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From the notebook

1949-1967

Chronology

[line-3, body-2, active-color-interactive-accent]
date: 1949
title: Armistice Agreements
content: Arab negotiators demanded territory for vague promises of non-belligerency — Egypt the Negev, Syria half the Sea of Galilee. Azzam Pasha to Abba Eban: "As long as we don't make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over." Jordan's Abdullah was the lone exception, and was murdered in 1951.
 
[[1949-1967#1949: Armistice Agreements|→ full entry]]
date: 1950s
title: Palestinian fedayeen
content: Guerrilla groups drawing on Vietnam, China, Algeria and Latin America, mainly left-wing nationalist, socialist or communist, whose proclaimed purpose was to defeat Zionism and establish Palestine as a "secular, democratic, nonsectarian state."
 
[[1949-1967#1950s: Palestinian Fedayeen|→ full entry]]
date: 1952
title: Cross-border raids and reprisals
content: Ben-Gurion ordered retaliation against Egypt and Jordan, drawing international rebuke. "Unless it's clear that there's a price to pay for Jewish lives, we will not be able to survive."
 
[[1949-1967#1952: Cross boarder raids|→ full entry]]
date: 1954 – 1955
title: Lavon Affair and the slide to war
content: Israeli saboteurs planted bombs in Egypt; two were executed and two jailed. Egypt trained Gazans for intelligence and sabotage, then turned to the Soviet Union for arms. Britain and France, wanting the Suez Canal back, became Israel's allies.
 
[[1949-1967#1954-1955 Egyptian-Israel Issues & Heat up to War|→ full entry]]
date: 1955 Feb 28
title: Operation Black Arrow
content: Israeli raid into Gaza. Morris traces a direct line from the Cairo hangings to this raid, and from the raid to both the Egyptian fedayeen campaigns and the Egyptian–Soviet arms deal.
 
[[1949-1967#1955 February 28: Operation Black Arrow (Israel military operation into Gaza)|→ full entry]]
date: 1956 Oct 29 – Nov 7
title: Sinai War / Suez Crisis
content: Nasser nationalised the canal, closed it and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel invaded the Sinai on 29 October under the Protocol of Sèvres with Britain and France. Israel 172 dead; Egypt 1,500–3,500. US pressure forced withdrawal by March 1957.
 
[[1949-1967#1956.10.29-1956.11.07 - The Second Arab-Israeli War, or the Suez Crisis|→ full entry]]
date: 1950s – 1960s
title: Israeli relations with the West
content: The United States was largely unsympathetic toward Israel until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; in 1956 Washington forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai.
 
[[1949-1967#1950s-1960s: Israeli Relations|→ full entry]]
date: 1963 – 1969
title: Eshkol government
content: Egypt, Jordan and Syria formed a unified military command in 1964. Israel completed the National Water Carrier and the Arabs attempted to divert the Jordan headwaters. De Gaulle cut off French arms in 1966 and the US replaced the flow.
 
[[1949-1967#1963-1969 - Eshkol|→ full entry]]
date: 1964
title: Palestine Liberation Organization founded
content: The PLO is established, modelled on Algeria's FLN.
 
[[1949-1967#1964: Establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization|→ full entry]]
date: 1967 Jun 5 – 10
title: Six Day War
content: After false Soviet reports of an Israeli build-up, Nasser massed troops in the Sinai, expelled UNEF and closed the Straits of Tiran, declaring "our basic objective will be to destroy Israel." Israel's preemptive strike destroyed the Egyptian air force; in six days it took the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
 
[[1949-1967#1967 June: Six Day War|→ full entry]]
date: 1967 Jul – Oct
title: Clashes along the Suez Canal
content: Artillery exchanges, air duels and naval actions. On 21 October Egyptian missile boats sank the destroyer INS *Eilat*, killing 47 sailors.
 
[[1949-1967#1967|→ full entry]]
date: 1967 Aug
title: Khartoum Resolution
content: The Arab League summit produces the "Three No's" — no peace with Israel, no recognition, no negotiations. The final note asserted Palestinian rights to the whole of Palestine.
 
[[1949-1967#1967 August: Arab League Summit (Khartoum Resolution)|→ full entry]]
date: 1967
title: Allon Plan
content: Israeli proposal for the disposition of the territories captured in June.
 
[[1949-1967#1967: Allon Plan|→ full entry]]
date: 1967 – 1970
title: War of Attrition
content: Ongoing border conflict with Egypt, Jordan and the PLO, with no territorial changes. The PLO deployed suicide bombers for the first time in 1968, and the Battle of Karameh followed.
 
[[1949-1967#^m7s32m|→ full entry]]

1949: Armistice Agreements

1949 Armistice Agreements

The war of return - Adi Schwartz, Einat Wilf (Annotated), p.47 (file not included in this release)

Arab negotiators at the time demanded to relieve Israel of its territorial assets—Egypt, for example, demanded that Israel relinquish the Negev (more than half of its territory), and Syria demanded Israel cede half of the Sea of Galilee, the lake that was Israel’s primary source of water. All of this was in exchange for extremely vague promises of non-belligerency—promises that often disappeared as quickly as they came.

