The Psychology of Morality - Peterson Academy

⬅️ Peterson Academy - Course Notes Index · Domain: 60.21 Psychology · Companion course: Intro to Metaphysics & Epistemology - Peterson Academy · Notebook index: Personal Journal

Provenance

Written up 2026-08-02 from your handwritten notes: March 21 – June 9 2026 notebook, pp. 86–96 (PDF pp. 93–103) — 11 pages. Lecturer: Dr. Rob Henderson. Each section links to the page it came from; structure and wording follow your notes.

The caveat you opened with

“The science is not settled in psychology” — the replication crisis of the 2010s. Your first line on the first page. Worth keeping attached to every finding below, several of which are single studies.

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 6 — add triggers and first-draft status to the course map

Haidt’s more precise model distinguishes an original trigger—the recurrent problem a proposed system was selected or prepared to process—from a current trigger, anything that activates it now. Culture can expand, contract, or redirect current triggers in a generation: a hover fly can exploit wasp avoidance, and a political symbol can acquire the moral force of coalition, authority, or sanctity. “Innate” here means prepared learning, not a fixed behavior or a single brain spot.

The five-foundation table in Chapter 6 is a first draft: Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Liberty is deferred, names and counts changed during development, and the table is a theoretical synthesis rather than a validation study. Use it to ask what a person perceives, then separately test facts, rights, reciprocity, proportionality, and consequences. Modules and triggers, PDF pp. 149–151 (file not included in this release) · Figure 6.2 and first-draft history, PDF pp. 152–153 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 6 source audit

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 9 — shared intentionality and the hard cooperation problem

Haidt sharpens the course’s evolutionary section by separating mutualism from the harder case. Cooperation is strategically unsurprising when every participant expects a private gain. The puzzle is cooperation when someone could do better by slacking, cheating, or leaving while still sharing the group’s benefit. Shared intentionality helps solve part of it: people represent a joint goal, assign complementary roles, notice obstruction or hogged spoils, and form expectations about how “we” act.

In the Tomasello study Haidt summarizes, chimpanzees and two-year-olds performed similarly on physical tasks (about 68 percent correct), but children outperformed chimps on social-communicative tasks (74 versus 35 percent). The result supports a source-era comparative hypothesis, not an all-or-none division: chimpanzees collaborate, form coalitions, and show building blocks of norms and culture. Haidt’s further claim that group-level selection helped shape human morality remains contested and should not replace current primatology, genetics, or archaeology. full concept note and audit · tasks and shared intentionality, PDF pp. 236–238 (file not included in this release) · comparative qualifications, Chapter 9 endnotes, PDF pp. 408–409 (file not included in this release)

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① Morality by Nature

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The organising analogy

Morality is like language. Every society has a moral code shaped by culture but built on shared human instincts. Seeking the correct morality is like searching for the original, true language.

• Moral life is inescapable at the level of lived human psychology, even if people dispute it philosophically.
• Moral order isn’t merely idealism — it’s part of the species’ survival strategy.
• “Normal” often means morally acceptable or desirable, not statistically average.

Morality and the “true self”

Moral evaluation changes judgements of intention, and morality shapes how people think about identity itself. Your two examples:

1. A conservative Christian man with same-sex desire
2. A social justice advocate with anti-gay disgust reactions

→ People identify the “real” self as whichever side aligns with their own moral commitments. Morality isn’t peripheral; it’s central to how humans understand identity and relationship.

Evolutionary foundations

Cooperation, not just survival of the fittest. Being perceived as moral builds trust, attracts allies, attracts mates — and kindness is one of the strongest predictors of attraction. The currency isn’t survival, it’s reproduction.

Moral emotions make norms socially enforceable long before formal law appears — guilt, shame, disgust, pride, joy, betrayal all encourage cooperation, punish defection, and bind people to group expectations.

Evolution developed both kindness and cruelty, cooperation and conflict. Moral psychology includes cognitive systems for reputation tracking, punishment, and selective trust.

Churchland

“Attachment begets caring, caring begets conscience.” — conscience grows out of attachment systems, especially mother–child bonding, then expands to social relations.

Pinker’s Chapter 4 supplement — perspective-taking, compassion, and reciprocal reason are distinct

Pinker separates two meanings often collapsed into “empathy.” Perspective-taking is cognitively representing another person’s first-person viewpoint; compassion is valuing that person’s welfare. Reading can supply the first without guaranteeing the second, but repeatedly entering unfamiliar minds may make another person’s pleasures and pains harder to ignore. His historical hypothesis is that expanding print, fiction, travel writing, and correspondence helped widen the circle beyond kin and neighbors.

