (1984-1988)
The excerpt from “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim covers Israeli political and diplomatic developments from 1984 to 1987. Here is a summarized timeline and key points:
- 1984-1988: Political Paralysis
- 1984: Israeli general election amidst Lebanese conflict and economic crisis.
- Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir lead a grand coalition government with a novel rotation agreement. Peres serves as Prime Minister for the first 25 months, then Shamir.
- Policy Guidelines
- Main points include withdrawal from Lebanon, consolidating peace with Egypt, rejecting a Palestinian state and PLO negotiations, settlement expansion in West Bank, and maintaining united Jerusalem.
- Diplomatic Efforts and Challenges
- Peres’s Achievements: Addressed hyperinflation, began IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, attempted to improve international relations.
- Challenges with Egypt over Taba dispute, leading to arbitration.
- The Jordanian Option
- Peres aimed for a deal with Jordan, overcoming the challenges posed by the PLO’s role and the concept of an international conference.
- King Hussein of Jordan explored negotiations without PLO involvement.
- Israeli Internal Dynamics
- Differences between Peres and Shamir, particularly on approaches to the Arabs and peace processes.
- The complexity of Israeli politics, including Peres’s technocratic style versus Shamir’s ideologically driven approach.
- International Relations and Military Actions
- The Israeli raid on Tunis in response to PLO activities.
- Ongoing negotiations and challenges with Jordan and Egypt.
- 1987: Shift in Leadership and Policy
- Peres hands over premiership to Shamir, marking a shift in diplomatic approaches.
- Focus on bilateral negotiations under an international umbrella, bypassing the PLO.
- Irangate Scandal Impact
- Israel’s involvement in the Iran-Contra affair and its repercussions.
- 1984-1988: Political paralysis in Israel due to national unity government between Labor Alignment and Likud
- July 1985: Peres secretly meets with King Hussein to discuss peace negotiations
- October 1985: Israel bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis in retaliation for terrorism
- February 1986: Hussein ends effort to work with PLO on joint peace strategy
- March 1986: Rabin meets Hussein and asks for help against PLO
- July 1986: Rabin says Israel aims to strengthen Jordan’s position in West Bank vs PLO
- April 1987: Peres and Hussein secretly meet in London and agree on framework for starting peace talks (London Agreement)
- July 1987: Shamir meets Hussein but they disagree on path forward
- December 1987: Outbreak of first Palestinian intifada uprising against Israeli occupation
- 1984 national unity government was politically paralyzed between Alignment and Likud views
- Peres tried to advance “Jordanian option” for peace while foreign minister
- Met secretly with Hussein several times but struggled to gain support within Israeli government
- Hussein made overtures but remained constrained by deals with PLO
- Reached London Agreement with Hussein on framework for talks but Shamir rejected it
- Israel bombed PLO HQ in Tunis in 1985 and intervened against PLO in Lebanon civil war
- Palestinian intifada uprising began in 1987, caught Israel by surprise
- Intifada aimed to achieve Palestinian independence and statehood
- Israel responded with force but was unable to put down the mass civil unrest
- Intifada further paralyzed and divided the national unity government
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https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/019e8bf6-091d-4367-8ea9-d72fea638c3b/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 609 - 653.pdf - 1984-1988: Political Paralysis
- Chapter 12: Stonewalling (1988-1992)
The section of Avi Shlaim’s book “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” that you’ve provided covers a significant and complex period of Israeli history, primarily focusing on the late 1980s and early 1990s. Here’s a concise summary in bullet points, along with a timeline of key events:
Summary:
- 1988-1992 Political Landscape: The Israeli political scene was deeply influenced by the intifada, with parties divided over responses to Palestinian unrest and negotiations. The Labor party focused on peace, while Likud emphasized security and an “iron fist” approach.
- Election Outcomes and Government Formation: Elections during this period did not yield a clear winner, leading to complex coalition formations. Yitzhak Shamir emerged as a dominant figure, forming governments that reflected a hardline stance on territorial issues and negotiations.
- Yitzhak Shamir’s Ideology and Leadership: Shamir, influenced by his past and views on security, was skeptical of peace negotiations and territorial compromise, adhering to a policy of maintaining the status quo and emphasizing military strength.
- The Peace Initiative and Internal Opposition: Shamir proposed a peace initiative involving elections in the West Bank and Gaza to form a non-PLO Palestinian leadership for negotiations. This initiative faced significant opposition within Israel, particularly from right-wing factions.
- The Gulf War Impact: The 1990-91 Gulf War had significant implications for Israel, including missile attacks from Iraq. Israel’s decision not to retaliate against Iraq, despite public pressure, marked a shift in its military posture.
- Post-Gulf War Dynamics and Madrid Peace Conference: After the Gulf War, the U.S. pushed for renewed peace efforts in the region, leading to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Israel’s participation, though reluctant, marked a significant step in the peace process.
- 1988: Israeli general elections held in the backdrop of the intifada.
- 1989: Yitzhak Shamir’s government proposes a peace initiative.
- 1990-91: Gulf War; Iraq launches Scud missiles at Israel.
- 1991: Madrid Peace Conference convenes with U.S. encouragement.
Summary
Main Points
- The article discusses Israel’s foreign policy and relations with Arab states, the Palestinians, and the US from 1988-1992, covering:
- The First Intifada (Palestinian uprising) and its impact
- The 1988 Israeli elections and formation of a Likud-Labor national unity government led by Yitzhak Shamir
- Shamir’s political views and leadership style
- Shamir’s 1989 peace initiative and its failure
- The 1990-91 Gulf War and its impact on Israel
- The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference convened after the Gulf War
Key Facts
- In 1988, Yitzhak Shamir of Likud becomes Prime Minister in a power-sharing agreement with Labor
- Shamir is deeply suspicious of Arabs and reluctant to trade land for peace
- The First Intifada erupts in 1987 in the occupied Palestinian territories
- In 1988 the PLO accepts Israel’s right to exist. The US opens dialogue with the PLO
- Shamir launches a peace initiative in 1989 but it fails due to opposition within Likud
- Iraq invades Kuwait in 1990 leading to the Gulf War
- Israel refrains from retaliating against Iraq during the Gulf War
- After the Gulf War, the US pressures Israel to attend the Madrid Peace Conference with Arab states and Palestinians
Timeline
- 1987: First Intifada begins
- 1988: PLO accepts Israel’s right to exist; Shamir becomes PM
- 1989: Shamir peace initiative
- 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait; Gulf War starts
- 1991: Gulf War ends; Madrid conference held
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https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/5f10594f-694f-43b0-8189-b31778a3bed5/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 654 - 703.pdf - Chapter 13: The Breakthrough (1992-1995)
The section from Avi Shlaim’s “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” covers the period from 1992 to the early 1990s, focusing on significant political and diplomatic developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here is a summary with key points and a timeline:
- 1992-1995: Breakthrough Period
- 1992: Labor Party, led by Yitzhak Rabin, wins the Israeli general election. Rabin’s government marked a shift from the previous Likud government’s policies, particularly in its approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian nationalism.
- Ideological and Policy Differences: The Labor and Likud parties had fundamental ideological and policy differences regarding the Palestinians and peace negotiations.
- Rabin’s Foreign Policy: Rabin, as Prime Minister, had significant authority in foreign policy decisions. His military background influenced his cautious approach to peace talks, though he recognized the need for negotiation with Arab states and Palestinians.
- Bilateral Peace Talks: The peace talks with various Arab parties, including Palestinians and Syrians, faced challenges. Initial focus on Palestinian autonomy shifted towards a potential settlement with Syria.
- Oslo Channel
- Direct Talks with PLO: A significant shift in Israeli foreign policy, leading to the Oslo Accord in September 1993. Key figures in this decision were Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yossi Beilin.
- Oslo Accord: Marked the start of a new era in the Middle East, with mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and a framework for Palestinian self-governance.
- Historic Reconciliation: The accord was based on the principle of partition of Palestine, a significant shift from previous policies of both Israeli and Palestinian sides.
- Implementation and Opposition
- Implementing the Oslo Accord: The process included setting up committees for negotiations, leading to the Cairo Agreement in 1994.
- Opposition and Challenges: The accord faced opposition from various groups within Israel and the Palestinian territories. Issues like the Hebron massacre and the reaction to Israeli settlements highlighted ongoing tensions.
- Overall Impact
- The period marked a significant shift in the approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the Oslo Accord being a landmark in efforts towards peace.
- June 1992: Labor Party wins Israeli elections, Rabin becomes prime minister
- August 1992: First meeting between Israeli and Syrian delegations in Washington peace talks
- December 1992: Israel repeals law banning contact between citizens and PLO
- 1993: Secret Oslo talks between Israel and PLO
- September 1993: Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles accord signed
- May 1994: Israel-PLO Cairo agreement signed on Gaza-Jericho withdrawal
- September 1995: Oslo II accord signed
- The Labor government under Rabin represented a shift in priorities from Greater Israel ideology of Likud to pursuit of peace
- Madrid peace talks made little progress. Bilateral track with Palestinians deadlocked over extent of autonomy
- Oslo backchannel opened between Israel and PLO in 1993 outside official talks
- Declaration of Principles provided for phased withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, Palestinian elections and interim self-government
- Letters of mutual recognition exchanged - a historic reconciliation between Israel and PLO
- Opposition from Israeli right-wing and radical Palestinian factions - but accords had majority support
- Implementation faced difficulties - divisions over security control, settlements, violence from Hamas
- Further agreements in 1994-95 extended withdrawal to West Bank towns and set 3 zones of control
- Oslo was interim agreement, permanent status issues left for later negotiations
- Separate Israel-Syria track also made progress - Rabin eventually agreed to full Golan withdrawal, but Assad had reservations
- Oslo challenged Greater Israel ideology, paved way for wider Arab-Israeli normalization
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https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/c91adace-6b95-48c8-8dda-2990afab52cc/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 704 - 757.pdf - 1992-1995: Breakthrough Period
- Chapter 14: The Setback (1995-1996)
The section from Avi Shlaim’s “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” covers a critical period in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, notably the aftermath of the Oslo Accords and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It delves into the evolving political landscape, the challenges in implementing the peace process, and the regional implications of these developments. Key events include:
- 1995-1996: The period focuses on the implementation of the Oslo Accords, the differing visions of peace between Rabin and Yasser Arafat, and the challenges due to the expansion of Israeli settlements.
- Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (1995): Rabin’s assassination by a right-wing Jewish extremist drastically altered the course of the peace process.
- Shimon Peres’s Leadership and Vision: The book discusses the leadership of Shimon Peres after Rabin’s assassination, his policies, and his vision for a “New Middle East.”
- Challenges in the Peace Process: The book covers the obstacles encountered in the peace process, particularly with Syria and the Palestinian Authority.
- Impact of Regional and International Politics: The narrative includes the influence of regional and international dynamics on Israeli politics and the peace process.
Summary
- Yitzhak Rabin began treating Yasser Arafat as a partner for peace through the Oslo Accords, though they had differing visions of the final outcome
- Rabin envisioned a demilitarized Palestinian entity less than a state; Arafat wanted a sovereign Palestinian state including East Jerusalem
- On November 4, 1995, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Jewish extremist named Yigal Amir, who opposed the peace process
- Over 1 million Israelis attended Rabin’s funeral, where world leaders like Bill Clinton and King Hussein paid respects
- Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin as prime minister and continued the peace efforts, promoting his vision for a “New Middle East”
- Peres focused on achieving a breakthrough with Syria’s Hafez al-Assad but faced resistance from Assad and his own advisers like Ehud Barak
- In January 1996, Peres approved assassinating Hamas bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash; this led to a series of revenge suicide bombings by Hamas inside Israel
- Public opinion swung towards Netanyahu and his tough security stance as a result
- In April 1996, Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath against Hezbollah in Lebanon, leading to over 100 civilian deaths
- The operation was condemned internationally and boosted Assad’s standing
- In the Israeli election on May 29, 1996, Netanyahu narrowly defeated Peres to become prime minister
- Netanyahu capitalized on public fears over security and skepticism of the peace process
Timeline
- November 4, 1995: Yitzhak Rabin assassinated
- November 22, 1995: Shimon Peres becomes prime minister
- January 5, 1996: Israel assassinates Yahya Ayyash
- February-March 1996: Series of Hamas suicide bombings in Israel
- April 11-27, 1996: Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon
- May 29, 1996: Netanyahu elected prime minister over Peres
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https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/7742445/2ea9cb2a-91e7-408a-868f-9678a3a37729/The Iron Wall_ Israel and the A - Avi Shlaim pages 758 - 778.pdf - Chapter 15: Back to the Iron Wall (1996-1999)
The pages 779-844 of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim cover a detailed analysis of Israeli politics and foreign relations, focusing on the period from 1996 to 1998 during the tenure of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Here’s a summarized timeline and key points in bullet points:
Timeline:
- 1996-1999: Binyamin Netanyahu’s tenure as Prime Minister of Israel.
- March 1993: Netanyahu elected leader of Likud.
- 1993: Publication of Netanyahu’s book “A Place among the Nations.”
- 1996: Netanyahu elected Prime Minister of Israel.
- January 1997: Signing of the Hebron Protocol.
- 1997-1998: Expansion of Jewish settlements and internal political developments in Israel.
Key Points:
- Netanyahu’s Rise to Power: Represented a shift from Labor’s pragmatic approach towards Arabs to a more ideological stance rooted in Revisionist Zionism.
- Ideological Background: Netanyahu was influenced by Revisionist Zionist teachings, emphasizing Jewish persecution and survival.
- Views on Arab-Israeli Relations: Netanyahu saw the relationship as a permanent conflict, portraying Arab regimes negatively and denying the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.
- Hebron Protocol (1997): Divided Hebron into two zones, marked the first agreement signed by Likud with Palestinians.
- Domestic Politics: Netanyahu faced challenges within his coalition and criticism for his hardline policies.
- Settlement Expansion: Continued expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territories.
- International Relations: Netanyahu’s policies led to strained relations with Arab neighbors and challenges in the peace process.
- Policy of Land for Peace: Netanyahu’s approach contrasted with the previous government’s policies, focusing more on Israeli security and less on land concessions.
Summary
Netanyahu’s Policies
- After becoming Prime Minister in 1996, Netanyahu worked to undermine the Oslo peace accords with the Palestinians
- He suspended further redeployments of Israeli forces on the West Bank, violated the spirit of Oslo by building more settlements, and treated the Palestinian Authority as subordinate rather than an equal partner
- Adopted a confrontational stance on negotiations over Jerusalem, vowing to resist compromise and strengthen Israel’s hold over the city
- Refused to honor Rabin’s conditional commitment to withdraw Israeli forces from the Golan Heights back to the 1967 lines in a peace deal with Syria
- Tried to backtrack on agreements made in 1995 between Israeli and Syrian negotiators regarding security arrangements in a future peace treaty
Consequences
- Relations with Palestinians deteriorated over settlement growth, land confiscations, and lack of further redeployments
- Violent clashes erupted in 1996 over the opening of an archaeological tunnel near the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa mosque
- Forced to make some concessions in the 1997 Hebron Protocol due to pressure after clashes
- Peace talks with Syria stalled due to refusal to continue from where they left off under Rabin
- Mossad assassination attempt in Jordan in 1997 severely damaged relations with King Hussein
- Lebanon policy aimed to marginalize Syria and separate negotiations with Lebanon, but it failed
Opposition
- Security chiefs doubted Netanyahu’s competence and opposed his policies undermining Oslo
- 1,500 IDF reserve officers signed a letter in 1998 urging Netanyahu to choose peace over expanding settlements
Timeline
- May 1996: Netanyahu elected Prime Minister
- Sep 1996: Opening of archaeological tunnel sparks violent clashes
- Jan 1997: Hebron Protocol signed
- Feb 1997: Plans announced for Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem
- Sep 1997: Failed Mossad assassination attempt in Jordan
- 1998: Little progress made in peace talks, continued settlement growth
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The document “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim, focuses on the period from 1999 to 2000, detailing Israel’s political and diplomatic activities, particularly under the leadership of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Here’s a summarized timeline and the main points:
- 1999-2000: Ehud Barak’s Tenure
- May 1999: Ehud Barak wins the general election, marking a shift in Israeli politics.
- Rise of Ehud Barak: Focus on healing internal divisions and capturing the middle ground in Israeli politics, resembling Tony Blair’s New Labor in Britain.
- Political Landscape: A fragmented Knesset with many parties, complicating coalition formation. Barak emphasizes security and pragmatism over ideological positions.
- Barak’s Background: Noted for his military career, including leading elite commando units, and later roles in politics as interior and foreign minister.
- Domestic Politics: Barak’s approach is hierarchical and authoritarian, leading to criticisms within his party.
- Foreign Policy Stance: Emphasis on security (“bitkhonist” approach), prioritizing peace with Syria and the Palestinians, and maintaining a strong military presence.
- Peace Negotiations: Attempts to restart stalled talks with Syria and reach a peace deal, including a withdrawal from Lebanon.
- Palestinian Relations: A focus on final status talks, with conditions including maintaining Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and not fully withdrawing to the 1967 borders.
- Syrian Negotiations: Barak’s focus on a peace deal with Syria, seen as a more significant military threat compared to the Palestinians.
- Internal Challenges: Struggles with forming a government and balancing different political factions.
- Public Perception: Mixed views on Barak’s leadership style and approach to peace negotiations.
Summary
Rise of Ehud Barak
- Ehud Barak elected prime minister in May 1999, seen as a “new dawn” after Netanyahu
- Aims to heal divisions in Israeli society and politics
- Models his One Israel party on Tony Blair’s New Labour
- Prioritizes capturing political middle ground
Priorities and Approach
- Top priorities are reaching deals with Syria and Palestinians, followed by withdrawal from Lebanon
- Sees Syria as more serious military threat than Palestinians
- Wants “peace of separation” rather than “peace of integration” like Peres
- Puts security before peace in negotiations
Early Negotiations
- Meets Arafat in July 1999 but make little progress
- Visits Washington in July 1999, promises to work closely with Clinton administration
- Signs Wye II accord with Palestinians in September 1999 to restart final status talks
Syria First Strategy
- Concentrates on Syria track first rather than Palestinian track
- Secret talks held in late 1999 to prepare for resumed negotiations
- Shepherdstown summit in January 2000 ends abruptly without a deal
- Barak raises then dashes expectations, angers Clinton
- Geneva summit with Assad in March 2000 also fails quickly
Lebanon Withdrawal
- After failure with Syria, seeks unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon
- Announces withdrawal in March 2000 to fulfill election promise
- Pulls troops out by late May 2000 despite security concerns
Timeline
- May 1999: Barak elected prime minister
- July 1999: Meets Arafat and Clinton
- September 1999: Wye II accord signed
- January 2000: Shepherdstown summit with Syria
- March 2000: Geneva summit with Syria fails
- March 2000: Announces Lebanon withdrawal
- May 2000: Completes Lebanon withdrawal
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- Chapter 17: Peace in Tatters (2000-2001)
The provided section of “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim covers significant events and developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly focusing on the period around 2000-2001. Here’s a summary in bullet points along with a timeline:
- Negotiations with Palestinians vs. Syrians (2000-2001): The negotiations with Palestinians were more complex than with Syrians, involving deeper existential issues.