The war of return - Adi Schwartz, Einat Wilf (Annotated), p.47 (file not included in this release)

Official Arab envoys were candid on this matter. “Why do we need peace now?” Egyptian diplomat Abdul Monem Mustafa wondered aloud to an Israeli diplomat in spring 1949. “Peace would only allow you to grow economically and entrench yourselves.” This belief—that the Arab world would derive no benefit from an agreement with Israel—was also expressed by Azzam Pasha to Abba Eban:
“We have a secret weapon which we can use better than guns, and this is time. As long as we don’t make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over [our emphasis] and as long as the war is not over, there is neither victor nor vanquished. As soon as we recognize the existence of Israel, we shall have admitted by this very act that we are vanquished.”

The war of return - Adi Schwartz, Einat Wilf (Annotated), p.48 (file not included in this release)

A Baghdad radio broadcast in June 1949 said, “The Arabs will never cease to regard Israel as a hostile country.The Jews are our enemies irrespective of the degree of appeasement they may display toward us and of how peace-seeking their intentions may be [our emphasis] . We do not pause for a single moment in our preparations for the day of vengeance.”29 The outlier among Arab states in its attitude to Israel was Jordan, whose King Abdullah had been the exception in his consistently conciliatory stance ever since the 1920s. Even before the war, Abdullah offered the Yishuv leaders Jewish autonomy or even limited independence under his control, wanting to rule the entire region, including Syria and Lebanon. After the war, Abdullah was the only Arab ruler to want reconciliation with Israel, even holding several rounds of negotiations to this end. These talks, however, failed to ripen, and Abdullah was murdered in East Jerusalem by a Palestinian assassin in 1951, in part because of his relatively conciliatory approach to Israel.

1952: Cross boarder raids

  • Ben-Gurion ordered retaliation towards Egypt & Jordan
    - Villages across boards that help
    - Jordan village attack, International rebuke for that attack
    - “It doesn’t matter what the world says. It doesn’t matter what they say about Israel anywhere else. The only thing that matters that we can exist here. Unless its clear that there’s a price to pay for Jewish lives, we will not be able to survive. And that’s what counts.” -David Ben-Gurion
  • Palestinian Fedayeen insurgency - Wikipedia
  • 1952 raid on Beit Jala - Wikipedia

1954-1955 Egyptian-Israel Issues & Heat up to War

  • Jewish saboteurs in Egypt, planting bombs but nobody was killed
  • Egypt trained Gazans
    • Paid $4 a month
    • Sent to Israel to gather intelligence and sabotage
  • Egypt turned to Soviet Union for help
  • Moshe Dayan wanted to attack Egypt first before Egypt got their new weapons from the Soviet Union
  • Britain and France wanted the Suez Canal back and became allies to Israel
    • Were planning to take it back
    • Wanted to see if Israel joined them
    • Ben-Gurion agreed to help

1955 February 28: Operation Black Arrow (Israel military operation into Gaza)

Operation Black Arrow - Wikipedia

1949-1967 > 1955 February 28: Operation Black Arrow (Israel military operation into Gaza)

Operation Black Arrow - Wikipedia

This is how Benny Morris describes the early 1955 period:

By February 1955 the situation was ripe for a massive explosion. In Cairo there was deep suspicion (monitored by IDF Intelligence Branch) of Israel’s aggressive intentions; and in Jerusalem there were both real and feigned suspicions and antipathy toward the Egyptian dictator. The Cairo death sentences, aggravated by what was seen as Nasser’s duplicity, and Ben-Gurion’s return to the Defense Ministry, signifying a weakening of Sharett’s moderate approach, were the two important precipitants of what was about to happen. But the immediate trigger, as usual, was provided by the Arab side: In the last week of February a team of Egyptian intelligence scouts penetrated deep into Israel, reconnoitered a number of sensitive defense facilities, and on February 25 gratuitously shot and killed an Israeli cyclist on a road near Rehovot.
Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001 (New
York: 2001), pp. 399

Here is the full section:

Before March 1955 Egypt generally sought tranquillity along its borders with Israel, the more freely to pursue its goals of banishing the British, gaining ascendancy in the Arab world, and developing its political, economic, and social structures. It was ‘far less concerned over the Palestine question’ than any of the other Arab states, reported the American ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, at the end of 1954.
In his programmatic—philosophical work, The Philosophy of the Revolution, written, apparently, in late 1953, Nasser carefully avoided calling for Israel’s destruction and did not set it as a goal of Egyptian policy. He spoke only vaguely of the ‘common [Arab] struggle’ and described Israel as a ‘fruit of imperialism’ and Palestine as ‘a home stolen illegally from its owners’. But Israel’s—and especially, Ben-Gurion’s—attitude towards Egypt soured in the course of 1954 and January 1955. A major factor was the increasing violence, occasionally by Egyptian army-directed squads, along the Gaza frontier. Continuing Egyptian political and propaganda warfare against Israel also played a role. And so, somewhat paradoxically, did the Bat-Galim and Lavon affairs. But perhaps the single clinching, traumatic event that soured attitudes towards Cairo among Israeli policy- makers was the hanging of the two Jewish saboteurs in Cairo in January 1955. The hangings led almost directly to the IDF raid on Gaza in February 1955, which, in turn, led directly to both the Egyptian Fedayeen campaigns and the Egyptian Soviet arms deal.
Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Oxford: 1993), pp. 272–3

1956: Sinai War

Suez Crisis

On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces moved across the border, defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, captured Sharm al-Sheikh and thereby guaranteed Israeli strategic control over the Straits of Tiran. Britain and France issued their ultimatum and landed troops, effectively carrying out the agreed upon operation.

