⬅️ Hub: LonerBox Notes · Related: Nakba · 1900-1948 · Ethnic Cleansing
Historiographical dispute
Keep each historian’s quotation, translation, document version, and conclusion separate. Evidence that leaders considered or supported transfer does not by itself establish a single master plan for every locality; absence of one master plan does not erase documented expulsions, flight under attack, or policy choices that encouraged non-return.
Raw Research
Benny Morris, Refabricating 1948
- Claim from Karsh that Zionist leadership in 1973-38 had supported a “transfer” solution to the Jewish state’s “Arab problem”
- 1947-early 48: Arabs flee for fear of “bombs and bullets”
- April-July 1948: Zionist leadership, guided by Ben-Gurion, was predisposed to nudge the process along, occasionally with the help of expulsions
Ben Gurion’s predisposition
- Letter to his son in 1937
- “The Arabs will have to go, but one needs an opportune moment for making it happen, such as a war.” (Pappe)
- “We must expel Arabs and take their place” (Karsh, quoting Teveth)
- “And then we will have to use force…without hesitation only when we have no choice. We do not wish and do not need to expel Arabs and take their place…” (Morris)
- Morris claims that in the late 30s and early 40s, Zionist leadership was almost unanimous in support of the idea of transfer
- NEVER went on the record against the idea or policy of transfer
- Aug 7th 1937 at the 20th Zionist Congress
- “In many parts of the country new Jewish settlement will not be possible unless there is a transfer of the Arab fellahs (peasantry)”
- Jun 12th 1938: “I support compulsory transfer. I don’t see in it anything immoral.”
- Jan 30th 1941, Chaim Weizmann to Ivan Maisky (Soviet ambassador to London): “If half a million Arabs could be transferred, two million Jews could be put in their place. That, of course, would be a first instalment.”
Yishuv-Hashemite Agreement
- Shlaim’s Collusion Across the Jordan
- a) Zionist-Hashemite contacts and shared political interests led to an unwritten agreement between Yishuv leaders and king Abdullah: don’t fight, but split Palestine between them
- b) Britain tacitly approves the agreement in early 48 by supporting Jordan’s takeover of the West Bank
- c) Limited and indecisive warfare between the IDF and the Arab Legion (Jordan’s army)
- d) After the war, Abdullah wanted to reach peace with Israel but couldn’t reach a treaty
- Internal weakness of Abdullah
- Israeli unwillingness to make concessions
- Unwritten agreement sealed in Nov 1947 between King Abdullah and Golda Meir (Jewish Agency representative)
- 22 March 1948, Bevin brought the plan before the British cabinet for approval
- Agreement fell apart in April 48, then Israeli-Jordanian battles of May-July
- Haganah’s military successes, disintegration of Palestinian society and Deir Yassin massacre
- Abdallh felt unable to stand aside or to break ranks publicly with the Arab leaders
- Agreement seemed to hold in May
- Arab legion did not attack Jewish state territory
- Occupied UN-allocated Arab areas
- BUT drove into East Jerusalem (International zone)
- Secured the Old City and conquered the Jewish Quarter
- Generally refrained from attacking other Jewish positions (some exceptions)
- Attack seemed to be in response from Arab pressure
- The Haganah/IDF broke it by attacking Latrun, Lydda-Ramla and near Taqumiya
- Ben-Gurion broke it to lift the siege of Jerusalem and expand Jewish territory beyond what the UN had drawn up
- From July, 1948, conflict was between Israel and Egypt
- Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Jordan all looking on from the sidelines
- Jordan and Israel both didn’t want a Husayni led Palestine for a neighbour
- Arab legion did not attack Jewish state territory
- Impact of arms embargoes on the Arab states
- UN-sanctioned embargoes resulted, by summer 1948, in critical shortage of ammunition and spare parts in the Arab legion, Egypt, Iraq and Syria (substantially aided the Israeli war effort)