Chapter 4 then adds a non-emotional route. If I ask you to respect my interests while claiming a unilateral right to disregard yours, my appeal defeats itself; reciprocal reasoning pressures participants toward rules they can accept from interchangeable positions. Pinker joins this universality to positive-sum cooperation, where mutual restraint can leave both parties better off. This is a philosophical-historical synthesis published in 2011, not a settled experimental finding that fiction reliably produces compassion or that reason alone motivates moral action. Chapter 4 synthesis · The expanding circle and literacy hypothesis, PDF pp. 255–256 (file not included in this release) · Perspective-taking versus compassion, PDF pp. 256–259 (file not included in this release) · Fallibility, common human nature, and reason, PDF pp. 263–265 (file not included in this release) · Reciprocity and positive-sum morality, PDF pp. 265–266 (file not included in this release)

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② Moral Foundations — intuition first

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Content of morality vs. the psychology of moral judgement — the course is about the second.

• Consequentialism — morality depends on outcomes
• Deontology — some actions are wrong regardless of consequences

People shift between frameworks based on context, not consistent philosophical reasoning. The factors that move them: physical closeness, emotional vividness, felt violation.

Trolley problem: ~80% would flip the switch. ~30% would push the man. Same arithmetic, different answer.

The central claim

Intuition comes first; reasoning often serves as post-hoc justification.
Haidt’s analogy: you don’t decide whether something is disgusting — you just know. Moral judgements are like that. Hume: “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.”

Moral dumbfounding

Haidt’s vignettes — the sibling incest case, the flag used as a cleaning rag, the frozen chicken, eating the family dog. People hold the judgement firmly and cannot produce a defence.

→ Moral judgements routinely exceed people’s ability to articulate a rational defence.

Supporting mechanisms

• Behavioural immune system — people highly sensitive to disgust condemn moral violations more strongly. Emotions that once protected the body were co-opted into protecting social order.
• Error management theory — it’s safer for the mind to make too many false alarms than too few. Many emotions aren’t “irrational glitches” but biased safety systems.
• Proximate vs. ultimate explanations — proximate is the immediate felt reason; ultimate is the evolutionary reason the desire exists. Geoffrey Miller: “A costly behaviour cannot evolve just because it happens to feel good. Feeling good must have evolved to motivate the behaviour, which must have some hidden benefit.”

The sexual-strategy reading of politics

Your own note: the politics of drugs and abortion are partly about regulating sexual behaviour. Pro-abortion and pro-drug positions correlate with more promiscuous, short-term strategies; if everyone is short-term focused, it becomes harder to find a long-term partner for a family — which pushes the other side toward pro-life and anti-drug policy. A battle over sexual strategies, not only over ethics.

Carry this one into 40 Stories

“People are persuaded more by emotions than abstract information. Stories > Facts.”
That’s the empirical backing for why the stories in your position cards outperform the statistics.

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 2 — intuition first is a social, revisable model

Haidt’s full claim is more precise than “emotion beats reason.” Intuition commonly generates the first judgment; judgment recruits explicit reasons; and other people’s reasons, approval, disapproval, and perspective can change what the person intuitively sees. Direct reasoned judgment and private reflection remain in the model, although Haidt conceded that he had no frequency evidence for those pathways.

The source base also needs the replication warning at the top of this note: Haidt’s early cognitive-load null findings and his thirty-student dumbfounding study were unpublished. The model is best used to explain likely sequences and design better dialogue, not as a universal percentage claim about all moral thought. Early tests and interviews, PDF pp. 54–59 (file not included in this release) · Figure 2.4, PDF pp. 66–69 (file not included in this release) · Endnote 44, PDF p. 369 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 2 source audit · Permanent model note

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 3 — the evidence is plural, and so are its limits

Haidt’s Chapter 3 case for intuition-first judgment does not rest on moral dumbfounding alone. It joins six proposed lines of evidence: affective primacy and mere exposure; social and political cueing; bodily-state effects; psychopathy; infant helper-hinderer evaluation; and moral-neuroscience timing. The convergence is conceptually useful, but the studies do not all have the same evidentiary status. The hypnosis sample was selected for high hypnotizability; the infant looking-time result appeared only among ten-month-olds while reaching favored the helper at both ages; and the original trolley reaction-time inference was later challenged.