  • For 10 years there was peace along the Egyptian and Israeli border, under the UN flag.

1950s-1960s: Israeli Relations

  • The United States, at least until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s, was largely unsympathetic toward Israel. In 1956, Washington even forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula it had just conquered in a war provoked by Egypt. Following the Six-Day War, the leading European states oscillated between support for Israel and criticism of its policies, especially vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the occupied territories. Benny Morris

1950s: Palestinian Fedayeen

1956.10.29-1956.11.07 - The Second Arab-Israeli War, or the Suez Crisis

1949-1967 > 1956.10.29-1956.11.07 - The Second Arab-Israeli War, or the Suez Crisis

  • Lead-up
    • Suez Canal Company formed in 1858 by French Ferdinand de Lesseps to build the Suez Canal from 1859 to 1869, opening on 1869 to allow trade.
    • Baghdad Pact in 1955, created compromising Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the United Kingdom
    • Tripartite Declaration was a way for the US, France and the UK to limit the amount of arms sales in the Middle East, hopefully preventing an arms race.
    • Egypt was responsible for establishing multiple Palestinian fedayeen camps inside Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon.
    • Israel was willing to work with Egypt in direct negotiations in 1956, regardless of Egypt’s aggressive demand to resettle Palestinian refugees and the annexation of the southern half of Israel.
    • Nasser (leader of Egypt) built reputation of extreme anti-Zionism in attempt to unify and be the leader of the Arab states.
  • On July 26th, 1956, Nasser nationalized and purchased all assets of the Suez Canal Company, closed the canal to Israeli shipping, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba.
    • Contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and most likely a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.
  • Different countries had different positions on what to do
    • Eden from Great Britain wanted war, though opposition parties cautioned that doing so without UN approval would not be supported.
    • Guy Mollet from France and the rest of the nation was eager for military action.
    • Eiseinhower from DC did not really care.
    • Canada didn’t care.
    • Australia kind of cared.
    • New Zealand cared.
  • Initial proposal would have allowed Egyptian “sovereignty” to be recognized while maintaining an international operation of the Canal. Nasser rejected.
  • British and French hungry for military intervention to solve potential Canal problems, despite Eisenhower’s disapproval.
  • Israel was interested in partaking in military conflicts.
    • Israel’s interest in war was weakening a hostile state. Egypt-held Gaza Strip (+ surrounding countries, via Egyptian supported Palestinian Fedayeen) was responsible for attacks injuring approximately 1,300 civilians.
    • Israel was also scared about Egypt’s large procurement of weapons, and feared they’d forged a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.
    • Ben-Gurion’s “grand plan” involved Israel taking territory north into Lebanon, having the West Bank run as a semi-autonomous state attached to Israel, and having Iraq claim everything on the East Bank because Israel believe Jordan to be an unstable state. They also encouraged the taking of the Sinai Penisula.
  • The Protocol of Sèvres was agreed to by Israel, France and the UK.
    • On October 29th, Israel would invade the Sinai.
    • On October 30th, Anglo-French ultimatum to demand both sides withdraw from canal zone.
    • On October 31st, Britain and France would begin Revise.
  • The Kafr Qasim massacre
    • Took place in Israeli Arab village of Kafr Qasim during the war, where Israel Border Police illegally killed Arab civilians returning from work during a curfew they were unaware of. 48 people died.
    • The border policemen who were involved in the shooting were trialed and jailed for 7-17 years.
    • All sentences were later reduced, with some of the convicted receiving presidential pardons.
    • Every convicted person was eventually released by November 1959.
  • Total casualties
    • British 22 dead, 96 wounded
    • French 10 dead, 33 wounded
    • Israel 172 dead, 817 wounded
    • Egypt 1,500-3,500 dead, 4,900 wounded, with 1,000 Egyptian civilians estimated dead
  • International Reaction
    • Eisenhower was very upset with Israel/Britain/France, because the US could not reasonably oppose Soviet actions in Hungary while remaining silent on European plans to seize territory from Egypt.
    • 300,000 protestors in Pakistan chanting anti-British slogans.
    • Syrian government blew up the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline to punish Iraq and Britain.
    • Saudi Arabia imposed a total oil embargo on Britain and France.
    • US calls for security council and UN meetings/resolutions
      • Resolution 997, a call for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was currently blocked. Passes with a vote of 64-5
    • West Germany was furious with the US and supported France and Britain.
    • Israel originally wanted to maintain indefinite control over the Sinai, but was eventually forced out due to international pressure lead heavily by Eisenhower.
  • November 6th, 1956 British announced a ceasefire.
  • Anglo-French Task Force was fully withdrawn by December 22nd, 1956.
  • Israeli forces were fully withdrawn from the Sinai and Gaza in March of 1957 after destroying and stealing Egyptian infrastructure and villages on the way out.
  • Eisenhower asked Congress for authorization to use military force and set aside $200 million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the US.
  • The Soviet Union was given all the credit due to nuclear sabre rattling from Nasser, though it was almost assuredly US diplomatic and financial pressure that brought the conflict to a swift end.
  • Jews had their civil liberties infringed upon in Egypt following the war, resulting in some 25,000 (almost half) of the Jewish population leaving Egypt.
  • Final summary
    • In 1956 Egyptian leader Nasser, driven by his desire to be neither a puppet to the US nor USSR, nationalized the Suez canal (in defiance of the Constantinople Convention of 1888) while simultaneously acquiring large amounts of weapons from the USSR. Worried that trade would be interrupted, Britain and France approached Israel, who was worried that the anti-Zionist Egypt was amassing a massive military, to devise a covert plan, the Protocol of Sèvres, in order to stage an Israeli military invasion that would be disrupted by Anglo-Franco forces, which would then give way to an international ownership of the Suez Canal. Despite military success by all three parties, intense international pressure, especially from the United States, pressure from revolting colonies, and intense domestic pressure at home, combined with nuclear sabre-rattling from the USSR, forced the Anglo-Franco forces to immediately withdraw, suffering an international humiliation. Israel would withdraw its forces sometime later, having re-established trade through the Straights of Tiran. Egypt, and namely, Nasser, would emerge feeling as though they had single-handedly defied European imperialistic aims, and saw itself as an emerging unaligned leader of the Arab World.