- Israel developed sources of supply among private arms merchants and in Czechoslovakia
- Last major shipment of ammunition and shells to the Arab legion was in Feb 1948
- British embargo on all Arab states apart from Jordan (until Jordan attacked the Haganah)
Avi Shlaim, The War of the Israeli Historians
Old historiography claims:
- Arab intransigence was the obstacle to peace from September ‘48 onwards
New historiography claims:
- Arabs were willing to make peace offers with Israel
- King Farouk wanted cession of Gaza and a strip of desert in exchange for de facto recognition of Israel
- King Abdullah wanted an overall settlement in return for a land corridor linking Jordan with the Mediterranean
- Colonel Husni Zaim (Syria) offered full peace and recognition and resettlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria in return for moving the border to the middle of the Sea of Galilee
- Ben-Gurion didn’t want to yield substantial tracts of territory or to resettle large amounts of refugees - but he had the choice
Iron Wall theory (based on Jabotinsky, 1923)
- Two stages of Israeli recognition
-
- “Fuck around and find out”, push Arab nations into abandoning the idea of destroying Israel
-
- Follow Arab moderation with negotiations, including the national rights of Palestinians
-
- Israeli right wingers see stage I as permanent
- Oslo accord, 1993 seen as stage II
- Education minister Yossi Sarid publicly apologised for the Kafr Qasim massacre, 1956
- Shlomo Ben-Ami, Nov 28th in Ha’aretz opposed the prime minister’s office who had prepared a long list of Palestinian violations of the Oslo accords
- Bibi seen as a return to stage I
- Shlaim saw 96-99 as the dark and terrible years of the iron wall
- Tutu: “it is difficult to know what to forgive unless we know what happened”
- Sharon before 2001: “I would like them to study the history of the people of Israel and the land of Israel… the children must be taught Jewish-Zionist values, and the new historians must not be taught”
- Limor Livnat, education minister wrote an article entitled: “Back to the Iron Wall”
Morris Ha’aretz article
Shlaim, The Debate about 1948
Arms from Czechoslovakia
Deir Yassin Massacre (April 9th, 1948)
- Benny Morris, The Historiography of Deir Yassin
- Initial charge of around 250 dead came from Zionist and British as well as Arab officials
- Paper in March 1969 by the Israel Foreign Ministry: “Background Notes on Current Themes: Deir Yassin”
- “Big Lie”, “part of a package of fairy tales, for export and home consumption,” with the purpose of raising generations of Arab children as terrorists
- Paper asserts that Deir Yassin was a battle for a “strongly fortified” village, part of the battle for Jerusalem
- “Jewish units attacked the village only after a truck with a megaphone warned non-combatants “to withdraw from the danger zone” (thus sacrificing the element of surprise)
- Jews lobbed grenades through windows of “hotly defended” houses
- “When the fighting subsided, the Jewish troops were “horror-stricken to find” bodies of women and children among those of the combatants
- The paper failed to mention the Haganah’s role, failed to mention Lehi’s participation and got the date wrong “10 April”
- Menachem Begin (then leader of the Irgun) spread the story to the US in 1971
- Article mentioning a talk he had with students in New Jersey: “I told them the facts… About the fortified hotbed of rioters/lawbreakers… about the fighters who gave up the element of surprise and over a megaphone called on inhabitants, before the battle, to leave their homes… about the lack of choice in throwing grenades into houses… about the civilian losses caused in this fighting; about the deep regret we expressed immediately after we learned of these casualties”
- What Actually Happened
- Deir Yassin villagers had participated in the Arab revolt 1936-39 and had occasionally attacked Giv’at Shaul
- Peace pact made in mid 1947
- One report at the end of March stating that 150 Syrian and Iraqi irregulars had gone into the village - turned out to be false.