- Ehud Barak’s Leadership (2000): Barak’s approach to negotiations was criticized for being egocentric and dismissive towards others, including Bill Clinton.
- Camp David Summit (July 2000): The summit was marked by differing expectations and approaches from Israeli and Palestinian sides. Key issues included territory, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees.
- Palestinian Frustration and Israeli Politics: Palestinian frustration grew due to perceived Israeli intransigence and expansion of settlements. Israeli political scene was polarized, affecting the peace process.
- Differing Narratives and Historical Perceptions: Both sides held fundamentally different views on the conflict’s nature and solutions, influenced by differing interpretations of history and justice.
- Violence and the Al-Aqsa Intifada (September 2000): Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount escalated tensions, leading to widespread violence known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
- American Role and Diplomacy: The U.S. played a key role in negotiations but faced criticism for perceived biases. Clinton’s efforts, especially the “Clinton Parameters,” sought a comprehensive settlement but were ultimately unsuccessful.
- 2000-2001: Period of intense negotiations and rising tensions.
- July 2000: Camp David Summit held.
- September 2000: Ariel Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
- Late 2000: Clinton Parameters proposed, marking a significant U.S. diplomatic effort.
Timeline
- July 2000 - Camp David summit between Israel and the Palestinians fails to reach agreement
- September 2000 - Ariel Sharon visits Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa Mosque, sparking riots that lead to the Second Intifada
- December 2000 - President Clinton presents his “parameters” for a final settlement
- January 2001
- Arafat gives a qualified acceptance of Clinton’s parameters
- Final negotiations held in Taba, Egypt between Israel and the Palestinians
Summary
Camp David Summit (July 2000)
- Convened by President Clinton with aim of reaching final settlement between Israel & Palestinians
- Barak offers Palestinians:
- 91% of West Bank
- Small land swap near Gaza
- Sovereignty in Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem and Muslim/Christian quarters of Old City
- Custodianship over Temple Mount
- Arafat rejects offer, wants full sovereignty over East Jerusalem and right of return for refugees
- Summit collapses without agreement
Outbreak of Second Intifada (September 2000)
- Erupts after Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa Mosque
- Violence escalates rapidly with clashes and reprisals between Palestinians and Israel
- Oslo peace process breaks down, mutual distrust grows
Clinton’s Parameters (December 2000)
- Clinton presents plan outlining proposed permanent settlement
- Israel accepts with reservations
- Arafat gives qualified acceptance but raises questions about details
Taba Talks (January 2001)
- Last minute negotiations between Israel & Palestinians, without US involvement
- Discuss Clinton’s parameters as basis for final settlement
- Some progress made but talks suspended unilaterally by Israel shortly before elections
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The document, “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World” by Avi Shlaim, covers pages 926 to 970 and mainly focuses on Ariel Sharon’s tenure as Israel’s Prime Minister, emphasizing his approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly between 2001 and 2003. Here’s a summarized timeline and the main points in bullet form:
Timeline
- 2001-2003: Ariel Sharon’s leadership period covered.
Main Points
- Sharon’s Political Stance:
- Known as a hawk in Israeli politics.
- Campaign rebranded him as a peacemaker, promising peace with the Palestinians.
- Advocated a policy of “No negotiations under fire.”
- Sharon’s Background and Beliefs:
- Seen as a practical and pragmatic, yet deeply anti-intellectual and nationalist.
- History of advocating for “iron fist” policies against Arabs.
- Reputation for being tough and uncompromising, with a focus on military solutions.
- Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
- Continued expansion of Jewish settlements in occupied territories.
- Opposed the Oslo accords and did not propose a clear alternative.
- Aimed to consolidate Israeli settlements and control over West Bank and Gaza.
- Viewed relations with Palestinians as a zero-sum game.
- International Relations and Leadership Style:
- Tried to maintain good relations with the United States.
- Considered negotiations a sign of weakness and preferred unilateral actions.
- Viewed as using diplomacy as an extension of war.
- Impact of 9/11:
- Saw 9/11 as a validation of his views on terrorism and conflict.
- Attempted to align Israel’s interests with the U.S. “war on terror.”
- Responses to Palestinian Intifada:
- Focused on military response to Palestinian violence.
- Refused to negotiate under fire, insisting first on Palestinian cessation of violence.
- Policy seen as a continuation of his hard-line, military-focused approach.
- Final Observations:
- Sharon’s policies and actions continued to be a subject of controversy and debate.
- His leadership significantly impacted Israeli-Palestinian relations during this period.
Summary
- Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel in 2001. He was seen as a hawk and hardliner on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Sharon took a confrontational approach toward Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians. He blamed Arafat for the violence of the Second Intifada and refused to negotiate.
- After 9/11, Sharon tried to link the Palestinian militant groups to the global terrorism of Al-Qaeda. He wanted Israel’s fight to be seen as part of the global “War on Terror.”
- In 2002, Sharon ordered a large-scale military operation called “Defensive Shield” to reoccupy Palestinian territory in the West Bank. The aim was to dismantle terrorist infrastructure.
- Sharon oversaw a policy of targeted assassinations of Palestinian militant leaders during the Intifada. This was controversial but had public support in Israel.
- In 2002, Saudi Arabia proposed an Arab Peace Initiative offering Israel full recognition and normalization of relations from Arab states in return for withdrawal from occupied territories. Sharon dismissed the offer.
Timeline
- February 2001: Sharon elected Prime Minister
- September 2001: 9/11 terrorist attacks
- March 2002: Sharon launches Operation Defensive Shield, reoccupying West Bank
- March 2002: Arab League proposes peace initiative at Beirut Summit
- 2002-2004: Israel pursues policy of targeted assassinations under Sharon
- 2004: Sharon announces unilateral “Disengagement Plan” to withdraw settlements from Gaza
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The document, “The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World,” by Avi Shlaim covers the period from 2003 to 2006, focusing on Israeli-Palestinian relations and developments in the Middle East. Here is a summarized timeline and key points in bullet format:
Timeline and Main Points:
- 2003-2006: The period of focus in the document.
- Construction of the Security Barrier: Israel announced the construction of a barrier in the West Bank for security against suicide bombers. This barrier was criticized for its impact on Palestinian territories and its political implications.
- Ideological and Political Shifts: Shifts in Israeli politics, particularly within the Likud party, regarding the construction of the barrier and its implications on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- International and Domestic Reactions: Reactions to the barrier ranged from muted international criticism to intense domestic debate within Israel and among the Palestinian population.
- Impact on Palestinian Life: The barrier caused significant disruptions to Palestinian life, including land confiscation, separation of communities, and increased hardship.
- International Legal Challenges: The International Court of Justice and the United Nations issued statements and rulings against the construction of the barrier, citing violations of international law.
- Israeli Unilateral Actions and Diplomacy: Israel’s unilateral approach to defining its borders and the impact of this strategy on peace negotiations.
- U.S. Involvement and Policies: The U.S. government’s stance on the barrier and its broader Middle East policies, including the influence of pro-Israeli advisors in shaping U.S. foreign policy.
- The Road Map Initiative: Introduction of the Road Map for peace by the Quartet (United States, Russia, the UN, and the European Union), aiming for a two-state solution by the end of 2005.
- Internal and External Challenges to Peace Efforts: Obstacles to the Road Map initiative, including internal opposition within Israel, Palestinian reactions, and the complex interplay of regional and international politics.
- Continued Conflict and Lack of Progress: Despite various initiatives and proposals, the ongoing conflict and lack of substantial progress towards a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Timeline
- 29 Nov. 1947: UN resolution for the partition of Palestine.
- 14 May 1948: Proclamation of the State of Israel.
- 15 May 1948–7 Jan. 1949: First Arab-Israeli War.
- 11 Dec. 1948: UN General Assembly Resolution 194 on refugees.
- Feb.–July 1949: Arab-Israeli armistice agreements signed.
- April–June 1949: First round of Lausanne talks under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.
- 11 May 1949: Israel admitted to UN membership.
- 9 Dec. 1949: General Assembly votes for internationalization of Jerusalem.
- 13 Dec. 1949: The Knesset decides to hold its sessions in Jerusalem.
- 4 April 1950: Jordan annexes West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
- 25 May 1950: Britain, France, and U.S. issue Tripartite Declaration on regulating the supply of arms to the Middle East.
- 12 Feb. 1951: Israel begins Huleh drainage work in DMZ with Syria.
- 4 April 1951: Syria attacks Israeli patrol in al-Hamma.
- 2–6 May 1951: Israeli-Syrian clashes in Tal al-Mutilla.
- 23 July 1952: Free Officers’ revolution in Egypt.
- 18 Aug. 1952: Ben-Gurion welcomes Egyptian revolution in the Knesset.
- 9 Oct. 1952–27 May 1953: Syrian-Israeli talks on the division of the DMZs.
- 2 Sept. 1953: Israel starts work on Jordan River project. Syria complains to Security Council.
- 1 Oct. 1953: President Eisenhower appoints Eric Johnston to mediate in water dispute.
- 15 Oct. 1953: The Qibya raid.
- 7 Dec. 1953: Moshe Sharett succeeds David Ben-Gurion as prime minister.
- 17 April 1954: Colonel Nasser becomes prime minister of Egypt.
- July 1954: The Lavon affair, or “the mishap”—activation of Jewish sabotage ring in Egypt.
- 28 Sept. 1954: Egypt seizes Israeli ship Bat Galim at Port Said.
- 19 Oct. 1954: Britain signs Suez base evacuation agreement with Egypt.
- 21 Feb. 1955: Ben-Gurion returns to government as minister of defense.
- 24 Feb. 1955: Iraq and Turkey sign the Baghdad Pact.
- 28 Feb. 1955: IDF raid on Gaza.
- 5 April 1955: Britain joins the Baghdad Pact.
- 9 Aug. 1955: Elmore Jackson embarks on his mission of conciliation.
- 27 Sept. 1955: Nasser announces the Czech arms deal.
- 20 Oct. 1955: Egypt and Syria sign mutual defense treaty.
- 2 Nov. 1955: Ben-Gurion again becomes prime minister.
- 11 Dec. 1955: Operation Kinneret.
- Dec. 1955–March 1956: The Anderson mission.
- 6 April 1956: UN secretary-general begins shuttle to reestablish the Israeli-Egyptian armistice.
- 13 June 1956: British complete evacuation of their forces from Suez.
- 18 June 1956: Sharett resigns as foreign minister.
- 24–26 June 1956: The Vermars conference.
- 26 July 1956: Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal Company.
- 30 Sept.–1 Oct. 1956: The St.-Germain conference.
- 22 Oct. 1956: Defense pact signed by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
- 22–24 Oct. 1956: The conference of Sèvres.
- 29 Oct.–7 Nov. 1956: The Suez War.
- 5 Nov. 1956: USSR threatens use of force, including rockets, if Britain, France, and Israel do not halt attack on Egypt.
- 5 Jan. 1957: Anti-Communist Eisenhower Doctrine proclaimed.
- 10 March 1957: IDF withdraws to armistice line with Egypt.
- 1 Feb. 1958: Syria and Egypt merge to form the United Arab Republic (UAR).
- 14 July 1958: Revolution in Iraq.
- 15 July 1958: American deployment to Lebanon; British deployment to Jordan.
- 28 Sept. 1961: Syrian coup leads to dissolution of UAR.
- 8 March 1963: Ba’thist coup in Syria.
- 16 June 1963: Ben-Gurion resigns and Levi Eshkol succeeds.
- 13–17 Jan. 1964: First Arab summit meeting in Cairo decides on Jordan River diversion.
- 29 May 1964: Creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
- 5–11 Sept. 1964: Second Arab summit in Alexandria.
- 23 Feb. 1966: Left-wing coup in Syria followed by increased PLO activity against Israel.
- 9 Nov. 1966: Syria and Egypt sign mutual defense treaty.
- 13 Nov. 1966: Israeli raid on West Bank village of Samu.
- 7 April 1967: Israeli aircraft shoot down seven Syrian MiGs.
- 15 May 1967: Nasser deploys troops in Sinai.
- 19 May 1967: Nasser requests withdrawal of UN Emergency Force from Sinai.
- 22 May 1967: Nasser closes the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
- 26 May 1967: Abba Eban meets President Johnson after talks with Charles de Gaulle and Harold Wilson.
- 30 May 1967: Egypt and Jordan sign mutual defense pact in Cairo.
- 1 June 1967: Government of national unity formed in Jerusalem.
- 5–10 June 1967: The Six-Day War.
- 27 June 1967: Israel annexes East Jerusalem.
- 26 July 1967: Allon Plan presented to cabinet.
- 29 Aug.–1 Sept. 1967: Arab League summit at Khartoum.
- 22 Nov. 1967: UN Security Council passes Resolution 242.
- 26 Feb. 1969: Levi Eshkol dies and is succeeded by Golda Meir.
- March 1969 – Aug. 1970: The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition.
- 9 Dec. 1969: The Rogers plan is announced.
- 22 Dec. 1969: Israel rejects the Rogers plan.
- 19 June 1970: The second Rogers initiative.
- 7 Aug. 1970: Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire under the Rogers initiative.
- Sept. 1970: “Black September”: Jordan crushes Palestinian fedayeen.
- 20 Sept. 1970: President Nasser dies and Anwar Sadat succeeds.
- 4 Feb. 1971: Sadat presents proposal for an interim settlement.
- 8 Feb. 1971: Gunnar Jarring’s questionnaire to Israel and Egypt.
- 4 Oct. 1971: The third Rogers plan.
- 15 March 1972: King Hussein unveils federal plan for a United Arab Kingdom.
- 22–26 May 1972: Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow.
- 18 July 1972: Sadat expels Soviet military advisers from Egypt.
- 6–26 Oct. 1973: The Yom Kippur War.
- 22 Oct. 1973: UN Security Council Resolution 338 calls for direct negotiations.
- 21 Dec. 1973: The Geneva peace conference.
- 18 Jan. 1974: The Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement is signed.
- 10 April 1974: Golda Meir resigns and is succeeded by Yitzhak Rabin.
- 31 May 1974: The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement is signed.
- 26–29 Oct. 1974: Arab League summit at Rabat recognizes PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”
- 13 April 1975: The outbreak of the Lebanese civil war.
- 1 Sept. 1975: Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement, Sinai II.
- 1 June 1976: Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.
- 4 July 1976: IDF frees Israeli passengers hijacked to Entebbe.
- 17 May 1977: Rise to power in Israel of right-wing Likud party.
- 1 Oct. 1977: Joint statement by the U.S. and USSR for reconvening the Geneva peace conference.
- 19–21 Nov. 1977: Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.
- 2–5 Dec. 1977: Arab front of steadfastness and opposition meets in Tripoli.
- 14 Dec. 1977: Cairo conference opens.
- 16 Dec. 1977: Begin unveils Palestinian autonomy plan in Washington.
- 25–26 Dec. 1977: Begin-Sadat summit at Ismailia.
- 11 Jan. 1978: Israel-Egyptian military committee convenes in Cairo.
- 19 March 1978: UN Resolution 425 calls for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
- 13 June 1978: IDF withdraws from Lebanon after UNIFIL deployed.
- 18–19 July 1978: Leeds Castle conference in the UK.
- 5–17 Sept. 1978: The Camp David conference.
- 17 Sept. 1978: Israel and Egypt sign the Camp David Accords.
- 12 Oct. 1978: Blair House conference opens in Washington.
- 2–5 Nov. 1978: Arab League summit in Baghdad denounces the Camp David Accords.
- 1 Feb. 1979: The Islamic revolution in Iran.
- 26 March 1979: Israel-Egypt peace treaty is signed at the White House.
- 21 Oct. 1979: Moshe Dayan resigns as foreign minister over conduct of Palestinian autonomy negotiations.
- 5 May 1980: Ezer Weizman resigns as defense minister.
- 30 July 1980: Basic Law: Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.
- 17 Sept. 1980: Outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran.
- 4 June 1981: Begin and Sadat meet in Sharm el-Sheikh.
- 7 June 1981: Israeli bombs the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad.
- 30 June 1981: The Likud is reelected.
- 6 Oct. 1981: President Sadat is assassinated and Mubarak succeeds.
- 30 Nov. 1981: U.S. and Israel sign memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation.
- 14 Dec. 1981: Golan Heights Law approved by the Knesset.
- 18 Dec. 1981: U.S. suspends the agreement on strategic cooperation with Israel.
- 26 April 1982: Israeli withdrawal from Sinai completed.
- 3 June 1982: Attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London.
- 6 June 1982: Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
- 13 June 1982: IDF begins siege of West Beirut.
- 21 Aug. 1982: PLO fighters are evacuated from Beirut.
- 1 Sept. 1982: President Reagan announces a new peace plan for the Middle East.
- 8 Sept. 1982: Arab summit proposal for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East (Fez plan).
- 14 Sept. 1982: President Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon is assassinated.
- 16 Sept. 1982: The massacre in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.
- 17 May 1983: Israel and Lebanon sign agreement. Menachem Begin resigns and Yitzhak Shamir succeeds.
- 28 Aug. 1983: Israeli-Lebanese agreement abrogated by President Amin Gemayel.
- 5 March 1984: National unity government under Shimon Peres takes office.
- 14 Sept. 1984: Israel withdraws from Lebanon, but forms a “security zone” in the south.
- 10 June 1985: Peres-Mubarak summit conference in Cairo.
- 11–12 Sept. 1985: Israel bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis.
- 1 Oct. 1985: Start in Geneva of international arbitration on Taba.
- 15 April 1986: American air attack on Libya.
- 20 Oct. 1986: The rotation agreement is implemented: Shamir replaces Peres as prime minister.
- 25–27 Feb. 1987: Second Peres-Mubarak summit conference in Cairo.
- 11 April 1987: The Peres-Hussein London Agreement.
- 8 Dec. 1987: Outbreak of the first intifada.
- 4 March 1988: George Shultz launches his peace initiative.
- 18 July 1988: End of Iran-Iraq war.
- 31 July 1988: King Hussein announces Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank.
- 1 Nov. 1988: Likud wins elections.
- 15 Nov. 1988: Palestine National Council in Algiers conditionally accepts UN Resolutions 181, 242, and 338.
- 14 Dec. 1988: Arafat accepts U.S. terms for talks with the PLO.
- 1 Nov. 1989: James Baker presents his five-point plan.
- 12 Oct. 1989: Ta’if accord to end the Lebanese civil war.
- 15 March 1990: Labor quits national unity government.
- 20 June 1990: U.S. suspends dialogue with the PLO. Iraq invades Kuwait.
- 2 Aug. 1990 - 28 Feb. 1991: The Gulf War.
- March 1991: President Bush announces a major new Middle Eastern peace initiative.