1963-1969 - Eshkol

In 1964, Egypt, Jordan and Syria developed a unified military command.
Israel completed work on a national water carrier, Arabs responded by attempting to divert the headwaters of the Jordan, leading to growing conflict between Israel and Syria
Until 1966, Israel’s weapons came from France, though Charles de Gaulle ceased supplying Israel with arms post Algerian withdrawal. The US stepped in to replace the flow of weapons.
The Samu incident

1964: Establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization

Palestine Liberation Organization
Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations - Palestine National Charter of 1964

1967 June: Six Day War

  • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_118

  • Nassar objective to destroy Israel

    Views of Arab leadership

    On 26 May Nasser declared, “The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.”16(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waiting_period_(Six-Day_War)#cite_note-Mutawi2002p95-16) At the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications: “Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we are ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation.”17(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waiting_period_(Six-Day_War)#cite_note-17)

  • How the Soviet Union provoked the war

    • MERIA: The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War
    • May 1967: Leaders of Soviet Union gave a false report by Soviet Intelligence ^ud0l0v
      • Sadat was in Moscow for talks with Prime Minster
      • Egypt was in Soviet camp
      • Minister took Sadat aside and told him Israel troops are amassing along Egyptian border
      • Nasser was hero of Arab world and expected to act
      • Nasser’s chief of staff went to border and saw nothing
      • Soviet ambassador said Soviet intelligence re-confirmed Israeli amassing troops and its very serious
      • Soviet ambassador meets with Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, angry about troops
        • Eshkol said they could go to the border right now to prove it wrong
        • Soviet ambassador said no
      • Soviet Union thought the US was losing the Vietnam war and wanted to weaken US interests in the Middle East
        • Wanted to start a localized war for their own benefit

  • Pre-War ^nn8i0o

    • Nasser put troops on high alert and moved troops into the Sinai
      • Didnt want war but needed to look strong in the eyes of the Arab war
      • Egyptian Prime Minister wanted to attack immediately
    • Nasser ordered UN out
      • Egyptians would have to replace the troops and close the Straits of Tiran
      • That would mean war
    • Nasser due to Arab solidarity, went on the offensive and said so publicly
    • Nasser refused ships to pass through Straits of Tiran
    • Israeli’s civilians prepared to defend themselves at home
    • After Straits of Tiran was closed, Israel knew it was war
    • Yitzhak Rabin wanted to avoid war
    • President Johnson didn’t want Israel to attack first
      • Skeptical that Israel was in danger
      • Defense Department stated Israel would take 7 days to win if they preempted Egypt, twice longer if Egypt starts first
      • If you go alone, you stand alone -US position if Israel preempts Egypt’s invasion
    • Egyptian meeting in Moscow
      • Soviet warned not to be seen as aggressors
      • A first strike will escalate and bring in the US
      • Soviet wouldn’t give arms at the moment, only support them if they weren’t aggressors
    • Egyptians knew first strike by Israel would be devastating.
    • War fever in Cairo and drove Nasser and other Arab rulers
      • Including Jordan’s King Hussein
      • Nasser didn’t discourage the public wanting war
      • King Hussein signed a mutual defense treaty with Nasser and army under Nasser’s command
      • “We were on the verge of war.” -King Hussein
    • Israel faced prospect for war on 3 fronts
      • Jordan
      • Syria
      • Egypt
    • Fear in Israel’s government that if they invaded they’d kill them all
    • Israel’s military was mobilized for two weeks so far
    • Factories closed and vehicles requisitioned
    • Israeli’s general insisting on preemptive strike
    • Moshe Dayan appointed Minister of Defense
    • Envoy sent to Washington for second time
      • Will they open Straits of Tiran or will Israel go alone?
        • No American plans of action
      • Due to Vietnam, US didn’t want to act alone
      • Due to Eisenhower promise about Straits of Tiran in 1956, US wouldn’t resist Israel if they acted alone, but wouldn’t help
    • The weeks leading up to the 1967 war were, in the Arab world, likewise a time of public displays of ecstasy. The hour of “revenge” was nigh, and the excitement was expressed in both mass public spectacles and elite opinion. The Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser promised an elated crowd the week before the war broke out that “our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.” Contemporary descriptions of the “carnival-like” atmosphere in Cairo in May 1967 relate that the city was “festooned with lurid posters showing Arab soldiers shooting, crushing, strangling, and dismembering bearded, hook-nosed Jews.” Ahmed Shuqeiri, then the leader of the PLO, promised that only a few Jews would survive the upcoming war. Link

