Azzam Pasha - Prewar Interview (11 October 1947)

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Corrected quotation

Azzam Pasha before the war — published 11 October 1947

“I personally wish that the Jews do not drive us to this war, as this will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Tartar massacre or the Crusader wars.

[…]

“This war will be distinguished by three serious matters. First—faith: as each fighter deems his death on behalf of Palestine as the shortest road to paradise; second, [the war] will be an opportunity for vast plunder.

[…]

“The Arab is superior to the Jew in that he accepts defeat with a smile: Should the Jews defeat us in the first battle, we will defeat them in the second or the third battle … or the final one … whereas one defeat will shatter the Jew’s morale!

[…]

“I foresee the consequences of this bloody war. I see before me its horrible battles. I can picture its dead, injured, and victims … But my conscience is clear … For we are not attacking but defending ourselves, and we are not aggressors but defenders against an aggression! …”

— Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, as reported by Mustafa Amin, Akhbar al-Yom, 11 October 1947, pp. 1, 9. Corrected excerpts from the passages supplied by Anthony, checked against Efraim Karsh’s published English translation in David Barnett and Efraim Karsh, Middle East Quarterly 18(4), Fall 2011, pp. 85–88. Not a continuous or complete quotation: […] marks passages omitted here; plain … follows the published translation, with spacing normalized. Translation and attribution · Arabic newspaper facsimile

The omitted third item, paraphrased: Azzam said volunteers arriving to avenge Palestinian Arab deaths would be difficult or impossible to restrain, and portrayed the struggle as a matter of Arab and Muslim honor. This belongs immediately after the plunder passage. Other omitted passages anticipate foreign volunteers, recount enthusiasm for desert warfare, and describe warnings to Jewish leaders. The supplied transcription joined separated passages; the callout now makes those cuts visible. Full published translation · Alternative translation

Corrections to the supplied transcription

English wording varies across translations: Karsh uses extermination and momentous massacre; the translation hosted by McKay uses elimination and dangerous massacre. These are translations of a published Arabic report, not authenticated original English speech. Karsh translation · McKay-hosted translation and source discussion

Source verification and date

1. Contemporary Arabic source: Mustafa Amin’s article in Akhbar al-Yom, 11 October 1947, pp. 1, 9, headed البلاد العربية تستعد للحرب (Arab countries prepare for war), includes a section headed حرب إبادة (war of extermination/annihilation). The two-page facsimile hosted by Brendan McKay was retrieved; page 9 was visually inspected, including the marked interview and printed date. Its red rectangles are modern markings identifying the interview. The English wording above was checked against the named published translation, not represented as a new certified translation. Facsimile · McKay’s account of obtaining the issue
2. Contemporary citation: the Jewish Agency’s memorandum A/AC.21/JA/12, submitted 2 February 1948, paragraph 6 and note 4, already quotes the massacre warning and cites Akhbar al-Yom, 11 October 1947. This independently establishes pre-May circulation of the attribution; it is Jewish Agency advocacy preserved by the UN, not a UN finding or a separate witness to the interview. Its opening drops Azzam’s stated wish to avoid war. Memorandum, PDF p. 2; note 4 in endnotes
3. Translation: Barnett and Karsh reproduce the report in English, explicitly crediting Karsh as translator. Their article’s label of a genocidal threat is an interpretation, separate from the newspaper’s wording. Article and PDF
4. Later provenance dispute: Tom Segev and McKay also identify the October 1947 issue while challenging the conventional use of the quotation as a May 1948 announcement of a genocidal invasion plan. Their disagreement with Barnett and Karsh concerns interpretation and source lineage, not the existence of the October report. Segev, 21 October 2011 · McKay

Correct chronological placement: the interview was published before the 29 November 1947 partition vote, before the ensuing civil-war phase, and before the May 1948 interstate invasion. Do not label these particular words a verified 15 May 1948 broadcast. The publication date is established; the precise date and exact spoken wording of the interview are not independently recoverable from an audio record inspected here. See partition and civil-war phase.

What this supports in an argument

A senior Arab official’s prewar rhetoric

Before Israel’s declaration of independence, the Arab League’s secretary-general was publicly reported anticipating mass killing and plunder, invoking religious motivation, and predicting eventual Arab victory while describing the fight as self-defense. This is evidence that violent opposition to the projected Jewish state and an expectation of catastrophic war existed at a high political level before May 1948. It helps explain why Jewish leaders could perceive an existential threat. That last connection is a historical inference; the interview alone does not measure anyone’s subjective fear.

Keep the actor, date, and inference precise

Cite Azzam’s reported rhetoric in October 1947, not what all Arabs thought. The interview is not representative polling, a unanimous Arab League resolution, a command to an army, or proof of a single operational plan shared by every Arab government or Palestinian. Preserve his opening wish to avoid war and his closing claim of defense. They show his justification; they do not erase his prediction of massacre and plunder or establish that the anticipated violence was lawful. The quotation also cannot by itself settle responsibility for each later expulsion, attack, or civilian death.

Interpretation and limiting evidence

Threat reading: Barnett and Karsh read the combination of extermination, anticipated plunder, and confidence in eventual victory as a genocidal threat. Warning/defeat reading: McKay reads the passage as a conditional warning about violent volunteers and the defeat of an imposed Jewish state, stressing that Azzam did not command the Arab states’ armies. Segev emphasizes the missing opening clause and reports a later Azzam statement offering Jews citizenship in an Arab Palestine. These views agree that the October rhetoric was belligerent; they differ over whether it establishes a specific extermination program. Barnett and Karsh · McKay · Segev

Segev identifies the later citizenship statement in the Palestine Post, 21 May 1948, while McKay dates the reported Amman press statement to 20 May and cites the next day’s newspaper. That newspaper page was not independently inspected here, so treat this as secondary-reported limiting evidence, not a newly authenticated quotation. A later citizenship offer does not cancel the October report, and the October report alone does not prove that every leader intended physical extermination.

Connections in the vault

• Argument context — distinguish a reported threat from a documented attack.
• Debate formulation and best objection.
• Dated history entry — separate October from the November vote and the May invasion.
• Nakba — prewar threat context alongside the separate record of Palestinian displacement.
• Peace Offers — acceptance, rejection, and the terms of proposed settlements.