The chapter also prevents the course shorthand from becoming “emotion always wins.” Haidt reports that a strong argument had no advantage over a weak one under immediate response, but did change judgments after a forced two-minute delay; weak reasoning did not improve. Treat this as a source-era example of conditional revision, not a current effect-size estimate. The odor, taste, washing, and sanitizer claims should remain in the replication queue named at the top of this note. Hypnosis and six-part argument, PDF pp. 72-88 (file not included in this release) · Reasoned revision, PDF pp. 90-91 (file not included in this release) · Selected hypnosis sample, PDF p. 370 (file not included in this release) · Infant qualification, PDF p. 373 (file not included in this release) · Trolley and reflection endnotes, PDF p. 374 (file not included in this release) · Permanent concept note

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 5 — cultural precursor to the foundations table

Shweder’s three ethics explain why the later foundations are not merely a longer list of taboos. Autonomy organizes morality around individuals, harm, rights, and justice; community around membership, duty, hierarchy, loyalty, and reputation; divinity around embodied elevation, purity, self-command, and degradation. Haidt presents these as moral languages rooted in different conceptions of the person.

The WEIRD warning applies directly to this course. Penn students were uniquely willing among Haidt’s twelve groups to override disgust with the harm principle, and 73 percent accepted the chicken case. That does not prove the later foundations taxonomy, make non-WEIRD samples homogeneous, or vindicate community and purity rules. It shows why a theory built only from educated Western judgments risks defining one cultural morality as human morality. Penn and WEIRD sampling, PDF pp. 118–121 (file not included in this release) · The three ethics, PDF pp. 122–124 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 5 source audit · Permanent three-ethics note

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③ Moral Theories — Moral Foundations Theory

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• Individualising foundations: care, fairness · Binding foundations: loyalty, authority, sanctity
• People care about fairness more than equality.
• Authority through prestige beats authority through dominance — dominance is unstable.
• Conservatives understand liberals better than liberals understand conservatives — because conservatives use all five foundations.

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 7 — what the five rows mean before making the partisan comparison

Haidt does not define the foundations as five political opinions. Each is a proposed developmental chain linking a recurrent problem to prepared attention and then to culturally learned current triggers. Care begins with vulnerable children and expands through cuteness and victimhood. Fairness begins with reciprocal cooperation and can be framed as equality or proportionality. Loyalty tracks team players and traitors. Authority tracks legitimate rank and reciprocal role duties, not simply dominance. Sanctity expands from contamination avoidance into bodily dignity, sacred objects, principles, and taboo.

The political shorthand above needs two limits. First, Chapter 7’s claim that the left relies mainly on Care and Fairness while the right uses all five is a hypothesis supported here by selected signs, photographs, anecdotes, and earlier studies; the cross-partisan survey evidence comes in Chapter 8. Second, a broader rhetorical palette is not moral superiority. Binding foundations can sustain cooperation or authorize exclusion, while individualizing foundations can protect victims or become paternalistic and selective. “Conservatives understand liberals better” is a further empirical claim that must be tested separately rather than inferred from foundation count. Five foundation dossiers, PDF pp. 158–183 (file not included in this release) · Political hypothesis, PDF pp. 183–184 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 7 source audit

The Righteous Mind, Chapter 8 — what the survey evidence adds and changes

Haidt’s first MFQ pattern came from about 1,600 voluntary Project Implicit respondents; a revised questionnaire later showed the same broad crossing pattern among about 132,000 self-selected YourMorals visitors. Care and Fairness averaged higher toward the liberal end, while Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity rose toward the conservative end. The two figures use different versions of the instrument, neither sample is a representative probability sample, and overlapping group averages cannot classify an individual or establish that foundations cause ideology.