- 30–31 Oct. 1991: Middle Eastern peace conference convenes in Madrid.
- 10 Dec. 1991: Bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks begin in Washington.
- 25 Dec. 1991: Dissolution of the USSR.
- 23 June 1992: Labor defeats Likud in Israeli elections.
- 16 Dec. 1992: Israeli deportation of 416 Hamas activists.
- 19 Jan. 1993: The Knesset repeals ban on contacts with the PLO.
- 25 July 1993: Israel launches Operation Accountability in Southern Lebanon.
- 10 Sept. 1993: Israel and PLO exchange letters formally recognizing each other.
- 13 Sept. 1993: Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-government is signed in the White House.
- 25 Feb. 1994: Massacre of Palestinians at Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron.
- 4 May 1994: Israel and PLO reach agreement in Cairo on limited Palestinian autonomy and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.
- 1 July 1994: Yasser Arafat returns to Gaza from Tunis.
- 25 July 1994 - 4 Jan. 2006: Washington Declaration ends the state of war between Israel and Jordan. Subsequent events include peace treaty signings, summit conferences, operations, assassinations, elections, and government changes leading up to Ehud Olmert becoming Prime Minister on 14 April 2006.
Important
HIGHLIGHTS
Preface
What I reject, and reject totally and uncompromisingly, is the Zionist colonial project beyond the 1967 borders. (Location 76)
transformed into the police force of a brutal colonial power. (Location 78)
release of the official documents by the government of Israel under the thirty-year rule. (Location 89)
“It is time for Israel to rebuild the ‘Iron Wall’ that will once again convince the Arabs that neither military threats nor terrorism will weaken Israel’s determination to protect the rights and freedom of the Jewish people.” (Location 149)
Livnat’s summary of the strategy of the iron wall is so crude and simplistic that one is bound to wonder whether she ever read the writings of Ze’ev Jabotinsky. (Location 150)
One of the first things that Livnat did on becoming minister of education was to order the history textbooks for secondary schools to be rewritten, removing all traces of the influence of the new historians. (Location 155)
Teddy Katz affair; (Location 157)
Benny Morris’s radical revision of his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Location 157)
“A nation,” wrote Karl Deutsch in Nationalism and Its Alternatives, “is a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbors.” The Israelis are no exception. (Location 212)
My aim in the present book is to offer a revisionist interpretation of Israel’s policy toward the Arab world during the fifty years following the achievement of statehood. (Location 221)
PROLOGUE THE ZIONIST FOUNDATIONS (Location 783)
hidden question came back to haunt the Zionist movement and the State of Israel throughout the first sixty-five years of its existence. (Location 791)
Zionism and the Arab Question (Location 793)
The term “Zionism” was coined in 1885 by the Viennese Jewish writer Nathan Birnbaum, Zion being one of the biblical names for Jerusalem. Zionism was in essence an answer to the Jewish problem that derived from two basic facts: the Jews were dispersed in various countries around the world, and in each country they constituted a minority. The Zionist solution was to end this anomalous existence and dependence on others, to return to Zion, to attain majority status there and, ultimately, political independence and statehood. (Location 795)
Modern Zionism was a phenomenon of the late nineteenth-century Europe. It had its roots in the failure of Jewish efforts to become assimilated in Western society, in the intensification of antisemitism in Europe, and in the parallel and not unrelated upsurge of nationalism. If nationalism posed a problem to the Jews by identifying them as an alien and unwanted minority, it also suggested a solution: self-determination for the Jews in a state of their own in which they would constitute a majority. (Location 801)
Zionism, however, embodied the urge to create not merely a new Jewish state in Palestine but also a new society, based on the universal values of freedom, democracy, and social justice. (Location 804)
father of political Zionism and the visionary of the Jewish state was Theodor Herzl (Location 806)
virulent antisemitism surrounding the Dreyfus Affair in the early 1890s, which he covered as the Paris correspondent of a Vienna daily newspaper, that aroused his interest in the Jewish problem. (Location 808)
The publication of The Jewish State also catapulted Herzl into a position of leadership in Jewish affairs, a position he retained until his death in 1904. (Location 820)
The Basel Program stated, “The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.” (Location 824)
In his diary Herzl confided, “At Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it.” (Location 827)
After the Basel Congress, according to an apocryphal story, the rabbis of Vienna decided to explore Herzl’s ideas and sent two representatives to Palestine. This fact-finding mission resulted in a cable from Palestine in which the two rabbis wrote, “The bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man.” (Location 830)
This cable encapsulated the problem with which the Zionist movement had to grapple from the beginning: an Arab population already lived on the land on which the Jews had set their heart. (Location 833)
He viewed the natives as primitive and backward, and his attitude toward them was rather patronizing. He thought that as individuals they should enjoy full civil rights in a Jewish state but he did not consider them a society with collective political rights over the land in which they formed the overwhelming majority. (Location 843)
Arab national movement would grow in Palestine in response to the Zionist drive to transform the country into a Jewish national home with a Jewish majority. (Location 852)
In defense of Herzl it should be pointed out that at the end of the nineteenth century Palestine was a distant province of the Ottoman Empire, and an Arab national movement was only beginning to develop there. (Location 853)
Chaim Weizmann and the British Connection (Location 870)
The chief architect of the alliance between the Zionist movement and Great Britain was Chaim Weizmann (Location 871)
One of Weizmann’s early contributions was to resolve the ongoing dispute between the political Zionists and the practical Zionists. (Location 880)
The political Zionists, following in Herzl’s footsteps, gave priority to diplomatic activity to secure international support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The practical Zionists, on the other hand, stressed the organization of Jewish immigration to Palestine, land acquisition, settlement, and the building of a Jewish economy there. (Location 881)
In general it seemed to him that the Arabs of Palestine were not a separate political community with national aspirations of its own but a tiny fraction of the large Arab nation, and he also expected that economic self-interest would temper their opposition to Zionism. (Location 888)
Balfour Declaration, as this letter came to be known, represented a major triumph for Zionist diplomacy. At the time of its issue, the Jewish population of Palestine numbered some 56,000 as against an Arab population of 600,000, or less than 10 percent. Considering that the Arabs constituted over 90 percent of the population, the promise not to prejudice their civil and religious rights had a distinctly hollow ring about it, since it totally ignored their political rights. (Location 900)
He was prepared to accept the Arabs as partners in running Palestine through an elected council based on parity between the two communities, but he did not accept them as equal partners in negotiations on the future of the country. According to him, these negotiations had to be conducted exclusively between Britain and the Jews. (Location 932)
Mounting Arab resistance, with occasional outbursts of violence, forced Britain to reassess its own wartime commitments to Zionism. (Location 941)
Winston Churchill’s white paper of 1922 limited British support for the Jewish national home in three significant ways: it laid down for the first time economic criteria for Jewish immigration, it proposed elected institutions based on proportional representation instead of parity, and it excluded Transjordan from the area available for Jewish settlement. (Location 943)
Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Revisionist Zionism (Location 954)
spiritual father of the Israeli right. (Location 955)
From the very start he was at odds with Chaim Weizmann, whose principal sparring partner he remained for the rest of his life. (Location 959)
established the New Zionist Organization, (Location 963)
Jabotinsky strongly opposed the partition of Palestine. (Location 964)
Growing militancy led him to take over the leadership of the dissident military organization, the Irgun. (Location 964)
no fundamental difference between Jabotinsky and Weizmann regarding the role of Great Britain. (Location 971)
He rejected the romantic view of the East and believed in the cultural superiority of Western civilization. (Location 974)
The East, in his view, represented psychological passivity, social and cultural stagnation, and political despotism. (Location 975)
not as the return of the Jews to their spiritual homeland but as an offshoot or implant of Western civilization in the East. (Location 977)
root cause of Jabotinsky’s dispute with the official Zionist leadership was his conception of the Jewish state. (Location 979)
territorial integrity (Location 981)
immediate declaration of the Jewish right to political sovereignty over the whole of this area. (Location 982)
reject, as totally unacceptable, any thought of removing the Arabs from Palestine. (Location 988)
in a nutshell, was Jabotinsky’s policy regarding the Arab question: to erect an iron wall of Jewish military force. (Location 1008)
On the need for an iron wall, he claimed, there was agreement among all Zionists. (Location 1008)
profession of faith that peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews in Palestine would be possible, but only as a result of the construction of an impregnable wall: (Location 1020)
A frequent argument against Zionism was that it violated the democratic right of the Arab majority to national self-determination in Palestine. Jabotinsky responded that the Jews had a moral right to return to Palestine and that the enlightened world had acknowledged this right. He then turned to the argument that the method of the iron wall was immoral because it tried to settle Jews in Palestine without the consent of its inhabitants. He pointed out that since no native population anywhere in the world would willingly accept an alien majority, the logical conclusion would be to renounce altogether the idea of a Jewish national home. Even to dream of a national home would then become immoral. The article concluded with an assertion of the morality of the iron wall: “A sacred truth, whose realization requires the use of force, does not cease thereby to be a sacred truth. This is the basis of our stand toward Arab resistance; and we shall talk of a settlement only when they are ready to discuss it.” 7 (Location 1031)
Once Arab resistance had been broken, a process of change would occur inside the Palestinian national movement, with the moderates coming to the fore. Then and only then would it be time to start serious negotiations. In these negotiations the Jewish side should offer the Palestinians civil and national rights. (Location 1040)
“On the Iron Wall,” in the words of one perceptive observer, should be treated as “a forceful, honest effort to grapple with the most serious problem facing the Zionist movement and as a formal articulation of what did become, in fact, the dominant rationale for Zionist and Israeli policies and attitudes toward the Arabs of Palestine from the 1920s to the late 1980s.” 8 (Location 1048)
Zionist movement was not a monolithic political movement but a collection of rival political parties, (Location 1051)
One fundamental difference between Labor Zionism and Revisionist Zionism related to the use of force. (Location 1052)
Labor Zionists wanted to proceed toward statehood by immigration and settlement and accorded a lower priority to the building up of a military capability. Jabotinsky never wavered in his conviction that Jewish military power was the key factor in the struggle for a state. (Location 1055)
David Ben-Gurion and the Triumph of Pragmatism (Location 1058)
What distinguished his approach to the Arab problem was unflinching realism. (Location 1075)
His fears and anxieties deepened when he realized that Arab opposition was grounded in principle and that it amounted to an utter rejection of the entire Zionist enterprise. (Location 1076)
conflict between Zionism and the Arabs was inescapable (Location 1077)
seek the support of an external power in order to compensate for the weakness of the Zionist movement. (Location 1079)
Although Ben-Gurion accepted partition, he did not view the borders of the Peel commission plan as permanent. (Location 1125)
difference between him and the Revisionists was not that he was a territorial minimalist while they were territorial maximalists but rather that he pursued a gradualist strategy while they adhered to an all-or-nothing approach. (Location 1127)
The Struggle for Statehood (Location 1144)
Ben-Gurion embodied the “fighting Zionism” that rose out of the ashes of World War II, and he wrested the leadership from the hands of Weizmann, who still adhered to “diplomatic Zionism” and to the alliance with Britain. Against Weizmann’s advice the Zionist conference of August 1945 decided on a policy of active opposition to British rule, and in October an armed uprising was launched. The (Location 1177)
state. In February 1947 the British government, unable to come up with a solution on which both sides could agree, referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. (Location 1192)
provided an invaluable charter of international legitimacy for the creation of an independent Jewish state. (Location 1202)
The Palestine Arabs, who unlike the Jews had done very little to prepare themselves for statehood, rejected the UN partition plan out of hand. The Arab Higher Committee, which represented them, denounced the plan as “absurd, impracticable, and unjust.” The Arab states, loosely organized since 1945 in the Arab League, also claimed that the UN plan was illegal and threatened to resist its implementation by force. On 1 December the Arab Higher Committee proclaimed a three-day strike, which was accompanied by violent attacks on Jewish civilians. The UN vote in favor of partition thus provided not just international legitimacy for creating Jewish and Arab states but, unintentionally, the signal for a savage war between the two communities in Palestine. (Location 1212)
1 THE EMERGENCE OF ISRAEL 1947–1949 (Location 1218)
The first phase lasted from 29 November 1947, when the UN passed the partition resolution, until 14 May 1948, when the State of Israel was proclaimed. The second phase lasted from 15 May 1948 until the termination of hostilities on 7 January 1949. (Location 1222)
The Unofficial War (Location 1226)
The Zionists were looking for an Arab leader who would accept the principle of partition, agree to a Jewish state, and be willing to coexist peacefully with such a state after its establishment. In 1947 there was only one Arab leader who fit the bill—King Abdullah. (Location 1242)
To both sides Palestinian nationalism posed a threat, and they therefore had a common interest in repressing it. (Location 1251)
Abdullah began by outlining his plan to preempt the mufti, to capture the Arab part of Palestine, and to attach it to his kingdom, (Location 1254)
result in a meeting of minds and laid the foundations for a partition of Palestine along lines radically different from the ones eventually envisaged by the United Nations. (Location 1260)
The aim of Plan D was to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them, so as to provide a solid and continuous basis for Jewish sovereignty. The novelty and audacity of the plan lay in the orders to capture Arab villages and cities, something the Haganah had never attempted before. Although the wording of Plan D was vague, its objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May, the Haganah thus directly and decisively contributed to the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. (Location 1273)
Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine’s Arabs: it was a military plan with military and territorial objectives. However, by ordering the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of villages, it both permitted and justified the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians. (Location 1281)
first and largest wave of refugees occurred before the official outbreak of hostilities on 15 May. (Location 1284)
The military chiefs presented a rather pessimistic appraisal of the military situation and warned that the chances of victory and defeat were equally balanced. This estimate that the Yishuv had only a fifty-fifty chance of survival was based on the assumption that it would have to withstand a concerted attack by all the Arab armies, including Transjordan’s Arab Legion. (Location 1306)
At four o’clock in the afternoon on 14 May 1948, in front of the leaders of the Yishuv in the Tel Aviv Art Museum, David Ben-Gurion read out the Declaration of Independence and proclaimed the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine to be called Medinat Israel—the State of Israel. (Location 1313)
The Declaration of Independence pledged that the State of Israel would be based on the principles of liberty, justice, and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; would uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex; and would loyally uphold the principles of the UN Charter. It specifically promised equal rights to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel and extended the hand of peace to all the neighboring Arab states. (Location 1315)
The War of Independence (Location 1326)
On 15 May the regular armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded Palestine, reinforcing the Palestinian irregular forces and the Arab Liberation Army, which was sponsored by the Arab League. Israel was thus born in the midst of war. (Location 1326)
The conventional Zionist version portrays the 1948 war as a simple, bipolar, no-holds-barred struggle between a monolithic Arab adversary and a tiny Israel. (Location 1332)
Arabs enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. (Location 1348)
inferior military hardware at their disposal, at least until the first truce, when illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia decisively tipped the scales in their favor. (Location 1350)
at each stage of the war, the IDF significantly outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it, and by the final stage of the war its superiority ratio was nearly two to one. (Location 1353)
King Abdullah, who was given nominal command over all the Arab forces in Palestine, wrecked this plan by making last-minute changes. His objective in sending his army into Palestine was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state but to make himself the master of the Arab part of Palestine. There was no love lost between Abdullah and the other Arab rulers, who resented his expansionist ambitions and suspected him of being in cahoots with the enemy. (Location 1360)
The inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military plans was in no small measure responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them. (Location 1364)
To the embattled Israelis the truce was, in the words of General Moshe Carmel, like “dew from heaven.” They used it to recruit more soldiers, retrain, reorganize, and rearm. (Location 1387)
When Egypt violated the truce on 8 July, the IDF was ready to launch its counteroffensive. The main target of the counteroffensive was the Arab Legion. (Location 1395)
All the other Arab armies lost ground to Israel. Israel improved its position immeasurably as a result of the ten days’ fighting: it seized the initiative and retained it until the end of the war. (Location 1400)
In the second half of the war, the special relationship between Israel and Transjordan slowly began to reassert itself. (Location 1402)
By this time the IDF had the military capability to capture the entire West Bank. All it needed was the order to move. In the cabinet six ministers voted for the proposal and six voted against, and the plan was consequently shelved. Ben-Gurion described this decision as a cause for “mourning for generations to come.” But he must have had second thoughts about the wisdom of his own proposal, because he did not bring it up again. Those who knew him suggested several reasons for his decision not to press for the capture of the West Bank or a large part of it. First and foremost, he feared British military intervention under the terms of the Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty. Second, he estimated that the inhabitants of the West Bank would not run away, and he was reluctant to include a larger number of Arabs than was strictly necessary within the borders of the Jewish state. Third, he knew that the capture of a large part of the West Bank would irreversibly destroy the special relationship with King Abdullah. Whatever his motives, Ben-Gurion bore the ultimate responsibility for the political decision to leave the West Bank in the hands of King Abdullah. 15 (Location 1409)
The cabinet was divided between those ministers who had an orientation toward peace with Egypt and those, like Ben-Gurion, who inclined toward peace with Transjordan. (Location 1423)
On 15 October, Israel broke the cease-fire and launched an attack on the Egyptian forces in the south. By the time of the cease-fire on 7 January 1949, the entire Negev was in Israeli hands. (Location 1426)
Israel and Transjordan certainly emerged from the war as the best of enemies. (Location 1428)
Israel emerged from the war economically exhausted but with superior organization and morale, a tremendous sense of achievement, and a confident outlook on the future that formed a solid foundation for the development of parliamentary democracy. (Location 1437)
As the moderate American Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann noted in his autobiography, the military victory of 1948 had a marked psychological effect on Israel: It seemed to show the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy… . The victory offered such a glorious contrast to the centuries of persecution and humiliation, of adaptation and compromise, that it seemed to indicate the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on. To brook nothing, tolerate no attack, cut through Gordian knots, and shape history by creating facts seemed so simple, so compelling, so satisfying that it became Israel’s policy in its conflict with the Arab world. 17 (Location 1447)
With a victorious army behind him, Ben-Gurion ignored not only the advice of the political experts but also the calls of the UN for a cease-fire. At the end of December he launched a second offensive in the south, Operation Horev, with the aim of throwing the Egyptian army back across the international border. The IDF penetrated into Sinai and reached the outskirts of El-Arish, but heavy American pressure compelled it to retreat and to leave the Gaza Strip in Egyptian hands. Both sides accepted the Security Council’s call for a cease-fire on 7 January 1949 and agreed to begin armistice negotiations. (Location 1461)
Armistice Agreements (Location 1466)