- Irgun and Lehi wanted a target in April to prove their strength (it was their first operation of its kind)
- Attack on Deir Yassin was reluctantly green lit by the Haganah
- Loudspeaker van halted 30 yards from the outskirts at an impassable ditch, warning the villagers to leave
- We don’t know if the broadcasts were heard by anyone; people did start fleeing at the sounds of gunfire
- Irgun troops met strong resistance as they were young and badly trained (apart from in terrorism)
- Haganah squads provided cover fire and shot at people fleeing the village
- 4 Jewish troops killed and a dozen seriously wounded
- Houses and corpses were looted and survivors robbed
- Survivors loaded onto trucks and paraded through the streets of West Jerusalem where they were spat on and stoned
- Women and children offloaded and sent to walk into East Jerusalem
- Men were taken back to Deir Yassin and killed
- The Historiography
- Begin’s memoir, April 9th
- Alleged that Arab irregulars had passed through Deir Yassin and attacked traffic along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road
- Attacking force had suffered “nearly forty percent casualties”
- Civilians had been given “humane warning”
- Official history published by IDF History Branch in 1959
- “Some 200” villagers had died “in the course of the conquest of the village”
- 107 number comes from two Arabic writers in 1987; previous Israeli works were happy to accept the initial 245-254 number
- Begin’s memoir, April 9th
- Matthew Hogan, The 1948 Massacre at Deir Yassin Revisited
- Haganah had been making gains on the Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv corridor and the Irgun/Lehi wanted to get involved
- Goal was to improve Jewish morale after Arab attacks on Haganah convoys and to obtain supplies for their bases
- Inside the Jerusalem international zone
- One Lehi member, David Siton, argued that targeting a non-hostile village risked endangering Western Jerusalem
- District commander Mordechai Raanan conceded that the town was docile
- Yona Ben-Sasson, Haganah commander recalled that “there was not even one (hostile) incident between Deir Yassin and the Jews”
- Haganah Jerusalem commander, David Shaltiel wanted the paramilitarie groups to help them attack other targeted villages
- Most Irgun fighters were teenagers
- 254 figure from a press statement by Irgun commander Raanan
Tiberias (April 16-18th, 1948)
- Birth, p.181-186
- First Arab urban community to fall; mixed community of 6,000 Jews and 4,000 Arabs; western shore on the Sea of Galilee; included in the Jewish State by the UN partition plan
- December 1947
- Leading notable, Sheikh Naif Tabari initiated talks with Jewish leaders regarding a ‘peace pact’
- Arab families anticipated trouble and already started leaving
- Jewish families fled the predominantly Arab ‘Old City’, leaving only a quarter of the Jews in the area still present (Arabs fleeing Jewish neighbourhoods occupied the empty flats)
- The Tabaris (leading notable) consistently stopped more militant youngsters from engaging in hostilities
- Jewish community leader did the same and met similar dissent from Jewish youths
- Despite some scuffles, Arabs continued to move freely in Jewish markets, rode on Jewish buses and conducted business with Jews
- Truce collapsed mid-March
- Jewish police effort to disarm Arabs resulted in a shootout on the 12th
- Town hall meeting; Arabs blamed Jews for provoking the fight
- ALA tried to take over defences in Tiberias, but the local Arab leader refused
- Irregulars took positions in the Arab quarters anyway
- Final battle on 8-9 of April, beginning with a shootout in the downtown area
- April 10th, Haganah bombed the Arab population (residential areas) with mortars
- Golani Brigade attacked two tenant farmer villages overlooking Tiberias; met with unexpected resistance and killed 22 (some women and children) before occupying the village
- Arrival of refugees into Tiberias weakened Arab morale
- Haganah plan to pacify Arab Tiberias, which was blocking the road to settlements in the Galilee
- April 16/17, the Old City was attacked with mortars and dynamite, blowing up 8 houses
- Arab notables sued for a truce, but Haganah commanders refused to negotiate, opting for a surrender
- British were asked to intervene, but only offered protection until 22 April before leaving; Arabs decided to evacuate
- Evacuation caused by panic
- Economic conditions weakened by Haganah control of access to roads
- Fall of Nasir ad Din village
- Haganah offensive
- Aftermath
- Truce on April 18th
- Dozens of buses and trucks brought in to evacuate the Arabs to Nazareth or towards Jordan with British escorts
- Within hours, a Jewish mob descended upon evacuated areas and began looting the shops, until they were stopped by the Jewish police
- HIS reported that Haganah soldiers had participated in the robbery
- Carried on for several days (one Sephardi was shot and killed) and the authorities lost control on 22nd April
The Battle of Haifa (April 21-22nd, 1948)
- Birth, p. 186-208
- December 47 - early April 48: 20,000-30,000 people had already left (mostly middle and upper classes)
- Months of fighting in and around the area resulted in a food shortage
- Departure of the British Mandate government had caused a surge in unemployment
- Arab irregulars killed four Jews in an attempt to strengthen their position on April 16th
- Haganah wanted to leave Haifa till last to avoid British entanglement - British redeployed early and Arab irregulars started firing on Jewish traffic in the city
- Plan Dalet
- Policy for taking over the mixed cities involved: “gaining control of all government property and services, the expulsion of the Arabs from the mixed districts and even from certain (all-Arab) neighbourhoods that endanger our lines of communication in these cities or that serve as staging grounds for attack. Also… the sealing off of the Arab population - in a part of the city that will be surrounded by our forces.”