  • War

    • 180 aircraft took off to Egypt
    • Destroyed runways first
    • Egypt’s air force was destroyed
    • Egypt couldn’t implement their counter attack plan due to no planes
    • Egypt had three times the tanks compared to Israel in the Sinai, but with no air cover it was no match
    • Egypt retreats and Israel gives chase
    • Thousands of Egyptian tanks destroyed
    • 15,000 Egyptians dead, 370 Israeli dead
    • Jerusalem, West Bank
      • Didn’t plan to take it
      • Sent message to King of Jordan, if they stayed out nothing would happen
      • King Hussein started shelling Jerusalem that same night
      • Decision to take on Jordan, authorized to enter Old City
      • Took Israeli 10 hours of bitter street fighting to take the Old City
      • Jordan had lost all of West Bank at the end
    • Golem Heights
      • Moshe Dayan said he was going to take it
      • Religious leader opposed
      • Dayan was adamant
      • Dropped more bombs than Egyptian air fields
      • Soviets were forced to react
        • Made clear to US they would intervene and join Syria to invade Israel, weren’t bluffing
        • Bombers were sent, with different paint and pilots with no identifying materials
        • President Johnson worked on response, sent message to Kremlin saying he’s trying stop Israel, wasn’t really true.
      • Israel’s pressed on and encountered no Soviet forces because Johnson raised the stakes
        • Move the American navy fleet from 100 miles to 50 miles
        • Soviet secret invasion didn’t happen
      • Israel achieved their objective
    • 6 days
      • Quadrupled the area they controlled
        • Golan Heights
        • West Bank
        • Sinai
      • Best chance for peace with the area they controlled
    • Israeli’s flocked to the Old City
    • Of course, the promise of revenge was not realized, and the expectant longing was not satisfied. The Arabs were quickly routed, and almost all of the Jews survived. Then, however, despite the eagerness to fight, the incitement to war, and the euphoria at the prospect, this defeat was reconceived not simply as a story of loss but once again into a story of victimhood. The pre-war fantasies were forgotten; like everything else about the 1967 war, this process happened very quickly. In the Khartoum Resolution rejecting any accommodation with Israel that was agreed on by the Arab League less than three months later, the war is referred to unironically as the Israeli “aggression of June 5.” Link

References

Six Day War (1967) | The 50 Years War: Israel and the Arabs (2 of 6) - YouTube
Israel_deceived_teh_world_in_1967.pdf (file not included in this release)
Heikal_Papers.pdf (file not included in this release)

1967 War Unjustified

  • Threat of closing Straits of Tiran and build up of troops overstated
  • Plausible attempts at diplomacy (Finklestein argument)
    • Nassar said he was building up troops
    • Nassar knew closing Strait meant war

Soviet Union involvement

The Soviet Union played a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as detailed in the documents I have access to. Here are some key aspects of the Soviet Union’s involvement:

  1. Support for Arab States: The Soviet Union provided significant support to Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, during various periods of the conflict. This support included arms supplies and military advisors.
  2. Influence in Regional Politics: The Soviet Union’s involvement in the Middle East was part of its broader Cold War strategy against the United States. It sought to extend its influence in the region by supporting and arming radical Arab regimes that were hostile to Israel.
  3. Impact on Peace Negotiations: The Soviet Union’s role in the region affected peace negotiations and the dynamics of the conflict. For instance, its support for Arab states influenced their strategies and positions in negotiations with Israel.
  4. Role in the Collapse of the Soviet Union: The collapse of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the conflict. It led to a shift in the balance of power in the region and affected the strategies of various actors, including the Arab states that had previously relied on Soviet support.
  5. Influence on Israeli Policy: The Soviet Union’s actions and policies influenced Israeli decision-making and strategies, particularly in the context of the Cold War and the perceived threat from Soviet-backed Arab states.
  6. Involvement in International Conferences: The Soviet Union was involved in various international conferences and initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict. Its position and actions in these forums were influenced by its broader geopolitical objectives and rivalry with the United States.

Overall, the Soviet Union’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict was characterized by its support for Arab states, its rivalry with the United States, and its influence on the regional dynamics and peace negotiations.