Having gained military control over the West Bank, Abdullah set in motion a process of creeping annexation that culminated in the Act of Union in April 1950. Arab disapproval of his policy of annexing the West Bank made Abdullah all the more dependent on the goodwill of Israel. Indeed, he counted on Israel to help him mobilize international support, and especially American support, for incorporating the remains of Arab Palestine into his kingdom. This was the background to the renewal of direct contact between the two sides in the autumn of 1948. (Location 1493)
The armistice agreement with Jordan represented a major victory for Israeli diplomacy. “Coercive diplomacy” might be a more appropriate term, since the negotiations were accompanied by the threat, and actual use, of military force. This combination of diplomacy and force secured for Israel significant territorial and strategic gains in the Negev and in the Wadi Ara area. To avert a military clash, Abdullah had to retreat. Yet, at the same time, by signing the armistice agreement, Israel implicitly recognized his rule over a large portion of the territory that the UN had allocated to the Palestinian state. (Location 1527)
Arab Palestine, or what remained of it, was officially designated as West Jordan, or more colloquially as the West Bank, while former Transjordan was known from then on as East Jordan, or the East Bank. In a very real sense, therefore, the signing ceremony at Rhodes represented the official demise of Arab Palestine. On both sides the general expectation was that the armistice agreement would soon be followed by an overall peace settlement. (Location 1533)
Of all the Arab countries, Syria proved the toughest nut to crack. (Location 1537)
Syria was in a strong military position but internally unstable. (Location 1541)
The first Arab-Israeli war was officially over. In the course of the war, Israel had expanded its territory from the 55 percent of mandatory Palestine allocated to it by the United Nations to 79 percent. (Location 1575)
The Elusive Peace (Location 1583)
The armistice agreements were intended to serve as steps on the road to peace. An identical preamble to all four agreements stated that their purpose was “to facilitate the transition from the present truce to a permanent peace in Palestine.” Yet not in a single case did the armistice agreement turn out to be the precursor to a formal peace settlement. Why was there no political settlement between Israel and its neighbors after the guns fell silent? Why did peace prove to be so elusive? This is one of the most contentious issues in the debate about 1948. (Location 1583)
The traditional Zionist answer to this question can be summed up in two words: Arab intransigence. (Location 1587)
The files of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, for example, burst at the seams with evidence of Arab peace feelers and Arab readiness to negotiate with Israel from September 1948 on. The two key issues in dispute were refugees and borders. Each of the neighboring Arab states was prepared to negotiate directly with Israel and to bargain about borders. (Location 1596)
The position was that Israel alone had created the refugee problem and that it must not be allowed to evade its responsibility for solving this problem. (Location 1600)
Israel’s position on the Palestinian refugee problem was diametrically opposed to that of the Arab League. Israel claimed that the Arabs had created the problem by starting the war and that Israel itself was not responsible in any way. (Location 1605)
having lost the war, Arab governments used whatever weapons they could find to continue the struggle against Israel, and the refugee problem was a particularly effective weapon for putting Israel on the defensive in the court of international public opinion. (Location 1611)
Jordanian government had a policy of rehabilitating the Palestinian refugees, giving them Jordanian citizenship, and integrating them into the life of the nation. (Location 1614)
Egyptian government, by contrast, did very little for the 200,000–300,000 refugees who lived in the Gaza Strip, and refused to give them Egyptian citizenship. (Location 1615)
no Arab government felt at liberty to proceed to a separate peace with Israel in total disregard for the rights of the Palestinian refugees. (Location 1616)
On the Israeli side, military power expanded the margins for political choice. (Location 1623)
While the institutional trappings of prime ministerial power helped Ben-Gurion maintain tight control over policy-making toward the Arabs, even more important was the fact that he was articulating a policy with which most of the Israeli elite, and especially the army, were in agreement. (Location 1628)
Peace with the Arabs was certainly something Ben-Gurion desired, but it was not his main priority at this particular time. His top priorities were the building of the state, large-scale immigration, economic development, and the consolidation of Israel’s newly won independence. (Location 1631)
He knew that for formal peace agreements Israel would have to pay by yielding territory to its neighbors and by agreeing to the return of a substantial number of Palestinian refugees, and he did not consider this as a price worth paying. (Location 1633)
an important factor in the failure to proceed from armistice agreements to contractual peace agreements was Ben-Gurion’s inflexibility. And the major reason for this inflexibility was his belief that time was on Israel’s side. (Location 1636)
with the passage of time the world would get used to Israel’s existing borders and forget about the UN borders and the UN idea of an independent Palestinian state. Similarly, in respect to the Palestinian refugees, Israel’s position continued to improve despite moral pressure from the UN to allow them to return. The same was true of Jerusalem. People were getting used to the existing situation and beginning to see the absurdity of the idea of suddenly establishing an international regime over the city. (Location 1639)
Ben-Gurion succinctly summarized his contradictory position: “I am prepared to get up in the middle of the night in order to sign a peace agreement—but I am not in a hurry and I can wait ten years. We are under no pressure whatsoever.” (Location 1657)
2 CONSOLIDATION 1949–1953 (Location 1669)
Within the territory of the State of Israel at the end of the War of Independence, there were 716,000 Jews and 156,000 Arabs, 700,000 of the country’s Arab inhabitants having ended up as refugees in the neighboring Arab countries in the course of the war. Israel’s commitment to the new demographic status quo took the form of firm opposition to the return of the refugees. (Location 1673)
The Status Quo (Location 1676)
David Ben-Gurion had a very low opinion of Menachem Begin and the other advocates of historic borders and the whole Land of Israel, referring to them disparagingly as verbal maximalists. 2 In the Knesset, Ben-Gurion told Begin that it was preferable to have a democratic Jewish state without the whole of the Land of Israel than to have the whole land without a Jewish state. A Jewish state, he argued, was not possible over the whole Land of Israel if that state was also to be democratic, because the number of Arabs there exceeded the number of Jews. The choice was between a democratic state of Israel in part of the land and a Jewish state over the whole land and the expulsion of its Arab inhabitants. (Location 1685)
Ben-Gurion to observe that it was not Israel’s responsibility to create a state for the Arabs of Palestine. “We are not contractors for the construction of an independent Palestinian state,” he said sarcastically. “We believe this is a matter for the Arabs themselves.” 5 Ever the realist, Ben-Gurion had reduced his thinking to one simple rule in his diary entry for 18 January 1949: “Peace is vital—but not at any price. Peace with the existing, not the imaginary, Arabs. No war for an Arab state. No war to place a particular Arab group in power. If such a war is needed, let it be a war between Arabs and Arabs and not with us.” 6 (Location 1699)
Israel and the Arabs interpreted the armistice agreements very differently. Israel maintained that the agreements gave Israel three indisputable rights. The first right was to an absolute cease-fire, which would be binding not only on regular armies but also on irregular forces and civilians. The second was to have the cease-fire lines treated as international borders for all intents and purposes, pending the conclusion of final peace agreements. This meant full sovereignty over Israeli territory, the only limitation being on the introduction of armed forces into the demilitarized zones. The third right was to settle Jews on all the land within its domain and to develop the economy without taking into account the rights of the previous owners who had become refugees. (Location 1717)
The Arabs, on the other hand, claimed three rights under the armistice agreements. First, they held that the agreements did not terminate the state of war with Israel and that they were therefore not precluded by international law from denying Israel freedom of navigation, imposing an economic boycott on it, and waging a propaganda campaign against it. Second, they insisted that the armistice lines were only cease-fire lines and not international borders and that Israel was therefore subject to restrictions on its rights to develop the demilitarized zones and to exploit their water resources. Third, they argued that the armistice agreements did not cancel the rights of the displaced Palestinians to return to their lands and that Israel’s use of that land was therefore not legitimate. Moreover, they claimed, the Palestinians were entitled to struggle against the occupation of their land, and the Arab states were under no obligation to curb this struggle. 10 (Location 1723)
United Nations to the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). (Location 1731)
The Israelis therefore approached the Lausanne conference in a cautious and defensive mood; they spent all their time fending off pressures from the PCC and the U.S. government, and they breathed a collective sigh of relief when the conference ended inconclusively. The entire conference, in the words of one member of the Israeli delegation, was “an exercise in futility.” 12 (Location 1737)
Arab governments also approached the Lausanne conference in an uncompromising mood. (Location 1740)
Having rejected the UN partition resolution of 29 November 1947, they now wanted to put the clock back and to use it as the basis for a settlement with Israel. (Location 1742)
Lausanne conference the two main bones of contention were refugees and territory. Israel’s position on the former was clear and emphatic: the Arab states were responsible for the refugee problem, so responsibility for solving it rested with them. Israel was willing to make a modest financial contribution toward the resolution of this problem but only as part of an overall settlement of the conflict and only if the refugees were to be resettled in Arab countries. On the second issue Israel’s position was that the permanent borders between itself and its neighbors should be based on the cease-fire lines, with only minor adjustments. (Location 1751)
Arab representatives refused to negotiate with Israel directly and insisted on dealing with the PCC as a single, unified delegation. They wanted to place the refugee problem at the top of the agenda, arguing that Israel was alone responsible for the Palestinian exodus. They also demanded that all the refugees be given a choice between returning to their homes and receiving compensation. Israel’s suggestion that permanent borders be based on the cease-fire lines was rejected out of hand, and each Arab delegation demanded far-reaching changes in its country’s border with Israel. (Location 1756)
American pressure (Location 1765)
Israel’s willingness to take back 100,000 refugees. (Location 1766)
Ben-Gurion opposed this proposal on the grounds that it would not satisfy either the Americans or the Arabs and would be harmful to Israel’s security. (Location 1767)
watered-down version (Location 1768)
failure of the Lausanne conference came as no surprise to Israel. It only served to reinforce the conviction that direct bilateral talks held out more promise of progress than mediation by third parties. (Location 1771)
In the second half of 1949 Ben-Gurion’s tough line continued to prevail. This line held that Israel could not afford to make concessions for the sake of peace, let alone concessions that might harm its security, and that for the time being the armistice agreements provided a satisfactory substitute for peace. (Location 1773)
newborn Jewish state desperately wanted Jerusalem to be its capital. (Location 1779)
Israel and Jordan were allies in the fight to keep their respective parts of the Holy City in their own hands. Against them emerged an alliance of three blocs of countries that favored internationalization: nearly all the Muslim states, the Vatican and the Catholic states, and the Soviet Union and its satellites. (Location 1781)
On 9 December the UN General Assembly adopted by a large majority a resolution that called for treating Jerusalem as a separate entity and placing it under UN rule. (Location 1790)
Ben-Gurion’s close party colleagues that his assertive public posture concealed deep inner doubts and anxieties. In his diary he confided that the decision over Jerusalem was one of the most difficult and fateful decisions he had ever been called upon to make, for it involved not just defiance of the UN but a confrontation with the Muslim, Catholic, and Soviet worlds. (Location 1805)
Jerusalem was thus the all-important test case. If Israel defeated the UN resolution, the question of borders would be solved and the pressure to repatriate the refugees would cease: “Our success in Jerusalem solves all the international problems around the State of Israel.” 15 (Location 1811)
Peace Talks with Jordan (Location 1817)
Ben-Gurion appears to have shared both the left’s suspicion of Abdullah and his British masters and the right’s unease about giving up Israel’s claim to the whole of mandatory Palestine. But as a pragmatic politician he realized that no peace would be possible without some Israeli concessions, and he was ready for border changes based on the exchange of territory. 19 (Location 1840)
major breakthrough was achieved on 13 December when Israel eventually offered the king access to the sea. (Location 1845)
The idea of a five-year nonaggression pact was put forward by King Abdullah himself at a meeting at Shuneh on 17 February in a dramatic personal intervention to save the talks from shipwreck. (Location 1860)
king had not been able to overcome his government’s opposition to a separate agreement with Israel. Jordan was being subjected to a hostile propaganda campaign and faced expulsion from the Arab League for its dealings with Israel. The king was prepared to disregard this pressure, but his government was not. (Location 1879)
While the talks were suspended, the situation along Israel’s long and unnatural border with Jordan steadily deteriorated, culminating in an armed clash between the IDF and the Arab Legion at the end of the year. In the absence of the restraining discipline of peace talks, the IDF adopted a very aggressive policy for dealing with incursions into Israeli territory that were carried out mainly by Palestinian refugees for economic reasons. Thus diplomatic deadlock led to military escalation, which in turn encouraged hopes of territorial expansion, at least in some quarters. (Location 1885)
Major General Dayan, who followed the foreign minister, questioned the value of formal peace agreements with the Arab countries. Only Jordan had a concrete interest in peace, he pointed out, because it stood to receive compensation. The other Arab states were not compelled by any practical reasons to make peace with Israel; on the contrary, their prestige would be harmed by making peace. (Location 1893)
“The State of Israel,” said Sharett, “will not get embroiled in military adventurism by deliberately taking the initiative to capture territories and expand. Israel would not do that, both because we cannot afford to be accused by the world of aggression and because we cannot, for security and social reasons, absorb into our midst a substantial Arab population … We cannot sacrifice Jewish fighters, nor can we harm others in an arbitrary fashion merely in order to satisfy the appetite for expansion.” 20 (Location 1899)
The quest for an overall settlement was thus doomed essentially because Israel was too strong and inflexible while Abdullah was too weak and isolated. (Location 1925)
King Abdullah was murdered by a Muslim fanatic outside the al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem. With the king’s death the era of personal diplomacy in Jordanian-Israeli relations came to an end. (Location 1927)
The more Ben-Gurion thought about the idea of capturing Sinai with the help of the British, the more he liked it, especially since the Sinai peninsula, unlike the West Bank, was not densely populated with Arabs. 22 (Location 1932)
King Abdullah’s murder was a critical episode in the history of Israeli-Arab relations. Ben-Gurion summed up its impact during talks on Arab policy held over a year later: “We did have one man who we knew wanted peace with Israel. We tried to negotiate with him, but the British interfered, and then a bullet came and put an end to the business. With the removal of the Abdullah factor, the whole matter was finished.” (Location 1939)
Conflict with Syria (Location 1943)
If King Abdullah was the most moderate Arab ruler in relation to Israel, the Syrians were Israel’s most intransigent and implacable enemies. (Location 1943)
The root cause of the dispute between Israel and Syria and of their armed clashes was the question of sovereignty in the DMZs. (Location 1951)
Syria maintained that these zones must remain under UN supervision until the conclusion of a peace agreement. Israel, on the other hand, insisted that they lay within its sovereign territory and that it was only precluded from introducing arms into them. (Location 1952)
Ben-Gurion saw full control over the DMZs as a vital Israeli security need. (Location 1967)
This policy had three principal aims: to establish physical control over the disputed territories, to contain Syrian influence, and to do away with UN supervision. (Location 1969)
Israel seized an opportunity in March 1951 to move forcibly several hundred Bedouins who refused to accept Israeli identity cards from the central DMZ to Arab villages in northern Israel. (Location 1972)
In early 1951 Israel embarked on a major development project: the draining of Lake Huleh, designed to reclaim 15,000 acres for cultivation. (Location 1975)
The sending of the patrol to al-Hamma was severely attacked by members of the Knesset Committee for Defense and Foreign Affairs and senior officials in the Foreign Ministry. (Location 1990)
The cabinet met on 5 April and, in the absence of the foreign minister, accepted the prime minister’s recommendations to destroy three Arab villages inside the DMZ, bomb from the air the Syrian post and police station in al-Hamma, boycott the MAC, and lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council on the murder of the seven “policemen.” This response to an incident Israel had provoked was amazingly aggressive. (Location 1995)
The whole experience convinced Ben-Gurion that relations with Syria were a zero-sum game and that Israel should act unilaterally to complete the Huleh drainage project. When the project was completed, and after much bloodshed and damage to Israel’s international standing, the experts concluded that it was not just unnecessary but actually damaging to Israel’s agriculture and ecology. (Location 2006)
It was true that the Syrians stood to gain more. Nevertheless, as far as method was concerned, the Syrians strove to solve the problem in a simple and practical manner, whereas the Israelis complicated the matter with legal niceties that verged on sophistry. (Location 2029)
In conclusion, Ben-Gurion noted that Israel should not enter into any official negotiations on the liquidation of the DMZs as long as Syria did not offer compensation for Israel’s concessions. Above all, Israel must not give up its exclusive right to the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee without an appropriate Syrian return, which in his view it was unrealistic to expect. (Location 2037)
the final analysis, it was Israel’s insistence on exclusive and unfettered rights over the lakes and the Jordan River that seems to have upset the applecart. An opportunity for an agreement with a major adversary existed and was allowed to slip away. Yet the fact that the negotiations came so close to success is in itself significant because it shows that, contrary to popular Israeli perceptions, Syria was capable of behaving in a practical, pragmatic, and constructive fashion. There was definitely someone to talk to on the other side. (Location 2073)
The Egyptian Revolution (Location 2077)
After the assassination of King Abdullah in July 1951, Israel shifted the focus of its peace efforts from Jordan to Egypt. (Location 2078)
Egypt’s history, size, national cohesion, and leadership position all combined to make it the preferred peace partner as far as Israel was concerned. (Location 2080)
Egypt would consider a nonaggression pact with Israel only in return for substantial territorial concessions in the Negev and the return of the Palestinian refugees. (Location 2082)
The revolution of the Free Officers that toppled the monarchy in a bloodless coup on 23 July 1952 therefore kindled hopes that a new chapter was about to begin in Israeli-Egyptian relations. (Location 2086)
Israeli suspicions that Naguib was playing a double game: that he was projecting an image of moderation that would enable Egypt to obtain arms and economic aid without taking any concrete steps toward a settlement with Israel. (Location 2106)
Ben-Gurion, in his summing up, injected a note of skepticism. Israel’s talk about peace was not a trick, he said, But at the same time we have to remember that there are limits to our desire for peace with the Arabs. This is one of our vital interests, but it is not the first and all-determining interest. First and foremost, we have to see to Israel’s needs, whether or not this brings improvement in our relations with the Arabs. The second factor in our existence is American Jewry and its relationship with us (and the state of America since these Jews live in it). The third thing—peace with the Arabs. This is the order of priorities. 33 (Location 2110)
the Israeli side, however, the suspicion persisted that the RCC had no intention of entering into serious peace negotiations. 41 (Location 2164)
Infiltration and Retaliation (Location 2167)
Infiltration was a direct consequence of the displacement and dispossession of around 700,000 Palestinians in the course of the 1948 war, and the motives behind it were largely social and economic rather than political or military. Many of the infiltrators were Palestinian refugees whose reasons for crossing the borders included looking for relatives, returning to their homes, recovering material possessions, tending their fields, harvesting, and, occasionally, exacting revenge. Some of the infiltrators were thieves and smugglers; some were involved in the hashish convoys; others were nomadic Bedouins, more accustomed to grazing rights than to international borders. There were acts of terror and politically motivated raids, such as those organized by the ex-mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini and financed by Saudi Arabia, but they did not amount to very much. According to the best available estimate, during the 1949–56 period as a whole, 90 percent or more of all infiltrations were motivated by social and economic concerns. (Location 2175)