- Operation Passover Cleansing
- British redeployment effected by 6 a.m.
- Firefights between Jews and Arabs trying to control buildings evacuated by the British
- Impromptu meeting at the Carmeli headquarters; based on an older plan called Operation Scissors which aimed to “damage and shock rather than to conquer”
- Operation aimed at ‘breaking the enemy’ by simultaneous assault from several directions
- The Battle
- Started with a fight for the link between the Jewish part of Haifa and settlements to the east and north
- Arab militiamen and residents fled the eastern approach to Haifa where their arrival spread panic amongst the local population
- Through the night, the Haganah started assaulting the main Arab positions by firing mortars into downtown Haifa. When they arrived at Hamra square the next day, the area was deserted with “only several sick old Arab men and women moving about, confused”
- That morning around 6,000 Arabs rushed onto boats and set sail for the town of Acre
- People trampled over each other as they rushed to the port gates, many of the boats were quickly overcrowded and end up capsizing
- British intelligence officer describing scenes at the harbour entrance
- “During the morning (the Jews), were continually shooting down on all Arabs who moved both in Wadi Nisnas and the Old City. This included completely indiscriminate and revolting machinegun fire, mortar fire and sniping on women and children sheltering in churches and attempting to get out… through the gates into the docks… the 40 RM. CDO. (Royal Marine Commandos) who control the docks… sent the Arabs through in batches but there was considerable congestion outside the East Gate of hysterical and terrified Arab women and children and old people on whom the Jews opened up mercilessly with fire.”
- Late afternoon, 22nd April, the Carmeli Brigade reported hospitals full, with many dead and wounded left to lie in the streets
- Haganah loudspeakers announced: “The day of judgement has arrived”, “move away from every house and street from every neighbourhood, occupied by foreign criminals,” “evacuate the women, the children and the old immediately, and send them to a safe haven.”
- Morris: “Demoralisation was a primary aim. It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units.”
- Haganah terms of surrender
- Disarming of the Arab community
- Deporation of all foreign Arab males of military age
- Removal of Arab roadblocks
- Arrest of European Nazis found in Arab ranks
- 24-hour curfew in the Arab neighbourhoods to assure complete disarming
- Arab response was to evacuate Haifa… man woman and child
- British and Jewish officials shocked
- Levy wanted the Arabs to reconsider, arguing that they shouldn’t leave a city “where they had lived for hundreds of years, where their forefathers were buried and where, for so long, they had lived in peace and brotherhood with the Jews.”