Six-Day_War.pdf (file not included in this release)

  • Background and Participants:
    • The Six-Day War, also known as the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, was fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, primarily Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, from June 5 to 10, 1967
    • The war erupted due to escalating hostilities and poor relations post-1949 Armistice Agreements. Tensions over the Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt to Israeli shipping, were a significant precursor
  • Key Events Leading up to the War:
    • In May 1967, Egypt’s President Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, mobilized troops along the Israel border, and expelled UNEF forces from the region, escalating tensions
    • A defense pact between Jordan and Egypt was signed on May 30. Israel formed a National Unity Government and decided to go to war
  • Israeli Military Strategy:
    • Israel’s initial strategy was a series of preemptive airstrikes, called Operation Focus, against Egyptian airfields, which caught Egyptian forces by surprise and destroyed nearly all of Egypt’s military aerial assets, giving Israel air supremacy
    • Israel’s ground offensive targeted Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli army, including reservists, totaled approximately 264,000 but could not be sustained in a long conflict
  • Arab Military Forces and Armaments:
    • Egypt had approximately 100,000 troops in Sinai with tanks, APCs, and artillery. Syria’s military strength was about 75,000, but it was less prepared for war
    • The Jordanian Armed Forces included 55,000 troops, modern tanks, and artillery, and were relatively well-equipped
    • Arab forces primarily used Soviet weaponry, with Jordan equipped with American weaponry and British aircraft
  • Israeli Armaments and Training:
    • Israeli weapons were mainly of Western origin, with their air force composed primarily of French aircraft and armoured units of British and American design
    • Israeli pilots and ground crews were extensively trained in rapid refitting of aircraft, allowing for multiple sorties per day
  • War’s Progression and Key Battles:
    • Following Israel’s surprise attack, Egyptian President Nasser ordered an evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel occupied by the sixth day
    • Jordan, misled by Egypt’s false claims of success, attacked Israel but faced significant losses after Israeli airstrikes targeted Jordanian airbases
    • Intense fighting occurred in Jerusalem, with Israeli forces using tank artillery and mortar fire to soften Jordanian positions and eventually encircling the city
  • Conclusion and Aftermath:
    • The war concluded with a ceasefire between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Israel seized territories including the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula
    • Israel’s capture of these territories led to significant displacement of civilians and had long-term consequences, including the Palestinian and Syrian refugee crises
    • The war’s outcome affected international politics, leading to the closure of the Suez Canal until 1975 and contributing to the 1970s energy crisis
  • Casualties and Losses:
    • The conflict resulted in over 20,000 Arab and fewer than 1,000 Israeli fatalities. Civilian casualties included deaths due to airstrikes and incidents like the USS Liberty attack
  • Concerns Over Jerusalem’s Holy Sites:
    • Israel’s Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was cautious about entering Jerusalem’s Old City due to concerns over international backlash and the sanctity of holy sites