As the years went by, a certain overlap developed between economic infiltration and political infiltration geared to killing and injuring Israelis and spreading terror. The “free fire” policy adopted by the Israeli army, border guard, and police in dealing with suspects—a policy of shooting first and asking questions later—contributed to this overlap. Faced with trigger-happy soldiers, infiltrators started coming in organized bands and responding in kind. Altogether between 2,700 and 5,000 infiltrators were killed in the period 1949–56, the great majority of them unarmed. (Location 2182)
Infiltration, in short, posed a danger not only to the country’s day-to-day security but also to its territorial integrity. (Location 2192)
To cope with this threat, Israel established new settlements along the borders, razed abandoned Arab villages, and gave Arab homes in towns like Jaffa and Haifa to new immigrants from Central Europe, many of whom were Holocaust survivors. Israeli units began patrolling the borders, laying ambushes, placing land mines, and setting booby traps. A “free fire” policy toward infiltrators was adopted. Periodic search operations were also mounted in Arab villages inside Israel to weed out infiltrators. From time to time the soldiers who carried out these operations committed atrocities, among them gang rape, murder, and, on one occasion, the dumping of 120 suspected infiltrators in the Arava desert without water. The atrocities were committed not in the heat of battle but for the most part against innocent civilians, including women and children. Coping with the problems of day-to-day security thus had a brutalizing effect on the IDF. Soldiers in an army that still prided itself on the precept of “the purity of arms” showed growing disregard for human lives and carried out some barbaric acts that can only be described as war crimes. (Location 2193)
These forays across the armistice lines were carried out by IDF units against Arab villages suspected of helping infiltrators. In effect they were a form of collective punishment against whole villages. The first full-scale attacks by the IDF were directed against the Jordanian villages of Falama and Sharafat in February 1951. (Location 2202)
It was a difficult period for the IDF. Its morale, vigilance, and performance were all at a low ebb. (Location 2210)
While failing to achieve its objectives, the policy of military retaliation greatly inflamed Arab hatred of Israel and met with mounting criticism from the international community. (Location 2211)
The official line was that Palestinian infiltration into Israel was aided and abetted by the Arab governments following the defeat of their regular armies on the battlefield; that it was a form of undeclared guerrilla warfare designed to weaken and destroy the infant Jewish state; that Israel was thus the innocent victim of Arab provocation and aggression; and that its military reprisals were a legitimate form of self-defense. (Location 2215)
There is strong evidence from Arab, British, American, UN, and even Israeli sources to suggest that for the first six years after the war, the Arab governments were opposed to infiltration and tried to curb it. Each Arab government dealt with this problem in its own way, with varying degrees of success. (Location 2218)
Israel’s response was that the Jordanian authorities were aiding and abetting border violations and that they alone must be held responsible for the progressive breakdown of the armistice regime. These charges were contradicted by the evidence available to the Israelis at the time. The evidence consisted not simply of declarations by Glubb but of the constructive and cooperative attitude displayed by all the Jordanian representatives within the Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission in dealing with the problems that kept cropping up. (Location 2240)
Secret Jordanian military documents captured by the Israeli army during the June 1967 war prove conclusively that Glubb’s version of Jordanian policy is correct and that the Israeli version is utterly false. (Location 2248)
Despite these strenuous efforts, tension along the border increased in the course of 1953. (Location 2262)
Domestic political considerations also played a part in the decisions to resort to military force in countering the challenge of infiltration. (Location 2271)
Ben-Gurion personified this militant national mood, and within the government and the party he was the undisputed leader of the activist school. He wanted the IDF to strike hard at civilians across the border in order to demonstrate that no attack on Israeli citizens would go unpunished. (Location 2276)
The moderate school in opposition to Ben-Gurion was headed by Sharett. (Location 2280)
Military retaliation was the central issue in the debate between the activists and the moderates. The activists believed that the Arabs were interested in Israel’s destruction, that they understood only the language of force, that Israel could not rely on the UN for her security, and that, in order to survive, the State of Israel had repeatedly to demonstrate its military power. In short, they believed in the policy of the iron wall. The moderates did not object to military retaliation in principle, but they wanted to use it in a more selective and controlled way and only after careful consideration of the likely political consequences. They were more sensitive to Arab feelings and to world opinion; they wanted to create a climate that would favor the possibilities of peaceful coexistence in the Middle East; they feared that frequent and excessive use of force would further inflame Arab hatred of Israel and set back the prospects of reconciliation. (Location 2280)
Sharett had the thankless task of holding the party, the government, and the country together in the period preceding Ben-Gurion’s formal resignation on 2 November 1953. (Location 2303)
The manner of Ben-Gurion’s departure weakened the government and the authority of his successor. One of Sharett’s first tasks as acting prime minister was to deal with the crisis caused by Israel’s project for the diversion of water from the Jordan River in the north to the parched lands of the Negev in the south. (Location 2304)
In July, before Ben-Gurion went on leave, the cabinet decided to divert the Upper Jordan and transport that water to the Negev. (Location 2310)
Dayan had a political aim in pursuing this engineering project. His broader purpose was to squeeze the Syrians out and establish complete Israeli control over the DMZ and the water sources in the north of the country. (Location 2316)
Ben-Gurion ruled that the work should proceed and that the UN should be ignored. Sharett left the meeting in a very bitter mood and on the way back to the Foreign Ministry even talked about resigning. He knew that a clash with the UN was inevitable and that he would have to extricate Israel from the imbroglio. (Location 2322)
Arab-owned land was affected. (Location 2328)
While Israel was in the dock at the Security Council in New York, the policy of reprisals took a nasty turn with an IDF attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya on the night of 14–15 October 1953. (Location 2345)
following the murder of an Israeli mother and her two children by infiltrators (Location 2347)
Unit 101 was commanded by an aggressive and ambitious young major named Ariel (“ Arik”) Sharon. Sharon’s order was to penetrate Qibya, blow up houses, and inflict heavy casualties on its inhabitants. His success in carrying out this order surpassed all expectations. (Location 2354)
forty-five houses had been blown up, and sixty-nine civilians, two-thirds of them women and children, had been killed. (Location 2357)
Qibya massacre unleashed against Israel a storm of international protest of unprecedented severity in the country’s short history. (Location 2362)
In a radio broadcast the following day, Ben-Gurion gave the official version. He denied any IDF involvement, placed responsibility for the action on the villagers who had been provoked beyond endurance, and expressed the government’s regret that innocent people had been killed. 57 This was not Ben-Gurion’s first lie for what he saw as the good of his country, nor was it to be the last, but it was one of the most blatant. (Location 2367)
Dayan’s claim that the terrorists who provoked the reprisal were sponsored and guided by the Arab Legion was blatantly self-serving. It was also untrue. (Location 2389)
was a striking juxtaposition of the profoundly dissimilar philosophies of the outgoing and the incoming prime ministers. It was also a preview of the political program that Sharett planned to introduce after replacing Ben-Gurion at the helm. (Location 2408)
On 7 December Ben-Gurion relinquished all his ministerial duties. Before proceeding to his desert retreat in Sede-Boker, however, he made a number of important appointments. He confirmed the forty-nine-year-old Pinhas Lavon in the post of minister of defense, promoted the twenty-nine-year-old Shimon Peres from deputy to director general of the Ministry of Defense, and, as his last official duty, appointed the thirty-seven-year-old Moshe Dayan IDF chief of staff. The three men had one thing in common: they were all ardent supporters of an activist defense policy. The outgoing prime minister counted on this trio to continue the tough defense policy he had established and to counter the conciliatory line of the man his party had chosen to succeed him, against his advice. (Location 2410)
3 ATTEMPTS AT ACCOMMODATION 1953–1955 (Location 2417)
formative period in the evolution of Israel’s policy toward the Arab world. Israel’s leaders were deeply divided among themselves on the nature of the threat facing them and on the best way of safeguarding the country’s security. There was no uniform perception of the character and magnitude of the Arab threat and no consensus on how it should be countered. Rather, Israel’s behavior in the conflict was the product of an internal struggle between two schools of thought: one hawkish, the other dovish; one activist, the other moderate; one favoring retaliation, the other negotiation. These two schools were epitomized by David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett, who alternated as prime minister during this eventful and critical period. (Location 2419)
Personalities and Policies (Location 2425)
Sharett is generally regarded as a weak, hesitant, and ineffectual politician, subservient to Ben-Gurion and totally overshadowed by him. (Location 2425)
Ben-Gurion had surprisingly little knowledge of Arab culture and Arab history and no empathy whatever for the Arabs. Arabic was not among the half dozen languages he spoke. His experience of direct contact with ordinary Arabs was limited and did not inspire any trust in them or liking for them. His basic image of the Arabs was that of a primitive, fierce, and fanatical enemy that understood only the language of force. In his monumentally prolix speeches he repeatedly stressed the alienation and the gulf between “us” and “them.” “We live in the twentieth century, they—in the fifteenth,” he said in one speech. He took pride in the fact that “we created a proper society … amid the world of the Middle Ages.” 3 Ben-Gurion could not conceive of a multi-ethnic society, embracing Jews and Arabs. He often compared Israel to a boat and the Arabs to a cruel sea and ruled out the possibility of harmony between them. His aim was to make the boat so robust that no storm or turbulence in the sea could capsize it. 4 (Location 2440)
Like Ben-Gurion, Sharett was unwilling to take back the bulk of the Palestinian refugees or to relinquish large tracts of territory, if that was the price demanded from Israel in exchange for a peace settlement with the Arabs. Unlike Ben-Gurion, he attached considerable value to patient and imaginative diplomacy, to conciliatory language, and to gestures of goodwill in an effort to whittle down Arab hostility. (Location 2458)
In sharp contrast to Ben-Gurion, Sharett was highly sensitive not only to what the Gentiles said but even more to what they did. He acknowledged that the UN had played an indispensable part in the creation of the State of Israel, and he was in favor of allowing it to play a larger and more effective role in the regulation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He believed that international public opinion had a bearing on Israel’s security and was, therefore, a factor worth taking into account. Above all, he was eager to enlist the sympathy and support of the Western powers in Israel’s quest for security and peace. To this end he deemed it necessary to abide by the prevailing norms of international behavior and to refrain from actions that would fuel Arab hatred. (Location 2471)
Dayan was both an expansionist and an activist. He held the view that Israel’s borders had to be expanded so as to rectify the omissions of the 1948 war. In particular he felt that the border with Jordan, which he himself had helped negotiate, was impossible to live with and had to be replaced by a natural border running along the Jordan River. He was an activist in the sense that for him the solution to Israel’s security problems lay in direct military action to enhance the deterrent power of the IDF and to compel the Arab governments to curb infiltration from their territory into Israel. The premise behind this policy was that the only effective antidote to force is force—and not reliance on the goodwill of Arab neighbors or on the protection of external powers and international agencies. (Location 2524)
Dayan was clearly not insensitive to Arab feelings. He recognized the injustice that his country had inflicted on hundreds of thousands of Arabs. But his very empathy bred deep pessimism concerning the possibility of an accommodation with them. It was not self-righteousness but the conviction that Israel’s survival was at stake that led him to reject any magnanimity. Dayan’s was the philosophy of a man who was born in war, who lived all his life in war, and for whom war had always been the focus of his thought. His funeral oration epitomized the stark philosophy of the “Arab fighter,” that is, the equivalent of what Americans used to call the Indian fighter, a type common in the second generation of settlers in a country where newcomers are forced to fight the native population. 14 His instinctive feeling that Israel was doomed to live in continual warfare and the grim outlook that followed from it made him the symbol of a whole generation of Israeli activists or “Arab fighters.” (Location 2545)
Dayan’s appointment as chief of staff was a milestone in the development of Israel’s military doctrine, the core of which was the policy of reprisals. Until his appointment reprisals were carried out in the context of day-to-day security. Their objective was to reduce infiltration. After his appointment they were carried out in the context of basic security. (Location 2558)
We could not guard every water pipeline from being blown up and every tree from being uprooted. We could not prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard or a family in their beds. But it was in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab governments to think it worth paying… . It was in our power to cause the Arab governments to renounce “the policy of strength” toward Israel by turning it into a demonstration of weakness. (Location 2574)
These were the premises that guided Dayan’s conduct during his four years as chief of staff. Like Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Dayan wanted to build an iron wall of Jewish military strength. Like Jabotinsky, he wanted to use this wall to demonstrate to the Arabs their military inferiority. And like Jabotinsky, he hoped that the iron wall would eventually extinguish the hope in Arab minds of ever prevailing in the struggle against the Jewish community. (Location 2578)
The Activist Challenge to Sharett (Location 2597)
In the course of 1954 Israeli-American relations deteriorated as a result of the U.S. decision to supply arms to the Arab states and base its military plans for the defense of the Middle East increasingly on Iraq and Egypt. Israel as a consequence felt marginalized. Britain’s agreement to withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal Zone also caused concern in Israel. Along Israel’s borders the situation deteriorated, with more incidents of infiltration, theft, murder, and sabotage, which the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) was unable to prevent. These developments combined to make Israelis feel isolated and ignored, and this intensified the conflict between the two approaches. (Location 2598)
Lavon’s refusal to accept Sharett’s authority in defense matters. He treated Sharett as no more than foreign minister and tried to limit his intervention in what he considered his own departmental concerns. Lavon did not report to Sharett regularly on the IDF operations along the borders, and the reports that he did make were often partial and misleading. (Location 2605)
“the Committee of Five,” (Location 2611)
In the space of two days, Sharett had checked three plans for intervention. In the face of combined pressure from Ben-Gurion, Lavon, and Dayan, he stood his ground and mobilized the cabinet as a counterweight to the policies urged by the interventionists. (Location 2644)
The scope for large-scale reprisals against Jordan was reduced both because of Sharett’s restraining influence and because the Arab Legion stationed four battalions along the border to prevent incidents. (Location 2661)
Lavon colluded with the IDF chiefs in concealing this covert strategy from Sharett and in feeding him false reports when incidents came to light, but Lavon himself was not informed about all the activities of the army, which was nominally under his ministerial control. Sharett (Location 2668)
Johnston plan for the allocation of water quotas was a unique example of agreement between Israel and its neighbors. (Location 2700)
The policy differences between Dayan and Sharett were exacerbated by power struggles, personal antipathies, and disputes over jurisdiction within the defense establishment. This murky labyrinth of rivalries, intrigues, and mutual mistrust among the leading players constituted the domestic backdrop to “the mishap.” (Location 2716)
The Mishap (Location 2718)
The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s experts on Arab affairs believed that once Nasser achieved his central goal of freeing his country from the presence of foreign troops, he would adopt an “Egypt first” policy and become more amenable to a settlement with Israel. (Location 2725)
A Jewish espionage ring, organized and directed by military intelligence, carried out a series of acts of sabotage inside Egypt in July 1954. These acts were intended to derail or postpone Anglo-Egyptian agreement. (Location 2733)
The political thinking that motivated this amateurish and incompetently executed operation was staggeringly crude. The purpose of the scheme was to fake anti-British and anti-American incidents, so making it plain to the West that the Nasser regime could not be trusted to protect Western personnel and property in Egypt. (Location 2740)
Sharett, intent on presenting Israel as a peace-loving nation and on dissuading the Western powers from supplying arms to Egypt, rejected the proposal, because it was likely to prove to the world that Israel was bent on aggression and conquest. 38 (Location 2771)
On 8 December a party of five Israeli soldiers was captured several kilometers inside Syria’s territory. Under interrogation they told their captors that their mission had been to pick up a device for tapping a telephone line that had been installed by the IDF some time before. Following the capture of the group, Lavon ordered the Israeli Air Force to force a civilian Syrian airliner to land in Israel with the intention of using its passengers and crew as hostages pending the release of the Israeli soldiers. The story subsequently issued by the IDF spokesman, stating that the airliner had violated Israel’s airspace and endangered its security, was pure fabrication. (Location 2803)
On 18 January 1955 two Israeli tractor drivers were murdered by Jordanian infiltrators in Ajour, an abandoned Arab village. The news hit Sharett like a bolt from the blue, and he immediately realized that retribution would be demanded and that this time he must grant it. (Location 2824)
wave of indignation that was sweeping through the country: the Cairo trial, Bat Galim, the Damascus prisoners, Uri Ilan’s suicide, and now the double murder. (Location 2829)
To Sharett’s great relief, something happened to make it unnecessary to go ahead with the plan to retaliate. On 23 January, in the middle of a cabinet meeting, a message arrived to say that the Jordanians had informed the MAC that they had captured some of the murderers, all of whom had lived in the village of Ajour and lost their homes in the 1948 war. After the cabinet meeting, Sharett convened the Committee of Five and suggested calling off the plan to launch a raid into Jordan that night. (Location 2844)
The Dialogue with Nasser (Location 2852)
The terrorist attacks of July 1954 flatly contradicted all the earlier assurances of Israel’s desire to see Egypt free and independent. These attacks seemed to confirm the worst Egyptian stereotypes about Jewish duplicity and double-dealing and the worst fears of devilish plots being hatched by Israel to undermine their national unity and independence. (Location 2862)
he kept the Divon-Sadeq channel open even after the Israeli-sponsored undercover unit had planted bombs in Cairo and Alexandria. (Location 2872)
Sharett knew that a death sentence would have a disastrous effect at home because the Israeli public had been led to believe that the defendants were innocent. (Location 2881)
These talks, which lasted from October 1954 until January 1955, were not confined to the Bat Galim and the Cairo trial but were extended to cover broader aspects of Israeli-Egyptian relations, such as the blockade of Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, the situation along the borders, restraints on propaganda, solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem, and avenues for economic cooperation. (Location 2884)
almost unreasonably reasonable. He also showed himself to be a man of his word. He promised to release the Bat Galim, and he did. He promised to curb hostile propaganda and political warfare, and he did. Israel, meanwhile, did the opposite. Nasser promised to make efforts to prevent border incidents, and the records of Egyptian military intelligence show that he did. On the Cairo trial he said many things, but he never promised that there would be no death sentence. (Location 2919)
As Nasser explained to numerous intermediaries sent by Israel to plead for clemency, it would have been politically disastrous for him to be seen to be more lenient toward Jewish than toward Muslim terrorists. (Location 2924)
He also wanted the Israelis to understand that, with all the goodwill in the world, under the circumstances he was unable to act differently. (Location 2928)
Sharett had no doubt that even if Lavon had not given Gibli the specific order that led to the Cairo calamity, he bore the political and moral responsibility because “he constantly preached acts of madness and taught the army leaders the diabolic lesson of how to set the Middle East on fire, how to cause friction, cause bloody confrontations, sabotage targets and property of the great powers, and perform acts of despair and suicide.” At the same time, Sharett was shocked by the general picture that emerged from the enquiry. “I would never have imagined,” he confided in his diary, “that we could reach such a horrible state of poisoned relations, the unleashing of the basest instincts of hate and revenge and mutual deceit at the top of our most glorious ministry. I wander around like a sleepwalker, horror-stricken and lost, completely helpless… . What shall I do, what shall I do?” (Location 2951)