More important, criticism changes the taxonomy. The original Fairness items overrepresented equality, so Haidt recenters Fairness on proportionality, contribution, and free riding and moves much anti-inequality concern toward Care plus a provisional sixth foundation: Liberty/oppression, understood as sensitivity to domination and reactance against arbitrary control. His “three versus six” conclusion is therefore a source-era translation hypothesis, not a moral score. Use it to locate a neglected concern; then test facts, rights, reciprocity, baseline, proportionality, consequences, legitimacy, voice, exit, and coercion. First MFQ, PDF pp. 188–190 (file not included in this release) · YourMorals pattern, PDF pp. 192–193 (file not included in this release) · Fairness and Liberty revision, PDF pp. 201–209 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 8 source and figure audit

Cross-partisan perception

• Lecture shorthand (see correction below): Conservatives underestimate how much liberals dislike them; liberals overestimate how much conservatives dislike them (Petsko & Kteily 2024).
• Read the original-study audit before using this claim: the paper compares dehumanization ratings of face composites, not a direct measure of how much each side dislikes the other; its 2017 supplementary study did not reproduce the same conservative underestimation of total dehumanization.
• Educated elites are more similar to peers abroad than to fellow citizens at home.

Moral credit — Aristotle vs. Kant

• Aristotle: credit belongs when the right thing came effortlessly
• Kant: credit belongs when temptation was overcome

Critiques and the rival theory

Critiques of MFT: top-down construction · weird, artificial scenarios · loose category boundaries · missing intuitions. “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” — George Box

Moral Dyad Theory (Kurt Gray) — a direct challenge: morality is fundamentally about harm. There is no such thing as a “harmless wrong” — people will infer some victim. Judgements stay harm-based even when the harm is abstract or hypothetical; purity violations cause people to infer a victim. The mind looks for, and fills in, a perpetrator and a victim.

(Your own Moral Foundations Test result, p. 91: Care 94% · Liberty 75% · Fairness 69% · Purity 67% · Authority 58% · Loyalty 47%. Strongest foundation Care; profile closest to Conservative.)

Pinker’s Chapter 9 supplement — morality can restrain violence or sanctify it

Pinker treats Haidt’s care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity foundations as a map of moral psychology, not a verdict about moral truth. He combines them with Alan Fiske’s relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing or rational-legal reasoning. The same person can be caring within a community, deferential inside a hierarchy, retaliatory under equality matching, and calculating in a legal or market setting. “Moral dumbfounding” shows that an intuition can be psychologically forceful even when its owner cannot articulate a defense; it does not show that the intuition is correct or arbitrary.

Sacred values reveal the violent edge. A value placed outside ordinary cost-benefit exchange can protect life or prohibit weapons, but it can also make compromise feel like betrayal or contamination. In the Israel–Palestine experiments Pinker reviews, cash and prosperity sweeteners softened nonabsolutists but increased anger, disgust, and willingness to endorse violence among participants who treated the disputed value as nonnegotiable; symbolic recognition by the opposing side reduced those reactions. The result concerns a specific historical sample and hypothetical deal, not present opinion or a complete peace policy. Chapter 9 synthesis · Moralization and dumbfounding, PDF pp. 854–859 (file not included in this release) · Relational models and foundations, PDF pp. 859–867 (file not included in this release) · Sacred values and taboo tradeoffs, PDF pp. 875–878 (file not included in this release)

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④ Judging Harm — moral typecasting

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Two-process theory of moral judgement: mental state / intention, and causal responsibility / outcome.

Moral character colours judgement — people don’t evaluate actions in isolation.

Moral typecasting — the most transferable idea in the course

• Moral agents: powerful doers, capable of planning and causing harm
• Moral patients: vulnerable feelers, in need of protection

This isn’t about individual actions — it’s how entire groups get socially coded. And the axis is a trade-off: the more competent someone seems, the less warm they are perceived to be. Warmer → less competent.

The pain-pill study: admired, highly competent or morally elevated figures are paradoxically seen as less vulnerable.

How the two coalitions typecast differently

• Liberals: oppressor / oppressed — cunning doers vs. vulnerable feelers
• Conservatives: everyone as both capable of agency and of suffering

Racial trolley study (lecture shorthand; percentages unverified against the primary paper): liberal participants chose to sacrifice the white man 77% vs 33%; conservative participants were ~51% either way — focused on the numbers, not race. Reading: liberals have morally typecast white vs. non-white individuals as thinking doers vs. vulnerable feelers.

Source check on this lecture shorthand

The original Chip/Tyrone paper measured ratings of hypothetical sacrifices, not a real choice to kill; the 77% / 33% / ~51% figures above are not reported as outcome percentages in that paper. Its first trolley experiment also changed the group being saved along with the victim’s name. The paper found a conservative-side asymmetry in a different Iraq-war scenario, so the overall lesson is motivated moral reasoning across contexts, not unique bias on one side.