Nassar Quotes before Six Day War

  1. On Arab Unity Against Israel: Nasser frequently spoke about the unity of Arab nations against Israel. In a speech in May 1967, he said, “The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel…to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan, and the whole Arab nation.”
  2. Regarding the Straits of Tiran: Nasser’s decision to block the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping was a key factor leading to the war. He declared, “The Gulf of Aqaba constitutes Egyptian territorial waters” and asserted Egypt’s right to bar Israeli ships, saying, “Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba.”
  3. On Arab Unity and Strength: Nasser often spoke about the unity and strength of the Arab nations as a counterforce to Israel. He emphasized the need for Arab solidarity and preparedness for any potential conflict.
  4. Regarding Israel: Nasser’s statements often reflected a strong opposition to the existence of Israel. His rhetoric was marked by a determination to confront Israel, which he viewed as an illegitimate state.
  5. On the Eviction of UN Peacekeeping Forces: Prior to the war, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. This move was seen as a significant escalation towards conflict.
  6. Blockade of the Straits of Tiran: Nasser’s decision to blockade the Straits of Tiran, which prevented Israeli access to the Red Sea, was a critical moment. He made clear statements about this blockade being a sovereign right of Egypt, despite its provocative nature.
  7. Speeches on Arab Nationalism and Socialism: Nasser was a proponent of Arab nationalism and socialism. His speeches from this time often reflected these ideologies, focusing on the need for Arab nations to resist Western imperialism and Zionism.
  8. Statements on the Potential for War: Nasser’s speeches and statements in the lead-up to the Six-Day War often hinted at the inevitability of military conflict with Israel, reflecting a sense of confidence in the military capabilities of Egypt and its allies.
  • Summary
    • May 1967, Nasser mobilizes Egyptian military into defensive lines along the Israeli border and closes the shipping lanes through the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels, despite Israel warning this would be a casus belli. Nasser also orders the removal of all UNEF personnel.
    • Israel would capture the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.
      • Israel gave back the Sinai to Egypt.
    • Military: 20,000 Arab deaths vs 1,000 Israeli deaths Civilian: 20 Israeli Civilians killed in Arab forces air strikes on Jerusalem, 15 UN peacekeepers killed by Israeli strikes in the Sinai, and 34 US personnel killed in the USS Liberty incident.
  • Background
    • Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, Syria and Egypt signed a mutual defense agreement.
    • PLO activity and attacks against Israel from Arab countries continued.
    • In May, 1967, Nasser received bogus intel from the USSR that Israel was massing on the Syrian border, so he gathered troops in the Sinai Peninsula, ejected UNEF personnel, and once again denied passage of Israeli vessels through the Straits of Tiran.
    • On the 30th of May, Jordan an Egypt signed a defense pact. Iraq and Egypt began deploying troops and armored units in Jordan.
    • The United States did not believe at the time that Egypt was preparing for an offensive war against Israel, as per the Watch Committee.
    • Nasser’s speech towards the Arab Trade Unionists in May 26th, 1967, claimed “The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.”
      • Statements made by Nasser leading up to the war
        • “The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not of more declarations.” Gamal Abdel Nasser May 30th 1967
        • Nasser May 26 “The Arab people wants to fight. We have been waiting for the right time when we will be completely ready. Recently we have felt that our strength has been sufficient and that if we make battle with Israel we shall be able, with the help of God, to conquer Sharm el-Sheikh implies a confrontation with Israel. Taking this step makes it imperative that we be ready to undertake a total war with Israel.”
  • Involved Forces
    • Egypt amassing 100,000 troops in the Sinai.
    • Syria deploying 75,000 along their border with Israel.
    • Jordanian Armed Forces totaled 55,000 troops.
    • 100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division readied near the Jordanian border, along with two squadrons of Iraqi fighter-aircraft.
    • Saudi Arabia mobilized a few forces for deployment to the Jordanian front.
    • Arab air forces were also reinforced by aircraft from Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to make up for the first day losses of the war. Volunteer pilots also came from the Pakistan Air Force.
  • Noteworthy Battle Things
    • Surprise attack on Egyptian airfield guaranteed all but certain victory in the Sinai for Israel.
    • IDF originally was to avoid Gaza strip/city, but attacks from that area forced the IDF to take over that territory.
    • Jordanian Army was instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel itself.
    • Eshkol promised Israel would not initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of the way, but King Hussein refused.
    • Jordanian shelling of Jerusalem resulted in 20 dead and 1,000 wounded civilians.
    • Dayan ordered troops not to capture the Old City due to potential international backlash plus potential outrage of being forced to give back holy sites after capturing them. After hearing about the impending UN ceasefire, he changed his mind and captured it.
    • “Fearful that Israeli soldiers would exact retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city’s Jewish community, Hebron’s residents flew white sheets from their windows and rooftops.""
    • Syria entered the war on the assumption that Israel was losing dramatically to Egyptian forces. Nasser exaggerated/lied about Egyptian victory.
    • Dayan, after hearing of the Syrian acceptance of a cease-fire, clears an invasion/occupation on his own into the Golan Heights.
  • Conclusion
    • Israel seizes the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt), the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem (from Jordan), and the Golan Heights (from Syria).
      • Casualties - ~850 Israelis killed, 4,500 wounded. 10k-15k Egyptians killed, 4,300 capture. 700 Jordanian soldiers killed, 2,500 wounded. Syrians lost between 1k-2.5k, and about 450 captured.
    • 1967 Palestinian exodus.
      • 280k-325k Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, mostly resettled in Jordan, the other 700k remained.
      • 100k fled in the Golan Heights.
      • Israel granted full citizenship only to those in East Jerusalem (1967) and the Golan Heights (1981). Most Palestinians in territories declined to take citizenship.
    • Jews immigrating en masse out of the Soviet Union, and Jews leaving en masse from Arab countries (continued from 1948), and Jews leaving en masse from other Communist countries.
  • Extra links

Post-War Diplomacy

  • State Department - Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
    • In a June 19 address Johnson set forth five principles of U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the right of every nation in the area to live and to have this right respected by its neighbors, the need for justice for the refugees, the need to respect maritime rights, and the need to deal with the arms race in the Middle East. He reaffirmed the importance of respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area, but he declared that this could be effective only on the basis of peace between the parties, with recognized boundaries and other arrangements to provide security. He declared that the U.S. Government would “do its part for peace” but that the main responsibility rested on the peoples and leaders of the region. (308)
  • Nasser rejected Johnson’s peace plan

1967 August: Arab League Summit (Khartoum Resolution)

1949-1967 > 1967 August: Arab League Summit (Khartoum Resolution)

Famous for the Khartoum Resolution, known as the “Three No’s”
No Peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.
Other oil-rich Arab states will help other Arab states who lost the war and to rebuild their military.
The final note of the meeting asserted Palestinians rights to the whole of Palestine, meaning the total eradication of Israel.