In November of that year Sharett would hand the premiership back to Ben-Gurion. In June of the following year he would resign his post as foreign minister, and that would, in fact, be the end of his political career. (Location 2963)
The Gaza Raid (Location 2965)
It has been suggested that on his return to the government Ben-Gurion intended to restore the balance between the school of negotiation and the school of retaliation, which had crystallized and collided with such disastrous consequences in the course of 1954.62 But it would appear that he returned from his brief sojourn in Sede-Boker in a truculent and uncompromising mood, determined to restore the primacy of defense over foreign policy considerations in Israel’s relations with the Arabs. (Location 2966)
When Sharett visited him in Sede-Boker, he proposed the following formula: “Although defense takes precedence over everything else, constant efforts must be made to obtain peace.” This meant that retaliation would be permitted even if it damaged the prospects of peace. (Location 2974)
On 28 February, only a week after Ben-Gurion’s return, he inaugurated his tough new defense policy with a devastating raid on Gaza, code-named Operation Black Arrow. During the night two IDF paratroop companies led by Ariel Sharon attacked and destroyed the Egyptian army headquarters on the outskirts of Gaza City, killing thirty-seven Egyptian soldiers and wounding thirty-one at the cost to themselves of eight killed and nine wounded. The ferocity of the attack, the material damage it caused, and, above all, the heavy casualties made this the most serious clash between Israel and Egypt since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1949. (Location 2983)
His reasons for approving the plan had to do exclusively with domestic politics. He felt that the public would not understand a failure to respond to the recent provocations, especially in the aftermath of the executions in Cairo. In fact, he regretted that Ben-Gurion would get the credit for a reprisal that he would have approved anyway. 66 (Location 2992)
Sharett assumed full responsibility for the raid, although the number of Egyptian soldiers killed was four times greater than he had been led to expect. He did not deny the raid’s positive impact at home, but he expected it to have an adverse effect on the secret talks with Egypt, which had shown some signs of progress recently, and on Israel’s efforts to obtain arms and a security guarantee from the United States. (Location 3012)
Moreover, the repercussions of the raid were not confined to Nasser’s internal position and international relations. Crowded in the Gaza Strip were around 300,000 Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war who for years had been demanding the right to be armed and organized into an army in preparation for recovery of their homeland. The Israeli attack sparked mass demonstrations and riots throughout the strip that raged on for three days. The indignant refugees stormed UN and Egyptian government buildings, smashed windows, burned vehicles, trampled on the Egyptian flag, and beat up Egyptian soldiers. “Arms” was the universal cry, “give us arms and we shall defend ourselves.” 70 These demonstrations and mob violence called into question the ability of Nasser’s regime to maintain its rule over this strife-ridden and volatile area. A military regime cannot suffer military humiliation without risk to its position at home. Nasser was stung, and his attention was thereafter fixed on Israel. From this point on, the Egyptian authorities, instead of curbing and repressing militancy in the Gaza Strip and infiltration into Israel, began to devise ways in which the refugees’ demands to be armed could be channeled into forms of hostile action against Israel that would fall short of full-scale war. (Location 3028)
The general view was that the Gaza raid was the pretext rather than the cause of Nasser’s turn to the Soviet bloc for arms. (Location 3040)
Ben-Gurion and his defenders maintain that the Gaza raid was not the cause, but merely the excuse, for Nasser’s switch from moderation to confrontation. They see post-Gaza developments as stemming not from the attack but from the inherently aggressive tendencies of Nasser’s undemocratic regime. 76 There is no evidence to substantiate this contention and a great deal of evidence to refute it. The clearest manifestation of Nasser’s switch to confrontation was the unleashing of guerrilla warfare in the form of fedayeen attacks on Israel. “Fedayeen” is the Arabic term for self-sacrificers. In August 1955 the fedayeen made their appearance on the Israeli scene. During the next fourteen months fedayeen units, recruited from among the Palestinian refugees in Gaza and trained for sabotage by Egyptian officers, carried out a series of attacks inside Israel. They laid road mines, ambushed vehicles, sabotaged installations, committed acts of murder, and struck terror into the heart of the civilian population. The fedayeen raids were only one reason prompting Israel to launch the Sinai Campaign, but they were an important one since no other method proved effective. They thus constitute a significant strand in the tangled history of this period. (Location 3055)
his claim is that in unleashing the fedayeen Egypt was not acting but reacting to Israeli aggression and that it was therefore Israel, not Egypt, that bore the responsibility for the subsequent escalation. (Location 3068)
Records of Egyptian and Jordanian military intelligence captured by the Israeli army in the course of the 1956 and 1967 wars conclusively disprove Dayan’s version and substantiate Nasser’s version. These records show that until the Gaza raid, the Egyptian military authorities had a consistent and firm policy of curbing infiltration by Palestinians from the Gaza Strip into Israel and that it was only following the raid that a new policy was put in place, that of organizing the fedayeen units and turning them into an official instrument of warfare against Israel. (Location 3069)
The Coalition (Location 3078)
The coalition that produced the Gaza raid also made it impossible to pursue a coherent or consistent policy in its aftermath. A spate of incidents and bloody clashes along the border with Gaza, which Sharett viewed as the inevitable consequence of the Israeli attack, was taken by Ben-Gurion as a sign of growing Egyptian bellicosity, which, if allowed to go unchallenged, would endanger Israel’s basic security. (Location 3078)
Ben-Gurion summoned Dayan and told him that they should expel the Egyptians from the Gaza Strip, capture it, and keep it under Israeli rule. This suggestion surprised Dayan. In the past Ben-Gurion had consistently opposed the capture of Gaza because it contained 300,000 bitter and hostile refugees that the State of Israel could do without. This time, Ben-Gurion explained, their duty to protect the settlers, boost their confidence, and enable them to put down roots outweighed all other considerations. For Dayan military considerations were still all important, and on these grounds he opposed the idea. (Location 3083)
Sharett stated his general preference for accepting Israel’s existing borders, reducing the tension with neighbors, strengthening relations with the Western powers, and cultivating international sympathy. He conceded that urgent defense considerations could sometimes necessitate actions that would increase tensions between Israel and the Arab world and damage Israel’s relations with the Western powers, but such actions, he thought, should be kept to a minimum rather than piled on top of one another. (Location 3091)
Relations between Ben-Gurion and Sharett became progressively more strained, tense, and envenomed, causing the latter endless frustration and mental anguish. There were recurrent clashes over the respective jurisdictions of the Foreign Ministry and the defense establishment in the conduct of armistice affairs, over the role of the United Nations in these affairs, over relations with the Western powers, and, above all, over the question of reprisals. Ben-Gurion, who had come back from Sede-Boker to reassert a tough defense policy, found himself swimming against a current of moderation in the cabinet. His formal subordination to Sharett, which in no way reflected the true power relations between them, was an additional source of friction and complication. (Location 3123)
But after Iraq and Turkey took the first step toward the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, offered Israel a mutual defense pact, provided it undertook not to expand its borders by force and to refrain from military retaliation against its neighbors. Ben-Gurion and Sharett appeared willing to accept the first condition, but not the second. (Location 3133)
Ben-Gurion told him that the three things dearest to his heart were the security of Israel, peace in the Middle East, and friendship between Israel and America. (Location 3138)
conditions did prove unacceptable, and after the Czech arms deal was announced, Israeli diplomats shifted the emphasis in their discussion with the Americans from a defense pact to the supply of arms. (Location 3143)
No less shocking was the double standard evinced by Ben-Gurion in the debate on Lebanon. The same man who was so touchy about Israel’s independence and territorial integrity, and so quick to react to the slightest manifestation of foreign interference in its affairs, also showed complete disregard for the rights of other sovereign states. (Location 3173)
Whereas Lebanon did not pose any threat to Israel’s day-to-day or its basic security, Egypt did. The problem of day-to-day security grew progressively more acute in the aftermath of the Gaza raid. (Location 3183)
Ben-Gurion developed a personal obsession with Nasser and concluded that his removal was a matter of vital national interest. (Location 3189)
explosion of a mine near the border with Egypt in which four Israeli officers were injured in mid-May prompted Ben-Gurion to propose to the Committee of Five a military reprisal. (Location 3190)
One additional argument for restraint arrived in the morning, with an American offer to help Israel build a nuclear reactor. Sharett attached great importance to this offer because of its potential contribution both to nuclear research and to closer political relations with America, and he feared that it might be withdrawn if Israel persisted in acting aggressively. (Location 3210)
19 May, an Israeli force attacked an Egyptian army post near the place of the mine incident, blew it up, and returned to base without inflicting or suffering any casualties. (Location 3214)
The Trials and Tribulations of a Moderate (Location 3217)
At the meeting he outlined the main principles of his defense policy: strict observance of the armistice agreements, the search for peace with the neighboring Arab states, and no territorial expansion, because what Israel needed was more Jews, not more land. (Location 3226)
There he presented Dayan’s letter of resignation and called for the adoption of a clear line—either the Sharett line or the Ben-Gurion line—because alternating between the two caused nothing but harm. Ben-Gurion expressed regret that he had suggested the Gaza raid, because it went against the prevailing political line. If the majority preferred Sharett’s line, concluded Ben-Gurion, then that line should be adopted and adhered to. Having had his say, Ben-Gurion walked out of the room and, as a sign of protest, stayed away from his office in the Defense Ministry for twenty-four hours. Sharett caved in. That very afternoon he convened a cabinet meeting, which, on his recommendation, approved Dayan’s plan for an assault on the police station of Khan Yunis, at the southern end of the Gaza Strip. Dayan and Ben-Gurion returned to their posts, and the first large-scale operation since the Gaza raid was launched, claiming the lives of thirty-seven Egyptians and wounding forty-five others. (Location 3257)
Sharett was worn out by the constant struggle to restrain Ben-Gurion and his officers. Every incident along the border was followed by a proposal for military retaliation, and every time he mustered a cabinet majority to defeat the proposal, the activists stepped up their campaign to discredit him. (Location 3264)
Note: The latest chapter and the preceding one is really hammering home that idea that Ben-Gurion was a hawk, wanted war and the rest of the government wanted that as well. While little old Sharett was the right one, wanting peace and would of been better for Israel long term.
“Preventive war” was a misnomer, for there was no evidence that Egypt planned to attack Israel, yet the advocates of war always called it that. (Location 3272)
War was evidently too serious a business to be left to the elected politicians. Dayan’s guidelines to the General Staff embodied a new defense policy that had not been vouchsafed to the prime minister. They also supplied the answer to the question that troubled Sharett. With complete clarity, they indicated that when Ben-Gurion said that he was opposed to “an initiated war,” he meant that he wanted war but that he did not want Israel to initiate it directly. On 2 November, Sharett stepped down to make way for Ben-Gurion. His premiership was over, and so was the policy of accommodation with the Arab world that he had pursued in the face of such overwhelming opposition from his own defense establishment. (Location 3327)
4 THE ROAD TO SUEZ 1955–1957 (Location 3333)
The absence of the General Zionists and the presence of Mapam and the Ahdut Ha’avodah did not make a perceptible difference in the government’s foreign policy. Major decisions continued, in practice, to be taken by the leaders of Mapai and sometimes by Ben-Gurion alone. (Location 3338)
Moshe Dayan Wants War (Location 3340)
Ben-Gurion resumed his old practice of combining the premiership with the defense portfolio. (Location 3341)
Dayan wanted a preventive war against Egypt, Sharett was firmly opposed to war, and Ben-Gurion was undecided. It was to take a year almost to the day to resolve this question, and the Suez War was the answer. (Location 3346)
Another major difference between Sharett and Dayan concerned the acquisition of arms. Both men were of course strongly committed to arms procurements for the IDF, but they went about it in very different ways. Sharett believed that the best chance of persuading the Western powers to supply arms to Israel lay in abiding by the rules of international law, cooperating with the UN observers, and behaving like a reasonable and responsible member of the international community. Dayan believed that if Israel behaved itself it would definitely not get arms, whereas if it misbehaved it might be given some arms as an incentive to behave better. He thought that Israel had a nuisance value, and he wanted to capitalize on this in order to induce the Western powers to give Israel arms in the hope that it would stay out of mischief. In other words, he considered military activism a factor more likely to help than to hinder the quest for arms. (Location 3363)
France offered arms in the hope of inducing Israel to go to war against Egypt, whereas America allowed its allies to supply arms to Israel on condition that Israel did not go to war. (Location 3378)
The policy of confrontation with Egypt was announced by Ben-Gurion on 2 November 1955, when presenting his government to the Knesset. He began with the habitual expression of willingness to meet with any Arab leader to discuss a settlement, but he ended with a stern warning that the one-way war being waged against Israel by Egypt could not remain one-way for very long: (Location 3384)
The assault on al-Sabha was the largest military operation carried out by the IDF since the end of the 1948 war. It was planned by Dayan as part of his overall strategy of prodding Nasser to go to war. (Location 3389)
The supply of arms by the Soviet bloc to Egypt was followed by a diplomatic setback in the form of renewed Anglo-American pressure to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Anglo-American suggestions for a settlement were outlined in Project Alpha in February 1955. (Location 3399)
In the Knesset, on 15 November, Ben-Gurion firmly rejected Eden’s offer to mediate on this basis: “His proposal to truncate the territory of Israel for the benefit of its neighbors,” he said, “has no legal, moral, or logical basis, and cannot be considered.” (Location 3410)
Perhaps because of the risk of war, and the risk of British intervention against Israel, Ben-Gurion showed none of his earlier enthusiasm for capturing the Straits of Tiran. (Location 3429)
tended to favor a political rather than a military solution. (Location 3433)
Operation Kinneret (Location 3442)
Kinneret. On the night of 11 December a paratroop brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ariel Sharon raided the Syrian gun positions on the northeastern shore of Lake Kinneret, better known outside Israel as Lake Tiberias, or the Sea of Galilee. (Location 3443)
Operation Kinneret was an unprovoked act of aggression by Israel. (Location 3447)
backdrop to the raid was Syrian interference with Israeli fishing on the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. The Syrians, however, fired not on the Israeli fishing vessels but merely on the patrol boats, and only when they came within 250 meters of the shore. (Location 3449)
On 10 December a police vessel was sent close to the shore, specifically in order to draw Syrian fire. A Syrian soldier fired a few shots that scraped some paint off the bottom of the patrol boat. No one was killed or wounded. This was the pretext for the IDF operation. Most observers agreed that the punishment was out of all proportion to the provocation. This judgment needs to be qualified in one respect: there was no Syrian provocation. (Location 3452)
Sharett made a bitter comment on the decision-making process: “Ben-Gurion the defense minister consulted with Ben-Gurion the foreign minister and received the green light from Ben-Gurion the prime minister.” (Location 3462)
Dayan had his own motives for ordering such a massive raid. In the first place, the Syrian army had never been defeated by the IDF, and by inflicting a crushing military defeat on it he wanted to break its image and its self-confidence. In addition, he wanted to put to the test the mutual defense pact that Syria and Egypt had concluded in October. If Nasser failed to rise to the challenge, the hollowness of his pledge would be exposed before the entire Arab world; if he did rise to it, this local incident might develop into a general confrontation with Egypt. (Location 3474)
Sharett forcefully stated the case against going to war: I am against preventive war because it can turn into general war, to a ring of fire all around us, rather than be restricted to war with Egypt. I am against preventive war because that which did not occur in the War of Independence may occur, namely, intervention by a foreign power against us… . I am against preventive war because it means measures by the UN against us. I am against preventive war because it means injury and damage at home, the destruction of settlements, and the spilling of much blood. 25 (Location 3511)
The damage to Israel’s international standing was serious. Some observers even questioned the sanity of the Israeli policymakers. The glaring disproportion between the scale of the Kinneret operation and its alleged cause put Israel in a worse light than usual. (Location 3522)
costliest consequence of the Kinneret raid, however, was the American refusal to supply arms to Israel. (Location 3528)
The Kinneret raid thus illustrated once again the rift between the defense establishment and the Foreign Ministry. (Location 3535)
On the question of war with Egypt, the majority in the cabinet also sided with Sharett. (Location 3552)
As 1955 turned into 1956, the idea of a preventive war was no longer a serious topic of conversation in government circles. The debate had not been about “war or peace,” because peace was not seen as an option at that time. The debate was between those who wanted to initiate war and those who wanted to exhaust every diplomatic avenue in order to restore the military balance of power between Israel and Egypt. (Location 3559)
The Anderson Mission (Location 3577)
Between December 1955 and March 1956, Anderson conducted three rounds of talks, shuttling between Cairo and Jerusalem via Athens and Washington in the utmost secrecy. 35 (Location 3580)
while Ben-Gurion and Nasser doubted that agreement was possible, each had his own agenda. Both needed American goodwill: Ben-Gurion in order to obtain arms, Nasser in order to obtain financial aid for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Moreover, even if the talks failed, both had an interest in placing the onus for failure on the other side. (Location 3585)
Nasser demanded a substantial part of the Negev to allow for territorial contiguity between Egypt and Jordan. He also wanted Israel to give the Palestinian refugees a free choice between repatriation and resettlement with compensation. Ben-Gurion and Sharett were prepared to discuss minor territorial adjustments and a contribution to the settlement of the refugee problem, but only within the framework of direct peace negotiations. (Location 3588)
clearly from the protocols is Ben-Gurion’s old tactic of projecting an image of reasonableness and placing the onus for the deadlock on the shoulders of his Arab opponents. (Location 3596)
If only he and Nasser could meet face-to-face, Ben-Gurion told Anderson, peace might be reached in two or three days. This seemed a reasonable proposition, but, as Ben-Gurion knew full well, there was not the remotest chance that Nasser would agree to it, because of the strong Arab taboo against recognizing Israel or talking to the enemy. One is forced to conclude that Ben-Gurion was simply trying to score points off his opponent. (Location 3600)
Anderson tried his best to persuade Nasser to grant Ben-Gurion’s wish for a high-level meeting, but Nasser rejected the idea. He said that the Egyptian people, the Egyptian army, and the Arab nation would not allow such a meeting. Nasser made two additional points. First, Israel was not just an Egyptian problem but an all-Arab problem, and Egypt had to keep in step with the other Arab states. Second, as far as Egypt was concerned, the only basis for a settlement with Israel was the UN partition resolution of 1947. This was, of course, a complete nonstarter for Israel. (Location 3603)
Note: MORE COMPLETE NONSTARTERS FOR A NEGOTIATION FROM NASSER
mission, Anderson reported that Nasser mentioned four times the murder of King Abdullah. He was willing to talk to the United States, which could talk to Israel, but he could not take the risk of bringing an Israeli to Egypt. Eisenhower blamed both sides for the failure. Nasser was “a complete stumbling block,” while the Israelis were “completely adamant in their attitude of making no concessions whatsoever in order to obtain peace.” (Location 3608)
On 14 February he wrote to President Eisenhower, depicting Nasser as a threat to Western interests in the Middle East as well as to Israel’s security, and protesting the denial of arms to Israel. At his last meeting with Anderson, on 9 March, Ben-Gurion sounded a note of alarm. To bring about peace was impossible, he said, but there was a way to prevent war. The only way to do so was to let Israel have defensive arms. (Location 3619)
Nasser had decided to retaliate in kind with the only effective weapon at his disposal, the sending of fedayeen inside Israel to kill civilians. (Location 3653)