Speech simplification study: white liberal politicians simplify their language when addressing Black audiences; white conservatives don’t change. Takeaway — white liberals unconsciously see minorities as more vulnerable, less competent, in need of accommodation. Well-intentioned, but perceived as patronising.

Warmth/competence stereotypes: Asians coded machine-like, competent, rational, less emotional; Black people coded as having deep emotional depth, less competent.

Gender typecasting: wrongs committed against women are perceived as more egregious than the same wrongs by women against men, and men are perceived as experiencing less harm in the same scenario.

Strengths of the dyad model: elegant simplicity (perpetrator / victim / harm), fits intuition, cross-cultural plausibility, political explanatory power.
Critiques: may stretch “harm” too far · may be too WEIRD · harm is not always immoral — violence is often used to regulate relationships.

Subjective experience of harm depends heavily on interpretation, agency, and perceived legitimacy.

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⑤ Light vs. Dark

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Dark Triad — psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism. More utilitarian in their moral judgements.

Robert Greene: “Those who love this Machiavellian part of our nature and revel in it can get pretty far, but they are eventually tripped up. They don’t understand there is a whole other side to the game, which requires empathy and cooperation.”

Counter-empathy:

• Schadenfreude — pleasure at others’ misfortune
• Glückschmerz — pain at others’ success
• Affective sadism — active enjoyment in worsening others’ lives

Moral grandstanding — self-promotion, status seeking, social superiority. Useful if used tactfully.

Prevalence: 5–8% of the population score high on Dark Triad traits. Psychopaths are 1–3% of the population but commit 30–40% of all violent crime. Prison inmates 20% · business executives 13% · college students 8%.

Victim signalling — victimhood as camouflage.

Light Triad

Humanism (valuing others’ success and creation) · Kantianism (integrity and honesty rather than deceitful charm) · faith in humanity (people as basically good and trustworthy).

→ They object more strongly to wrongdoing, are more charitable, orient outward — and report higher self-esteem and life satisfaction.

State orientation (self-absorption, inward preoccupation) predicts worse well-being. Task orientation (goals, action, the world outside oneself) predicts higher well-being.

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⑥ The Moral Life

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• Committing moral acts → higher happiness.
• People often desire self-improvement more than their friends and family expect of them.
• Moral character may be a stronger predictor of happiness than worldly success.
• Moral character — mainly — and competence drive the impressions we form of others.
• The link between moral judgement and the happiness concept appears as early as age four.

The line to keep

“Happiness is more than just good feelings; it arises from goodness in the soul.” — Fan Yang, Joshua Knobe & Yarrow Dunham

And Paul Bloomfield’s syllogism: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore morality is necessary for happiness.

Loose ends worth their own notes

• Luxury beliefs — the higher the socioeconomic status, the more relaxed the attitude toward conventional morality and transgression; moral energy gets redirected to more fashionable causes of the day (recycling vs. crime). Connected to reversing moral priorities: from in-group to out-group.
• Mind–body — as physical strength increases, neuroticism tends to drop and willingness to take social and moral risks rises.
• As societies become richer and more equal, sex differences often get larger, not smaller.
• Wisdom requires experience, not just theory (Ardelt; Sternberg & Glück) — most wisdom insights reduce to proverbs everyone already knows. What changes a life is experiencing their truth.
• The 1% rule of posting: 1% create, 9% engage, 90% lurk.

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🔗 How this feeds your arguments

Direct connections to the position cards

• Moral typecasting (④) is the sharpest tool here. The agent/patient coding — and the finding that competence and warmth trade off — is a mechanism-level account of the oppressor/oppressed frame you argue against in Christian Nationalism and elsewhere. It explains why the frame is intuitive rather than merely asserting it’s wrong.
• Gender typecasting — men perceived as experiencing less harm in identical scenarios — is empirical support for the Boy Crisis card’s core claim, and it’s currently missing from that card’s evidence locker.
• Intuition-first / moral dumbfounding (②) is why your reply matrices work: pressure questions expose that the judgement came first and the reasoning was assembled afterwards.
• “Stories > Facts” is the empirical warrant for the whole 40 Stories project — and for leading with Augustus or Casey Martin rather than a statistic.
• MFT (③) gives Conservatism a descriptive backbone: the binding foundations are exactly what the Hayek objection says conservatism can’t justify.
• Aristotle vs. Kant on moral credit connects straight to Intro to Metaphysics & Epistemology - Peterson Academy and the virtue/duty split in Morality.