1967: Allon Plan

Allon Plan

1967-1970: War of Attrition

1968-2023 > 1968

  • Ongoing border conflict between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and the PLO and their allies. ^m7s32m
    • No territorial changes during this time.
    • In 1968 the PLO deploys suicide bombers for the first time.
    • Israel engaged in an air battle, Rimon 20, to directly target Soviet fighter pilots to drive the USSR from the conflict.
    • In August of 1970, Israel, Jordan and Egypt agreed to an “in place” ceasefire under the Rogers Plan, though Egyptians and Soviet allies violated the agreement shortly thereafter.
  • Battle of Karameh ^lfbr8n
    • 1968 Battle of Karameh involved IDF forces crossing into Jordan to attack Karameh and the village of Safi, purportedly to eliminate PLO forces and fedayeen camps staging attacks against Israel, and to capture Yasser Arafat, including a school bus full of children running into a mine.
    • Israel dropped leaflets to warn the Jordanian army not to intervene, but Jordan decided to assist the PLO regardless.
    • In the aftermath, though Israel had achieved its tactical aims, they came at international political cost, with the US condemning Israel’s actions.
    • Nearly 20,000 fedayeen in Jordan due to surging recruits after the psychological victory over the IDF.
    • Iraq and Syria offered training programs for several thousand guerillas, the Persian Gulf States and Kuwait raised money through taxes on Palestinian workers, and a fund drive in Lebanon raised $500,000 from Beirut alone. The PLO began to guarantee a lifetime support for the families of guerillas killed in action. Fatah had branches in about 80 countries after the conflict.

Israel_Notes_5.pdf (file not included in this release) The Lebanese Civil War, Explained | Casual Historian

  • Anwar Sadat said if Israel moved a couple miles away from border, he’d reopen Suez Canal

  • Palestinian Exiles (1970-82) | The 50 Years War: Israel and the Arabs (4 of 6) - YouTube

    • Palestinian Guerrillas
      • Small band of P. guerrillas setup a camp in Karame in the Jordan River Valley. From the bank of the Jordan they could see Israel’s patrolling the bank. They waited until they passed by and they started to cross. First to cross was Yasser Arafat.
      • Setup to recruit and train to strike Israel
      • Throw grenades at vehicles
      • Had support from Jordan army
      • Israel bus attack
        • Broke the camels back
        • 2 killed, 28 children injured landmine attack
      • Israel orders destroying Karame P. bases
        • Israel wasn’t careful and didn’t hide troop movements; overconfident
        • 300 P. fighters; half dead by lunch
        • Arafat left before the fighting early in the morning
        • Massive Jordanian involvement
        • P. declared victory
          • Arafat calls it the first victory of the P. state
          • Wasn’t true according to King Hussein
          • Amazing to see Arafat look straight into the camera and say the story as he didn’t chicken out and leave in morning before the battle and then declare that it was victory
          • The propaganda swelled the ranks
      • 52 P. guerrilla organizations
      • P. wanted to remove King Hussein
      • King Hussein assassination attempt
      • George Habash
        • Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
        • Wanted to kill King Hussein the most

List of attacks against Israeli civilians before 1967 - Wikipedia

1967

Israeli naval personnel celebrate their victory after an engagement with Egyptian naval forces near Rumani, 1967

1949-1967 Misc

The war of return - Adi Schwartz, Einat Wilf (Annotated), p.177 (file not included in this release)

The new winds blowing from the Kremlin were keenly felt in the Arab world, which had enjoyed massive Soviet assistance in the form of arms, weapons, and diplomatic support since the mid-1950s. For the Palestinians, this swift and unexpected U-turn in Soviet policy provoked an acute crisis. The PLO had always known that it could count on Soviet support in international forums such as the United Nations and on a constant flow of weapons and ammunition. The end of the Cold War sparked panic in the PLO, requiring it to examine how to continue the Palestinian struggle with neither a clear patron nor international support. “We must admit we do not have all the time in the world,” acknowledged Abu Iyad, Arafat’s deputy, at the end of the 1980s. “We are not capable of war … We need an initiative to prove to our people that we exist on the political map, so that there will be a goal for the continuation of revolution and struggle.”

  • May 11th, 1949 - Israel admitted as a member of the United Nations
  • Over the next few years, lots of Jews (over 700,00) came from all over the Middle East/world to live in Israel.
    • Between 1948 and 1958, the population of Israel rose from 800,000 to 2,000,000.
  • 1953-1956 - Intermittent clashes along all of Israel’s borders
  • Haj Amin al-Husseini (Grand Mufti) working with Hitler and the Nazi’s
  • Zionists are settler colonial project
  • PLO is founded in 1964, model’ed on Algeria’s FLN (they kicked out the French)
    SuezCrisis-_Wikipedia.pdf (file not included in this release)
  • According to Martin Gilbert, between 1951 and 1955, 967 Israelis were killed in what he claims as “Arab terrorist attacks”, a figure Benny Morris characterizes as “pure nonsense”. Morris explains that Gilbert’s fatality figures are “3-5 times higher than the figures given in contemporary Israeli reports” and that they seem to be based on a 1956 speech by David Ben-Gurion in which he uses the word nifga’im to refer to “casualties” in the broad sense of the term (i.e. both dead and wounded). According to the Jewish Agency for Israel between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded in fedayeen attacks. Dozens of these attacks are today cited by the Israeli government as “Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis prior to the 1967 Six-Day War”
    How the Soviet Union Transformed Terrorism - The Atlantic

Golda Mier - I’ m a Palestinian - Youtube Short