Sharett’s Fall (Location 3659)
10 June, to go ahead with secret negotiations with France on far-reaching cooperation, including joint war operations against Egypt. (Location 3674)
mid-June 1956 Sharett tendered his resignation. (Location 3678)
The real reason behind Sharett’s ouster was that he advocated an alternative to Ben-Gurion’s militant policy in the conflict with the Arabs. In the cabinet, as we have seen, a majority of the ministers frequently rallied behind Sharett on crucial issues. During the six months when Ben-Gurion served as defense minister in the cabinet headed by Sharett, he suffered two major defeats: one on the proposal to capture the Gaza Strip and the other on his proposal for the renunciation of the armistice agreement. After Ben-Gurion replaced Sharett as prime minister, he suffered two more defeats at the instigation of his foreign minister: first the rejection of Operation Omer for the capture of the Straits of Tiran, then the rejection of the proposal to build new settlements in the El-Auja DMZ. All these decisions served to deflect Ben-Gurion from the militant course he was intent on pursuing, but he regarded it as utterly intolerable that measures supported by the majority of their party colleagues in the government were vetoed by a “Sharettist” majority consisting largely of non-Mapai ministers. (Location 3685)
Sharett’s departure was thus doubly significant: it marked the final collapse of the moderate school of thought on Israel’s relations with the Arabs and the final triumph of Ben-Gurionism, and it cleared the most serious internal stumbling block along the path that led Israel within a few months to a full-scale war with Egypt. (Location 3703)
The French Connection (Location 3706)
The relationship between Israel and France began with the supply of arms, developed into political and military cooperation, and reached its climax in the joint war against Egypt. (Location 3717)
The idea of a coordinated military offensive against Egypt emerged only after Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July, the fourth anniversary of the Free Officers’ revolution. Nasser made his dramatic announcement following the abrupt cancellation of the American offer of funding to build the Aswan High Dam. (Location 3768)
French advocated immediate military action against Egypt, the British wanted to allow two more months for diplomatic action, and the Americans wanted a much longer period to undermine Nasser’s regime without the use of military force. He assumed that Israel’s timescale was closer to Britain’s than to France’s. (Location 3801)
On 10 August, Ben-Gurion had written in his diary that Nasser was likely to emerge victorious from the dispute because the British did not seem ready to act against him, and without force he would not give up: “The growth in Nasser’s prestige is bound to make him want to destroy Israel, not by a direct attack but first by a ‘peace offensive’ and an attempt to reduce our territory, especially in the Negev, and when we refuse—he will attack us.” 58 (Location 3812)
The War Plot against Egypt (Location 3835)
plan originated with General Challe, he repeatedly referred to it as “the British plan.” He strongly resented the suggestion that Israel play the aggressor while Britain and France posed as the peacemakers. Israel, he repeated on a number of occasions, would not allow itself to be treated like a concubine. (Location 3855)
In his diary Ben-Gurion wrote, “It seems to me that the British plot is to embroil us with Nasser, and in the meantime bring about the conquest of Jordan by Iraq.” (Location 3867)
Ben-Gurion long to conclude, on the basis of this flimsy evidence, that Israel had a historic right to the Straits of Tiran, though as a reader of Greek he regretted not having Procopius in the original. The books were a gift from Moshe Dayan. 68 (Location 3876)
The conference thus hatched not just the most famous but also the best-documented war plot in modern history. (Location 3883)
development of nuclear power was a subject dear to Ben-Gurion’s heart. He saw in it a technological challenge that would help transform Israel into an advanced industrial state. (Location 3960)
A year later, in September 1957, when Bourgès-Maunoury was prime minister, France delivered to Israel a nuclear reactor with twice the capacity previously promised. 76 (Location 3968)
nuclear deal concluded at the private meeting at Sèvres is interesting for three main reasons. First, it shows that the French were determined to go to war at almost any price. Secondly, it reveals the full extent of the incentives the French were prepared to give Israel in order to induce it to play the part assigned to it in the war plot against Egypt. Third, it confirms the impression that Israel did not face any serious danger from Egypt at that time but nevertheless colluded with the European powers to attack Egypt for other reasons. Taken together, the two private conversations at Sèvres thus drive a coach and horses through the official version, which says that Israel went to war only because it faced an imminent danger of attack from Egypt. (Location 3971)
The Protocol of Sèvres gave Ben-Gurion the guarantee he desperately wanted against British betrayal, but it also constituted the smoking gun of the tripartite collusion. (Location 3980)
The plan is thus highly revealing of Ben-Gurion’s inner thoughts about Israel, the European powers, and the Arab world. It revealed his craving for an alliance with the imperialist powers against the forces of Arab nationalism. It exposed an appetite for territorial expansion at the expense of the Arabs and expansion in every possible direction: north, east, and south. And it exhibited a cavalier attitude toward the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the neighboring Arab states. (Location 4010)
The Sinai Campaign (Location 4013)
The cabinet approved the proposal to go to war with Egypt by a large majority. Only the two Mapam ministers voted against it: they objected to the link with the colonial powers. (Location 4018)
On 29 October, in the afternoon, the IDF launched the Sinai Campaign with a paratroop drop in the Mitla Pass. On 30 October, before the IDF forces reached the Suez Canal, Britain and France issued their prearranged ultimata to Israel and Egypt, demanding that they withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the canal. Israel accepted the ultimatum; Egypt, as expected, did not. Britain and France began aerial bombardment of the Egyptian airfields during the evening of 31 October instead of at dawn as planned. Ben-Gurion was so anxious and so angry about the delay that he threatened to call off the attack. Despite the vacillation and delays that continued to characterize the military operations of the allies, the IDF achieved a complete military victory within a few days. The Egyptian forces in Sinai and the Gaza Strip withdrew in haste across the Suez Canal, leaving nearly six thousand prisoners and large quantities of military equipment in Israeli hands. By giving the order to withdraw, Nasser minimized the losses to his army. Gaza was captured on 2 November and, by 5 November the whole peninsula was in Israeli hands (Location 4021)
On 5 November, Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet premier, sent letters to Britain, France, and Israel threatening them with rocket attacks and promising volunteers to help the Egyptian army. The letter to Ben-Gurion was particularly brutal in its language. It accused the government of Israel of “criminally and irresponsibly playing with the fate of the world” and of placing in question the very existence of the State of Israel. In his diary Ben-Gurion recorded that the letter could have been written by Adolf Hitler. (Location 4041)
Ben-Gurion was in a panic because Israel was completely isolated in the face of the Soviet threats. Pressure from the UN reached its climax that morning when the secretary-general spoke of dire consequences for Israel. In the end Ben-Gurion adopted Eban’s suggestion, although he considered it rather risky. Ironically, Ben-Gurion, the proponent of the view that it does not matter what the Gentiles say, seemed very frightened of what the Gentiles were saying on this occasion. Eban, the disciple of Moshe Sharett, had the correct reading of the international situation, and it was he who stepped in to pick up the pieces. (Location 4067)
The third kingdom of Israel had lasted three days. (Location 4076)
Ben-Gurion did not really want to keep the Gaza Strip, because it contained 350,000 disgruntled and disorderly Arabs. He wanted to use Israel’s occupation of Gaza as a bargaining card for retaining Sharm el-Sheikh. (Location 4081)
There were three operational objectives and three political aims. The three operational objectives were to defeat the Egyptian army, to open up the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and to put an end to fedayeen attacks across Israel’s southern border. All three objectives were achieved to some extent. (Location 4090)
The three political aims behind the Sinai Campaign were the overthrow of Nasser, the expansion of Israel’s borders, and the establishment of a new political order in the Middle East. None of these aims was realized. The tripartite aggression not only failed to bring about Nasser’s downfall; it greatly increased his prestige and influence in the region and in the Third World. Nasser snatched a most spectacular political victory out of the jaws of military defeat. Israel, on the other hand, paid a heavy political price for ganging up with the colonial powers against the emergent forces of Arab nationalism. The collusion seemed to provide the decisive proof of the reactionary and expansionist character of the Zionist movement. Israel’s reputation was seriously tarnished. Its own actions could henceforth be used as proof of the long-standing claim that it was a bridgehead of Western imperialism in the midst of the Arab world. (Location 4100)
official Israeli version of the 1956 war, like that of the 1948 war, is little more than the propaganda of the victors. (Location 4125)
The Sinai Campaign was a major watershed in Israel’s relations with the Arab world. In the years 1953–56 a great internal battle raged between the moderates and the activists, between the proponents of diplomacy and the proponents of military force, between the school of negotiation and the school of retaliation. (Location 4126)
The Sinai Campaign drove the last nail into the coffin of the moderate alternative represented by Sharett. Ben-Gurion failed to topple Nasser but he succeeded in toppling Sharett. (Location 4131)
5 THE ALLIANCE OF THE PERIPHERY 1957–1963 (Location 4134)
THE SUEZ WAR DID not produce permanent territorial changes in the Middle East, but it had profound repercussions for the balance of power between Israel and the Arab world, between East and West, and between the conservative and radical forces within the Arab world. Israel was the clear winner in the military contest with Egypt, and the result was to boost national self-confidence, enhance the deterrent power of the IDF, and confirm Israel as a major military power in the Middle East. On the other hand, the change in the power relations between East and West worked in favor of the Arabs. The Suez War undermined the cohesion of the Western alliance, caused the collapse of British and French influence in the Middle East, and paved the way to further Soviet advances in the region. (Location 4136)
Nasser’s own attitude toward Israel hardened as a result of the war. Suez confirmed his worst fears and suspicions about Israel. After Suez he identified Israel and the European powers as one enemy and repeatedly stated that the Arabs had to fight both Israel and the powers that stood behind it. (Location 4146)
Reassessment and Realignment (Location 4155)
The conventional wisdom maintains that the Sinai Campaign gave Israel eleven years of peace. This is true in the limited sense that Nasser kept the border with Israel quiet while working to change the military balance of power in favor of the Arabs. But the conventional wisdom is wrong inasmuch as the Suez War further envenomed and deepened the conflict between the Arab world and Israel. (Location 4156)
His power was so great that his coalition partners used to joke that he submitted proposals to the cabinet only when he wanted them to be defeated. 3 (Location 4163)
In the period 1957–63 Ben-Gurion thus enjoyed a near-monopoly in the making of foreign and defense policy. (Location 4175)
The main lesson that Ben-Gurion drew from the Suez War was that Israel could not realistically hope to expand its territory at the expense of its neighbors. He learned the hard way that in the modern world military conquest did not necessarily confer the right to retain territory, and he came to accept the territorial status quo enshrined in the 1949 armistice agreements as permanent. (Location 4176)
While deterrence was one major theme in Ben-Gurion’s post-Suez strategy, the quest for external guarantees of Israel’s security was another. (Location 4181)
Soviet Union was preparing an attack on Israel through Syria. He saw Soviet references to Israeli troop deployment on the northern front as an attempt to procure an alibi for an attack or a provocation. (Location 4206)
Ben-Gurion replied immediately, to stress the dangers to the free world in general and Israel in particular if international communism was to establish a base in the heart of the Middle East, to renew the plea for joint action, (Location 4212)
Ben-Gurion was so desperate to find shelter under the NATO umbrella (Location 4221)
NATO Council rejected Israel’s request for association. (Location 4223)
Since the American position remained unchanged, the Israelis turned to Western Europe in their search for allies and new sources of arms. (Location 4228)
France continued to serve as Israel’s chief arms supplier, and there was close cooperation between the two countries in the cultural as well as the political, military, and intelligence spheres. (Location 4230)
The Federal Republic of Germany had already concluded a reparations agreement with Israel in 1952. (Location 4236)
Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). (Location 4242)
Iraq and Jordan formed a loose Hashemite union, the better to protect themselves against the spread of the Nasserist tide. (Location 4244)
The Alliance of the Periphery (Location 4253)
forming alliances with Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia. (Location 4256)
two main aims were to check Soviet advances in the Middle East and to curb the spread of Nasser’s influence in Asia and Africa. (Location 4258)
Harel wanted to turn Israel into an ally of America in the global contest against the Soviet Union and in the regional contest against Arab radicalism. It was America’s rejection of Harel’s offer of secret cooperation to block the expansion of Nasser’s influence that led him to embark on the creation of a belt of states around the periphery of the Middle East and Africa. (Location 4286)
Israel began to cultivate bilateral relations with Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia long before the Suez War. But the formation of the UAR in February 1958 and the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq five months later alerted these countries to the danger of Arab radicalism and formed the real backdrop to Israel’s efforts to go beyond tentative bilateral relationships and try to develop some kind of a grouping. (Location 4300)
In the late 1950s Israel also began to develop friendly relations with the black African countries that were in the process of gaining independence from colonial rule. The list of black African countries cultivated by Israel included Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Zaire. (Location 4345)
Israel extended technical assistance on a large scale in economic planning, building infrastructure, establishing educational, medical and social welfare facilities, and developing the armed forces. (Location 4350)
Americans saw the strength of this argument and agreed to meet some of Israel’s costs on a project by project basis. (Location 4356)
By the mid-1960s Israel had established on the African continent a considerable presence, which greatly enhanced Israel’s international standing, especially at the United Nations. (Location 4357)
The 1958 Crisis (Location 4376)
series of crises involving Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. (Location 4377)
Ben-Gurion pinned his greatest hopes on a change of attitude in Washington. He therefore mustered all his powers of persuasion in a letter to President Eisenhower on 24 July. (Location 4435)
The implication was that Israel was better placed than the United States to organize the containment of Nasser because it did not arouse suspicions of neocolonialism. (Location 4444)
The Soviet Union, which had played no visible role in the crisis of 1958, suddenly loomed large in the eyes of the Israeli ministers with the arrival of a Soviet note on 1 August. The note protested against the overflight of Israel by U.S. and UK aircraft, associated Israel with their aggressive acts, and spoke of perilous consequences for Israel’s own national interest. (Location 4458)
Ben-Gurion felt very bitter at what he saw as American hypocrisy in exposing Israel to the risk of retaliation from another superpower while denying it a formal defense guarantee and a part in the formulation of Western plans for the defense of the region. The resentment was mutual. Dulles resented the constant pressure to which the Israelis subjected him, especially during the crisis. In his public utterances he was careful not to show his true feelings, but in private Anglo-American exchanges he called Israel “this millstone round our necks.” 27 (Location 4470)
Ben-Gurion and the Bomb (Location 4483)
The 1958 crisis was followed by several years of acute instability in the internal politics of the Arab states and in inter-Arab relations. But along Israel’s borders with its neighbors, except for that with Syria, a general relaxation of tension prevailed. (Location 4484)
a high-level French commitment to provide Israel with a nuclear reactor. (Location 4499)
1955 President Eisenhower had offered Israel assistance in nuclear research under the Atoms for Peace program. (Location 4505)
The question was not whether Israel should base its defense on conventional weapons or on nuclear weapons. It was clear to everyone that Israel was bound to continue to defend itself by conventional weapons. Rather, the debate was about defense priorities, about the allocation of scarce resources, and about the pace of the nuclear program. (Location 4519)
The first challenge to Israel’s nuclear ambition came in December 1960, in the twilight between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations. In Israel there was tight military censorship, but Western newspapers started buzzing with rumors that Israel was building a nuclear reactor that would enable it to start producing nuclear weapons within about five years. American U-2 spy planes discovered that the plant in Dimona, officially described as a textile factory, was a large and tightly guarded nuclear facility. The press reports caused surprise and suspicion in official quarters and provoked condemnation in the Arab states. The U.S. government wanted to know whether Israel was planning to produce nuclear weapons. (Location 4542)
In the summer of 1962 Kennedy reversed his decision against the sale of Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. He hoped that this would discourage Israel from seeking to develop a nuclear option, and he wanted to signal to the Arabs more clearly than in the past that the United States was committed to the defense of Israel. (Location 4585)
They wanted peace in order to solve the refugee problem but were convinced that the Arab states wanted resettlement in order to destroy the State of Israel. (Location 4599)
The End of the Ben-Gurion Era (Location 4610)
There were also signs of change in Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward Nasser, although in public he continued to express his policy in barks of defiance. Building up Israel’s deterrent power remained at the top of his list of priorities, but he was on the lookout for signs of change on the Arab side as well. The conviction that had guided his conduct all along was that nothing much could be done about peace until the Arabs had recognized that Israel was unbreakably strong. Now he was trying to assess whether this point had been reached. Nasser held the key. He was undoubtedly the most important leader in the Arab world. If he would agree to reconciliation with Israel, the other Arab leaders would follow suit. But Ben-Gurion could not tell for certain what Nasser’s current views were on the fateful subject of such reconciliation. 40 He therefore took the initiative in asking other world leaders, including U Nu of Burma and President Tito of Yugoslavia, to try to arrange a secret meeting between himself and Nasser. (Location 4636)
Just as the hope of a dialogue with Nasser faded away, the fear of a combined Arab attack on Israel returned to haunt Ben-Gurion with a vengeance. In Cairo, on 17 April 1963, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq signed a provisional constitution for an Arab federation. The constitution spoke prominently of “the question of Palestine and the national duty to liberate it.” (Location 4652)
stating that the expression “liberation of Palestine” meant nothing less than the aim to destroy Israel. He denounced the document as a flagrant violation of the Charter and as a direct threat to international peace and security. (Location 4656)
The Americans also thought that Egypt’s ballistic missile program posed no threat to Israel, and they dismissed the reports that Egypt was developing nonconventional weapons. (Location 4685)
For the Americans the most serious worry was Israel’s nuclear program. A CIA report warned that Israel’s acquisition of a nuclear capability would substantially damage the U.S. and Western position in the Arab world. It would make the Middle East more polarized and unstable, make Israel’s policy toward its neighbors more rather than less tough, make Israel feel freer to take vigorous action against border harassments, (Location 4687)
Ben-Gurion was seventy-six years old and a very tired man, an exhausted volcano. He was also a troubled and disillusioned man. He was the founder of the Jewish state and the main architect of its defense policy, yet peace with the Arabs had eluded him. Although in objective terms Israel was much more secure in 1963 than it had been in 1948, he fell prey, in the twilight of his long political career, to inflated and irrational doubts about his country’s long-term prospects of survival. He himself was aware that his mental powers were in decline, and this probably contributed to his decision to retire. “The young ones” were left out on a limb. The government fell into the hands of the Mapai old guard, led by Levi Eshkol. (Location 4713)
6 POOR LITTLE SAMSON 1963–1969 (Location 4720)
Levi Eshkol did not like to make irrevocable choices. He was a man of consensus and compromise. (Location 4730)
Personalities and Policies (Location 4738)
Membership in this moderate movement helped form his general outlook toward the Arabs. His attitude was liberal, humane, and sympathetic, and it was accompanied by a belief in the possibility of Jewish-Arab coexistence. (Location 4740)
His attitude toward the Arabs was one of live and let live. Like Moshe Sharett, he saw the Arabs not just as an enemy but as a people. Like Sharett, he did not think that Israel was doomed to live forever by the sword. (Location 4745)