- What was left of the Arab leadership had given orders to leave the city, as the invasion by the Arab armies was close
- One Jewish official argued that Arab leaders from outside of Palestine had pressured Arab commanders to leave, as a way to instigate flight
- Morris: “The weight of the evidence suggests that this is incorrect”
- Local leaders tried to get orders from Damascus, al-Husseini or the Arab Higher Committee but they had no response
- Evacuation orders didn’t come from outside, but they were supported by the AHC after the fact
- Claim that Arab leaders convinced their people to leave by assuring them the city would be reconquered by the outside armies is not supported by evidence
- More likely that they were intimidated to leave through threats, warnings and rumours (one was that they would be taken hostage and used as bargaining chips against future Arab attacks)
- Call for evacuation was only one variable
- Tens of thousands of middle and upper class residents had already left before the battle started
- By the end of the battle, thousands and already fled from the conflict zones and then to the harbour
- Haganah mortar attacks were designed to break Arab morale and force a quick surrender
- It might not have been their explicit plan to cause a mass evacuation, but it’s very unlikely that it didn’t cross their minds
- The battle of Tiberias had happened only 4 days earlier
- We know now that the offensive, which included indiscriminate mortar fire on crowded areas, clearly forced people to flee
- Before any Arab leader said anything about evacuating, 15,000 people had already fled
- A few hundred refugees returned permanently, but generally the ones who returned only stayed for a day or two after collecting something they had left behind
- Jews did make several attempts to persuade the Arabs to stay
- The week after the battle, several officials spent the week after the battle going through the Arab neighbourhoods urging them to stay
- Baghdad Radio reported it on May 25th
- British military intelligence noted that despite their efforts, Arabs, on the whole “remain indifferent”
- Some argued the Jews only wanted them to stay for fear of a labour shortage and to show the world an example of ‘democratic treatment’
- The Haganah was not averse to seeing the Arabs evacuate
- Second communiqué to the Haifa Haganah took some protective measures: ordered them not enter mosques, forbade them from looting abandoned property, but made no mention of persuading locals to stay
- Carmel’s commanders were aware that Haifa would be easier to govern without a large Arab population
- The Irgun didn’t help
- Entered downtown Haifa on April 23 (one day after the battle)
- Their policy “was to promote a further rush of armed forces into the Suq and other places where Arabs were still living… to force the issue by creating more refugees and a new wave of terror”
- Change in Jewish attitude within days
- Civilian leadership did seem to sincerely want Arabs to stay
- After the Haganah took control, the civilian leaders were sidelined
- The Haganah knew that an Arab evacuation would make their jobs considerably easier
- Within a week, even some of the local leaders u-turned very quickly at the prospect of Haifa becoming a permanently Jewish city (‘everything changed within a week’)
- Jewish leaders on 25th April didn’t renew the appeal to stay
- Life for the Arabs who stayed
- Collapse of infrastructure and services, shortage of food and water
- Expecting an intervention from neighbouring Arab forces, the Haganah carried out a rushed security operation which involved curfews, searches, interrogations and imprisonment, resulting in lot of arbitrary and inhumane treatment
- The Irgun went on a rampage of looting, vandalism and attacks on Arab civilians. Despite their orders, some Haganah troops carried out their share of abuses too
- For the Arabs, the way they were treated on the ground spoke louder than any pleas from the local Jewish leaders
- They had lived side-by-side with Jews for decades but it only took a few days of living under Jewish military rule before they completely lost interest in staying
- As conditions in the Arab quarter started to improve, further appeals were made for coexistence to resume. Most of the Arabs didn’t respond and people were still queuing up at the harbour where some families had been sleeping for days, waiting for a chance to leave.
- No expulsion plan, but
- Carmeli headquarters, Yosef Weitz’s diary for 22-24 April: “I think that this (flight prone) state of mind (among the Arabs) should be exploited, and (we should) press the other inhabitants not to surrender (but to leave). We must establish our state”
- 24th April, upon hearing of two Arab villages being evacuated: “I was happy to hear from him that this line was being adopted by the (Haganah) command, (that is) to frighten the Arabs so long as flight-inducing fear was upon them.”
- Levy’s turnaround on demolitions
- Eventually put at ease by the Interior Minister and was assured no compensation would need to be given---
- December 47 - early April 48: 20,000-30,000 people had already left (mostly middle and upper classes)