On the aims of Israel’s defense policy, the prime minister and the chief of staff were in complete agreement. The first five-year plan for the IDF worked out under Rabin’s direction, reflected a broad consensus that “the State of Israel can realize fully its national goals within the borders of the armistice agreement.” (Location 4775)
He convinced Kennedy that the reactor in Dimona was intended exclusively for peaceful purposes, and he agreed in principle to visits by American experts but not to a regular or intrusive system of inspection. (Location 4782)
nuclear program. 4 What he did was refrain from adopting a nuclear strategy, as Ben-Gurion had done before him. In return Eshkol obtained a clearer American political commitment to Israel’s defense, strategic talks between the experts of the two countries, and access to America’s conventional arsenal. It was a classic Eshkol compromise, in which he obtained much more than he conceded. (Location 4787)
Johnson had taken a consistently pro-Israeli line, and he continued to display strong support for Israel after assuming the presidency. (Location 4791)
Whatever his motives, Ben-Gurion turned against his longtime comrade with unprecedented vehemence and venom, declaring him unfit to govern. Ben-Gurion accused Eshkol of unspecified security failures. (Location 4812)
Ben-Gurion created his own splinter political party, (Location 4816)
They sent a report to Nasser that Israel was concentrating forces on its northern front and planning to attack Syria. The report was untrue and Nasser knew that it was untrue, but he was in a quandary. His army was bogged down in an inconclusive war in Yemen, and he knew that Israel was militarily stronger than all the Arab confrontation states taken together. Yet, politically, he could not afford to remain inactive, because his leadership of the Arab world was being challenged. Since the Samu raid the Jordanians had been accusing him of cowardice and of hiding from the Israelis behind the skirts of the UN Emergency Force in Sinai. Syria had a defense pact with Egypt that compelled it to go to Syria’s aid in the event of an Israeli attack. Clearly, Nasser had to do something, both to preserve his own credibility as an ally and to restrain the hotheads in Damascus. There is general agreement among commentators that Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. What he did was to embark on an exercise in brinkmanship that was to carry him over the brink. (Location 5078)
Nasser took three steps that were intended to impress Arab public opinion rather than be a conscious prelude to war with Israel. The first step was to send a large number of troops into Sinai. The second was to ask for the removal of the UN Emergency Force from Sinai. The third and most fateful step, taken on 22 May, was to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. For Israel this constituted a casus belli. (Location 5086)
“In that case, you, or whoever gave you permission to mobilize so many reservists, made a mistake,” repeated Ben-Gurion. “You have led the state into a grave situation. We must not go to war. We are isolated. You bear the responsibility.” 31 The words struck Rabin like hammer blows and contributed to the breakdown he suffered on the evening of 23 May. The next day he stayed at home and received medical attention. Acute anxiety incapacitated him for twenty-four hours, after which he returned to full activity. (Location 5121)
President Lyndon Johnson. Johnson told Eban that it was the unanimous view of his military experts that there was no sign that the Egyptians were planning to attack Israel and that if they did attack, the Israelis would “whip the hell out of them.” Johnson promised to act with other maritime powers to open the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and he warned against the initiation of hostilities by Israel. He repeated several times, “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone.” (Location 5128)
June. Amit indicated that the Americans would welcome an independent Israeli strike to shatter Nasser. Yet, surprisingly, Amit suggested waiting a week in order to test whether Israel had a casus belli by sending a ship through the straits. Dayan, for whom this was the second day at his new post, pressed for immediate action and refused to wait a day or two. Yigal Allon, the minister of labor, agreed with him. They were the most fervent advocates of military action. The next day, Sunday, 4 June, the full cabinet met and took the decision to go to war. (Location 5155)
The Six-Day War (Location 5160)
The fighting on the eastern front was initiated by Jordan, not by Israel. King Hussein got carried along by the powerful current of Arab nationalism. On 30 May he flew to Cairo and signed a defense pact with Nasser. On 5 June, Jordan started shelling the Israeli side in Jerusalem. This could have been interpreted either as a salvo to uphold Jordanian honor or as a declaration of war. Eshkol decided to give King Hussein the benefit of the doubt. (Location 5206)
Nowhere was Moshe Dayan more erratic and unpredictable than in relation to Syria. Here too the government had no clearly defined war aims. The IDF was deployed in a defensive mode on the Syrian front, as it was on the Jordanian, when the war against Egypt was launched. Syria for its part, wanted to stay out of this war. True, its air force made a sortie and its artillery bombarded Israeli settlements along the front line on 5 June, but these were limited hostilities and they ceased after Israel’s devastating counterattack on Syria’s air force. There was no need for Israel to open a second or third front. David Elazar, OC Northern Command, exerted all the pressure he could for all-out war against Syria, but Dayan kept him on a very tight leash. (Location 5256)
Dayan’s next move completely astounded his colleagues. Early in the morning on 9 June, a few hours after Syria requested a cease-fire, Dayan called General Elazar directly, bypassing the chief of staff, and ordered him to go to war with Syria. It was up to the chief of staff to give operational orders, but on this occasion Rabin had “no desire to quibble when the Syrians were about to get their just deserts for malicious aggressiveness and arrogance.” 47 Eshkol did not receive the news with the same equanimity. He suspected that Dayan was trying to steal all the glory for himself and even considered canceling his order. “What a vile man,” he muttered in the presence of his aide-de-camp. (Location 5281)
Although Dayan got most of the glory for the victory over Syria, he himself later regarded the decision to go to war against Syria as a mistake. In his 1976 conversations with the journalist Rami Tal, Dayan confessed that on the fourth day of the June War he had failed in his duty as minister of defense by agreeing to the war with Syria. (Location 5305)
Postwar Diplomacy (Location 5338)
Victory in the Six-Day War marked the beginning of a new era in Israel’s history—an era of uncertainty. The victory reopened the old question about the territorial aims of Zionism. This question had been settled by the 1949 armistice agreements, and the armistice lines were reconfirmed in the aftermath of the Sinai Campaign. By 1967 it had become clear that the Zionist movement could realize all its essential aims within the 1949 borders. Now, following a war seen by the overwhelming majority of Israelis as a defensive war, as a war of no choice, they were in control of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank (see map 8). The question was what to do with these territories, and to this question there was no simple answer. (Location 5339)
But in another sense the annexation of East Jerusalem represented an abrupt reversal of the policy of the Zionist movement over the preceding three decades. From 1937 until 1967 the Zionist movement was resigned to the partition of Jerusalem, and in 1947 it even accepted the UN plan for the internationalization of the city. But from 1967 on there was broad bipartisan support for the policy that claimed the whole of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the State of Israel. (Location 5360)
If the consensus on complete withdrawal from Sinai and the Golan Heights was quickly eroded, on the West Bank there was no consensus at all. (Location 5409)
The person who was perhaps closest to the prime minister in his thinking was the chief of staff. On the one hand, Rabin thought that the river Jordan was the best line of defense to the east and that it would therefore be a mistake to restore the West Bank to Jordanian rule. On the other hand, he thought that the addition of a million Arabs would spell disaster for the State of Israel. He therefore favored a special status for the West Bank. (Location 5437)
Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but de facto acceptance of its existence as a state. (Location 5462)
The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel. At Khartoum, Nasser advised, and indeed urged, King Hussein to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement with Israel. Israel’s intelligence services obtained the verbatim text of the Khartoum deliberations and apprised the cabinet of the sea change they heralded in the Arab attitude. (Location 5479)
The resolution was a masterpiece of deliberate British ambiguity. It was this ambiguity that won for the resolution the support of the United States, the Soviet Union, Jordan, and Egypt but not of Syria. Israel had many successes on the long road that led to its adoption. It defeated a series of Arab and Soviet proposals that called for withdrawal without peace. Another success was to avoid the requirement of withdrawing from “the territories” or “all the territories” occupied in the recent war. The final wording was “withdrawal from territories,” and this gave Israel some room for maneuver. The cabinet decision of 19 June played a major part in enlisting American support for the Israeli position, but the Americans understood the UN resolution to mean Israeli withdrawal to the international border in Sinai and on the Golan Heights. (Location 5500)
Israel’s interpretation of Resolution 242 also differed from the Arab interpretation. Egypt and Jordan agreed to peace but insisted that the first step be complete Israeli withdrawal. Israel declared that before it would withdraw from any part of the territories, there must be direct negotiations leading to a contractual peace agreement that incorporated secure and recognized boundaries. (Location 5506)
Avi Raz, after careful scrutiny of the relevant evidence, rejects the notion that Eshkol was a dove who fell among hawks. (Location 5596)
Eshkol chose to go with the flow. Thus, willy-nilly, he ended up by presiding over the transformation of little Israel into a colonial empire three times its original size. (Location 5605)
7 IMMOBILISM 1969–1974 (Location 5612)
Golda the Intransigent (Location 5623)
Having been brought out of retirement, Golda ruled her party and her country with an iron rod for the next five years. (Location 5623)
Nowhere was Golda’s self-righteousness more conspicuous than in relation to the Arab world. (Location 5628)
On becoming prime minister, Golda Meir adopted the two principles that formed the bedrock of Israeli policy after 1967: no return to the prewar borders and no withdrawal without direct negotiations and peace treaties with the Arab states. (Location 5651)
When the Arab states resorted to force in order to dislodge Israel from their land, Israel responded with greater force. Under Meir’s leadership, Israel’s policy in the conflict consisted essentially of military activism and diplomatic immobility. “Intransigent” was not only her middle name. It was also the hallmark of Israel’s policy in the conflict with the Arab world during the five years of her premiership. (Location 5717)
The War of Attrition (Location 5720)
Failure to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories by diplomatic means led Gamal Abdel Nasser to coin the slogan “That which was taken by force can only be recovered by force.” (Location 5720)
The Rogers plan took Israel’s leaders by complete surprise. They saw it as evidence of U.S.–USSR collaboration in trying to impose a peace settlement on them. (Location 5756)
Having rejected the American peace proposals, Israel returned to wage the War of Attrition. (Location 5766)
The IDF was authorized to start implementing the new policy on 7 January 1970. The military objectives of this policy were, first, to reduce Egyptian military pressure in the forward canal area; second, to deter the Egyptians from planning a full-scale war; and third, to bring the War of Attrition to an end and compel Egypt to observe the cease-fire. The idea was to end the war in such a way as to enhance the deterrent power of the IDF. This goal could not be attained by a negotiated, mediated, or conditional cease-fire. It was thought to require a demonstration of the IDF’s capacity to compel the Egyptian army to follow a course of action prescribed for it. (Location 5779)
The conduct of the campaign was not accompanied by any sign of political flexibility. Israel’s leaders were simply bent on increasing the military pressure until they succeeded in eliciting from Nasser a public agreement to abide by an unlimited cease-fire. (Location 5796)
The War of Attrition, waged at great economic cost and with heavy casualties, was the longest war in Israel’s history. After it came to an end, Meir resorted to a diplomacy of attrition in defense of the status quo, and the eventual result was another full-scale Arab-Israeli war. (Location 5881)
A Reply to Dr. Jarring (Location 5900)
In September 1970 two events distracted attention from the crisis over the reactivation of Dr. Jarring’s mission: the civil war in Jordan and the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. (Location 5900)
An Interim Settlement (Location 5961)
The eclipse of the Jarring mission coincided with an initiative by the new Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat. Jarring’s aim was an overall peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Sadat’s aim was an interim settlement in the first instance. (Location 5961)
Dayan also thought that his proposal could have averted the Yom Kippur War, but he blamed Golda Meir for missing the opportunity. His main aim throughout was to reduce Egypt’s motivation to go to war. He believed that the danger of war would decline if Israel pulled back its forces and allowed Egypt to reopen the canal to international shipping and restore normal civilian life in the cities around it. (Location 6036)
The Americans regarded the Israeli position as the main stumbling block to an interim settlement. They even suspended the supply of Phantom planes to induce Israel to show some diplomatic flexibility. On 4 October 1971 William Rogers outlined American thinking on an interim settlement in an address to the UN General Assembly. He said that the reopening of the Suez Canal would be a step in the implementation of Resolution 242 and that negotiations for a comprehensive settlement should take place under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. He added that the two sides would have to find a solution to all the technical problems connected with operating the canal, including the presence of Egyptian personnel on the east bank, and he suggested “proximity talks” between them in New York. (Location 6047)
The Diplomacy of Attrition (Location 6100)
Israel’s principal aim in 1972–73 was to perpetuate the status quo. (Location 6101)
The strategy of attrition was accompanied, logically enough, by a diplomacy of attrition. If the strategy of attrition was directed at perpetuating the territorial status quo, the diplomacy of attrition was directed at perpetuating the political deadlock and at denying the Arabs any political gains until they accepted Israel’s terms for a settlement. Israel’s confidence in its ability to preserve the status quo came from two main sources: a favorable military balance and strong support from the United States. (Location 6107)
Golda Meir had never shown any interest in the Palestinian option. She regarded the Palestinians as the irreconcilable enemy of Israel. Her views about the Palestinians had been formed in the pre-Independence period and had hardly changed. In November 1947 she and King Abdullah had reached an agreement to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians, and that policy held until early June 1967. After June 1967 she remained unremittingly hostile toward Palestinian nationalism. (Location 6133)
King Hussein had his own reasons for cooperating with Israel in the security, administrative, judicial, and economic spheres. As far as he was concerned, however, there was never a Jordanian option in the political sphere. In Israel the much vaunted Jordanian option meant territorial compromise over the West Bank. This was unacceptable to him. Golda Meir favored the Allon Plan as the basis for a settlement, but the king rejected it again and again. She was also prepared to go along with Dayan’s plan for a functional solution, the essence of which was that Jordan would administer the West Bank while Israel would be in charge of security. This plan, too, was unacceptable to the king. 42 In March 1972 the king unveiled his own federal plan for a United Arab Kingdom. The federation was to consist of two regions: the region of Jordan, comprising the East Bank, and the region of Palestine, comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Each region was to have its own government and its separate judicial system. Amman was to be the capital of the federation and of the Jordanian region, and Jerusalem was to be the capital of the Palestinian region. By launching this plan, the king wanted to signal to the Arab world and the international community that he had no intention of abandoning his claim to the West Bank or to the representation of the Palestinians who lived there. The plan was rejected by the PLO, by Egypt, and by Israel. (Location 6165)
While preparing for war, Sadat made one last attempt to persuade America to put pressure on Israel to accept his terms for a political settlement. He sent his national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, on a secret mission to Washington. Henry Kissinger, who had replaced William Rogers as secretary of state, held a series of meetings with Ismail between the end of February 1973 and the end of May. Two conversations with King Hussein bracketed Kissinger’s first meeting with Ismail. On 1 March, Golda Meir had a meeting with President Nixon and followed it up with detailed discussions with Kissinger. Thus, in the early months of 1973, Kissinger was drawn, somewhat against his will, into the labyrinth of Middle Eastern diplomacy. (Location 6206)
51 If Golda Meir was the main advocate of political immobilism, Moshe Dayan was the main advocate of territorial expansionism. (Location 6244)
The Galili Document was incompatible with peace with Israel’s neighbors. Its supporters argued that there was no realistic possibility of peace with the Arabs in the foreseeable future anyway. Its critics later claimed that it gave Sadat and Hafez al-Assad the final push to go to war. The Syrian-Egyptian decision to go to war, of course, preceded the publication of the Galili Document. (Location 6265)
The Yom Kippur War (Location 6288)
At 2 P.M. on Saturday, 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a combined military attack on Israel. The war that the intelligence chiefs had described as a “low probability” erupted with spectacular suddenness. The day chosen for the attack was the Day of Atonement, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. It gave the war its portentous title: the Yom Kippur War. (Location 6288)
Failure to anticipate the Arab attack was caused not by the shortage of information but by the misreading of the available information. The Agranat Commission attributed the intelligence failure to what it called “the conception.” “The conception” rested on two assumptions: (a) Egypt would not go to war until it was able to stage deep air strikes into Israel, particularly against its major military airfields, in order to neutralize Israel’s air force; (b) Syria would not launch a full-scale war against Israel unless Egypt was in the struggle too. (Location 6297)
overconfidence in Israel’s power to deter an Arab attack. (Location 6305)
Arab aim in launching the war was to break the political deadlock and to provoke an international crisis that would force the superpowers to intervene and put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territories it had captured in June 1967. Egypt’s aim was to cross the Suez Canal in force and entrench itself on the east bank of the canal before the diplomatic negotiations began. Syria’s aim was to recapture parts of the Golan Heights and to destroy some of the Israeli forces there. Both Egypt and Syria had limited war aims. They had no illusion that they could defeat Israel or dislodge it from all the territories it had captured in 1967. Their aim was primarily political. They followed Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. (Location 6306)
Israel’s aim in the event of war was “to deny the enemy any military gain, to destroy his forces and military infrastructure, and to give Israel significant military advantages both in terms of the balance of forces and in terms of the cease-fire lines.” Achieving this aim was intended to strengthen Israel’s deterrent power, to prove again to the Arabs that they had no military option, and to give Israel strong cards in the negotiations to terminate the war. 58 None of these aims were fully achieved. (Location 6311)
Israel was taken by surprise, it had to mobilize the bulk of its reserves only after the fighting had started, and it suffered very serious setbacks in the initial phase of the fighting. Yet Israel managed to recover from the surprise, to regain its balance, and to launch a powerful counteroffensive. (Location 6324)
third reason that political negotiations became possible in the immediate aftermath of the war was U.S. engagement. (Location 6334)
Kissinger took charge of the practical negotiations, relegating the Soviet Union to the sidelines. (Location 6350)
Golda Meir’s premiership was marked by a stubborn refusal to reevaluate Israel’s relations with the Arab world. She personally had no understanding of the Arabs, no empathy with them, and no faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with them. This bolstered a simplistic view of the world in which Israel could do no wrong and the Arabs no right. More than most Israeli leaders, she exhibited the siege mentality, the notion that Israel had to barricade itself behind an iron wall, the fatalistic belief that Israel was doomed forever to live by the sword. Meir was a formidable war leader, but her own policy of immobilism was largely responsible for the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. In her five years as prime minister she made two monumental mistakes. First, she turned down Jarring’s suggestion that Israel should trade Sinai for peace with Egypt, the very terms on which the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was to be based eight years later. Second, she turned down Sadat’s proposal for an interim settlement, thus leaving him no option except to go to war in order to subvert an intolerable status quo. Few leaders talked more about peace and did less to give it a chance to develop. Meir never tired of repeating that she was prepared to go anywhere at any time to meet any Arab leader who wanted to talk about peace. Given her expansionist policies, these statements had a distinctly hollow ring. Even her own officials used to joke about Golda’s launderette being open twenty-four hours a day. With her departure from office, a singularly sterile phase in Israel’s relations with its neighbors came to an end. (Location 6379)